Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 10/2/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Vladimir Nesov wrote: > > > >Are you asking why I consider notion of p-zombieness meaningful? > > By "p-zombieness" are you referring to philosophical zombies? If so, I > suppose I find them "meaningful" as a philosophical thought-experiment for > making the case that facts about consciousness are at least partly > independent from facts about the physical world, but I don't believe that > any real-world implementation of a mind would be a philosophical zombie > (see > Chalmers' argument about 'fading qualia' at > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ) -- do you? I found this paper particularly mind-bogging. It turns about the argument that since mind is implemented by brain, mind can't have a property that is not present in given implementation. Which ignores the possibility that there can be multiple minds that correspond to given implementation, and there are implementations in other worlds that can receive the mind without breaking subjective experience, even when from third-person POV you can argue that there are strange things going on with mind that could correspond to given contraption (which should instead be attributed to changes in set of minds that corresponds to contraption in question). Basically, I now define a mind by set of worlds in which it can find itself subjectively. This set roughly corresponds to set of worlds that only differ in things it doesn't know about, as if you jump from one world to another, you won't notice it if only things you don't know about were changed. With simplifying assumption that mind is implemented by a limited material structure in each of these equivalent worlds, it's possible to say that all worlds that contain the same implementation are equivalent, independent on all the rest of their content. So, notion of complete worlds is useless, as observations are selected arbitrarily in a way that is consistent with observer. Worlds are constructed 'on the fly' from their fragments. Any relation between parts of the world is a property of observer, because if it didn't know about this relation, it would be undefined (arbitrary). Observation (time) is a process of interaction between world fragments which creates new fragments. Brain-like structure has a very interesting property of being strongly connected. Each element of the brain depends on other elements of it, so sets of the worlds in which some of these fragments are present are very similar. Functional elements of the same mind inhabit the same set of worlds. More than that, brain learns tremendous amount of facts about its environment, thus selecting a narrow and structured set of worlds consistent with it. When brain is destroyed, elements become independent and mind expands to bigger set of worlds, which corresponds to loss of structure it can consistently observe. -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Le 02-oct.-07, à 01:30, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > On 02/10/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> Also single mind can be regarded as collection of parts interacting >> with each other. If each part can be regarded as its information >> content, each physical implementation ties together instantiations of >> parts. If single mind can be implemented by multiple implementations, >> each of these implementations also implements all parts of mind, so >> mind can be composed of different parts, where each of the parts is >> implemented in different universe. So, brain can be half- p-zombie and >> half-conscious. > > I don't see in what sense it could be a single mind if part of it is > zombified. If your visual cortex were unconscious, you would be blind, > and you would know you were blind. (Except for unusual situations like > Anton's Syndrome, where people don't realise that they're blind). I guess you are meaning: "if your visual cortex were non functioning, you would be blind". It does not make sense to say that a part of the brain (including the whole brain) is unconscious. I am not even sure it is relevant to talk about a conscious mind, although it is a less grave lapsus: only persons are thinking. "Mind" is a so general word that we can almost say anything about it. All this is still coherent with the idea that there is in the brain some locus specialized into the working of consciousness. Again it does not mean that such a locus is conscious. Consciousness is an integrating unity building making it possible for a subject to anticipate quickly its relative reality-neighborhood. Very useful for self-moving bodies. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 02/10/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain > implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie. > Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain) > exists as information content and can be implemented in different > universe. This view can be applied to gradual uploading argument. So what would it actually be like for you if in the next minute your visual cortex was zombified, i.e. still functioned processing visual signals (all visual signals - not selectively lacking in V1 function as in blindsight) but lacking phenomenal consciousness? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Vladimir Nesov wrote: > >Are you asking why I consider notion of p-zombieness meaningful? By "p-zombieness" are you referring to philosophical zombies? If so, I suppose I find them "meaningful" as a philosophical thought-experiment for making the case that facts about consciousness are at least partly independent from facts about the physical world, but I don't believe that any real-world implementation of a mind would be a philosophical zombie (see Chalmers' argument about 'fading qualia' at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ) -- do you? Jesse > >On 10/2/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Vladimir Nesov wrote: > > > > > > > > >Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain > > >implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie. > > >Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain) > > >exists as information content and can be implemented in different > > >universe. This view can be applied to gradual uploading argument. > > > > But why do you think there could be any functionally identical > > implementations of a part of a brain that would be "zombies", i.e. not > > really conscious? > > > > Jesse > > > > _ > > It's the Windows Live(tm) Hotmail(R) you love -- on your phone! > > >http://www.microsoft.com/windowsmobile/mobilehotmail/default.mspx?WT.mc_ID=MobileHMTagline2 > > > > > > > > > > > >-- >Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > >> _ Discover sweet stuff waiting for you at the Messenger Cafe. Claim your treat today! http://www.cafemessenger.com/info/info_sweetstuff.html?ocid=TXT_TAGHM_SeptHMtagline2 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Are you asking why I consider notion of p-zombieness meaningful? On 10/2/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Vladimir Nesov wrote: > > > > > >Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain > >implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie. > >Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain) > >exists as information content and can be implemented in different > >universe. This view can be applied to gradual uploading argument. > > But why do you think there could be any functionally identical > implementations of a part of a brain that would be "zombies", i.e. not > really conscious? > > Jesse > > _ > It's the Windows Live(tm) Hotmail(R) you love -- on your phone! > http://www.microsoft.com/windowsmobile/mobilehotmail/default.mspx?WT.mc_ID=MobileHMTagline2 > > > > > -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Vladimir Nesov wrote: > > >Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain >implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie. >Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain) >exists as information content and can be implemented in different >universe. This view can be applied to gradual uploading argument. But why do you think there could be any functionally identical implementations of a part of a brain that would be "zombies", i.e. not really conscious? Jesse _ It's the Windows Live(tm) Hotmail(R) you love -- on your phone! http://www.microsoft.com/windowsmobile/mobilehotmail/default.mspx?WT.mc_ID=MobileHMTagline2 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie. Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain) exists as information content and can be implemented in different universe. This view can be applied to gradual uploading argument. On 10/2/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 02/10/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Also single mind can be regarded as collection of parts interacting > > with each other. If each part can be regarded as its information > > content, each physical implementation ties together instantiations of > > parts. If single mind can be implemented by multiple implementations, > > each of these implementations also implements all parts of mind, so > > mind can be composed of different parts, where each of the parts is > > implemented in different universe. So, brain can be half- p-zombie and > > half-conscious. > > I don't see in what sense it could be a single mind if part of it is > zombified. If your visual cortex were unconscious, you would be blind, > and you would know you were blind. (Except for unusual situations like > Anton's Syndrome, where people don't realise that they're blind). > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 02/10/2007, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Also single mind can be regarded as collection of parts interacting > with each other. If each part can be regarded as its information > content, each physical implementation ties together instantiations of > parts. If single mind can be implemented by multiple implementations, > each of these implementations also implements all parts of mind, so > mind can be composed of different parts, where each of the parts is > implemented in different universe. So, brain can be half- p-zombie and > half-conscious. I don't see in what sense it could be a single mind if part of it is zombified. If your visual cortex were unconscious, you would be blind, and you would know you were blind. (Except for unusual situations like Anton's Syndrome, where people don't realise that they're blind). -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Also single mind can be regarded as collection of parts interacting with each other. If each part can be regarded as its information content, each physical implementation ties together instantiations of parts. If single mind can be implemented by multiple implementations, each of these implementations also implements all parts of mind, so mind can be composed of different parts, where each of the parts is implemented in different universe. So, brain can be half- p-zombie and half-conscious. On 10/1/07, Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 4. All particles in the observable universe are interacting. The neurons in > our brain which instantiate thoughts are not closed loops, they are fed in > with data from the senses, thoughts can be communicated between brains (as > they are now when you read this post), my neural activity can affect your > neural activity, there is only a longer and slower path connecting neurons > between everyone's brain. Think of a grid computer consisting of super > computers connected with 14.4 Kbps modems, the bandwidth is not sufficient > for transferring large amounts of data or the content of their hard drives > in any reasonable time, but short and compressed information can still be > shared. If they are interacting as part of the same large state machine > then minds are not islands, and it lends credence to their being a universal > mind. > > Jason > -- Vladimir Nesovmailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 4/29/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: > > 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" > experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- > verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all > branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is > and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move > across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, > therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any > other person. > > 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which > show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation > thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical > body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to > information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time > does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it > to be the same person? What happens if you make copies of those bits > (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it > elsewhere? > > Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). > > Jason > > On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > (Jason:) > > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > > altogether. ...>" > > > > Sais WHO? > > > > John > > > I've thought of two other ideas which further complicate personal identity: 3. Mind uploading / Simulation Argument / Game worlds in the context of infinite universes. If all universes are real there are an infinite number of "causes" for your current observer moment, including the explanation that your OM is instantiated in a computer simulation or game world. The instantiation could be part of a "game" some alien who uploaded his mind is playing, perhaps the game is called "simhuman", when the being awakens from the game all the memories of your human life will be integrated into the alien being's memories. Therefore it could be said that there are an infinite number of observers (each with highly varied experiences and memories) to which this OM belongs. A nice consequence of this is that it can provide escape from eternal agedness implied by many worlds. 4. All particles in the observable universe are interacting. The neurons in our brain which instantiate thoughts are not closed loops, they are fed in with data from the senses, thoughts can be communicated between brains (as they are now when you read this post), my neural activity can affect your neural activity, there is only a longer and slower path connecting neurons between everyone's brain. Think of a grid computer consisting of super computers connected with 14.4 Kbps modems, the bandwidth is not sufficient for transferring large amounts of data or the content of their hard drives in any reasonable time, but short and compressed information can still be shared. If they are interacting as part of the same large state machine then minds are not islands, and it lends credence to their being a universal mind. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Thanks, Jason, i did not think in marvels of (reductionist) physics when contemplating about mentality - my mistake, but that's where I live in. I don't 'make' copies and have no idea "how many" of "how many" details will destroy the identity, when there are more and less qualifying aspects. You may recognise a unit from just a few characteristics while eliminating a lot still let you stay with the same one. When it comes to a clash between common sense and theoretical physics, I am with the former one. John On 4/29/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: > > 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" > experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- > verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all > branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is > and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move > across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, > therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any > other person. > > 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which > show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation > thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical > body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to > information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time > does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it > to be the same person? What happens if you make copies of those bits > (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it > elsewhere? > > Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). > > Jason > > On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > (Jason:) > > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > > altogether. ...