Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

[tozziarturo]

Dear Emanuel, 

Hi!
I'm sorry, but the UCLA finding does not put an end to any question.  Indeed, 
this paper about memory transfer has been highly criticized:  

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/neuroskeptic/2018/05/18/epic-snail-about-that-injectable-memory-study/#.Ww-V81UzYps


The term "material" for the definition of information is less correct than 
"physical": indeed, "pyhsical" encompasses also the quantum fields, the 
solitons, the oscillations that, although not being properly "material", 
nevertheless are able to tranfer "information".




> Il 31 maggio 2018 alle 5.55 Emanuel Diamant  ha scritto:
> 
> 
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
> 
>  
> 
> For most of the time, I restrain myself from taking part in the FIS 
> discussions – we speak different languages and adhere to different 
> principles. My paper invited for publication in MDPI Informatics Special 
> Issue: Selected Papers from the ISIS Summit Vienna 2015 has been declined for 
> publication. (Never mind, it was published afterwards in the Research Gate 
> repository https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291352419 ).
> 
>  
> 
> In the concluding part of the paper I enumerate 8 topics in Neuroscience 
> research that require immediate revision taking into consideration the new 
> principles that follow from my definition of information. For example, that 
> information is a material, palpable string of letters and linguistic signs, a 
> piece of text, a textual description. That means that all derivatives of 
> semantic information (thoughts, memories, feelings, and so on) are material 
> entities (“Information as a thing” – once there was a fierce debate around 
> this subject). Or, as Mark Burgin claims: ”Now assuming that information 
> exists, we have only one option, namely, to admit that information is 
> physical because only physical things exist”. (I do not use the term 
> “physical”, I distinguish Physical and Semantic Information. In place of 
> Burgin’s “physical” I prefer to use the term “material”).
> 
>  
> 
> I would not remind you of our old controversies but recently UCLA 
> researchers reported that they have transferred a memory from one marine 
> snail to another (Biologists 'transfer' a memory, Neuroscience 
> https://medicalxpress.com/neuroscience-news/ , May 14, 2018 
> https://medicalxpress.com/archive/14-05-2018/ , University of California, Los 
> Angeles, https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-05-memory-snails.html 
> https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-05-memory-snails.html ).
> 
>  
> 
> I hope that the UCLA finding will put an end to the question “Is 
> information material (physical, in Burgin’s inquiry)?” Yes, information is 
> material. Other options do not exist.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Best regards, Emanuel.
> 
>  
> 
 

> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> 
 


Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/ 
___
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Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 
You state that:
"When poll are done at congress in cosmology or quantum computing, about half 
of the physicists endorse the non collapse theory, as it is covariant, and has 
no “measurement problem”.
This means that the main tenet of your account, your "First Principle", is not 
accepted by HALF of the scholars.
How can you build your huge building on a so much controversial claim?
Furthermore, your links with Tegmark and Benacerraf confirm my thesis: your 
account is a philosophical one, based on a logical principle, that, although 
fashinating and intriguing, is highly controversial.  The results in common 
with the scientific knowledge are just coincidental, I believe.  On the other 
side, Robert Grosseteste talks about the big bang in 1228, based on simple 
logical accounts, and Eraclitus talks about the vacuum.  Just coincidences.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android lunedì, 21 maggio 2018, 00:16PM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Dear Arturo,
>
>This is already my second post of this week, so you might answer to my two 
>posts, and I will comment your possible answer (if necessary) next week. Thank 
>you.
>
>
>>On 20 May 2018, at 19:30,  tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
>>Dear Bruno,  
>>You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the 
>>arithmetical reality)".
>>This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of 
>>mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of 
>>Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill, 
>>Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, 
>>Benacerraf.   
>>
>
>Well, actually it is Tegmark which follows my lead, as he sent me his first 
>draft of the “mathematical universe”, and took my suggestion into account when 
>adding computationalism, but he missed the 1P/3p distinction, so my older 
>studies remains more consistent. Actually, he cite my papers in the draft, but 
>I guess was not able to maintain it for publication. Many told me that there 
>is some resistance, not to my ideas, but personal or political (I don’t know 
>as I have never met such opponents).
>But I have been influenced by Benacerraf and also Judson Webb, etc. (and of 
>course Gödel, Hilbert, etc.).
>
>Yet my approach is different. I start from the computationalist hypothesis, 
>and everything I say is derived from it, first informally (the universal 
>dovetailer argument) and formally (in the more mathematical part).
>
>
>>Your idea is interesting and intriguing,  related as it is to the philosophy 
>>of mathematics. 
>It can be related to philosophy of mathematics, but that is a work which 
>remains to be done. 
>
>>However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method 
>>and of testable hypothesis. 
>That is not correct. I prove that if Mechanism is true, the physical reality 
>is “in the head of the universal Turing machine”. 
>That makes Mechanism testable, by comparing the physics which is in the head 
>of the machine with the physics that we infer from observation. When I was 
>young I concluded that Mechanism is refuted, but I was naive and ignorant of 
>quantum mechanics, which eventually confirmed all the weirdness that I got 
>from mechanism, like indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning, the possibility 
>of many “parallel” computations/worlds and the possibility to extract a 
>material sort of information (confirmed by the notion of quantum information). 
>A lot of works remains to be done, but until now, mechanism is confirmed by 
>nature, when physicalism + mechanism is refuted by nature. Physicalism + non 
>mechanism is still an option, though, but is it really plausible? I don’t 
>know. As a scientist, I do not defend any options. I just show mechanism 
>testable and confirmed up to now.
>
>
>
>
>>You are talking about philosophy, not about science.   
>>
>
>The complete contrary. I avoid doing philosophy. That is especially important 
>when tacking some philosophical questions (at least classify as such by 
>Aristotelians) and show them testable experimentally. 
>
>
>>I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying 
>>the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific 
>>papers.   
>
>Then study well my papers, because there is no statements which are not 
>testable. The whole goal of my work was to show that metaphysics and theology, 
>in the frame of some hypothesis, become amenable to the scientific method.I 
>literally predicted quantum mechanics from pure arithmetic + mechanism a long 
>time ago. Then my thesis shows that all universal machine finds this when 
>looking inward (in the sense of Gödel’s self-reference).
>
>
>>Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context.   
>>
>
>I am with you on this. It is the whole point of my research. Too show that 
>thanks to Gödel’s and Turing’s discovery, and some works, we can test today if 
>Aristotle 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 
You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the 
arithmetical reality)".
This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of 
mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of 
Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill, 
Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, Benacerraf. 
 
Your idea is interesting and intriguing,  related as it is to the philosophy of 
mathematics.  However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of 
scientific method and of testable hypothesis.  You are talking about 
philosophy, not about science.  
I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying the 
philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific papers.   
Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues,
>
>
>>On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths < dai.griffith...@gmail.com > wrote:
>>What is a 'thing'? 
>
>I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if true 
>it provides a clear (and tastable) answer.
>
>For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any universal 
>complete theory or system.
>To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are 
>more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. That 
>determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience 
>differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially 
>correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the believer, 
>the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc. 
>
>A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative) 
>neighbourhood of consistent continuations.
>
>I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it explains 
>many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as immediate 
>undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for 
>consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers.
>
>
>
>
>>Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes
>>  exist, and that for human convenience in living in the world we
>>  put conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and
>>  call them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two
>>  aspects (things and predictions about those things), but simply
>>  the monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we find.
>>  This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms
>>  might be a special kind of process).
>>Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully
>>  reformulated as "Is information a thing?”.
>
>It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal 
>difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen 
>from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not 
>dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity 
>emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted the 
>non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it. 
>The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations 
>between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe, 
>know, observe among all things/relations.
>
>Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what the 
>universal machine like to do the most. 
>See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast variety 
>of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also 
>in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its computable part).
>
>Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>Dai
>>
>>
>>On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco
>>  Rivero wrote:
>>>Dear FISers, 
>>>I recently came across an old interview to W. van
>>>Orman Quine and I got an idea -maybe  not very original per se.
>>>Quine distinguishes two kind of philosophical problems:
>>>ontological (those referred to the existence of things) and
>>>predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
>>>Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological
>>>problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem.
>>>The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All we
>>>have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think
>>>of Science as a communicative social system differentiated from
>>>its environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree
>>>with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the social
>>>system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are
>>>

[Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 

as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires the 
tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist.

In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.



I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the FISers 
unaware of the Everett's account:


You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other turns rigth.

You have to choose where to turn.

If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right.

This is, very roughly speaking, what quantum wave collapse means: if you make a 
choice, it is irreversible in our Universe.



In order to avoid such irreversibility, Everett, who did not like quantum wave 
collapse, provided the following account:

every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or right, the 
entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in one Universe you turn 
left, while another you turns right in another Universe.




Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or it is not, 
and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me how it could be even 
theoretically demonstrated.  



> Il 17 maggio 2018 alle 11.25 Bruno Marchal  ha scritto:
> 
> Dear Arturo,
> 
> 
> 
> > > On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziart...@libero.it 
> mailto:tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > Daer Bruno, 
> > 
> > first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for 
> > a mistake, I did not add the FIS list in the CC. 
> > 
> > 
> > Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,
> > 
> > > I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any scientists. 
> > Especially that we need only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth. 
> 
> Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her children from 
> primary school when they are taught the laws of addition and multiplication, 
> by claiming they have not that faith?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > this appraoch... simply does not work for the description of 
> > physical and biological issues. 
> > 
> > > The approach just study the necessary logical consequence of 
> > assuming our bodies to be digitalisable.  I predicted all the quantum 
> > weirdness from this 45 years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get 
> > precise mathematical predictions, which until now fits with the fact, when 
> > physicalism needs a brain-mind identity thesis which has been shown 
> > inconsistent. 
> I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work for physical and 
> biological issues. You might confuse the computable (like automata), and the 
> semi-computable (like the universal Turing machine).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > It is just in our mind.  See: 
> > 
> > http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> What do you mean by “real world”?
> I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole physical reality is 
> indeed shown to be “in the head” of *any* universal machine or universal 
> number, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > 
> > I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of 
> > course, the work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is 
> > exactly like Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, 
> > without any possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics 
> > to the whole macroscopic world. 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the Schroedinger 
> equation, that is QM without the unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put 
> simply: the “many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without collapse.
> Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he just showed that we 
> don’t need the collapse axiom, as QM + mechanism recovers it 
> phenomenologically. Then my work shows this can work only if we recover also 
> the wave itself from arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
> 
> It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not needed, untestable, 
> assumption. 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > When you state that:
> > 
> > > > > "the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the 
> > universal Turing machine) and the physical is the border of the universal 
> > mind viewed from inside that universal mind".
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not 
> > understand your emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, 
> > reduction, and so on), needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the 
> > gold standard. 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by many people. Have you 
> read my papers?
> Did you find a problem, or are you just criticising the 
> assumption/theory? Ask specific question, but normally all this has been 
> clearly proofed. 
> 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > A suggestion: you cold try to correlate your "physical border of 
> > the Universal 

[Fis] Fwd: Re: [FIS] Is information physical?

[tozziarturo]

Daer Bruno, 

first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a mistake, 
I did not add the FIS list in the CC. 


Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic, this appraoch... simply does not work 
for the description of physical and biological issues.  It is just in our mind. 
 See: 

http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132


I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of course, the 
work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is exactly like 
Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, without any 
possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to the whole 
macroscopic world. 

When you state that:

> "the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing 
> machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from 
> inside that universal mind".
> 

you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not understand your 
emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, reduction, and so on), 
needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the gold standard. 

