Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
First off, I would like to apologize for being over-reactionary in mislabeling labeling a digression as trolling. I seem to have shot myself in the foot with that remark. Second, I will have more to say about specific posts later today, but I would like to clarify what I mean by Fuzzy Logic (FL), and it's connection to Classical Logic (eg, Model Theory). On that note, fuzzy logic truth sets need not be [0,1] but could be anything algebraically like a Boolean Algebra. Specifically, the truth set could be what's known as an MV-algebra, which could have some order. Chang's Theorems relate MV-equations to equations that hold in [0,1], making the comparison to [0,1] quite relevant, actually, but without (seemingly) realizing it. I suggest readers interested in what I mean by Fuzzy Logic see this paper which I referenced, and the references of the paper I am linking: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/444507.html PDF version: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cache/papers/cs/22478/http:zSzzSzwww.cs.cas.czzSzedcizSzhajekzSzstrls2.pdf/a-set-theory-within.pdf Recall from an earlier post that I am pushing question (2) on page 8 in reference to a universal fuzzy set axiom and this in relation to Tegmark's MUH. Perhaps some universal fuzzy set +is+ the universe in some sense. Also, for my ME statements (mutual exclusivity), I am suggesting that "locally" ME holds and maybe sometimes ME does not hold[***], within the context of Tegmark's MUH. It seems apparent that ME is true in the parallel we inhabit. With my D+( ) notation above, I was just trying to formalize a conjecture along the lines of "ME seems locally true". Discussion of what I mean by designated truth degrees can be probably found in the references to the paper I just linked to. Also, I suggest seeing parts of this: A treatise on many-valued logics by Siegfried Gottwald http://worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/44162540 Also, this might be worth trying for background: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-valued_logic [quote] The first known classical logician who didn't fully accept the law of the excluded middle was Aristotle (who, ironically, is also generally considered to be the first classical logician and the "father of logic"[1]), who admitted that his laws did not all apply to future events (De Interpretatione, ch. IX). [/quote] MV-algebra (truth sets are these sorts of things, basically): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV-algebra I just wanted to clarify what I mean by F.L. before launching into how F.L. might interact with the MUH in the sense of a "strong fuzzy universal set" being the universe. [***] I'm wondering, not knowing about QM much, how in some parallels the Copenhagen interpretation could be correct and in others, the Everett interpretation could be, in light of the MUH---if different +fundamental equations+ of Physics are true in a Level 4 multiverse scenario, then are different +interpretations+ of the equations correct in different parallels? Perhaps this paradox (and all paradoxes) could have a very (unsatisfying?) resolution in the context of ME not being universally "true"? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Le 08-mars-08, à 21:09, George Levy a écrit : > > Hi Brian > > As Russell said, we have been discussing this topic for at least a > decade. We all respect each other. I am sure that Bruno did not mean > harm when he made his comment. Actually I was replying, not even to Brian. But thanks. > > You bring up an interesting question: the relationship between Fuzzy > logic and the MUH and you state that Fuzzy logic is a superset of > deterministic logic. Isn't true that Fuzzy Logic can be implemented by > means of a Turing Machine? Since a Turing Machine is purely > deterministic it means that Fuzzy logic is actually a subset of logic. > Hence the ad hoc introduction of Fuzzy logic may be unnecessary in the > context of MUH. > > I don't think that the indeterminacy that we are considering here is > fundamental or derives from an axiomatic approach. It is rather a > consequence of living in many worlds simultaneously. This is the key point. Tegmark believes that the physical universe could be a mathematical structure among others, which I can believe too. But with the coomputationalist hypothesis or its many weakenings, we have to take into account all mathematical structures supporting the self aware entities, to derive that particular mathematical structure. So we just cannot postulate a theory like "SWE", we have to derive it from a sum on all (sufficiently rich) mathematical structures. We just cannot consistently invoke a notion of existence of a "physical universe". This gives a clue why we believe or could believe in such a physical universe. > When "I" make a > measurement, a number of "I"'s make(s) a measurements. The result of > the > measurement that each "I" perceive(s) defines the world where the "I" > actually am (is). As you can see English is not rich enough to talk > about "I" in the third person or in the plural. > > If there is a need for Fuzzy Logic, it would have to be a kind of logic > adapted to deal with the MUH. I don't know enough to say if there is > such a logic. This puts light on the reason why the "explicitation" of comp (or its weakenings) is useful. The logic, in this case, has to be derived (by the UDA) from the sum invoked above. When the math are done we do find indeed a sort of quantum logic (ref in my url). It is an open problem if this logic is a fuzzy quantum logic. Evidences add up to think it could be a form of quantum credibility, instead of the "usual" quantum probability theory. This is related to the fact that we get the modal B logic (the "Brouwersche system") *without* the rule of necessitation. Much works remain, of course. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Hi Brian As Russell said, we have been discussing this topic for at least a decade. We all respect each other. I am sure that Bruno did not mean harm when he made his comment. You bring up an interesting question: the relationship between Fuzzy logic and the MUH and you state that Fuzzy logic is a superset of deterministic logic. Isn't true that Fuzzy Logic can be implemented by means of a Turing Machine? Since a Turing Machine is purely deterministic it means that Fuzzy logic is actually a subset of logic. Hence the ad hoc introduction of Fuzzy logic may be unnecessary in the context of MUH. I don't think that the indeterminacy that we are considering here is fundamental or derives from an axiomatic approach. It is rather a consequence of living in many worlds simultaneously. When "I" make a measurement, a number of "I"'s make(s) a measurements. The result of the measurement that each "I" perceive(s) defines the world where the "I" actually am (is). As you can see English is not rich enough to talk about "I" in the third person or in the plural. If there is a need for Fuzzy Logic, it would have to be a kind of logic adapted to deal with the MUH. I don't know enough to say if there is such a logic. George Brian Tenneson wrote: >> We get Tegmark on this list occasionally. He, like you, needs to >> acquaint himself more with the core concepts of THIS discussion. >> In his last post to us he admitted as much. >> > > > By THIS discussion, did you mean the aspects of the connections to > Fuzzy Logic and the MUH that I am discussing in THIS thread? > > Can we +please+ either talk about the first post on THIS thread or > anything at least somewhat related or post in a different thread? > > I did not come here to argue about who is diverting the topic away. > > Please don't reply in THIS thread if you aren't going to discuss THIS > topic (connections between Fuzzy Logic and the MUH). Thanks. > > > > > I did not post my ideas in a random person's thread. If I did, I > would be called a troll, perhaps, or at least, unnecessarily diverting > the thread. > > > > > > It is insulting to me to be said I'm looking for attention. Why use > THIS thread's bandwidth to analyze my psychological makeup? > > Thanks. > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of the MUH