>" > > > > Sais WHO? > > > > John > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 4/29/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. That's true. It's rather like comparing familiar classical mechanics with the strange things that happen at relativistic speeds or very small scales. Our brains did not evolve to easily cope with these things. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? If five copies of you were made secretly in five different labs, then without further information each of the copies would believe he was the "real" you and had somehow been drugged and transported to a distant place (or something like that). From a third person perspective, there are now five copies, not in communication with each other, sharing past memories up to a certain point. From a first person perspective, you have a 1/5 chance of finding yourself in one of the five labs, and otherwise will feel perfectly normal. Do you think it could possibly be otherwise? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). But the whole point of consciousness is that "it seems that way". I really can't know how many identical copies of my mind are running, what sort of hardware (if any) they are running on, whether I was created one second ago complete with false memories, or any other diabolical variation on these themes. However, whatever is actually going on, I hope that it or some equivalent process will continue going on, because then it will seem that I have survived another moment, which is important to me. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Sun, Apr 29, 2007 at 09:00:57AM -, Jason wrote: > > Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: > > 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" > experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- > verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all > branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is > and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move > across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, > therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any > other person. This is debatable. > > 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which > show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation > thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical > body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to > information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time > does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it > to be the same person? When you've changed enough bits for the person to no longer be conscious (ie for the observer moment so generated to be unexperiencable). > What happens if you make copies of those bits > (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it > elsewhere? > > Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). > The answer is that each duplicate experiences its own observer moment. All other possibilities appear absurd. > Jason > > On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > (Jason:) > > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > > altogether. ...>" > > > > Sais WHO? > > > > John > > > -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any other person. 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it to be the same person? What happens if you make copies of those bits (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it elsewhere? Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much seems that way subjectively). Jason On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > (Jason:) > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > altogether. ...>" > > Sais WHO? > > John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Interleaving ONE tiny question: On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: (Jason:) "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity altogether. ...>" Sais WHO? John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Short comments to Jason, Marc and John. Jason, I agree with the answers given by Russell and Stathis to your "one person idea" or single mind theory. The "one person idea" (a recurring theme of the list) is still coherent with comp, but most probably undecidable, and above all not relevant for testing comp (deriving the comp-physical laws). Lee Corbin (I think in both the FOR list and the EVERYTHING list), but also David Chalmers (personal communication), were arguing that, after a Washington-Moscow duplication (with annihilation of the original in Brussels), they are simultaneously in W and in M. Honestly this could be just a matter of taste. But I told them that if we are in both W and M, then we most probably are *all* disconnected incarnation of the same person, going thus in your single mind theory direction. But here Lee and David seemed to disagree without justification. I think Lee changes his mind, or at least did understand the non-relevance of the single mind theory for the derivation of the physical laws from comp (or other "many-OMs" theories. Single mind? Why not, indeed. It makes true one feature of Plotinus theory of evil, where all the bad you do to someone will be done to you. It is the good/bad conservation law. Plotinus dares to say: if a man rapes a woman, he will be reincarnated into a woman just to be raped. The one-person theory makes Plotinus principle true trivially without the need of explicit temporal-like reincarnations. I do like this idea. But this is irrelevant for deriving the physical laws from the comp hyp, where you have to justify probability of families of result-experiences from what you guess about your actual state. In that case, you have to take into account the 1-3 person points of view distinction so that you can infer things like the fact that the probability of self-localization in Washington is 1/2, ... in the same way that you infer that the probability that your coffee will be cold is near one if you add enough cold milk. All that could be sort of illusions, but deriving the physics from comp consists justly in that: explaining where such illusions come from and why they are stable, and why does it hurt, etc. Marc, I will comment Tegmark diagram asap. John, I am still working on some of your posts, but I'm a bit busy, and I ask you to indulge for my lateness. Thanks. Bruno Le 21-avr.