A suggestion: you cold try to correlate your "physical border of the Universal 
mind viewed from inside that universal mind" with the holographic principle and 
the cosmic horizon.  But in order to do that, you need a strong math, not to 
quote old philosophers that, for a simple matter of luck, were able to 
inconsciously predict some recent developments of the modern science.  I like 
logic, I love logic, I read logic, I study logic, I read a lot of the latin 
texts of the old philosophers that use it (in the Medioeval ones), but I have 
to confess that the scientific value of logic is close to zero.  Both of the 
ancient and of the "novel" logics.

Sorry again! 

  



 Messaggio originale --
Da: Bruno Marchal 
A: FIS Webinar 
Data: 14 maggio 2018 alle 11.48
Oggetto: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

Dear Arturo, Dear Colleagues, 



On 11 May 2018, at 18:36, tozziart...@libero.it mailto:tozziart...@libero.it 
wrote:

Dear Bruno, 
I'm sorry, but I cannot agree.



I take a disagreement as a courtesy to pursue a conversation, which would be 
boring without them.

But, what I say has been proved, peer reviewed by many, so it is perhaps more a 
matter of understanding than of agreeing.

Or you are just telling me that you disbelieve in Mechanism. I prefer to remain 
agnostic.

Mechanism is my working hypothesis. The idea is to take it seriously until we 
find a contradiction (internal or with the observation). It is a common by 
default type of hypothesis, held by many people, notably most materialist. But 
here I can prove that (even weak) materialism (the belief in ontological 
primary substances/matter) is inconsistent with (even weak) mechanism. See my 
papers for this, it is not entirely obvious. 





"eve­ntually I found a co­nceptually isomorphic explanation in ari­thmetic."  
Isomorphy is a dangerous claim: the underliying mechanisms in biology could be 
something other than isomorphism (i.e., an Ehresmann connection in a hyperbolic 
manifold, as it occurs in gauge theories).



Nothing in the observation point on either primary matter, nor on non 
mechanism. I am not sure why you think that Ehresmann connection or gauge 
theories are non mechanist. Actually Mechanism entails that the physical 
phenomenology cannot be mechanistic. You might confuse Mechanism in the 
cognitive science with digital physics. 

Digital physics (the idea that the physical reality is Turing emulable) does 
not make any sense. It entails mechanism, but mechanism entails the falsity of 
digital physics (see my paper or ask question: that is not obvious). So, with 
or without Mechanism, Digital Physics makes no sense.






Futhermore, you simply change the name of the primum movens, the first 
principium: instead of calling it physics, you call it arithmetic.  This is as 
fideistic as the Carnap's physicalist claims.  

?

Physics assumes Arithmetic.

Arithmetic do not assume physics.

I can follow you with the idea that arithmetic still ask for some faith, but 
the amount is less than assuming a primary physical reality.

Then, I have never heard about parents taking back their kids when they are 
taught elementary arithmetic.

Also, with mechanism, we need to assume only a Turing universal machinery. With 
less than that, we get no universal machinery at all. With one of them, we get 
all of them. I simply use arithmetic because everyone are familiar with it. The 
theology and physics of machine do not depend on the choice of the universal 
system assumed at the start. It is an important new invariant of physics. 
Indeed, it determines entirely physics (always assuming Mechanism (aka 
computationalism).






"If you think that a brain is not Turing emul­able, you might be the one to 
whom people can ask".  The burden of the final proof is yours, because your 
claim is stronger 

[Fis] Fwd: Re[2]: [FIS] Is information physical?

[tozziarturo]

 Messaggio inoltrato 
Da:  tozziart...@libero.it A: Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be Cc:  
fis@listas.unizar.es Data: giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 03:23PM +02:00
Oggetto: Re[2]: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

>Dear Bruno, 
>You state: 
>"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
>THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>brain/body at that level of description".
>The problem of your account is the following:
>You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
>Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested and 
>it is not empirically testable.  You are starting with a sort of postulate: I, 
>and other people, do not agree with it.  The current neuroscience does not 
>state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a digital machine.
>In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not exist in 
>our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.  
>--
>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da 
>Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :
>
>>(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, with 
>>minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first comment 
>>to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
>>
>>
>>Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
>>
>>
>>Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new 
>>computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
>>This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the end 
>>of the week.
>>
>>
>>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > wrote:
>>>Dear Colleagues,
>>>I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
>>>  Is information physical?
>>
>>That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. 
>>
>>My result here is that 
>>
>>IF  indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, 
>>
>>THEN   “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>>
>>The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from 
>>Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model" 
>>(logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
>>
>>Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>>change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>>brain/body at that level of description.
>>
>>Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all 
>>physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. Physics 
>>is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. 
>>Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic) is 
>>Turing complete (Turing Universal).
>>
>>The basic idea is that:
>>
>>1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an arithmetical 
>>reality or by a physical reality. And,
>>
>>2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are 
>>necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in 
>>arithmetic. 
>>
>>That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my 
>>actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I can 
>>describe more precisely in some future post perhaps).
>>
>>Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we 
>>cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to 
>>recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano 
>>arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first and 
>>third person views (and six others!).
>>
>>I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this (including 
>>the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago.  I was about sure this 
>>would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum mechanics, which 
>>verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism, unless we 
>>add the controversial wave collapse reduction principle.
>>
>>The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many 
>>computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy 
>>becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter 
>>becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person 
>>indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, 
>>…) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that neither matter 
>>appearance nor 

Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 
You state: 
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
brain/body at that level of description".
The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested and 
it is not empirically testable.  You are starting with a sort of postulate: I, 
and other people, do not agree with it.  The current neuroscience does not 
state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a digital machine.
In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not exist in 
our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, with 
>minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first comment to 
>Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
>
>
>Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
>
>
>Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new 
>computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
>This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the end 
>of the week.
>
>
>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > wrote:
>>Dear Colleagues,
>>I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
>>  Is information physical?
>
>That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. 
>
>My result here is that 
>
>IF  indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, 
>
>THEN   “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>
>The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from 
>Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model" 
>(logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
>
>Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>brain/body at that level of description.
>
>Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all 
>physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. Physics 
>is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. 
>Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic) is 
>Turing complete (Turing Universal).
>
>The basic idea is that:
>
>1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an arithmetical 
>reality or by a physical reality. And,
>
>2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are necessarily 
>undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in arithmetic. 
>
>That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my actual 
>state, and see from some first person points of view (something I can describe 
>more precisely in some future post perhaps).
>
>Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we 
>cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to 
>recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano 
>arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first and 
>third person views (and six others!).
>
>I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this (including 
>the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago.  I was about sure this 
>would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum mechanics, which 
>verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism, unless we 
>add the controversial wave collapse reduction principle.
>
>The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many 
>computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy 
>becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter becomes 
>obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person 
>indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, 
>…) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that neither matter 
>appearance nor consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as the whole 
>arithmetical reality—which is a highly non computable notion as we know since 
>Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes Digital Physics leaning to 
>inconsistency, as it implies indexical computationalism which implies the 
>negation of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of anything 
physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable, 
metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.  
Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if information 
is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we NEED to focus 
just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even if physics does 
not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something quantifiable and 
useful for my pragmatic purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable, but 
very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is fashinating, 
but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Hi Lou, Colleagues,
>
>
>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman < kauff...@uic.edu > wrote:
>>Dear Krassimir and Mark,
>>Let us not forget the intermediate question:
>>How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
>>This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
>>assigning existence to that which is relational.
>>
>>The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
>>number 2 exist without any couples?
>>The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
>>in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
>>a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
>>with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
>>assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
>>two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual move, 
>>but
>>I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such a 
>>way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
>>physical
>>except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
>>with the apparent physical.
>>
>>And let us not forget the other question.
>>What is "the physical”?
>>What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
>>generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
>>To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
>>extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
>>attractive or repelling it may seem.
>
>
>Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
>and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
>followers. 
>
>What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
>science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be 
>reduced to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
>contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
>favour the non existence of primary matter (as amazing and counter-intuive 
>this could seem).
>
>What many people seem to miss is that the notion of universal machine and the 
>notion of computations (Turing, Post, Church, Kleene) are purely arithmetical 
>notion. Anyone who is able to believe that (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3) is 
>necessarily either true or false even without verifying which it is, should be 
>able to understand that all computations exists independently of the existence 
>of anything physical, and then a reasoning can show that it is easier to 
>explain the illusion of an otological matter to complex number relation, than 
>to explain the numbers in term of complex relation between primary matter. In 
>fact it is impossible, and the notion of primary matter adds unnecessary 
>insuperable difficulties in the “mind-body” problem.
>
>Now, Landauer, and others, have given some evidence that some notion of 
>information is physical (like quantum information). That does not contradict 
>the idea that information is not physical. The illusion of physical 
>appearances is real, obeys laws, and physics is eventually reduced into an 
>internal statistics on all computations in arithmetic, and that can explain 
>some special form of physical information (and indeed the quantum one is 
>already explained in some testable way).
>
>The origin of information comes from the fact that aTuring machine cannot 
>distinguish the physical reality from the arithmetical reality (which emulates 
>all computations) except by observation. The machines are distributed in 
>infinitely many exemplars in arithmetic, and that defines a sort of indexical 
>differentiating consciousness flux, leading to (collective) sharable deep 
>dreams which we call the physical.
>
>Now, all this is long to explain, and I’m afraid this can look 

Re: [Fis] Information is physical

[tozziarturo]

Dear FISers, 

information is a measurable physical quantity.  

Indeed, it has been claimed that the physical world is made up of information 
itself (Bekenstein 2003), so that our Universe is assessable in pure terms of 
information. The idea that information is the fundamental physical quantity 
dates back to F.W. Kantor (1977).  

In our Universe, information cannot be created or destroyed. The conservation 
of information is derived from quantum field theory, via the quantum Liouville 
theorem (Zeidler 2011).

Therefore, information is here, in the Universe, and its total amount never 
changes (exactly like the amount if energy/matter).  It is like a huge Big Data 
that awaits to be extracted by something or somebody.  Indeed, chunks of such 
information can be extracted, and not just by the human mind, as somebody 
mistakenly says.

To make an example:  it's summer.  My body perceives, through its receptors, 
that it's very hot, and, in order to compensate, I start to sweat.  In this 
case, my body (without the need of my mind!) extracts a termic information from 
its surrounding environment and provides a physiological homeostatic response.  

That's all, folks.  Forget the anthropocentric importance that you give to your 
mind: it's just one of the countless tools able to extract part of the 
available cosmic information.  



NOTE FOR TECHNICAL READERS: 

Here follows the mathematical description of what I said above. 

In thermodynamics, information I can be defined as the negation of 
thermodynamic entropy S (Beck, 2009):

I = -S

Therefore, a bit of thermodynamic entropy stands for the distinction between 
two alternative states in a physical system.

The total entropy embedded inside a system can be quantified through the 
Bekenstein bound. The Bekenstein bound is an upper limit on the thermodynamic 
entropy S (or the information I, according to Shannon (1948)) endowed in a 
space region equipped with a given amount of energy. In other words, the 
Bekenstein bound stands for the maximum quantity of information required to 
describe a physical system down to the quantum level. The universal form of the 
bound can be described as follows (Bekenstein 1973; Bekenstein 1974):

Ssys = ζ

Where Ssys is the cosmic thermodynamic entropy detectable by the observer, A is 
the area of the system, E is the Energy including matter (the total mass-energy 
of the Universe consists of about 1069 Joule), ħ is the reduced Planck 
constant, c is the speed of light, k is the Boltzmann constant, ζ is a factor 
such that 0< ζ<1.

