Re: Victor Korotkikh
I read in this exchange: I have a problem with infinite time (or something of such meaning). Since IMO time is an auxiliary coordinate to 'order the view from the inside of this (our) universe and in view of the partial knowledge we so far obtained about it, it is (our?) choice HOW we construct our concept of that 'time'. Reminds me of my son, who - at 5 - did not dare to fall asleep because of 'sorcerers' he learned about in the Kindergarten and was afraid that in dreamland they come up. So I said: you little stupid kid, why don't you choose a dreamland in which there are NO sorcerers? He looked at me OK and sweetly went to sleep. We can change our ID of time into a format in which there is no problem with its infinity. (Maybe not so easy, but who said 'everything' is easy?) In my 'narrative' about the world I have problems how to handle the timeless (a-temporal) world and its concepts. I cannot 'change' the no-time into another one. G John M (PS: also waiting for a 'readable' new version of UDA). JM On Sat, May 16, 2009 at 7:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Ronald, On 15 May 2009, at 14:25, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here. All right. I have problems with infinite time and resources for your computations, if done in this physical Universe. Sure. Note that I use unbounded physical resources only in the step seven, to make the argument smoother, but the step 8 eliminates the need of that assumption. All you have to believe in is that a mathematical Turing machine either stop or not stop. Best, Bruno On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ronald, On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can understand? UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that physics statement. So it would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ SANE2004MARCHALAbstract... In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- duplicating experience, or in many-identical-states preparation like a concrete universal dovetailer would do all the time. So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = II principle (that if a story bifurcate, Y , you multiply their similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite part of that enumeration. Stable consciousness need deep stories (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, which shows that form their first point of view universal machine cannot distinguish real from virtual, but they cannot distinguish real from arithmetical either, so that the arithmetical realm defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any questions, or find a flaw etc. (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism
Re: Victor Korotkikh
On 15 May 2009, at 01:06, russell standish wrote: On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 05:30:57PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. I think this sums up my feeling too. Although, I'm not sure we're talking about the same error :) I guess my interest in pointing it out to you was whether some interesting structure could be extracted from it when put into the framework of the AUDA. Since you point out that Robinson arithmetic is universal, might not Korotkikh's integer relationships also be a reflection of the same universality. As far as I understand it looks interesting indeed. I will have to dig deeper. I kind of dismissed this stuff as a curiosity when I first heard about it 13 years ago, but I've grown intellectually since then (having being exposed to your ideas amongst others :). BTW - I'm still enjoying Secret of the Amoeba, which I haven't finished yet. Its a shame it wasn't published - its some of your best stuff! Thanks Russell, Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Hi Ronald, On 15 May 2009, at 14:25, ronaldheld wrote: Bruno: I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here. All right. I have problems with infinite time and resources for your computations, if done in this physical Universe. Sure. Note that I use unbounded physical resources only in the step seven, to make the argument smoother, but the step 8 eliminates the need of that assumption. All you have to believe in is that a mathematical Turing machine either stop or not stop. Best, Bruno On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ronald, On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can understand? UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that physics statement. So it would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ SANE2004MARCHALAbstract... In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- duplicating experience, or in many-identical-states preparation like a concrete universal dovetailer would do all the time. So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = II principle (that if a story bifurcate, Y , you multiply their similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite part of that enumeration. Stable consciousness need deep stories (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, which shows that form their first point of view universal machine cannot distinguish real from virtual, but they cannot distinguish real from arithmetical either, so that the arithmetical realm defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any questions, or find a flaw etc. (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). Hope this helped a bit. Bruno On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) ontologies. But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, where, saying yes to the surgeon requires to abandon that very idea. Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much more fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of mechanical laws. Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem and still use an identity relation between a mind and a implementation of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank.