-07, à 05:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > On 4/21/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote (quoting Brent Meeker): > >> >> > >> >> This seems to be a good definition for a person, but how does the >> definition handle duplication thought experiments or the infinite >> breadth of experiences across the multiverse which connects us all? >> Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious >> experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity >> altogether. I agree there is not an extra-OM that experiences OMs, >> but that seems to be what sampling assumptions imply. > I think of both personhood and personal identity as emergent > phenomena. It is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a > person that there exist a set of related moments of consciousness. > "Related" normally means that they arise in sequence as a result of > activity in a particular brain, but duplication thought experiments > suggest that a stream of consciousness can survive fragmentation of > the physical substrate. A person gets into teleportation machine A, is > destroyed, and a new person is created at receiving station B who > claims to be the same individual. This is simply a description of what > would happen if the experiment were performed, and "continuity of > personal identity" is a phrase commonly used to describe the > phenomenon. > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 4/21/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote (quoting Brent Meeker): > This seems to rest on an implicit idea that the OMs are "out there" and > that "you" are a person independent of them, a person to can sample them or > experience them. This is contrary to the idea of OMs which is that OMs are > atomic units of persons. You are a sequence of OMs. There is no extra-OM > "you" who can sample them or experience them. > > > > This seems to be a good definition for a person, but how does the > definition handle duplication thought experiments or the infinite > breadth of experiences across the multiverse which connects us all? > Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > altogether. I agree there is not an extra-OM that experiences OMs, > but that seems to be what sampling assumptions imply. I think of both personhood and personal identity as emergent phenomena. It is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a person that there exist a set of related moments of consciousness. "Related" normally means that they arise in sequence as a result of activity in a particular brain, but duplication thought experiments suggest that a stream of consciousness can survive fragmentation of the physical substrate. A person gets into teleportation machine A, is destroyed, and a new person is created at receiving station B who claims to be the same individual. This is simply a description of what would happen if the experiment were performed, and "continuity of personal identity" is a phrase commonly used to describe the phenomenon. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 09:53:03AM -, Jason wrote: > > Do you agree that under ASSA, the fact that you find yourself as an > observer who was spared from torture should give you no relief, as > your next OM is equally likely to sample the tortured perspective as > it is to experience the spared perspective? Shouldn't you be equally > as worried if anyone in the world (your copy or not) was to be > tortured, as the next sampled OM could be that person's. > > RSSA has never appealed to me because I see no logical reason to link > two observer moments from one time to another when those two observer > moments are not the same. Intuitively it feels that each mind is on a > set track to only experience those OM's that follow from the birth of > an observer, but logically there are too many problems with this. > > Possible problems with RSSA: > > Quantum mechanics means each observer follows multiple paths, some of > which intersect with what might have been considered a different > observer previously, this forms a spectrum linking all observers > together. > > Time by its nature implies change, an observer's brain state is in > different from one time to another, if the brains are different the > observers are different. By what rule set can two different observers > be said to be the same? > The teleporter thought experiments do show up problems with traditional ideas of personal identity. However, it may still be true that there is no continuous path linking you and me. Consider the sort of mechanism discussed by Parfit, replacing my neurons one by one with yours. It is very likely that once a certain percentage of neurons have been replaced, brain function will have been disrupted and I am no longer conscious. What is harder to say is whether there is a possible way of doing the replacements such that consciousness is maintained at all times. If we are all islands in the Multiverse, then there is a notion of global personal identity. If, on the other hand, we are all peninsulas of some massive fractal continent, then global identity may not be possible, but local identities such as we practice in day to day life is still meaningful. ... > The existance of a spectrum of related OM's means there is a choice in > interpretation of this infinite OM set. Either you can hold that each > OM constitues its own mind, or if you believe there is any > relationship between OM's (i.e. You experience now AND you will > experience 10 seconds from now) then you must conclude there is only > one mind. This is just my viewpoint on the issue and I invite others > to give their opinions on it and poke holes in it. > > Jason > You have identified yourself as an ASSAer. I daresay your viewpoint is probably perfectly consistent within the ASSA framework, but with the RSSA framework I don't see how this follows at all. My successor OMs are not the same as yours, and I don't expect to experience yours, ever. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Apr 20, 12:52 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Jason wrote: > > > On Apr 19, 10:34 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Even if there is in a sense just one mind perceiving all OM's > >> simultaneously > >> (Platonia, the mind of God, the Universe), there is still the fact that the > >> OM in Washington does not directly share the experiences of its counterpart > >> in Moscow. If it did, then they would not be distinct OM's. From the third > >> person perspective, there is no mystery in duplication: where previously > >> there was one, now there are two. The paradoxes arise from the fact that we > >> have the sort of minds which consider that one OM has a particular > >> relationship to another OM, based partly, but not entirely, on memory. For > >> example, if I am to be copied tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am > >> worried, because I feel there is a 50% chance that I will be the one; but > >> come tomorrow, and I am not tortured, I am relieved, and feel pity for my > >> copy screaming in the next room. This doesn't really make sense: today I > >> anticipate being both copies, and neither copy has greater claim to being > >> "me" than the other, but tomorrow the situation is completely different. > >> But > >> the subjective view doesn't have to make sense. It's just the way we think, > >> a contingent fact of evolution. > > > Do you agree that under ASSA, the fact that you find yourself as an > > observer who was spared from torture should give you no relief, as > > your next OM is equally likely to sample the tortured perspective as > > it is to experience the spared perspective? Shouldn't you be equally > > as worried if anyone in the world (your copy or not) was to be > > tortured, as the next sampled OM could be that person's. > > This seems to rest on an implicit idea that the OMs are "out there" and that > "you" are a person independent of them, a person to can sample them or > experience them. This is contrary to the idea of OMs which is that OMs are > atomic units of persons. You are a sequence of OMs. There is no extra-OM > "you" who can sample them or experience them. > This seems to be a good definition for a person, but how does the definition handle duplication thought experiments or the infinite breadth of experiences across the multiverse which connects us all? Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity altogether. I agree there is not an extra-OM that experiences OMs, but that seems to be what sampling assumptions imply. I don't think my views exactly fit into either ASSA or RSSA, but they are closer to ASSA. > > > > RSSA has never appealed to me because I see no logical reason to link > > two observer moments from one time to another when those two observer > > moments are not the same. > > I'm not sure about "logical reason" but the whole idea of OMs is that a > person is constituted by a sequence of them. If there is nothing to link > them then there is no sequence and no person; and the thing to be explained > has vanished from the explanation. > > Brent Meeker > > >Intuitively it feels that each mind is on a > > set track to only experience those OM's that follow from the birth of > > an observer, but logically there are too many problems with this. > > > Possible problems with RSSA: > > > Quantum mechanics means each observer follows multiple paths, some of > > which intersect with what might have been considered a different > > observer previously, this forms a spectrum linking all observers > > together. > > > Time by its nature implies change, an observer's brain state is in > > different from one time to another, if the brains are different the > > observers are different. By what rule set can two different observers > > be said to be the same? > > The are never the same in the sense of identical. Two OMs may be part of the > "same person" if there are in a sequence defined by some linkage, such as > continuity of spatial viewpoint and memory reference. How or whether such a > sequence can be said to exist was the subject of a long discussion between > Stathis and me. > > Brent Meeker > > > > > Common intuition and experience play many tricks on us. It makes us > > think that the current time (present) is special, because it is the > > only thing point in time we are aware of. It makes us think that the > > current laws of physics and universe we see around us is special, > > because it is the only set of laws we are aware of. I propose the > > same is true of personal identity, it makes us think that the self is > > special, because it is the only observer's perspective we are aware > > of. For those who believe in block time, the present is no more > > special or real than any other time. To those on the Everything list, > > the universe we perceive now is no more real than any other. Our > > current OM re
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Jason wrote: > > > On Apr 19, 10:34 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Even if there is in a sense just one mind perceiving all OM's simultaneously >> (Platonia, the mind of God, the Universe), there is still the fact that the >> OM in Washington does not directly share the experiences of its counterpart >> in Moscow. If it did, then they would not be distinct OM's. From the third >> person perspective, there is no mystery in duplication: where previously >> there was one, now there are two. The paradoxes arise from the fact that we >> have the sort of minds which consider that one OM has a particular >> relationship to another OM, based partly, but not entirely, on memory. For >> example, if I am to be copied tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am >> worried, because I feel there is a 50% chance that I will be the one; but >> come tomorrow, and I am not tortured, I am relieved, and feel pity for my >> copy screaming in the next room. This doesn't really make sense: today I >> anticipate being both copies, and neither copy has greater claim to being >> "me" than the other, but tomorrow the situation is completely different. But >> the subjective view doesn't have to make sense. It's just the way we think, >> a contingent fact of evolution. >> > > Do you agree that under ASSA, the fact that you find yourself as an > observer who was spared from torture should give you no relief, as > your next OM is equally likely to sample the tortured perspective as > it is to experience the spared perspective? Shouldn't you be equally > as worried if anyone in the world (your copy or not) was to be > tortured, as the next sampled OM could be that person's. This seems to rest on an implicit idea that the OMs are "out there" and that "you" are a person independent of them, a person to can sample them or experience them. This is contrary to the idea of OMs which is that OMs are atomic units of persons. You are a sequence of OMs. There is no extra-OM "you" who can sample them or experience them. > > RSSA has never appealed to me because I see no logical reason to link > two observer moments from one time to another when those two observer > moments are not the same. I'm not sure about "logical reason" but the whole idea of OMs is that a person is constituted by a sequence of them. If there is nothing to link them then there is no sequence and no person; and the thing to be explained has vanished from the explanation. Brent Meeker >Intuitively it feels that each mind is on a > set track to only experience those OM's that follow from the birth of > an observer, but logically there are too many problems with this. > > Possible problems with RSSA: > > Quantum mechanics means each observer follows multiple paths, some of > which intersect with what might have been considered a different > observer previously, this forms a spectrum linking all observers > together. > > Time by its nature implies change, an observer's brain state is in > different from one time to another, if the brains are different the > observers are different. By what rule set can two different observers > be said to be the same? The are never the same in the sense of identical. Two OMs may be part of the "same person" if there are in a sequence defined by some linkage, such as continuity of spatial viewpoint and memory reference. How or whether such a sequence can be said to exist was the subject of a long discussion between Stathis and me. Brent Meeker > > > Common intuition and experience play many tricks on us. It makes us > think that the current time (present) is special, because it is the > only thing point in time we are aware of. It makes us think that the > current laws of physics and universe we see around us is special, > because it is the only set of laws we are aware of. I propose the > same is true of personal identity, it makes us think that the self is > special, because it is the only observer's perspective we are aware > of. For those who believe in block time, the present is no more > special or real than any other time. To those on the Everything list, > the universe we perceive now is no more real than any other. Our > current OM remembering previous OM's experienced from the same > observer's viewpoint creates the illusion that said observer is > travelling into the future and bound to experience the next logical OM > for this observer, but I hold this is only an illusion. > > > ASSA is closer to a one mind/all perspectives experienced > simultanesouly view because it removes the notion of observers that > travel through time from one OM to the next and treats only observer > moments. Consider the infinite set of all OMs, by definition, the > existance of an OM necessitates its being experienced, but without a > multiplicity of observers who can say "who" is experiencing them? > There is no who, just the fact that each is being experienced. Since > this set exist