Setting ζ to one in case of the total Ssys, we are allowed to quantify the 
thermodynamic information, by partitioning the factor into a relative 
information component (ζI = 1- ζS) and a relative entropy (ζS = 1- ζI) (Street 
2016):

Isys = ζI = (1- ζS)

In case of loss of information from a system, the bits available for the 
observer decrease. This means that information exits from the system, according 
to the formula:

ΔIsys = = Δ ζS

Where T is the temperature. 






> Il 25 aprile 2018 alle 3.47 "Burgin, Mark"  ha scritto:
> 
> 
> Dear Colleagues,
> 
> I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
> 
>   Is information physical?
> 
> My opinion is presented below:
> 
>  
> 
> 
>Why some people erroneously think that information is physical
> 
>   
> 
>The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong 
> belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical 
> reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter 
> something that they call information.
> 
>When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information 
> because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, 
> i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information 
> is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is 
> information because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail 
> comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are 
> physical. As a result, people start thinking even more that information is 
> physical.
> 
>However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical 
> objects are only carriers or containers of information.
> 
>To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to 
> say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the 
> textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, the 
> textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same is true 
> for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects 
> because all of them only contain information but are not information. For 
> instance, as we know, different letters can contain the same information. 
> Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or any 

Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

[tozziarturo]

Dear Mark, 

the named set theory does not solve the Russell paradox.

Therefore  it would be better to use, in such approaches, the best theory 
available, i.e., the Fraenkel-Zermelo sets. 

In turn, the latter displays some limits: for example, the need of a set with 
infinite elements. 

Therefore, set theory is not able to tackle information problems.

You have to go back to other mathematical approaches. 

  


> Il 21 marzo 2018 alle 23.42 "Burgin, Mark"  ha scritto:
> 
> Dear Krassimir and other FISers,
> 
> After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like to 
> share with you some of my impressions and ideas.
> 
> I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible to 
> suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
> An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by 
> information.
> This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor.
> Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of 
> INFOS. For instance:
>  INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
>  INFOS only with effectors
>  INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
> Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS.
> 
> At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness needs 
> improvement because what many people mean using the word reality is actually 
> only one of the variety of realities, namely, the physical or material 
> reality, while consciousness is a part of the mental reality. It is possible 
> to find more information about different realities and their interaction in 
> the book (Burgin, Structural Reality, 2012). Please, don’t confuse Structural 
> Reality with virtual reality. 
> 
> One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which 
> allows further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the relation 
> (s, e, r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply a triple but a 
> fundamental triad, which is also called a named set.
> 
> Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r) as 
> a fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced mathematical 
> theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition of which is in the 
> book (Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it is possible to use this 
> mathematical theory for studying and using models. For instance, the 
> structure from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s letter is a morphism of named sets. 
> Named set theory describes many properties of such morphism and categories 
> built of named sets and their morphism. The structures from Figure 2 in 
> Krassimir’s letter are chains of named sets, which are also studied in named 
> set theory.
> 
> To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply 
> mathematics in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of 
> mathematics. As Roger Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics, but 
> mathematics provides different devices that are suited to different input. In 
> this respect, when you give good quality grains to a mathematical mill, it 
> outputs good quality flour, while if you put the same grains into a 
> mathematical petrol engine, it outputs trash.
> 
> The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies 
> because named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of information 
> and information processes.
>  
> Sincerely,
> Mark
> 
> On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
> 
> > >  
> > Dear Colleagues,
> >  
> > This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as 
> > follow:
> > - next step in “mental model” explanation;
> > - about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS 
> > Sci-coins.
> >  
> > 1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:
> >  
> > Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.
> >  
> > To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal, 
> > human, society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [1] we use the 
> > abstract concept “INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of 
> > artificial creatures which has features similar to the former ones.
> >  
> > Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to 
> > operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is possible - 
> > via effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality some of its 
> > (self-) reflections from its consciousness.
> >  
> > The commutative diagram on Figure 1 represents modeling relations. 
> > In the frame of diagram:
> > - in reality: real models: s is a model of r,
> > - in consciousness: mental models: si is a mental model of ri;
> > - between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating 
> > mental 

Re: [Fis] a short survey on the “mental models”

[tozziarturo]

Dear Krassimir, 

I agree with you. 

In our framework, your second type (deductive) exists only at the high 
DIMENSIONAL level of the brain.  

When I see a three-dimensional cat, my mind adds to the 3D picture other 
features (we call them dimensions), such as: I start to think that its name is 
Jack, it is a feline, it is nice and tender, and so on. 

The only difference from your account is that, according to our framework, we 
can (leaving apart the human language, that is something more subjective) 
physically quantify such higher dimensions.  And we tried to demonstrate how 
such process is feasible: 

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11571-017-9428-2


Ciao!

> Il 17 marzo 2018 alle 17.59 Krassimir Markov  ha scritto:
> 
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>  
> The Plato’s allegory about prisoners in the cave (maybe!) is one of the 
> first attempts to pay attention to consciousness models [Plato, 2002, Book 
> VII, p. 373]. Let remember that the best candidate for such kind of prisoner 
> is the brain, including ones of all kinds of Infoses. (To avoid 
> misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal, human, society, 
> humanity, living creatures, etc., we use the abstract concept “INFOS” to 
> denote every of them as well as all of artificial creatures which has 
> features similar to the former ones [Markov et al, 2007]).
>  
> There are at least two types of models created by and in the Infos’ 
> consciousness - isomorphic (correspond) to the structure of input from the 
> sensors (called in cognitive science “mental models” [Johnson-Laird, 1983]) 
> and not isomorphic (textual in any language) (called “deductive, analytic, or 
> logical models” [Wittgenstein, 1922]).
>  
> Both models are very important but the second type (deductive) exists 
> only at the high level and very complex organized Infoses (humans, societies, 
> humanity). For deductive modeling one needs a language as a tool for 
> modeling. Maybe some animals have some language possibilities but they are 
> not enough for deductive modeling.
>  
> Now I shall continue with a short survey on the “mental models”.
> In the next post I shall discuss the deductive models.
>  
> For humans, the mental models are psychological representations of real, 
> hypothetical, or imaginary situations.
> The mental model theory was established by Philip Johnson-Laird in 
> [Johnson-Laird, 1983] and has proven extremely powerful in predicting and 
> explaining higher-level cognition in humans [MMRW, 2018].
>  
> For other types of Infoses, the mental models correspond to the level of 
> consciousness organization, for instance art is a kind of “social mental 
> model”.
>  
> In 1896, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce had postulated 
> that reasoning is a process by which a human: “examines the state of things 
> asserted in the premises, forms a diagram of that state of things, perceives 
> in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the 
> premises, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the diagram that these 
> relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a certain 
> proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth.” 
> [Peirce, 1896].
>  
> In Wittgenstein’s “picture” theory of the meaning of language, mental 
> models have a structure that corresponds to the structure of what they 
> represent [Wittgenstein, 1922]. They are accordingly akin to architects’ 
> models of buildings, to molecular biologists’ models of complex molecules, 
> and to physicists’ diagrams of particle interactions.
>  
> In 1943, the Scottish psychologist Kenneth Craik had proposed a similar 
> idea:
> “... human thought has a definite function; it provides a convenient 
> small-scale model of a process so that we can, for instance, design a bridge 
> in our minds and know that it will bear a train passing over it instead of 
> having to conduct a number of full-scale experiments; and the thinking of 
> animals represents on a more restricted scale the ability to represent, say, 
> danger before it comes and leads to avoidance instead of repeated bitter 
> experience” [Craik, 1943, page 59].
> “If the organism carries a 'small-scale model' of external reality and of 
> its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various 
> alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations 
> before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the 
> present and future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, and 
> more competent manner to the emergencies which face it” [Craik, 1943, page 
> 61].
>  
> Since Craik’s insight, cognitive scientists have argued that the mind 
> constructs mental models as a result of perception, imagination and 
> knowledge, and the comprehension of discourse. They study how 

[Fis] Welcome, novel weapons!

[tozziarturo]

Dear FISers, Welcome, Dataism!Apart from the suggested "metaphysical" and sociological implications, Dataism, born officially in 2013, provides novel tools and opportunities to an otherwise frustrating landscape.  Indeed, despite the progresses in the very last years, we do not have still the weapons to crack the codes of the life, the brain, the quantum dynamics.  Welcome, therefore, to the novel weapons!So that, I hope, scientists will stop discuss about the (scientifically) useless accounts of Plato, Aristotle, Peirce, Wittgenstein, Maturana, Quine, and so on. Tha ancients are not better, nor wiser, than ourselves. They deserve our respect, but not our faith, because, thinking well, they, due to their lack of scientifical knowledge, said, among a few wise things, a lot of bollocks.  I hope, simply, in fresh tools that could be able to improve our scientific ability to discover novelties.  
 
___
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Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] What is the “mental model”?

[tozziarturo]

> head>Il 23 febbraio 2018 alle 20.47 PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ 
>  ha scritto:
> 
> 
> Dear Krassimir and FIS colleagues,
> 
>  
> 
> Many thanks for your message & effort to prepare the compilation to be 
> published soon. It is good counting with dissemination works that take these 
> information debates to different environments so that new insights and 
> conceptual cross fertilizations may occur. (These weeks I have been rather 
> absent minded, involved with the nasty task of closing my desk room and 
> having to transport home all my archives--throwing away lots and lots of 
> reprints and docs. No space available at home! It was very fatiguing. 
> Hopefully it is almost over.) Well, about Arturo's last comment, am sorry 
> about having to leave out of science most of research activities of last 
> centuries, including some of the Greatest Founding Books of Biology 
> (Darwin's), Neuroscience (Ramon y Cajal's, Sherrington's) and many others. No 
> maths there! Watson & Crick's arch-famous paper with the DNA report had no 
> maths either... They all will join the heaps of papers I discarded! Well, 
> more seriously, FIS was conceived to articulate a common ground in between 
> the different info worlds, utterly separated, taking from the 
> physical/computational, to the biological/neuronal, and to the 
> personal/social. There was, and there is, no immediate "informational" 
> connection at all. Perhaps after taking various steps behind each one of 
> these realms, a sort of general interconnecting thread could be discovered; 
> this is what we thought long ago. Hélas, as all these years discussions have 
> witnessed, the itinerary resembles an intransitable Moebius band rather than 
> a linear path... But at least there is fun in the attempt.
> 
> About data, "dataism", and some other curiosities we will have a new 
> discussion session at the end of next week. Raquel del Moral will present the 
> chair of this new session.
> 
> Best wishes to all,
> 
> --Pedro
> 
>  
> 
> On Wed, 21 Feb 2018 20:50:08 +0200 "Krassimir Markov" wrote:
> 
> blockquote>
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
> 
>  
> 
> The main result of our paper “Data versus Information” is the 
> understanding that the data and information are different (external and 
> internal kinds of reflection for subjective consciousness), i.e. "Information 
> = data + something in and by consciousness"
> 
>  
> 
> After publishing the paper, Arturo wrote an important remark and I 
> promise to answer in this letter. In private conversation we had discussed 
> some aspects. The conversation was interesting but it is not available for 
> the FIS-list and I have no permission to publish it. Because of this I will 
> use abstract form of questions (Q) and answers (A).
> 
> Dear Arturo, I apologize in advance but I hope there is nothing bad in 
> this and it will be useful.
> 
>  
> 
> The remark of Arturo was: I'm just annoyed that the most represented 
> position among FISers, i.e., that information is an objective, quantitative, 
> physical measure linked to informational entropy, has not been taken into 
> account at all.  After all our efforts to maintain our firm position, we have 
> been censored.
> 
>  
> 
> (A):  Usually we say “we collect information” measuring different 
> real features – temperature, distance, weigh, etc. Scientists from physics do 
> this permanently.
> 
> p> 
> 
>  
> 
> The methodical error here is that really we collect data.
> 
>  
> 
> After processing the data in the consciousness, the information may be 
> created in it. Reflections (data) exist everywhere, but information exists 
> only in consciousness. It is important that information in the consciousness 
> of one subject is external for another, i.e. it is data for him/her.
> 
>  
> 
> Yes, I know that many people believe in the opposite, but still there are 
> no scientific basics this believing to become scientific theory.
> 
>  
> 
> I am mathematician who had worked in the institute of mathematics more 
> than 40 years and, in particular, I have taught probability and statistics. I 
> absolutely clearly know (and every good mathematician knows!) that the 
> probabilities are a human model and do not exist in the reality. Because of 
> this, all definitions of information based on probability are the same what 
> we had published in the paper. This kind of information exits only in the 
> concrete human consciousness!
> 
>  
> 
> The rest is data; sometimes called: "statistical data".
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> (Q):   Statistics is so important, that we can quantify the 
> standpoint of our reality, i.e., quantum mechanics, just through statistical 
> tools. If you negate statistics in the study of reality, you fully destroy 
> the medicine, the scientific method and 