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Bruno: I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here. I have problems with infinite time and resources for your computations, if done in this physical Universe. Ronald On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ronald, On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can understand? UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that physics statement. So it would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract... In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- duplicating experience, or in many-identical-states preparation like a concrete universal dovetailer would do all the time. So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = II principle (that if a story bifurcate, Y , you multiply their similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite part of that enumeration. Stable consciousness need deep stories (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, which shows that form their first point of view universal machine cannot distinguish real from virtual, but they cannot distinguish real from arithmetical either, so that the arithmetical realm defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any questions, or find a flaw etc. (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). Hope this helped a bit. Bruno On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) ontologies. But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, where, saying yes to the surgeon requires to abandon that very idea. Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much more fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of mechanical laws. Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem and still use an identity relation between a mind and a implementation of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies problems. Sure. Bruno On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: Hi
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Bruno: Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can understand? Ronald On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) ontologies. But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, where, saying yes to the surgeon requires to abandon that very idea. Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much more fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of mechanical laws. Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem and still use an identity relation between a mind and a implementation of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies problems. Sure. Bruno On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: Hi Bruno, Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent article out in Complexity: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY=... (Complexity, 14, 40-46) It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers, prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure mathematical way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a much earlier one that is not behind a paywall: http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/ I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in Townsville, about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's presentation is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who consider him a genius. It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme is to yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint for starters. Cheers -- ---- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---- http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Ronald, On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can understand? UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that physics statement. So it would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- duplicating experience, or in many-identical-states preparation like a concrete universal dovetailer would do all the time. So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = II principle (that if a story bifurcate, Y , you multiply their similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite part of that enumeration. Stable consciousness need deep stories (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, which shows that form their first point of view universal machine cannot distinguish real from virtual, but they cannot distinguish real from arithmetical either, so that the arithmetical realm defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any questions, or find a flaw etc. (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). Hope this helped a bit. Bruno On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) ontologies. But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, where, saying yes to the surgeon requires to abandon that very idea. Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much more fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of mechanical laws. Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem and still use an identity relation between a mind and a implementation of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies problems. Sure. Bruno On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: Hi Bruno, Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent article out in Complexity: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY= ... (Complexity, 14, 40-46) It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers, prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure mathematical way, but he
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Bruno Marchal wrote: Ronald, On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can understand? UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that physics statement. So it would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- duplicating experience, or in many-identical-states preparation like a concrete universal dovetailer would do all the time. So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all the computations going through your actual state. I'm not sure how to understand your state. Is it a finite piece of the state of computation? In that case it seems it would be revisited arbitrarily many times and in different orders relative to other states. Sometimes I have to remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational history you belong, Is history meant in the sense of a thread in the completed infinite computation, or does it mean just the past part of the thread going back to the beginning of the UD? Brent but you can believe (as far as you are willing to believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = II principle (that if a story bifurcate, Y , you multiply their similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite part of that enumeration. Stable consciousness need deep stories (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, which shows that form their first point of view universal machine cannot distinguish real from virtual, but they cannot distinguish real from arithmetical either, so that the arithmetical realm defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any questions, or find a flaw etc. (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). Hope this helped a bit. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Victor Korotkikh
On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 05:30:57PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. I think this sums up my feeling too. Although, I'm not sure we're talking about the same error :) I guess my interest in pointing it out to you was whether some interesting structure could be extracted from it when put into the framework of the AUDA. Since you point out that Robinson arithmetic is universal, might not Korotkikh's integer relationships also be a reflection of the same universality. I kind of dismissed this stuff as a curiosity when I first heard about it 13 years ago, but I've grown intellectually since then (having being exposed to your ideas amongst others :). BTW - I'm still enjoying Secret of the Amoeba, which I haven't finished yet. Its a shame it wasn't published - its some of your best stuff! Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same error with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) ontologies. But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, where, saying yes to the surgeon requires to abandon that very idea. Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much more fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of mechanical laws. Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem and still use an identity relation between a mind and a implementation of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies problems. Sure. Bruno On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: Hi Bruno, Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent article out in Complexity: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY=1SRETRY=0 (Complexity, 14, 40-46) It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers, prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure mathematical way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a much earlier one that is not behind a paywall: http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/ I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in Townsville, about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's presentation is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who consider him a genius. It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme is to yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint for starters. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Victor Korotkikh
Hi Bruno, Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent article out in Complexity: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY=1SRETRY=0 (Complexity, 14, 40-46) It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers, prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure mathematical way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a much earlier one that is not behind a paywall: http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/ I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in Townsville, about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's presentation is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who consider him a genius. It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme is to yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint for starters. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