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Do you agree that under ASSA, the fact that you find yourself as an > observer who was spared from torture should give you no relief, as > your next OM is equally likely to sample the tortured perspective as > it is to experience the spared perspective? I guess the ASSA does imply that because it doesn't seem to respect the subjective sensation of the passage of time. For example, the ASSA seems to imply that if my measure were somehow increased a zillionfold for today only, then I would somehow find myself stuck in today forever. ASSA advocates might argue that as the clock strikes midnight, I will suddenly die (again, I'm guessing, because it doesn't make a lot of sense to me). I would expect that as the clock strikes midnight, I will notice nothing at all unusual as I find myself alive and well on April 21, 2007. This exactly mirrors my experience on the stroke of midnight the previous day: I notice nothing unusual at all as I find myself alive and well as one of the zillion copies on April 20, 2007. As long as there is a continuous path of OM's that can be drawn on the tree mapping my duplications and mergings, it is impossible for me (i.e., for any of the OM's at any point) to know whether I am living a branching or a linear life. It could be happening right now. Shouldn't you be equally > as worried if anyone in the world (your copy or not) was to be > tortured, as the next sampled OM could be that person's. No, neither under ASSA nor RSSA. Suppose in the next moment God suddenly switches my mind and body for George Bush's mind and body. Would it be best to describe the change I experience as (a) I suddenly find myself at home typing this email, but with George's thoughts and body, or (b) I suddenly find myself in the White House, surrounded by people I don't recognise and poised to sign a document I've never seen before? Identity is determined by the content of a person's mind. Even if some magical soul-substance existed, there is no sense in which I could suddenly become someone who shares none of my thoughts. RSSA has never appealed to me because I see no logical reason to link > two observer moments from one time to another when those two observer > moments are not the same. Intuitively it feels that each mind is on a > set track to only experience those OM's that follow from the birth of > an observer, but logically there are too many problems with this. But you do link two OM's from one time to another when those two OM's are not the same. Your immediate successor OM contains most of the thoughts of your previous OM, plus a little bit more. This is just a description of what normal life feels like, whether the underlying reality is linear or branching. Possible problems with RSSA: > > Quantum mechanics means each observer follows multiple paths, some of > which intersect with what might have been considered a different > observer previously, this forms a spectrum linking all observers > together. If we live forever such that we have every possible experience, then we will eventually become every possible person. However, it doesn't really matter that in a million years my personality will be completely different and I won't remember any of my present experiences. After all, I don't really remember the experiences I had as an infant, and that doesn't upset me. Time by its nature implies change, an observer's brain state is in > different from one time to another, if the brains are different the > observers are different. By what rule set can two different observers > be said to be the same? In ordinary life, although two instances of a person many years apart might seem completely different, there is a continuous progression whereby every OM has a successor differing from it only marginally. This progression is maintained even in a branching universe by following a single path along the tree diagram. Continuity is disrupted by memory loss caused eg. by head injury, and it is disconcerting when this happens. Common intuition and experience play many tricks on us. It makes us > think that the current time (present) is special, because it is the > only thing point in time we are aware of. It makes us think that the > current laws of physics and universe we see around us is special, > because it is the only set of laws we are aware of. I propose the > same is true of personal identity, it makes us think that the self is > special, because it is the only observer's perspective we are aware > of. For those who believe in block time, the present is no more > special or real than any other time. To those on the Everything list, > the universe we perceive now is no more real than any other. Our > current OM remembering previous OM's experienced from the same > observer's viewpoint creates the illusion that said observer is > travelling into the future and bound to experience the next logical OM > for this observer, but I hold this is o
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Apr 19, 10:34 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Even if there is in a sense just one mind perceiving all OM's simultaneously > (Platonia, the mind of God, the Universe), there is still the fact that the > OM in Washington does not directly share the experiences of its counterpart > in Moscow. If it did, then they would not be distinct OM's. From the third > person perspective, there is no mystery in duplication: where previously > there was one, now there are two. The paradoxes arise from the fact that we > have the sort of minds which consider that one OM has a particular > relationship to another OM, based partly, but not entirely, on memory. For > example, if I am to be copied tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am > worried, because I feel there is a 50% chance that I will be the one; but > come tomorrow, and I am not tortured, I am relieved, and feel pity for my > copy screaming in the next room. This doesn't really make sense: today I > anticipate being both copies, and neither copy has greater claim to being > "me" than the other, but tomorrow the situation is completely different. But > the subjective view doesn't have to make sense. It's just the way we think, > a contingent fact of evolution. > Do you agree that under ASSA, the fact that you find yourself as an observer who was spared from torture should give you no relief, as your next OM is equally likely to sample the tortured perspective as it is to experience the spared perspective? Shouldn't you be equally as worried if anyone in the world (your copy or not) was to be tortured, as the next sampled OM could be that person's. RSSA has never appealed to me because I see no logical reason to link two observer moments from one time to another when those two observer moments are not the same. Intuitively it feels that each mind is on a set track to only experience those OM's that follow from the birth of an observer, but logically there are too many problems with this. Possible problems with RSSA: Quantum mechanics means each observer follows multiple paths, some of which intersect with what might have been considered a different observer previously, this forms a spectrum linking all observers together. Time by its nature implies change, an observer's brain state is in different from one time to another, if the brains are different the observers are different. By what rule set can two different observers be said to be the same? Common intuition and experience play many tricks on us. It makes us think that the current time (present) is special, because it is the only thing point in time we are aware of. It makes us think that the current laws of physics and universe we see around us is special, because it is the only set of laws we are aware of. I propose the same is true of personal identity, it makes us think that the self is special, because it is the only observer's perspective we are aware of. For those who believe in block time, the present is no more special or real than any other time. To those on the Everything list, the universe we perceive now is no more real than any other. Our current OM remembering previous OM's experienced from the same observer's viewpoint creates the illusion that said observer is travelling into the future and bound to experience the next logical OM for this observer, but I hold this is only an illusion. ASSA is closer to a one mind/all perspectives experienced simultanesouly view because it removes the notion of observers that travel through time from one OM to the next and treats only observer moments. Consider the infinite set of all OMs, by definition, the existance of an OM necessitates its being experienced, but without a multiplicity of observers who can say "who" is experiencing them? There is no who, just the fact that each is being experienced. Since this set exists in the plentitude (which is timeless) then it follows that all perspectives are being experienced simultaneously. The existance of a spectrum of related OM's means there is a choice in interpretation of this infinite OM set. Either you can hold that each OM constitues its own mind, or if you believe there is any relationship between OM's (i.e. You experience now AND you will experience 10 seconds from now) then you must conclude there is only one mind. This is just my viewpoint on the issue and I invite others to give their opinions on it and poke holes in it. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Apr 19, 8:59 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > We have had discussions here about the possibility of Jesse Mazer > morphing into Bruno, and also about David Parfit's thought experiment > of morphing a person into Napoleon Bonaparte. I have expressed doubts > on this list as to whether this is possible, particularly in the form > of the thought experiments given by Parfit, but assuming it is > possible, then a single mind theory would have legs. > > -- > Consider what happens to a single person as they evolve through time in an ever-branching universe. Across the ever widening set of branches exists a spectrum of individuals similair enough to that person that no one could tell the difference, still further along that specturm there may be noticeable differences but still enough similarities to say that two people in different branches are the same. However you will soon reach a gray zone where you can't quite say if an individual is one person or another. Consider branches starting at the person's conception, there are many branches where the individuals share idenitcal genes, then there are some where the DNA makeup between two zygotes in two branches differs by only one gene, is it still the same person? If you move far enough across the spectrum you can link any two individuals, moving in steps so small that each observer differs by only an atom. In this sense, a self sampling observer could find themself morphing into someone else not travelling through time, but across branches in the multiverse. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: With ASSA/RSSA there is the assumption that there is a sampling, that > of all observers (or observer moments) one is selected and > experienced. Consider momentarily, that no sampling was taking > place? Is this view consistent and valid? > > Note that by "no sampling" I mean no discrimination. Instead of one > oberserver or observer-moment being chosen, all are chosen and all are > experienced. In this regard the pronoun "you" becomes meaningless, it > could be said that all perspectives are experienced by a single mind. > When a person is born an observer is not created, rather the universe > gains a new perspective upon itself. The same is true in all the > paradoxes of duplication/copying of observers. Instead of there being > a 50% chance of experiencing Washington or Moscow there is a 100% > chance the universe perceives both viewpoints. > > I do not believe there would be any noticeable difference if this > single mind experienced each observer-moment serially, simultanesouly, > or each for eternally. Although I think it is simpler to say every > observer-moment is being experienced eternally, as each brain state > exists eternally in platonia. If this view happens to be consistent, > then by Occam's razor it should be perferred over ASSA or RSSA since > it does not require there be any sampling. > Even if there is in a sense just one mind perceiving all OM's simultaneously (Platonia, the mind of God, the Universe), there is still the fact that the OM in Washington does not directly share the experiences of its counterpart in Moscow. If it did, then they would not be distinct OM's. From the third person perspective, there is no mystery in duplication: where previously there was one, now there are two. The paradoxes arise from the fact that we have the sort of minds which consider that one OM has a particular relationship to another OM, based partly, but not entirely, on memory. For example, if I am to be copied tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am worried, because I feel there is a 50% chance that I will be the one; but come tomorrow, and I am not tortured, I am relieved, and feel pity for my copy screaming in the next room. This doesn't really make sense: today I anticipate being both copies, and neither copy has greater claim to being "me" than the other, but tomorrow the situation is completely different. But the subjective view doesn't have to make sense. It's just the way we think, a contingent fact of evolution. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Thu, Apr 19, 2007 at 11:16:16PM -, Jason wrote: > > What if you were simultaneously experiencing every OM? Would any > individual OM be able to tell? Individual OMs do not "tell" anything. Only persons (or minds or observers) do. If I were simultaneously experiencing all OMs, "I" could tell. OM's isolated by different brains are > non-interacting, so any single OM won't have memories from another. > Consider two brains being simulated by a single computer, each as > different processes. The computer instantiates two conscious > observers at once, but neither observer remembers being the other > because protected memory insures one program can't access the other's > memory. Then you have two different conscious observers observing different OMs. The fact that they're implemented in a timesharing fashion on the same hardware is irrelevant. The same is true for our universe where physics is the single > computer realizing all observer moments, but our individual brains act > as protected memory creating the illusion of multiple minds. As Bruno > says, future OM's follow from consistent computations implementing an > observer; so what if multiple observers are part of a single program, > as would be the case if this universe is computable? Does the > "program" of this universe not realize all perspectives > simultaneously? In a sense, a single mind approach follows from there > being a single objective reality, the appearance of multiple minds > comes from the segmentation of memory. Memory maintains the illusion > of personal identity. > > Jason > The issue of whether there is but a single mind or not is a rather different kettle of fish from whether mind(s) experience OMs simultaneously or not. A single mind still samples OMs from the set available, rather than experiencing all relevant OMs simultaneously. We have had discussions here about the possibility of Jesse Mazer morphing into Bruno, and also about David Parfit's thought experiment of morphing a person into Napoleon Bonaparte. I have expressed doubts on this list as to whether this is possible, particularly in the form of the thought experiments given by Parfit, but assuming it is possible, then a single mind theory would have legs. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Apr 19, 6:27 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 19, 2007 at 06:48:06PM -, Jason wrote: > > > With ASSA/RSSA there is the assumption that there is a sampling, that > > of all observers (or observer moments) one is selected and > > experienced. Consider momentarily, that no sampling was taking > > place? Is this view consistent and valid? > > > Note that by "no sampling" I mean no discrimination. Instead of one > > oberserver or observer-moment being chosen, all are chosen and all are > > experienced. In this regard the pronoun "you" becomes meaningless, it > > could be said that all perspectives are experienced by a single mind. > > When a person is born an observer is not created, rather the universe > > gains a new perspective upon itself. The same is true in all the > > paradoxes of duplication/copying of observers. Instead of there being > > a 50% chance of experiencing Washington or Moscow there is a 100% > > chance the universe perceives both viewpoints. > > I'm not really sure what you mean by "no sampling". The sampling > refers to experiencing one OM selected from a set of multiple OMs. The > only way for this not to occur is for there to actually be only one OM > to select, or for all OMs to be experienced simultaneously. I would > argue that both of these cases contradict experience. I would even go > out on a limb and suggest that consciousness would be impossible if it > were not possible to experience different OM's sequentially, ie to be > able to form bits. > > Of course all OMs are experienced, (that is by definition) but not all > OMs are experienced simultaneously by a given experiencer. That is > what sampling means. > What if you were simultaneously experiencing every OM? Would any individual OM be able to tell? OM's isolated by different brains are non-interacting, so any single OM won't have memories from another. Consider two brains being simulated by a single computer, each as different processes. The computer instantiates two conscious observers at once, but neither observer remembers being the other because protected memory insures one program can't access the other's memory. The same is true for our universe where physics is the single computer realizing all observer moments, but our individual brains act as protected memory creating the illusion of multiple minds. As Bruno says, future OM's follow from consistent computations implementing an observer; so what if multiple observers are part of a single program, as would be the case if this universe is computable? Does the "program" of this universe not realize all perspectives simultaneously? In a sense, a single mind approach follows from there being a single objective reality, the appearance of multiple minds comes from the segmentation of memory. Memory maintains the illusion of personal identity. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Thu, Apr 19, 2007 at 06:48:06PM -, Jason wrote: > > With ASSA/RSSA there is the assumption that there is a sampling, that > of all observers (or observer moments) one is selected and > experienced. Consider momentarily, that no sampling was taking > place? Is this view consistent and valid? > > Note that by "no sampling" I mean no discrimination. Instead of one > oberserver or observer-moment being chosen, all are chosen and all are > experienced. In this regard the pronoun "you" becomes meaningless, it > could be said that all perspectives are experienced by a single mind. > When a person is born an observer is not created, rather the universe > gains a new perspective upon itself. The same is true in all the > paradoxes of duplication/copying of observers. Instead of there being > a 50% chance of experiencing Washington or Moscow there is a 100% > chance the universe perceives both viewpoints. I'm not really sure what you mean by "no sampling". The sampling refers to experiencing one OM selected from a set of multiple OMs. The only way for this not to occur is for there to actually be only one OM to select, or for all OMs to be experienced simultaneously. I would argue that both of these cases contradict experience. I would even go out on a limb and suggest that consciousness would be impossible if it were not possible to experience different OM's sequentially, ie to be able to form bits. Of course all OMs are experienced, (that is by definition) but not all OMs are experienced simultaneously by a given experiencer. That is what sampling means. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Jason: your idea sounds sound. I wonder if it is not a variation of the situation according to which "in facto" there is only ONE outcome under given circumstances of the actual OM, but we have the creativity of imagining more than just the one that occurs? I formulated this when I did not like the 'bifurcation' with which the lit was spread full some time ago. Then I argued that the scientist (who maybe a normal person as well) cannot propose more ways for a process to proceed than the (occurring) ONE allowed by the totality and its combined consequence, the other(s) are only speculations. Besides I argued against the "bi": nature is not restricted to only TWO ways to choose from and introduced the 'multifurcation' insted (to deny.). I was so proud to agree with Schrodinger (ha ha). John - Original Message - From: Jason To: Everything List Sent: Thursday, April 19, 2007 2:48 PM Subject: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory With ASSA/RSSA there is the assumption that there is a sampling, that of all observers (or observer moments) one is selected and experienced. Consider momentarily, that no sampling was taking place? Is this view consistent and valid? Note that by "no sampling" I mean no discrimination. Instead of one oberserver or observer-moment being chosen, all are chosen and all are experienced. In this regard the pronoun "you" becomes meaningless, it could be said that all perspectives are experienced by a single mind. When a person is born an observer is not created, rather the universe gains a new perspective upon itself. The same is true in all the paradoxes of duplication/copying of observers. Instead of there being a 50% chance of experiencing Washington or Moscow there is a 100% chance the universe perceives both viewpoints. I do not believe there would be any noticeable difference if this single mind experienced each observer-moment serially, simultanesouly, or each for eternally. Although I think it is simpler to say every observer-moment is being experienced eternally, as each brain state exists eternally in platonia. If this view happens to be consistent, then by Occam's razor it should be perferred over ASSA or RSSA since it does not require there be any sampling. After I developed this idea, I found that it was almost identical to ideas held by Erwin Schrödinger, who said: "There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of minds or consciousness. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth there is only one mind." and "[...] the plurality of sensitive beings is mere appearance (maya); in reality they are all only aspects of the one being." * Quotes obtained from http://www.cts.cuni.cz/~havel/work/schroe94.html -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 269.5.4/768 - Release Date: 4/19/2007 5:32 AM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
With ASSA/RSSA there is the assumption that there is a sampling, that of all observers (or observer moments) one is selected and experienced. Consider momentarily, that no sampling was taking place? Is this view consistent and valid? Note that by "no sampling" I mean no discrimination. Instead of one oberserver or observer-moment being chosen, all are chosen and all are experienced. In this regard the pronoun "you" becomes meaningless, it could be said that all perspectives are experienced by a single mind. When a person is born an observer is not created, rather the universe gains a new perspective upon itself. The same is true in all the paradoxes of duplication/copying of observers. Instead of there being a 50% chance of experiencing Washington or Moscow there is a 100% chance the universe perceives both viewpoints. I do not believe there would be any noticeable difference if this single mind experienced each observer-moment serially, simultanesouly, or each for eternally. Although I think it is simpler to say every observer-moment is being experienced eternally, as each brain state exists eternally in platonia. If this view happens to be consistent, then by Occam's razor it should be perferred over ASSA or RSSA since it does not require there be any sampling. After I developed this idea, I found that it was almost identical to ideas held by Erwin Schrödinger, who said: "There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of minds or consciousness. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth there is only one mind." and "[...] the plurality of sensitive beings is mere appearance (maya); in reality they are all only aspects of the one being." * Quotes obtained from http://www.cts.cuni.cz/~havel/work/schroe94.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