Re: [Fis] The FIS paper "Data versus Information " is published

[tozziarturo]

Dear, prominent Authors,

You write in this paper: " Several posts are not included in the text below due 
to lack of permission from their authors".

I think that several post were not included in the text just because they were 
too critical against the loose, flabby concepts of information provided in this 
paper. 

Some contributions are very interesting, but others deserve the despising label 
of pseudoscience. 

On the other side, If you provide ELEVEN (more or less, I cannot be sure, I 
counted it, but I lost my attention after the Greeek Gods...) different 
definitions of information, how do you hope to be trusted? 

Forgive me to be honest, but FIS means also harsh discussion!  



> Il 18 febbraio 2018 alle 20.49 Krassimir Markov  ha scritto:
> 
> Dear Pedro and FIS Colleagues,
>  
> I am glad to inform you that the paper which was created by a group of 
> FIS members is ready.
> It is published with open access in the International Journal 
> “Information Theories and Applications”, Volume 24, Number 4, pages 303-321.
>  
> The title of the paper is “Data versus Information“.
> It contains a small part of FIS discussions but it is representative how 
> creative is the FIS society!
> Many thanks to authors of the paper – more than three months we work on 
> the paper!
>  
> Links:
> IJ ITA Vol. 24:  http://www.foibg.com/ijita/vol24/ijita-fv24.htm
> Direct link to the paper: 
> http://www.foibg.com/ijita/vol24/ijita24-04-p01.pdf
>  
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> 


 

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> 


Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/ 
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Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[tozziarturo]

Dear Karl, 

your analysis about Wittgenstein does not take into account the second 
Wittgenstein, who repudiated his own idea from the Tractatus. 

I think, in touch with Carnap on other issues, that the use of the terms 
"symbol", "signal", "marker", "information" into scientific sentences does not 
mean anything. Such use gives rise to metaphysical (in its worst meaning) 
pseudosentences, because the propositions containing the terms "symbol", 
"signal", "marker", "information" can neither verified (in the Schlick sense), 
nor confirmed (in the Carnap sense), nor falsified (in the Popper sense), not 
statistically assessed (in the Reichenbach or Shannon sense). 

Therefore, I think, we are talking about pseudopropositions: there is not a way 
to empirically test the propositions containing the useless terms "symbol", 
"signal", "marker", "information".  Therefore, as always, and sorry to be 
boring and bothering, I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific 
adventures  the terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information".   

I'm deeply horrified by such residuals of the ancient Hermes Trismegstus' 
hermetic conceptions in our current scientific vocabulary and practice.  We are 
not dwarves on the shoulders of giants, we are giants on the shoulders of 
dwarves.


> Il 10 febbraio 2018 alle 19.36 Karl Javorszky  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> 
>  
> 
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms 
> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome 
> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when 
> creating great works.
> 
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical 
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. 
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> 
>  
> 
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by 
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he has 
> been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that 
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on 
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is opaque; 
> not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway 
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
> 
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of 
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate 
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is 
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a 
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only 
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. 
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an 
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an 
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised 
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding 
> so long.
> 
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are 
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his results 
> show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical words, the 
> collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial problem. 
> This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a tool of 
> sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in a 
> semantic fashion.
> 
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that 
> Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that 
> real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical 
> sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside 
> philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a 
> number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers 
> are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out 
> later for what they stand.
> 
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The 
> only noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that 
> old dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering 
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too 
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that 
> one executes by routine.
> 
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible 
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to 
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could 
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority 

Re: [Fis] Summing up: New Year Lecture

[tozziarturo]

Dear Karl, 

your words are so intriguing, that I will shamelessy quote them (and you, of 
course!), in my next papers.  I like very much your concept of sequential as 
well as commutative symbols in a biological context.  

Concerning your very interesting issue of the possible working principle that 
elucidates the interaction between sequences and mixtures, I have a (shameless, 
of course!) idea of mine:  http://vixra.org/abs/1801.0117


Again, thanks a lot for your very nice comment. 

And hallo to Pedro, who, it seems absourd, has to leave.  With his enthusiasm, 
he is surely younger that the most of my patients!  ...and I an a 
pediatrician...


 

 

> Il 2 febbraio 2018 alle 13.08 Karl Javorszky  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> Dear Arturo,
> 
>  
> 
> thank you for your forceful presentation of contemporary thoughts on 
> theoretical biology, specifically the problem of what the term “genetic 
> identity” in actual fact means.
> 
>  
> 
> Your handyman offers you tools which support that what you say. You say: 
> “ … Here we ask: what does “matching description” mean? Has it something to 
> do with “identity”? Going through different formulations of the principle of 
> identity, we describe diverse possible meanings of the term “matching 
> description”. …”
> 
> A very simple solution is to enumerate each and all of the variants of 
> whatever can have a description. Then we switch to a different describing 
> system and again describe all variants of whatever can have a description. 
> This is like making an inventory of the contents of one’s office: once with 
> regard to the things’ colour, once to their size. To each description we 
> attach a natural number. The inventory number of the red coffee cup on the 
> table will be probably different in the inventory list based on things’ 
> colour, to the inventory number of the same cup in the inventory list 
> according to size. The next step is to look for rules that allow matching the 
> two inventory numbers. Then we have “matching descriptions”.
> 
> In genetics, the combinatorial problem becomes quite evident. We 
> enumerate along time and we enumerate across time, too. We count the 
> sequential place of the elements of the DNA, and match this sequence to the 
> contemporary composition that is the living organism. Life happens in the 
> moment, across the temporal line, while the rules of assemblage and 
> maintenance are registered in a sequential form, along the temporal line.
> 
> We overcome the difficulty by employing as symbols for a general method 
> of enumeration the sequential number of the element within its cycle during 
> reorders. These symbols are as well sequential as well commutative. Symbols 
> that are both commutative and sequential are the basis for counting 
> consistently.
> 
> The picture becomes rather entertaining, as one finds that Nature uses a 
> clever little accounting trick. If one deals with a dozen or so cycles of 
> about 6 elements each, one can switch between how many, when, where and what 
> almost at one’s wishes. The working principle of the numeric connector 
> between enumerating across and along a sequence is explained 
> inhttp://www.oeis.org/A242615 . As said before, if we look at 66 elements all 
> at the same time (in a commutative fashion), what remains to be predicted, is 
> where specific combinations of symbols are to be expected. If we see 11 
> sequenced groups of 6 elements each, we can predict when, where and what will 
> be existing (contemporary).
> 
> The interaction between sequences and mixtures is a real, disruptive 
> game-changer. One has to re-learn all the basics of arithmetic. The positive 
> side is, that after having understood which basic rounding errors one has 
> learnt at elementary school, unlearning these and instead learning to use a 
> stricter concept of consistently counting, during this process of 
> self-education one will have found the answers to the questions you so 
> eloquently present.
> 
> PS.:  
> 
> 1) J Theor Biol 2000 Aug 21; 205(4):663-6 Interaction between sequences 
> and mixtures
> 
> 2) The lecture series: Learn to Count in Twelve Easy Steps was given in 
> FIS in 2013
> 
>
> 
> 
> 
> 2018-02-01 17:54 GMT+01:00  mailto:tozziart...@libero.it >:
> 
> > > 
> > Dear Karl and Pedro, 
> > 
> > A unifying principle underlies the organization of physical and 
> > biological systems. It relates to a well-known topological theorem which 
> > succinctly states that an activity on a planar circumference projects to 
> > two activities with “matching description” into a sphere. Here we ask: what 
> > does “matching description” mean? Has it something to do with “identity”? 
> > Going through different formulations of the principle of identity, we 
> > describe diverse possible meanings of the term “matching description”. We 
> > 

Re: [Fis] Summing up: New Year Lecture

[tozziarturo]

Dear Karl and Pedro, 

A unifying principle underlies the organization of physical and biological 
systems. It relates to a well-known topological theorem which succinctly states 
that an activity on a planar circumference projects to two activities with 
“matching description” into a sphere. Here we ask: what does “matching 
description” mean? Has it something to do with “identity”? Going through 
different formulations of the principle of identity, we describe diverse 
possible meanings of the term “matching description”. We demonstrate that the 
concepts of “sameness”, “equality”, “belonging together” stand for intertwined 
levels with mutual interactions. By showing that “matching” description is a 
very general and malleable concept, we provide a novel testable approach to 
“identity” that yields helpful insights into physical and biological matters. 
Indeed, we illustrate how a novel mathematical approach derived from the 
Borsuk-Ulam theorem, termed bio-BUT, might explain the astonishing biological 
“multiplicity from identity” of evolving living beings as well as their 
biochemical arrangements.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610717302055



