On 11 Feb 2009, at 20:47, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go
On 11 Feb 2009, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote:
This idea seems inconsistent with MWI. In QM the split is uncaused
so it's
hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases
the measure of
computations that were identical before the split.
I got the inspiration from
On 12 Feb 2009, at 02:59, Jack Mallah wrote:
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no?
I am afraid we are just a bit bactracking 10 years ago.
No problem. After all, concerning theology, I am asking people to
backtrack 1500 years ago (1480 to be precise).
Which
On 10 Feb 2009, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading
and is exactly why I broke down the
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in
2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes
up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's
me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical
characteristics and so on. In other words,
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding
any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the
same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation.
Yes, but
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
See my answer to Brent.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
See my answer to Brent.
Hi Jack
Nice to see you again.
The assumption that measure decreases continuously has been accepted too
easily. This is, however, really the crux of the discussion.
One could argue that measure actually increases continuously and
corresponds to the increase in entropy occurring in everyday
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes
up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's
me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical
characteristics and
2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms
of
it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same
memories, but without continuity to your past.
But that could lead to absurd
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in
terms of
it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same
memories, but without continuity to your past.
But
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice
in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same
old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again.
At least I think your point here is new to the list.
---
Jack Mallah wrote:
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice
in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same
old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again.
At least I think your point here is
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is
exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four
categories I did in the paper.
If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense,
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not
clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the
reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is
exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four
categories I did in the paper.
If you are considering future versions
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading
and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability
into the four categories I did in
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading
and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability
into the four
I agree. They are both pointers to the same abstract computation.
--
- Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.
2009/2/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not
clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the
reductionist theory of
As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the
clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and
what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that
you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be
B, with 100%
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic
computations confuses me - it
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1
(e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then
one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is
not.
On Tue, Feb 10, 2009 at 07:07:50PM -0800, Jack Mallah wrote:
That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of
counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of
saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is
not the same
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1
(e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then
one could say that A1 is the same person as B,
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am
part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my
current experience. This is the most conservative
definition and thus may be the least misleading.
This is the way I think of it,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am
part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my
current experience. This is the most conservative
definition and thus may be the least misleading.
This
--- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on
average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess
that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum
of the measures is N/N of the original.
I still find this
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