On Thu, Mar 06, 2008 at 08:25:40PM -0800, nichomachus wrote: > I would like to see that the relationship of the computable universe > hypothesis to the MUH be clarified. Is our universe's physics > classically computable at the quantum scale? If not, how does it > follow that the macroscopic universe, or the universe as a whole is > classically computable if its operation at the quantum level is not? I > apologize if this question displays my naivete on the subject, but it > is something I am currently endeavoring to more clearly understand. > One can solve the Schroedinger equation using a classical algorithm. > preferred? If we defined the complexity to be the length of the > shortest possible computer program that could generate the results, > doesn't this definition imply a particular computational architecture > that would itself be necessary to account for in measuring algorithmic > complexity? Also, does having the property of universality imply a > definite lower-bound to the complexity of a hypothetical physics? once > again, probably very naive questions on my part, but I would like to > better understand these matters. > This is resolved by using the observer as the reference to measure complexity. See my paper Why Occams Razor for a discussion. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
>We get Tegmark on this list occasionally. He, like you, needs to >acquaint himself more with the core concepts of THIS discussion. >In his last post to us he admitted as much. By THIS discussion, did you mean the aspects of the connections to Fuzzy Logic and the MUH that I am discussing in THIS thread? Can we +please+ either talk about the first post on THIS thread or anything at least somewhat related or post in a different thread? I did not come here to argue about who is diverting the topic away. Please don't reply in THIS thread if you aren't going to discuss THIS topic (connections between Fuzzy Logic and the MUH). Thanks. I did not post my ideas in a random person's thread. If I did, I would be called a troll, perhaps, or at least, unnecessarily diverting the thread. It is insulting to me to be said I'm looking for attention. Why use THIS thread's bandwidth to analyze my psychological makeup? Thanks. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Le 06-mars-08, à 21:55, Russell Standish a écrit : > > On Thu, Mar 06, 2008 at 08:20:52AM -0800, Brian Tenneson wrote: >> >> I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take >> your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a >> different thread. Thanks. >> > > Trolling! Bruno is not trolling. Thanks to you Russell, and thanks to Günther, Kim, Quentin for noticing that I was not trolling. I was just replying. > Whilst we all have some difficulties > fully comprehending his results, I have to come back on this some day, because I try to classify the difficulties. For example, there are people who does not understand the notion of 1-person indeterminacy, pretending for example, that they are in both Washington and Moscow after the usual self-duplication, like Chalmers. Actually they have a problem with the notion of first person/third person. They have problem with Everett too, and with the whole of "philosophy of mind" issues. They have problem with the type of discussion we have in this list, for sure. But then there are those who do not understand the mathematical logic, or point in theoretical computer science, but this means they have to work ... Well I say this because you say "we all". Surely every one can find some more difficult point ... Also, Russell, I feel a bit guilty because years ago you find a sort of real problem in the "movie graph argument" which is so interestingly relevant that I have never been able to finish my reply... Unfortunately it is currently a bit out-of-topic. I will come back on this when I will put my mind again in the movie-graph-Olympia issue. This is really (imo) conceptually difficult ... I am not yet entirely satisfied by my own argumentation ... > what he has to say is very > interesting, and highly pertinent to the relationship between physics > and mathematics. Thanks for saying. And sorry for Brian. I think all threads are related, but people replies from their own theory/prejudice. If someone is not sastified with an answer, he has to just say "you did not answer my question, let me perhaps rephrase it more succinctly ...", or something like that, (or ask somewhere else, of course). (Also the web group archive is not always simple to follow, sometimes you have to remember your password in the middle of a post reading, you stop daring to click or just touch your mouse ... I prefer the Nabble archive where posts are more easily individuated). Now, I do sincerely think my reply (to dzone actually) *has* a bearing with Brian's post or Tegmark's work. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of the MUH
Hi, I am new to this list. I am glad to see that there are others interested in Tegmark's ideas. I have been aware of his ideas since October but have largely agreed with them since prior to that. by that I mean that I had reasoned to similar conclusions prior to leaning that they had been so well developed and articulated by Tegmark. There are a few problems that I see with the MUH paper, although it could be that I just do not entirely understand all of it. Before I mention those I will just say that I believe his main thesis is correct. That is, his theory explains correctly the relationship between mathematics and physics, the reason why it is that mathematics has been so "unreasonably effective" at describing natural phenomena. I with the idea that the physical world is what Tegmark calls a mathematical structure -- a timeless entity that exists by virtue of its own logical possibility -- the only type of thing that truly exists. In his paper he defines a mathematical structures perhaps overly generally as "abstract entities with relations between them. This would seem to include a great many things besides the type of thing we would to call a mathematical structure. Personally I think we would want a definition that include things like fractals, logical calculi, and the outputs of algorithms to name a few examples, while excluding other types of things, such as Platonic forms (which would have to be included in the definitions provided). However, this ontology them classifies everything that we naturally think of as real as just substructures of something that is truly real: this universe. We ourselves are merely substrutures, albeit the self-aware kind, of this larger, real universe, and we therefore derive our being vicariously from it. I would like to see that the relationship of the computable universe hypothesis to the MUH be clarified. Is our universe's physics classically computable at the quantum scale? If not, how does it follow that the macroscopic universe, or the universe as a whole is classically computable if its operation at the quantum level is not? I apologize if this question displays my naivete on the subject, but it is something I am currently endeavoring to more clearly understand. I am particularly interested in information-theoretic descriptions of the this universe, or more precisely, information theory measures of the complexity of of this universe's presumed most basic laws (or Grand Unified Theory, Max Tegmark's level I TOE). What exactly does it mean to assign a value to the complexity of our still-undiscovered GUT? Would competing notions of algorithmic complexity yield discordant results in this case? Which measure