> Il 1 febbraio 2018 alle 17.16 Karl Javorszky  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> Biodiversity and Cartography
> 
>  
> 
> The excellent summary by Pedro of the session just past highlights 
> several different areas of processes, which appear to be interrelated at 
> least in some methodological ways. Pedro says in effect: “… systems such as 
> circulatory, pulmonary, renal, brain, etc. …” appear to work in a comparable 
> fashion, which has probably to do with fusing of two different spaces into 
> one common space.
> 
>  
> 
> Please allow me to propose a visualisation. We see a landscape with hills 
> and valleys. Some local biotopes have evolved, in which specific flora and 
> fauna are endemic, well adapted to their respective local circumstances. We 
> suspect that there are common traits present in the management of the diverse 
> habitats, with some obviously sustainable feedback loops – otherwise the area 
> would be barren. In this allegory, if one investigates the functions in 
> circulatory systems, one would be likened to someone investigating insect 
> life in a rainy forest in a division of our imagined landscape. A person 
> looking into the workings of the renal systems could be seen as a team 
> investigating the life of mammals in a savanna.
> 
>  
> 
> Among these field workers, a land surveyor tries to find someone who 
> would be interested in a new way to formalise the parameters of each and all 
> of the habitats, and tabulate every possible variety of anything that lives 
> in any of the habitats. This invention is way beyond the needs of any of the 
> field teams investigating the adaptations the fauna had to undergo due to the 
> properties of the flora, or partly the other way around. The teams have heard 
> about trigonometry and satellite positioning, but they are not involved with 
> the infrastructure of science. It would take a road building engineer to see 
> slopes and angles everywhere, and of that profession are the biologists not. 
> The teams could have heard about continual change, because they understand 
> that change is what life is all about, but they had never thought to be 
> possible to actually use measurable change tools like one uses a scalable 
> microscope.
> 
>  
> 
> Trigonometry would have remained a special pastime for scientists, had 
> not lenses, oculars and sextants been produced to the necessary degree of 
> mechanical precision. For the applications of trigonometry to become 
> ubiquitous in our everyday life, it was necessary to have achieved progress 
> in fine mechanics and precision measurement tools. The technology had to keep 
> step with the ideas. Both the ideas were present and the tools have become 
> available. The innovation could become integrated into the culture.
> 
>  
> 
> Presently, we try to understand the concept of information. In Pedro’s 
> words: “… two 3D projections are fused into a 4D one. The gain in information 
> is evident …”. The implication of Pedro’s thought is that sequences, 
> generally: order, are depositories of information, which gets – in a fashion 
> – released or actualised in the moment of the fusion of two spaces into a 
> common, third, space.
> 
> This state of affairs puts the problem with technology and ideas on its 
> head. We do have the technology to produce any kind of imaginable order and 
> disorder and to find such closed loops that are self-replicating. What we 
> lack presently is the understanding by the prospective users that they need 
> such a tool, and that such a tool is a) thinkable, b) designable, c) 
> realisable, d) working, e) useful.   
> 
>  
> 
> To give an example:
> 
> The two spaces Pedro refers to are well defined. They can be 

Re: [Fis] Summing up: New Year Lecture

[tozziarturo]

Dear FiSers, 

gamechanging?  Look at here: 

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29310692


Ciao!

> Il 22 gennaio 2018 alle 13.01 "Pedro C. Marijuan"  
> ha scritto:
> 
> Dear FISers,
> 
> Going to the extreme, I think this year opening lecture can be summarized 
> in three contentious points.
> 
> 1. That life's physiology is based on the conjunction of a few 
> principles: neguentropy, chemiosmosis, and homeostasis-homeorhesis.
> 
> 2. That communication (cell signaling) is an essential factor in the 
> multicellular evolution towards complexity.
> 
> 3. That epigenetic inheritance and the obligate recursion to the 
> unicellular state become the basis of a new evolutionary theory.
> 
> I disagree with point 1, as I think some nonliving states could also be 
> characterized by those principles (eg, chemical cycles/hypercycles in marine 
> vents, and other outcomes derived from "energy flows"); besides, some 
> previous "info stuff" has to be in place. Then I completely agree with point 
> 2, for signaling is not just another characteristic of the cell, it is "the" 
> eukaryotic trait par excellence.  And I am curious on how point 3 could be 
> further substantiated... In this respect I recommend the two papers that Bill 
> sent to the list a few weeks ago. Do we need to postulate the emergence of a 
> form of "self-referential cognition" right at the beginning?
> Perhaps!
> 
> All the best--Pedro
> 
> 
>  
> El 09/01/2018 a las 19:05, Bill escribió:
> 
> > > Dear Pedro and Colleagues,
> > 
> > I have been following the thread of comments with great interest, 
> > all of  which have all been occasioned by John Torday's profound insights 
> > about the nature of evolutionary development in light of the importance of 
> > cell-cell signaling and molecular biology.  From the comments, it is clear 
> > that there is a strong impulse to seek a means of integrating the role of 
> > symbiogenesis, viruses and mobile elements, multilevel selection, niche 
> > construction, genomic plasticity into a common narrative with an 
> > informational perspective at its foundation.
> > In the spirit of that line of discussion, I am offering two 
> > links that discuss evolution as an biologic information management system. 
> > Some of this work shares direct commonality with John's, since he and I are 
> > frequent collaborators. 
> > 
> > http://www.mdpi.com/2079-7737/5/2/21/htm
> > 
> > https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071730233X
> > 
> > Both of these articles can be considered as complementary to 
> > Pedro's very fine article, 'How prokaryotes ‘encode’ their environment: 
> > Systemic tools for organizing the information flow', which is in BioSystems.
> > 
> > I am grateful to John for inviting me to participate in the forum 
> > and to Pedro for encouraging me to share these manuscripts.
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > Bill
> > 
> > William B. Miller, Jr., M.D.
> > 602-463-5236
> > wbmill...@cox.net mailto:wbmill...@cox.net
> > 
> > > 
> -- 
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta 0
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> - 
> 


 

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> Fis mailing list
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> 


Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/ 
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[Fis] Math, math, math!

[tozziarturo]

Dear FISers,

My so called pseudoscience has been published in not dispisable journals, for a 
simple reason: I provide what is required by truly scientific reviewers, i.e., 
testable mathematical predictions.  


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Re: [Fis] A PROPOSAL ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF INFORMATION

[tozziarturo]

Dear Sung, 
I'm sorry, but the "Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics" still holds 
true.  
Forget philosophical concepts like Yin and Yang, because, in some cases and 
contexts , entropy is negative.  
Just to make an example,
"Since the entropy H(S|O) can now become negative, erasing a system can result 
in a net gain of work (and a corresponding cooling of the environment)."
https://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v474/n7349/full/nature10123.html
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android venerdì, 13 ottobre 2017, 10:11PM +02:00 da 
Sungchul Ji  s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu :

>Hi Arturo,
>
>( 1 )  I don't understand where you got (or how you can justify) S = 1 J/K in 
>your statement,
>
>" With the same probability mass function, you can see that H = S/(ln(2)*k B ),
> so setting S = 1J/K gives a Shannon entropy of 1.045×10 23  bits."
>
>( 2 ) I can see how one can get H = S/(ln(2)*k_B mathematically, but what does 
>this equality mean physically
> ?
>( 3 ) This reminds me of what Schroedinger did when he came up with the 
>conclusion that "negative entropy" is
> equivalent to "order", which led to Brillouin's so-called the "negentropy 
> Principle of Information (NPI)" [1, 2].
>
>Simply by multiplying the both sides of the Boltzmann equation with negative 
>one, Schroedinger obtained the following formula:
>
> - S = - k lnW = k ln (1/W)
>
>and then equating W with disorder, D, led him to 
>
>- S = k ln (1/D).
>
>Since (1/D) can be interpreted as the opposite of "disorder", namely, "order", 
>he concluded that
>
>"negative entropy = order".
>
>As you can see, the above derivation is mathematically sound but the result 
>violates the Third Law of Thermodynamics,
> according to which thermodynamic entropy cannot be less than zero.
>
>Thus, in 2012 I was led to formulate what I called the "Schroedinger paradox" 
>as follows [3]
>
>"Schroedinger's paradox refers to the mathematical equations, concepts, or 
>general statements that are formally true
> but physically meaningless." 
>
>( 4 ) If my argument in ( 3 ) is valid, this may provide an example of what 
>may be called 
>
>the " Unreasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics "
>
>which, together with Wigner's " Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics ", 
>may constitute an Yin-Yang pair
> of mathematics.  
>
>All the best.
>
>Sung
>
>
>
> 
>
>
>
>
>
>References:
>   [1]   Brillouin, L. (1953).  Negentropy Principle of Information, J. 
>Applied Phys. 24 (9),
> 1152- 1163.
>   [2]  Brillouin, L. (1956).  Science and Information Theory, Academic Press, 
>Inc., New York, pp. 152-156.
>   [3] Ji, S. (2012).   The Third Law of  Thermodynamics  and  “Schroedinger’s
> Paradox” .  In: Molecular Theory of the Living
> Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications.   
> Springer, New York.  pp. 12-15.  
> PDF at  http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Schroedinger_pa 
> radox.pdf
>
> 
>
>
>
>
>--
>From: tozziart...@libero.it < tozziart...@libero.it >
>Sent: Friday, October 13, 2017 4:43 AM
>To: Sungchul Ji;  fis@listas.unizar.es
>Subject: R: Re: [Fis] A PROPOSAL ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF INFORMATION
> 
>Dear Sung, 
>One J/K corresponds to 1.045×10 23  bits.
>
>Indeed, 
>The Gibbs entropy formula states that thermodynamic entropy S equals k B 
>*sum[p i *ln(1/p i )],
> with units of J/K, where k B  is
> the Boltzmann constant and p i  is
> the probability of microstate i. On the other hand, the Shannon entropy is 
> defined as H = sum[p i *log 2 (1/p i )],
> with units of bits. With the same probability mass function, you can see that 
> H = S/(ln(2)*k B ),
> so setting S = 1J/K gives a Shannon entropy of 1.045×10 23  bits.
>
>On the other side, The energy consumption per bit of data on  the Internet is 
>around 75 μJ at low access rates and decreases  to
> around 2-4 μJ at an access rate of 100 Mb/s.
>see: 
>http://www.ing.unitn.it/~fontana/GreenInternet/Recent%20Papers%20and%20p2p/Baliga_Ayre_Hinton_Sorin_Tucker_JLT0
> . pdf
>
>Futher,  according to Landauer's theory, a minimum amount of heat – roughly 10 
>–21  J
> per erased bit – must be dissipated when information is destroyed.
>http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2012/mar/12/wiping-data-will-cost-you-energy
>
>
>In other words, summarizing, if you use the free energy to assess the 
>information, it works the same, giving a quantifiable value.  
>
>
>Arturo Tozzi
>AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/  
>
>
>>Messaggio originale
>>Da: "Sungchul Ji" < s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu >
>>Data: 12/10/2017 22.08
>>A: "Francesco Rizzo"< 13francesco.ri...@gmail.com >, "Pedro C. Marijuan"< 
>>pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es >
>>Cc: "fis@listas.unizar.es >> fis@listas.unizar.es"< fis@listas.unizar.es >
>>Ogg: Re: [Fis] A PROPOSAL ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF INFORMATION
>>
>>Hi FISers,
>>
>>The following statement 

[Fis] Fwd: Re[2]: Heretic

[tozziarturo]

 Messaggio inoltrato 
Da:  tozziart...@libero.it A: Alex Hankey  alexhan...@gmail.com Data: 
mercoledì, 04 ottobre 2017, 07:37PM +02:00
Oggetto: Re[2]: [Fis] Heretic

>Dear Prof. Hankey,
>I come from a free country, where everybody can say his own opinion, in 
>particular if his opinion is not totally stupid.  
>The times of Giordano Bruno and Inquisition are gone.  
>
>--
>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android mercoledì, 04 ottobre 2017, 06:20PM +02:00 
>da Alex Hankey  alexhan...@gmail.com :
>
>>Dear Professor Tozzi, 
>>
>>Might I suggest that you graciously retire from the list, 
>>as you evidently do not wish to participate in what 
>>the rest of us find fascinating topics of discussion. 
>>
>>As a physicist, I have no difficulty in relating to the concept of 
>>'information',
>>and I am aware of no less than five conceptually totally different 
>>mathematical structures, all of which merit the name, 'information'.
>>
>>With all good wishes, 
>>
>>Alex Hankey 
>>
>>
>>On 4 October 2017 at 02:30,  < tozziart...@libero.it > wrote:
>>>Dear FISers,
>>>After the provided long list of completely different definitions of the term 
>>>"information", one conclusion is clear: there is not a scientific, unique 
>>>definition of information.
>>>Nobody of us is able to provide an operative framework and a single (just 
>>>one!) empirical  testable prevision able to assess "information".  
>>>For example, what does "semantics" and "meaning" mean, in empirical terms?
>>>Therefore, to talk about information is meaningless, in the carnapian sense. 
>>> 
>>>Judging from your answers, the most of you are foremost scientists.  
>>>Therefore, my proposal is to forget about information, and to use your 
>>>otherwise very valuable skills and efforts in other fields.
>>>It is a waste of your  precious time to focus yourself in something that is 
>>>so vague.  It is, retrospectively, a mistake to state that the world is 
>>>information, if nobody knows what does it mean.  
>>>--
>>>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
>>>___
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>>>Fis@listas.unizar.es
>>>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>-- 
>>Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
>>Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
>>SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
>>Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India  
>>Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 
>>Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
>>
>>
>>2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics 
>>and Phenomenological Philosophy
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[Fis] Heretic 2

