Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't neither
> >The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any
> personal observation,
So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the
duplication, it does not enter their consciousness, it does not change
their consciousness, and so far I agree with you completely; but then in
the next breath you say it DOES change their consciousness and the change
is about as dramatic as a change can get, it's so ENORMOUS that a new
individual is created. So do you believe they can perceive the duplication
or do you not?
> You misunderstand Everett. he said that we cannot feel the split ever
> after the differentiation occurred.
Everett said they would not feel the split but they would certainly feel
other things, and there would not even be a differentiation unless there
was something different about them to differentiate. Everett would also say
that talking about 2 absolutely identical points of view is silly, if there
is no difference between them then there is only one point of view.
> Now you come back to the idea that if I throw a dice, the notion of
> probability does not apply because the guy looking at the dice is not the
> same that the guy who threw it, which is straw man.
I know you like the phrase but when asked to calculate probabilities, or
anything else for that matter, it is not a straw man to ask just what you
want me to calculate; the probability that the guy who sees 12 on the dice
will see 12 is 100%, the probability that the guy who does not see 12 on
the dice will see 12 is 0%, the probability that right now John K Clark
will see 12 when he throes the dice in his hand is 1 in 36.
> So it looks you can give us an algorithm to predict what you will feel
> with certainty the result of your future self-localization. But I have
> already explain why it does not work.
I know that there is one chance in 36 that my future self (I don't see the
need of the word "localization") will be certain the dice gave him a 12,
and the algorithm to calculate this has been well known for centuries.
> *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one
Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has
survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both
> But the obvious point here is that he will not FEEL having survived in
> both cities.
Just ask them! Ask the Moscow man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is
experiencing Moscow and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Ask the
Washington man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is experiencing
Washington and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Therefore it doesn't
take rocket science to conclude that the Helsinki man experienced Moscow
> Both copies will FEEL having survive in only one city,
Yes, but it doesn't matter because BOTH are the Helsinki man who just
happens to be in another place, and we change our position all the time
without loss of identity.
> Each of them cannot know what the other feels.
True, so the Washington man is not the Moscow man, although both are the
Helsinki man. For some things like the integers H, M and W if H=M and H= W
then M=W, but that does not work for everything, for example a watermelon
is green and a pea is green but a watermelon is not a pea; it doesn't work
for personal identity either.
> You know perfectly well who you are, and the duplication will not change
Yes I will always know who I am, I will know I am in Moscow and only Moscow
and I will know I am in Washington and only Washington and I will know I am
in Helsinki and only Helsinki. Odd yes, contradictory no because there are
> You are back to the confusion between a 3-view on 1-views and the 1-views
One of us is very confused indeed over this point, but I don't believe its
> Ask them if they have seen, from their own eyes, Washington AND Moscow.
> They will deny this,
Sure, but each has seen one of those cities and both are the Helsinki man
(although they are not each other), therefore the Helsinki man saw
Washington AND Moscow; the Washington man didn't and the Moscow man didn't
but the Helsinki man did.
> unless you introduce magical telepathy between them.
Now THAT is a straw man! Telepathy has nothing to due with it.
> You are just avoiding putting yourself at the place of each copies
I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out and
find that I the Helsinki man am now in Moscow, and I the Helsinki man walk
into the duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the
Helsinki man is now in Washington, and I the Helsinki man walk into the
duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the Helsinki man am
still right here in Helsinki and wonder if the duplicating chamber has
malfunctioned. All three are me the Helsinki man and there is a 100% chance
I will go to Moscow only and a 100% chance I will go to Washington only and
a 100% chance I will remain in Helsinki. There is a 0% chance that I the
Helsinki man in Moscow will see Washington and there is a 0% chance that I
the Helsinki man in Washington will see Moscow. What have I avoided?
> You forget to say that neither the W-man nor the M-man could have guess
> in advance to be those one, from the complete protocol information he got
> in Helsinki.
Guessing is not necessary, the Helsinki man could have assigned a
probability of 100% that if he sees Moscow then he will become the Moscow
man because that's what the Moscow man is, the Helsinki man who saw Moscow.
And what is the probability that the Helsinki man will actually see Moscow?
100% of course.
>> How in the world does not drinking tea kill you??
> > Because in that experience the guy who drink no teal is the guy
> annihilated in Helsinki,
You've used the word "annihilated" before in this context and the only
evidence you could find to back it up is some ashes that were once part of
the Helsinki man's body, but that does not impress me, atoms are always
recycling in and out of our bodies but our identity remains.
> and that you were making him dying, contradicting (btw) the fact that you
> just agree above that he survive in the both cities.
I give you my word that I have no idea what you're talking about in the
>> Then when there are lots of I's running around it is meaningless to ask
>> what is the probability that "I" will see this or that.
> > Not at all. We can reason rigorously with vague notion.
Maybe you know how to give a correct answer when you don't even know what
the question is but I don't.
John K Clark
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