On 16 March 2012 05:57, John Clark wrote:
>> > it is obvious that you have seen the point that the first person are no
>> > duplicable from their first person point of view.
>
> To me that is about as far from "obvious" as you can get! And you can't
> explain to me what's so original about the or
On 16 Mar 2012, at 07:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/15/2012 10:57 PM, John Clark wrote:
> if you deny the 1-indeterminacy,
I see no difference from this "1-indeterminacy" thing of yours and
plain old fashioned indeterminacy, either way you can't always know
what you will see until you see it
On 16 Mar 2012, at 13:47, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 March 2012 05:57, John Clark wrote:
it is obvious that you have seen the point that the first person
are no
duplicable from their first person point of view.
To me that is about as far from "obvious" as you can get! And you
can't
expla
On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
> What is intended by "the first person are no duplicable from their first
> person point of view" is just the mundane assumption that any subjective
> point of view is always limited to that of a single, localised individual.
Evolution has cr
2012/3/16 John Clark
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > What is intended by "the first person are no duplicable from their first
>> person point of view" is just the mundane assumption that any subjective
>> point of view is always limited to that of a single, localised
2012/3/16 Quentin Anciaux
>
>
> 2012/3/16 John Clark
>
>> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> > What is intended by "the first person are no duplicable from their
>>> first person point of view" is just the mundane assumption that any
>>> subjective point of view is always
On 16 March 2012 17:28, John Clark wrote:
>> > since by assumption each successor must be restricted to a single,
>> > localised experience That's the whole point of this step in the UDA
>> > reasoning.
>
>
> I know, and that's exactly the problem.
OK, now we may be getting somewhere. If that's
On Mar 16, 1:57 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> So your point is that you would feel at both place at once ??? If that's
> not an extraordinary claim... don't know what is.
This is interesting I think as it leads directly back to the symbol
grounding (Chinese Room) problem, which is a problem creat
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:03 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:34, John Mikes wrote:
>
> >>Craig and Brent:
> "Free Will" is not a matter of faith. One does not "believe "IN" it, or
> not".
> (Of course this is a position in my (agnostic) worldview - my 'belief' ha
> ha).<<
>
>
On 3/16/2012 3:09 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 March 2012 17:28, John Clark wrote:
since by assumption each successor must be restricted to a single,
localised experience That's the whole point of this step in the UDA
reasoning.
I know, and that's exactly the problem.
OK, now we may be gett
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't neither
>> would.
>>
>
> >The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any
> personal observation,
>
So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the
duplication, it doe
On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 1:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>So your point is that you would feel at both place at once ??? If that's
> not an extraordinary claim... don't know what is.
>
One macroscopic object being at 2 places at the same time would indeed be
extraordinary, but 2 objects being in
On 3/16/2012 9:05 PM, John Clark wrote:
>The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any
personal
observation,
So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the duplication, it
does not enter their consciousness, it does not change their conscio
On 3/16/2012 9:05 PM, John Clark wrote:
> *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one
city*.
Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has survived in
both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both cities*.
But having
On 3/16/2012 9:05 PM, John Clark wrote:
> Each of them cannot know what the other feels.
True, so the Washington man is not the Moscow man, although both are the Helsinki man.
For some things like the integers H, M and W if H=M and H= W then M=W,
It does work for everything because it
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