[tozziarturo]

In sum, 
I will never use anymore in my papers the useless term "information".
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[Fis] Heretic

[tozziarturo]

Dear FISers,
After the provided long list of completely different definitions of the term 
"information", one conclusion is clear: there is not a scientific, unique 
definition of information.
Nobody of us is able to provide an operative framework and a single (just one!) 
empirical  testable prevision able to assess "information".  
For example, what does "semantics" and "meaning" mean, in empirical terms?
Therefore, to talk about information is meaningless, in the carnapian sense.  
Judging from your answers, the most of you are foremost scientists.  Therefore, 
my proposal is to forget about information, and to use your otherwise very 
valuable skills and efforts in other fields.
It is a waste of your  precious time to focus yourself in something that is so 
vague.  It is, retrospectively, a mistake to state that the world is 
information, if nobody knows what does it mean.  
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Re: [Fis] Principles of IS

[tozziarturo]

Dear FISers,
Hi!
...a very hot discussion...
I think that it is not useful to talk about Aristotle, Plato and Ortega y 
Gasset, it the modern context of information... their phylosophical, not 
scientific approach, although marvelous, does not provide insights in a purely 
scientific issue such the information we are talking about... 
Once and forever, it must be clear that information is a physical quantity.  
Please read (it is not a paper of mine!): 
Street S.  2016.  Neurobiology as information physics.  Frontiers in Systems 
neuroscience.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5108784/
In short, Street shows how information can be clearly defined in terms of 
Bekenstein entropy!
Sorry, 
and BW...
Arturo Tozzi
AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
Pediatrician ASL Na2­Nord, Italy
Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
http://arturotozzi.w­ebnode.it/ 
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android venerdì, 29 settembre 2017, 01:31PM +02:00 
da Rafael Capurro  raf...@capurro.de :

>Dear Pedro,
>
>thanks for food for thought. When talking about communication we
>  should not forget that Wiener defines cybernetics as "the theory
>  of messages" (not: as the theory of information) (Human use of
>  human beings, London 1989, p. 15, p. 77 "cybernetics, or the
>  theory of messages" et passim) Even for Shannon uses the
>  (undefined) concept of message 'as' what is transmitted (which is
>  not information) is of paramount importance. And so also at the
>  level of cell-cell communication. 
>
>The code or the difference message/messenger is, I think, a key
>  for interpreting biological processes. In this sense,
>  message/messanger are 'archai' (in the Aristotelian) sense for
>  different sciences (no reductionism if we want to focus on the
>  differences between the phenomena). 'Archai' are NOT 'general
>  concepts' (as you suggest) but originating forces that underline
>  the phenomena in their manifestations 'as' this or that.
>
>From this perspective, information (following Luhmann) is the
>  process of interpretation taking place at the receiver. When a
>  cell, excuse me these thoughts from a non-biologist, receives a
>  message transmitted by a messenger, then the main issue is from
>  the perspective of the cell, to interpret this message (with a
>  special address or 'form' supposed to 'in-form' the cell) 'as'
>  being relevant for it. Suppose this interpretation is wrong in the
>  sense that the message causes death (to the cell or the whole
>  organism), then the re-cognition system (its immune system also)
>  of the cell fails. Biological fake news, so to speak, with mortal
>  consequences due to failures in the communication.
>
>best
>
>Rafael
>>Dear FISers,
>>
>>I also agree with Ji and John Torday about the tight
>>relationship between information and communication. Actually
>>Principle 5 was stating : "Communication/information exchanges
>>among adaptive life-cycles underlie the complexity of biological
>>organizations at all scales." However, let me suggest that we do
>>not enter immediately in the discussion of cell-cell
>>communication, because it is very important and perhaps demands
>>some more exchanges on the preliminary info matters. 
>>
>>May I return to principles and Aristotle? I think that Rafael
>>and Michel are talking more about principles as general concepts
>>than about principles as those peculiar foundational items that
>>allow the beginning of a new scientific discourse. Communication
>>between principles of the different disciplines is factually
>>impossible (or utterly irrelevant): think on the connection
>>between Euclidean geometry and politics, biology, etc. I think
>>Ortega makes right an interpretation about that. When Aristotle
>>makes the first classification of the sciences, he is continuing
>>with that very idea. Theoretical sciences, experimental or
>>productive sciences, and applied or practical sciences--with an
>>emphasis on the explanatory theoretical power of both physics
>>and mathematics (ehm, Arturo will agree fully with him). I have
>>revisited my old reading notes and I think that the Aristotelian
>>confrontation with the Platonic approach to the unity of
>>knowledge that Ortega comments is extremely interesting for our
>>current debate on information principles. 
>>
>>There is another important aspect related to the first three
>>principles in my original message (see at the bottom). It would
>>be rather strategic to achieve a consensus on the futility of
>>struggling for a universal information definition. Then, the
>>tautology of the first principle ("info is info") is a way to
>>sidestep that definitional aspect. Nevertheless, it is 

Re: [Fis] A PRAGMATIC LANGUAGE FOR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES

[tozziarturo]

Dear Bruno, 
Thanks for your nice and kind comments!
I'm honoured that you got through my manuscript.
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android lunedì, 25 settembre 2017, 07:47PM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Dear Arturo,
>
>
>On 24 Sep 2017, at 21:35,  tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
>>Dear FISers,
>>
>>This text is brief is an effort to provide a viable solution for a double 
>>concern:
>>a)    1)  the proliferation of models, theories and interpretations that 
>>suggest pseudoscientific explanations (e.g., lacking the even theoretical 
>>possibility of empiric testability) for not-observable quantities, such as 
>>“God”, the “quantum brain”, “phenomenalistic” accounts of experience, 
>>“holistic” accounts of “Nirvana-like” psychological states, “observer-based 
>>information”, “string theories”, “quantum loop gravity” theories, and so on.
>>b)     2)  the attitude of scientists to generalize their results beyond 
>>their own experimental observations.  For example, it is easy to read, in the 
>>CONCLUSIONS of good papers, claims such as: “we demonstrated that some 
>>Primates acquired the vision of the red; this occurred because this novel 
>>ability gave them the evolutionary benefit to detect red soft fruits in the 
>>green bushes’ background”. 
>> 
>>In order to avoid the inconsistencies that undermine the (otherwise good) 
>>legitimacy of scientific claims and to make them as accurate as possible, 
>>here we provide a few suggestions concerning the very structure of scientific 
>>propositions.
>>Our formulation of the required language for scientific propositions wants to 
>>be as simple as possible and, at the same time, to encompass syntactic, 
>>semantic and pragmatic concerns.    We take into account the claims of 
>>several Authors and sources who tackled the difficult issue to cope with the 
>>structure of scientific language: Galileo, Mach, Frege, Brower, Carnap, 
>>Popper, Quine, Godel, Zermelo and Fraenkel, Brigdman, Feyerabend, Kellogg and 
>>Bourland, Kripke, Gadamer, McGinn, Badiou.
>> 
>>We suggest, so as to describe facts and observables of our physical and 
>>social environment, to make use of phrases written or spoken according to the 
>>following rules (provided in sparse order):
>> 
>>1)     1)    Never use the verb “to be”, including all its conjugations, 
>>contractions and archaic forms.  Indeed, the misuse of this verb might give 
>>rise to a “deity mode of speech” that allows people “to transform their 
>>opinions magically into god-like pronouncements on the nature of things” 
>>(Kellogg and Bourland, 1990-91)
>
>I think I understand. But it is hard in practice to avoid existential words. I 
>would say: be clear of what is assumed, and what is derived, and if the 
>derivation is ontological or phenomenological. "to be" has many meanings, and 
>the effort must be to reason validly with each of the possible meaning. (cf 
>Frege, Carnap, Quine, Godel, Zermelo and Fraenkel).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>2)     2)    Clearly define the universe of discourse in which your 
>>proposition is located.
>
>Yes, that is important. But some domain, like metaphysics or theology will 
>have multidisciplinar facets. 1) above still applies. 
>
>
>
>>3)     3)   Define your concepts not in abstract terms, but in terms either 
>>of observables, or, if observables are not properly definable, in a language 
>>as closest to observable quantities as possible.
>I agree. But that should be only on "observable in principle". How we could 
>kill the next good theory, which not only predict better, but linked the many 
>observable better.
>
>Here, if doing metaphysics, it is important to distinguish, observable, 
>believable, knowable, justifiable and ... true. 
>
>
>
>>4)     4)    Do not compare and mix sets and subsets in the same context 
>>(e.g., cat and feline).
>And don't confuse A included in B, with B included in A, like the paper 
>justifying prohibition of "drugs" do systematically.
>
>
>>5)     5)    Do not use the first order logic (based on universals described 
>>in the very premises of the propositions), rather describe just the 
>>relationships between the observables you are coping with.
>Why? First order logic is the best tool to avoid metaphysical baggage. But it 
>is OK to use set theory or second order logic. It will really depends on the 
>goal.
>>6)     6)    Use (at least qualitative) terms that indicate the probability 
>>of an event.  
>
>Or laws that such probabilities have to conform with. Some theories can 
>predict higher order relation between measurable numbers.
>
>
>>7)     7)    Describe events or things that are (at least in principle) 
>>testable.  
>
>OK. That's imporant too.
>
>
>>Otherwise, state clearly that yours is just a speculation.
>
>In the case of "my theory", it is a subtheory of all theories in physics, and 
>of most of math. So it is obviously the less speculative theory, except for 
>one strong axiom, two actually (Church thesis, and the existence of a 

[Fis] Game over! A Curious Story

[tozziarturo]

"The operation of the LHC is safe, not only in the old sense of that word, but 
in the more general sense that our most qualified scientists have thoroughly 
considered and analyzed the risks involved in the operation of the LHC. [Any 
concerns] are merely hypothetical and speculative, and contradicted by much 
evidence and scientific analysis."
Prof. Sheldon Glashow, Nobel Laureate in Physics, Boston University,
Prof. Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate in Physics, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,
Prof. Richard Wilson, Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics, Harvard University
"The world will not come to an end when the LHC turns on. The LHC is absolutely 
safe. ... Collisions releasing greater energy occur millions of times a day in 
the earth's atmosphere and nothing terrible happens."
Prof. Steven Hawking, Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, Cambridge University
"Nature has already done this experiment. ... Cosmic rays have hit the moon 
with more energy and have not produced a black hole that has swallowed up the 
moon. The universe doesn't go around popping off huge black holes."
Prof. Edward Kolb, Astrophysicist, University of Chicago
"I certainly have no worries at all about the purported possibility of LHC 
producing microscopic black holes capable of eating up the Earth. There is no 
scientific basis whatever for such wild speculations."
Prof. Sir Roger Penrose, Former Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics, Oxford 
University
"There is no risk [in LHC collisions, and] the LSAG report is excellent."
Prof. Lord Martin Rees, UK Astronomer Royal and President of the Royal Society 
of London
"Those who have doubts about LHC safety should read LSAG report where all 
possible risks were considered. We can be sure that particle collisions at the 
LHC  cannot lead to a catastrophic consequences."
Academician V.A. Rubakov, Institute for Nuclear Research, Moscow, and Russian 
Academy of Sciences
"We fully endorse the conclusions of the LSAG report: there is no basis for any 
concerns about the consequences of new particles or forms of matter that could 
possibly be produced at the LHC."
R. Aleksan et al., the 20 external members of the CERN Scientific Policy 
Committee, including Prof. Gerard 't Hooft, Nobel Laureate in Physics.
http://press.cern/backgrounders/safety-lhc