of complexity is to be preferred? If we defined the complexity to be the length of the shortest possible computer program that could generate the results, doesn't this definition imply a particular computational architecture that would itself be necessary to account for in measuring algorithmic complexity? Also, does having the property of universality imply a definite lower-bound to the complexity of a hypothetical physics? once again, probably very naive questions on my part, but I would like to better understand these matters. Probably what I find most appealing about the MUH is how it simplifies things. To me it answeres the age-old question, why is there something rather than nothing by boldly asserting that the universe is a member of the category of being for which there is no difference between possibility and necessity. However, this formulation leads to speculation on the ontic status of paraconsistent systems. I look forward to any replies on this extremely interesting topic. On Mar 4, 9:15 pm, Brian Tenneson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I'm trying to strike up a discussion of the MUH but my discussion > started at sci.logic and apparently, not many logicians are interested > in Physics, or something... :P > > Here is a link (two, actually) to the discussion. I don't know how to > proceed, to discuss here or there. It does not matter to me. > > http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/b0ed9baa... > > http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/ > b0ed9baa707749ad/ef7752e4bcfc2631#ef7752e4bcfc2631>MUH Discussion at > Google Groups --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of the MUH
It's obvious now who is the troll... Good idea to propose to return where you came from. Quentin Le Friday 07 March 2008 03:45:45 Brian Tenneson, vous avez écrit : > That's an appeal to authority. The discussion here has nothing to do > with my ideas, they are about Bruno's ideas, especially in Bruno's > answer to a question directed to him. > > I also find it odd that Bruno suggests asking specific questions but > in the link I posted to sci.logic, there were several specific > questions. > > Seems like it might just be easier to stick to sci.logic. Less > politics involved. > > How is that not trolling? > > On Mar 6, 1:32 pm, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Brian, > > > > I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll". > > He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion. > > > > I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling. > > > > Günther > > > > Brian Tenneson wrote: > > > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take > > > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a > > > different thread. Thanks. > > > > > > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > > To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob > > Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). > > >>> > > >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? > > >> > > >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we > > >> can believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute > > >> it experimentally. > > >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the > > >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, > > >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). > > >> > > >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive > > >> verifiable/refutable propositions: > > >> > > >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their > > >> indirect effects. > > >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any > > >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the > > >> substitution level. > > >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS. > > >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen > > >> Specker phenomenon) > > >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I > > >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in > > >> a purely deterministic global context btw). > > >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum > > >> suicide counterparts, etc.) > > >> > > >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too > > >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that > > >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization > > >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white > > >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after > > >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. > > >> > > >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist > > >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem > > >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in > > >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the > > >> computationalist thesis is two times more difficult than without, > > >> because it leads to a matter problem, under the form of the white > > >> rabbit problem, or, as called in this list, the (relative) measure > > >> problem. > > >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with > > >> too much details) in *Conscience et > > >> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecani > > >>sme.html > > >> > > >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of > > >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). > > >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on > > >> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf > > >> > > >>> or something that could be checked experimentally? > > >> > > >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To > > >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical > > >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch > > >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest > > >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the > > >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason > > >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) > > >> for doing that. > > >> > > >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an > > >> application of Everett's natural ide
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
That's an appeal to authority. The discussion here has nothing to do with my ideas, they are about Bruno's ideas, especially in Bruno's answer to a question directed to him. I also find it odd that Bruno suggests asking specific questions but in the link I posted to sci.logic, there were several specific questions. Seems like it might just be easier to stick to sci.logic. Less politics involved. How is that not trolling? On Mar 6, 1:32 pm, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Brian, > > I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll". > He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion. > > I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling. > > Günther > > Brian Tenneson wrote: > > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take > > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a > > different thread. Thanks. > > > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob > Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). > >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? > >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can > >> believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it > >> experimentally. > >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the > >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, > >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). > > >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive > >> verifiable/refutable propositions: > > >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their > >> indirect effects. > >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any > >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the > >> substitution level. > >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS. > >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen > >> Specker phenomenon) > >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I > >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a > >> purely deterministic global context btw). > >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum > >> suicide counterparts, etc.) > > >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too > >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that > >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization > >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white > >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after > >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. > > >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist > >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem > >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in > >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist > >> thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a > >> matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as > >> called in this list, the (relative) measure problem. > >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with > >> too much details) in *Conscience et > >> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html > > >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of > >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). > >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on > >> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf > > >>> or something that could be checked experimentally? > >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To > >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical > >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch > >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest > >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the > >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason > >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) > >> for doing that. > > >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an > >> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the > >> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just > >> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in > >> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its > >> consequences. > > >> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has > >> empirically verifiable consequences. > >> *My* theory of everything
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Brian, I can assure you that Bruno is the last on this list who would "troll". He is always very helpful and interested in serious discussion. I suggest you look at some of his papers before accusing him of trolling. Günther Brian Tenneson wrote: > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a > different thread. Thanks. > > On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >> >> >> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). >>> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? >> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can >> believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it >> experimentally. >> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the >> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, >> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). >> >> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive >> verifiable/refutable propositions: >> >> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their >> indirect effects. >> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any >> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the >> substitution level. >> -observable non locality in the same conditionS. >> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen >> Specker phenomenon) >> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I >> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a >> purely deterministic global context btw). >> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum >> suicide counterparts, etc.) >> >> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too >> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that >> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization >> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white >> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after >> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. >> >> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist >> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem >> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in >> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist >> thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a >> matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as >> called in this list, the (relative) measure problem. >> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with >> too much details) in *Conscience et >> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html >> >> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of >> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). >> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on >> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf >> >>> or something that could be checked experimentally? >> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To >> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical >> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch >> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest >> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the >> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason >> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) >> for doing that. >> >> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an >> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the >> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just >> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in >> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its >> consequences. >> >> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has >> empirically verifiable consequences. >> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson) >> arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are >> similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases. >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~--
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
On Thu, Mar 06, 2008 at 08:20:52AM -0800, Brian Tenneson wrote: > > I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take > your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a > different thread. Thanks. > Trolling! Bruno is not trolling. Whilst we all have some difficulties fully comprehending his results, what he has to say is very interesting, and highly pertinent to the relationship between physics and mathematics. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop. Please take your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a different thread. Thanks. On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob > >> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). > > > Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? > > I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can > believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it > experimentally. > (Also it is not *my *theory, but the > Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, > the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). > > But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive > verifiable/refutable propositions: > > -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their > indirect effects. > -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any > isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the > substitution level. > -observable non locality in the same conditionS. > - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen > Specker phenomenon) > - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I > don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a > purely deterministic global context btw). > (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum > suicide counterparts, etc.) > > Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too > much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that > the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization > consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white > rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after > the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. > > The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist > program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem > cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in > showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist > thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a > matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as > called in this list, the (relative) measure problem. > Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with > too much details) in *Conscience et > Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html > > My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of > Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). > See my Plotinus paper for more precision on > this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf > > > or something that could be checked experimentally? > > There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To > progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical > quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch > has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest > result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the > Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason > why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) > for doing that. > > What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an > application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the > physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just > arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in > trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its > consequences. > > My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has > empirically verifiable consequences. > *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson) > arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are > similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob >> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). > > Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it experimentally. (Also it is not *my *theory, but the Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is, the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness). But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive verifiable/refutable propositions: -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their indirect effects. -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the substitution level. -observable non locality in the same conditionS. - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen Specker phenomenon) - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a purely deterministic global context btw). (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum suicide counterparts, etc.) Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted. The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as called in this list, the (relative) measure problem. Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with too much details) in *Conscience et Mécanisme": http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle). See my Plotinus paper for more precision on this: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf > or something that could be checked experimentally? There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview) for doing that. What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its consequences. My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has empirically verifiable consequences. *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson) arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of the MUH
> but rarely, Tegmark does send a post. Try a specific question perhaps, There are approximately five or six specific questions in the 6 posts I made in the link I posted here. I'm not sure if I should cut and paste what those questions are because they take a while to set up and I might as well just paste the entire discussion to ask the questions. In lieu of that, I'll just leave the link and if anyone wants to address points made there, they can. I probably should have posted that thread in this list butI would be missing out on the volumes that logicians are writing on the subject of the MUH (joke-- no one replied to my knowledge yet)!! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH
Bruno Marchal wrote: > To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob > Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory? or something that could be checked experimentally? _ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of the MUH
Le 05-mars-08, à 04:15, Brian Tenneson a écrit : > > I'm trying to strike up a discussion of the MUH but my discussion > started at sci.logic and apparently, not many logicians are interested > in Physics, or something... :P Logicians are not interested in physics, and still less in metaphysics. Bruno Poizat (a french logician) said (in its textbook on Model Theory) that metaphysics is what logicians hate the most. I think this is just a result of contingent historical facts ... And physicists have been cooled down by the logicians reaction on Penrose's use of Godel's theorem, so that they are a bit inhibited. Even in the field of quantum computation, which has to bring back eventually logicians and physicists around the table, big misunderstandings still occur. > > Here is a link (two, actually) to the discussion. I don't know how to > proceed, to discuss here or there. It does not matter to me. > > > http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/ > b0ed9baa707749ad/ef7752e4bcfc2631#ef7752e4bcfc2631 We have discussed this a lot on this list. I don't know if most people have seen my point, but I can only sum up it here: I think the physical world cannot be a mathematical structure among others, but that physics-matter is more like a sort of border of mathematics-mind. So the relation between math and physics are more subtle than Tegmark seem to think. You can see this once you take seriously the mind body problem (or the problem of relating machine's first person talk and machine third person observations, provably so (I think) once you assume some precise version of the computationalist hypothesis. But Tegmark is right for its mathematicalist position. Again: right with respect to the comp hyp. To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL). More on this list or in my url. You can make your point of course, or ask questions. Sometimes but rarely, Tegmark does send a post. Try a specific question perhaps, or consult the archive. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Discussion of the MUH
I'm trying to strike up a discussion of the MUH but my discussion started at sci.logic and apparently, not many logicians are interested in Physics, or something... :P Here is a link (two, actually) to the discussion. I don't know how to proceed, to discuss here or there. It does not matter to me. http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/b0ed9baa707749ad/ef7752e4bcfc2631#ef7752e4bcfc2631 http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/ b0ed9baa707749ad/ef7752e4bcfc2631#ef7752e4bcfc2631>MUH Discussion at Google Groups --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