--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android martedì, 10 gennaio 2017, 06:09PM +01:00 da 
Louis H Kauffman  lou...@gmail.com :

>Dear Folks,
>It is very important to not be hasty and assume that the warning Professor 
>Rossler made is to be taken seriously.
>It is relatively easy to check if a mathematical reasoning is true or false.
>It is much more difficult to see if a piece of mathematics is correctly 
>alligned to physical prediction.
>Note also that a reaction such as 
>"THIS STORY IS A GOOD REASON FOR SHUTTING DOWN CERN PERMANENTLY AND SAVING A 
>LOT OF LARGELY WASTED MONEY.”.
>Is not in the form of scientific rational discussion, but rather in the form 
>of taking a given conclusion for granted
> and using it to support another opinion that is just that - an opinion. 
>
>By concatenating such behaviors we arrive at the present political state of 
>the world.
>
>This is why, in my letter, I have asked for an honest discussion of the 
>possible validity of Professor Rossler’s arguments.
>
>At this point I run out of commentary room for this week and I shall read and 
>look forward to making further comments next week.
>Best,
>Lou Kauffman
>
>
>>On Jan 9, 2017, at 7:17 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan < pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es > 
>>wrote:
>>From Alex Hankey
>> Mensaje reenviado 
>>Asunto: Re: [Fis] A Curious Story
>>Fecha:  Sun, 8 Jan 2017 19:55:55 +0530
>>De:  Alex Hankey  
>>Para:  PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ 
>>
>>THIS STORY IS A GOOD REASON FOR SHUTTING DOWN CERN
PERMANENTLY AND SAVING A LOT OF LARGELY WASTED MONEY.
>>
>>On 5 January 2017 at 16:36, PEDRO
  CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ  < pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es > wrote:
>>>Dear
FISers,
>>>
>>>Herewith the Lecture inaugurating our 2017
  sessions.
>>>I really hope that this Curious Story is just that,
  a curiosity.
>>>But in science we should not look for hopes but for
  arguments and counter-arguments...
>>>
>>>Best wishes to All and exciting times for the New
  Year!
>>>--Pedro
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>--
>>>De: Otto E.
  Rossler [ oeros...@yahoo.com ]
>>>Enviado el: miércoles, 04 de enero de
  2017 17:51
>>>Para: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ
>>>Asunto:  NY session
>>>--
>>>
>>>A Curious Story
>>> 
>>>Otto E. Rossler, University
  of Tübingen, Germany
>>>
>>>Maybe I am the only one who
  finds it curious. Which fact would then
   

[Fis] Medieval mustidisciplinarity

[tozziarturo]

Dear Karl, 
thanks for your comment.  
A true "medieval scholar and innovator, in touch with the interdisciplinary 
school of Salamanca", needs to put together different issues from a wide range 
of sources.  
Therefore, I suggest to read: 
HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND QUANTUM VACUUM
A dialogue between Martin Heidegger and a theoretical physician unveils the 
striking relationships between the philosophical concept of Being and the 
experimentally detectable quantum vacuum. We provide an account of 
long-standing theoretical issues, such Being, Entity, Existence and the unique 
role of the human Thoughts in the world, and expound their possible physical 
counterparts. 
http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/products/heidegger-s-being-and-quantum-vacuum/
Ciao!
Arturo Tozzi
AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/___
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[Fis] Entia Non Sunt Multiplicanda

[tozziarturo]

Dear “germane” Pedro, 
Thanks a lot for your comments.
Entia non sunt multiplicanda.  It’s the Occam razor: 
it’s better to use the simplest explanation, rather than more complicated 
descriptions of facts and events. 
You talked about metabolic cellular networks, cellular life cycle, abstract 
processing of neural 
information, human behavior, learning biases, emotional reactions, and so on.  
Despite I hate the Occam razor, rejected by the most basic physical assumptions 
(see quantum entanglement and the vacuum that is able to produce matter and to 
display virtual particles), nevertheless it is very useful for the description 
of the brain function and biological systems.  Why is the Occam razor useful, 
in such cases? Because, I think, they are "desperate" cases: despite two 
centuries of true, galileian science, we do not know very much either of living 
beings or the brain function.  To maxe an example, we are not even sure whether 
emotions are completely splitted from higher "cognitive" activities, or are 
not.  
Therefore, in such case, I think that our only hope to try to assess such still 
elusive phenomena is to use an approach from "above" and from "afar".     In 
touch with you claims, brain activity can be assessed either at 
anatomical/functional micro-, meso- and macro- spatiotemporal scales of 
observation, or at intertwined levels with mutual interactions.  Every 
neuro-technique is an observational domain of the whole  neuro-scientific 
discipline,  each one evaluating an anatomical or functional scale different 
from the others. 
Dimensional scales, as well as multilevel brain activity, can be assessed in 
terms of algebraic topology, a general framework that holds for all the 
experimental approaches (and "specific" functions) to the central nervous 
system, independent of their 
peculiar features, resolution, magnitude and boundaries.  The Borsuk-Ulam 
theorem tells us that a single feature at a lower level can be mapped to two 
features with matching description at an higher level, and vice versa. 
Therefore, brain activities with matching descriptions embedded in higher 
anatomical or functional nervous levels map to single activities in lower 
scales.This means that activities described in higher observational levels 
necessarily display a counterpart in the lower ones, and vice versa.  Next, 
consider Brouwer’s fixed point theorem: no matter how you continuously slosh 
the coffee around in a coffee cup, some point is always in the same position 
that it was before the sloshing began. And if you move this point out of its 
original position in the sloshing coffee, you will eventually move some other 
points back into their original position.In neurobiological terms, not only we 
can always find a brain region containing an activity, but also every activity 
comes together with another.
This leads to a novel scenario, where different scales of brain activity are 
able to scatter, collide and combine, merging together in an assessable way.  
Therefore, different neuro-techniques and brain functions are dual under 
topological transformation.  The term dual refers to a situation where two 
seemingly different physical systems turn out to be equivalent.  If two 
techniques or phenomena are related by a duality, one can be transformed into 
the other, so that the one ends up looking just like the other.  A topological 
investigation reveals that brain activities always have some element in common: 
they do not exist in isolation, rather they are part of a large interconnected 
whole, with which they interact.The distinction among different coarse-grained 
levels of nervous activity does not count anymore, because nervous function at 
small, medium and large scales of neural observation turn out to be 
topologically equivalent and fully interchangeable. Topological paths elucidate 
how the tight coupling among different neural activities gives rise to brains 
that are in charge of receiving and interpreting signals from other cortical 
zones, in closely intertwined relationships at every spatio-temporal level.
Summarizing, whether you experience pain or pleasure, or chomp on an apple, or 
compute a mathematical expression, or quote a proverb, or remember your 
childhood, or read Heidegger's Being and Time, it does not matter: the large 
repertoire of your brain functions  can be described in the same 
topological fashion.
Arturo Tozzi
AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/___
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[Fis] Fwd: about consciousness an Euclidean n-space

[tozziarturo]

 Messaggio inoltrato 
Da: James Peters  james.pete...@umanitoba.ca A:  tozziart...@libero.it Cc: 
James Peters  james.pete...@umanitoba.ca Data: mercoledì, 07 dicembre 2016, 
01:37PM +01:00
Oggetto: about consciousness an Euclidean n-space

>Dear Arturo and All in this great discusssion,
>Good morning from a snowy corner of our local Manitoba neighbourhood.   During 
>the
>past 24 hours, more than 30 cm of snow have fallen from the sky.   During most 
>of the
>time that the snow was falling to the ground, we had fairly high wind.  In 
>effect, we had
>a minor blizzard, here.  The result is an incredible display of snow shapes. 
>
>The passage of the swirling snow flakes during our blizzard is analogous to 
>what Hermann
>Weyl calls a world canal.   A system of particles moving through space sweep 
>out a world
>canal (H. Weyl, Space. Time. Matter [Raum.  Zeit.  Materie], 1917, pp. 
>268-269).  In addition
>to the geometry for this spacetime structure, Weyl gives his perceptive 
>description of the
>history of a system of moving particles.   His mathematics is intensive and 
>his evocation of
>a perception of this spacetime structure is equally intensive.   And the 
>history of swirling snowflakes
>during their passage from the overhead sky to the ground is analogous to 
>Weyl's peception
>of a world canal.
>
>My suggestion for moving this discussion forward is to couple epistemological 
>constructs with
>spacetime (physical) constructs.   That will help ground our discussion of 
>natural phenomena
>and human perceptions.
>
>Best,
>Jim
>
>
>James F. Peters, Professor
>Computational Intelligence Laboratory, ECE Department
>Room E2-390 EITC Complex, 75 Chancellor's Circle
>University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB  R3T 5V6 Canada
>Office: 204 474 9603   Fax: 204 261 4639
>email:  james.pete...@ad.umanitoba.ca
>https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James_Peters/?ev=hdr_xprf
>
>From: Fis [fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf of  tozziart...@libero.it 
>[tozziart...@libero.it]
>Sent: December 6, 2016 4:17 AM
>To: Jerry LR Chandler;  fis@listas.unizar.es
>Subject: [Fis] R: Re: Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space 
>???
>
>Dear Jerry,
>thanks a lot for your interesting comments.
>I like very much the logical approach, a topic that is generally dispised by 
>scientists for its intrinsic difficulty.
>We also published something about logic and brain (currently under review), 
>therefore we keep it in high consideration:
>http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2016/11/15/087874
>
>However, there is a severe problem that prevents logic in order to be useful 
>in the description of scientific theories, explanans/explanandum, and so on.  
>The severe problem has been raised by three foremost discoveries in the last 
>century: quantum entanglement, nonlinear dynamics and quantistic vacuum.
>Quantum entanglement, although experimentally proofed by countless scientific 
>procedures,  is against any common sense and any possibliity of logical 
>inquiry.  The concepts of locality and of cause/effect disappear in front of 
>the puzzling phenomenon of quantum entanglement, which is intractable in terms 
>of logic, neither using the successful and advanced approaches of Lesniewski- 
>Tarski, nor Zermelo-Fraenkel's.
>The same stands for nonlinear chaotic phenomena, widespread in nature, from 
>pile sands, to bird flocks and  to brain function. When biforcations occur in 
>logistic plots and chaotic behaviours take place, the final systems' ouputs 
>are not anymore causally predictable.
>Quantistic vacuum predicts particles or fields interactions occurring through 
>breaks in CPT symmetries: this means that, illogically,  the arrow of the time 
>can be reverted (!) in quantistic systems.
>
>Therefore (and I'm sorry for that), the explanatory role of logic in 
>scientific theories is definitely lost.
>Here we are talking about brain: pay attention, I'm not saying that the brain 
>function obeys to quantum behaviours (I do not agree with the accounts by, for 
>example, Roger Penrose or Vitiello/Freeman).  I'm just saying that, because 
>basic phenomena underlying our physical and biological environment display 
>chaotic behaviours and quantistic mechanisms that go against logic, therefore 
>the logic, in general, cannot be anymore useful in the description of our 
>world.
>I'm sad about that, but that's all.
>
>P.S.: A topological approach talks instead of projections and mappings from 
>one level to another, therefore it does not talk about causality or time and 
>displays a more general explanatory power.   But this is another topic...
>
>
>
>
>
>Arturo Tozzi
>
>AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
>Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
>Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
>http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
>Messaggio originale
>Da: "Jerry LR Chandler" < 

[Fis] Response to Jerry LR Chandler

[tozziarturo]

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android  Messaggio inoltrato 
Da:  tozziart...@libero.it A:  pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es Data: mercoledì, 30 
novembre 2016, 09:52AM +01:00
Oggetto: Response to Jerry LR Chandler

>
>>Dear Pedro, 
>>here you are!
>>I tried 4 times to submit this comment.  
>>Ciao, and thanks!
>>>

>Dear Jerry,
>Thanks for
the intriguing questions!
>I thank our guest,
Pedro Marijuan, for giving us the
opportunity to talk with such high-ranked scientists.  
> 
> Let’s start!
>The questions raised in this post are highly
provocative.  From the perspective of physical phenomenology, it is
necessary to identify corresponding illations between the electric fields of
brain dynamics (such as EEG patterns) and the mathematics of electric fields /
electro-magnetism.  It goes without
saying that such correspondences must associate the measured quantities with
the theoretical quantities.  In other words, the units of measurements of
“brain activity" should be associated with Maxwell’s equations.
> 
>Are we
really sure that this proposition is true?  How does
central nervous system process information? Current theories are based on two
tenets: (a) information is transmitted by action potentials, the language by
which neurons communicate with each other—and (b) homogeneous neuronal
assemblies of cortical circuits operate on these neuronal messages where the
operations are characterized by the intrinsic connectivity among neuronal
populations. In this view, the size and time course of any spike is stereotypic
and the information is restricted to the temporal sequence of the spikes;
namely, the “neural code”. However, an increasing amount of novel data point
towards an alternative hypothesis: (a) the role of neural code in information
processing is overemphasized. Instead of simply passing messages, action 
potentials
play a role in dynamic coordination at multiple spatial and temporal scales,
establishing network interactions across several levels of a hierarchical
modular architecture, modulating and regulating the propagation of neuronal
messages. (b) Information is processed at all levels of neuronal infrastructure
from macromolecules to population dynamics. For example, intra-neuronal
(changes in protein conformation, concentration and synthesis) and
extra-neuronal factors (extracellular proteolysis, substrate patterning, myelin
plasticity, microbes, metabolic status) can have a profound effect on neuronal
computations. This means molecular message passing may have cognitive
connotations. This essay introduces the concept of “supramolecular chemistry”,
involving the storage of information at the molecular level and its retrieval,
transfer and processing at the supramolecular level, through transitory
non-covalent molecular processes that are self-organized, self-assembled and
dynamic. Finally, we note that the cortex comprises extremely heterogeneous
cells, with distinct regional variations, macromolecular assembly, receptor
repertoire and intrinsic microcircuitry. This suggests that every neuron (or
group of neurons) embodies different molecular information that hands an
operational effect on neuronal computation.
>For further
details, see: 
>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11571-015-9337-1
> 
> In the philosophy of science, this is the basic
distinction between traditional mathematical narratives as pure abstractions
and APPLIED mathematical theories of explanations of scientific facts.  
> 
>Pursuing Quine’s
naturalized epistemology, we are aware that we need to make testable
previsions, in order to “link” mathematical theories with explanations of
scientific facts.  This is exactly what
we (try to) do. 
>The best
example is the following, that shows how a novel approach might lead to
unpredictable testable results: 
>Current
advances in neurosciences deal with the functional architecture of the central
nervous system, paving the way for general theories that improve our
understanding of brain activity. From topology, a strong concept comes into
play in understanding brain functions, namely, the 4D space of a “hypersphere’s
torus”, undetectable by observers living in a 3D world. The torus may be 
compared
with a video game with biplanes in aerial combat: when a biplane flies off one
edge of gaming display, it does not crash but rather it comes back from the
opposite edge of the screen. Our thoughts exhibit similar behaviour, i.e. the
unique ability to connect past, present and future events in a single, coherent
picture as if we were allowed to watch the three screens of past-present-future
“glued” together in a mental kaleidoscope. Here we hypothesize that brain
functions are embedded in a imperceptible fourth spatial dimension and propose
a method to empirically assess its presence. Neuroimaging fMRI series can be
evaluated, looking for the topological hallmark of the presence of a fourth
dimension. Indeed, 

Re: [Fis] What if consciousness is an Euclidean n-space?

[tozziarturo]

Dear Gordana,
Thanks for your wise comment.
You say: "It is vital to be awa­re under which assump­tion model/theory has­ 
been made".
It is an old statement, that reminds me the axiomatic fundations of Hilbert and 
the linguistic jokes of the second Wittgenstein:  neuroscientists start from a 
theory-laden  model, e.g., a linguistic joke,  where a series of axioms are 
preventively stated, then they find, through experimental procedures, what they 
want to find. 
To make an example: "The brain is a non-linear system at the edge of chaos"... 
or, at the opposite: "The brain is linear"... there are dozens of papers 
confirming both the approaches!  
We want clearly state that we do not know anything about the brain: also the 
more successful current models, such as the connectome approaches, do not 
explain anything at all.
Indeed, we do not know how to define consciousness, emotions, perception, and 
so on.    Neuroscientists say that we need to be on focus on a single brain 
activity (even if we do not know which are the brain activities!).  I think 
this is an hopeless approach, unless we do not have a very GENERAL scheme of 
the brain function.
Therefore, due to our current lack of knowledge, we need something different: 
we need a model that, in a "physicalistic" fashion, is not able to explain a 
single brain function, but all the brain functions.  
We need to explore something completely different.  
We admit that ours is a linguistic joke like others, but, to avoid to be 
"metaphysical", we propose how to test our own linguistic joke, in order to 
experimentally assess whether it is the "real" one.  
The advantage of our approach is that it holds for all the "brain functions", 
therefore it can be assessed and falsified by starting either from emotions, or 
cognition, and so on. 
We have also the advantage that our approach is multidisciplinary: we "glue 
together" issues from far-flung branches, like a bird who watches a landscape 
from afar.  We do not know whether our linguistic joke is just a fake, but, at 
least, we are pursuing SCIENTIFICAL, testable hypotheses that are different 
from the standard ones. 

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android sabato, 26 novembre 2016, 08:31PM +01:00 da 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic  gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se :

>Dear colleagues,
> 
>Krassimir makes very important point that I would like to expand on.
> 
>It is vital to be aware under which assumption model/theory has been made. One 
>might wish that this be accepted as a fundamental rule among researchers 
>presenting their models – first declare fundamental assumptions
 (preferably also implicit ones).
> 
>Only if we clearly understand the assumptions can we compare different models 
>and approaches. What happens all too often is that this fundamental part is 
>unclear and big discussions are taking place for no reason
 as theories are built under different assumptions and refer to different 
domains, have different level of abstraction etc. but they are assumed to 
somehow give the same results.
> 
>For example if we make our models under assumption that light has corpuscular 
>nature, we will see certain classes of phenomena. On the contrary, if we 
>assume that it is a wave, we will see something else.
> 
>The same goes even here. We should see the assumptions and ask ourselves:
> 
>What does it imply if we assume that consciousness is a continuous function of 
>reflected reality?
> 
>What does it imply if assume that consciousness is Euclidean n-space?
> 
> 
>With best wishes,
>Gordana
> 
> 
> 
>
>_
>Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Professor of Computer Science
>Vice Dean of Graduate Education
>Department of Applied IT
>Chalmers University of Technology & University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
>http://www.ait.gu.se/kontaktaoss/personal/gordana-dodig-crnkovic / 
>School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University
>http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc /
>President of the International Society for Information Studies 
>http://is4si-2017.org /
>
>
>
>
>From:  Fis < fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es > on behalf of Krassimir Markov < 
>mar...@foibg.com >
>Organization:  ITHEA
>Reply-To:  Krassimir Markov < mar...@foibg.com >
>Date:  Saturday 26 November 2016 at 18:23
>To:  FIS < fis@listas.unizar.es >
>Subject:  [Fis] Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space ???
>
>Dear FIS colleagues,
>I think, it is needed to put discussion on mathematical foundation. Let me 
>remember that:
> 
>The  Borsuk–Ulam theorem (BUT), states that every continuous function from an 
>n -sphere into Euclidean n -space maps some pair of  antipodal points to the 
>same point.
>Here, two points on a sphere are called antipodal if they are in exactly 
>opposite directions from the sphere's center.
>Formally:  if f: S n →
R n   is continuous then there exists an  x∈
S n  such that: f(
− x ) = f 
( x ) .
>[  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borsuk%E2%80%93Ulam_theorem ] 
> 
>Who may 

Re: [Fis] Fw: NEW DISCUSSION SESSION--TOPOLOGICAL BRAIN

[tozziarturo]

Dear Joseph, 
The Borsuk-Ulam theorem looks like a translucent glass sphere between a light 
source and our eyes: we watch two lights on the sphere surface instead of one. 
But the two lights are not just images, they are also real with observable 
properties, such as intensity and diameter. 
Until the sphere lies between your eyes and the light source, the lights you 
can see are two (and it is valid also for every objective observer), it's not 
just a trick of your imagination or a Kantian a priori.  
Therefore, the link between topology and energy/information is very strong.  If 
we just think the facts and the events of the world in terms of projections, we 
are able to quantitatively elucidate puzzling and counterintuitive phenomena, 
such as, for example,  quantum entanglement
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10773-016-2998-7
Therefore, the 'eternal' discussio­n of whether geometry­ or energy (call it 
dynamics, informational entropy, or whatsoever)­ is more fundamental ­in the 
universe, does not stand anymore: both geometry and energy describe the same 
phenomena, although with different languages.  In physical terms, we could say 
that geometry and energy are 'dual' theories, e.g., they are interchangeable in 
the description of real facts and events.  



--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android venerdì, 25 novembre 2016, 00:28PM +01:00 da 
Joseph Brenner  joe.bren...@bluewin.ch :

>Dear All,
> 
>Pedro should be thanked already for this new 
Session, even as we welcome Andrew and Alexander. The depth of your work 
facilitates rigorous discussion of serious philosophical as well as scientific 
issues.
> 
>In Pedro's note of 2016.11.24 there is the 
following:
> 
>" Somehow, the 
projection of brain "metastable dynamics" (Fingelkurts) to higher 
dimensionalities could provide new integrative possibilities for information 
processing. And that marriage between topology and dynamics would also pave the 
way to new evolutionary discussions on the emergence of the "imagined present" 
of our minds."
> 
>What Pedro calls here "the marriage between 
topology and dynamics" reminds one of the 'eternal' discussion of whether 
geometry or energy (dynamics) is more fundamental in the universe. I just 
suggest that there are alternative terms to focus on and describe the 
interaction between topology and dynamics that are more - dynamic, and make an 
emergence a more logical consequence of that interaction.
> 
>Best wishes,
> 
>Joseph
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[Fis] Another important paper

[tozziarturo]

Thanks for the nice paper!
Concerning the use of topology in hippocampus assessment, I suggest another 
paper, with a topological approach rather different from ours:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.01905
--
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