On 17/11/2011 07:30, Christopher Morrow wrote:
As mentioned in the WG meeting today, please take the time to
read/review/think-about the subject draft:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kirkham-private-ip-sp-cores-07
In fact, this ID is now at revision -08.
On 01/12/2011 15:14, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
This document proposes a simple protocol, BMP, which can be used to
monitor BGP sessions. BMP is intended to provide a more convenient
interface for obtaining route views for research purpose than the
screen-scraping approach in
On 13/04/2012 21:24, Tony Li wrote:
This may be a nit, but I think it's important to recall that UPDATE
messages include withdrawn routes. These MUST NOT be ignored by the
receiver. Doing so will simply result in forwarding loops or black
holes.
I'm trying to figure out which is worse:
On 17/05/2012 13:21, Russ White wrote:
The first thing to note is this draft specifically attacks FIB table
size without modifying the routing table size. Since I'm not convinced
that FIB size, as opposed to the on-the-wire table size, is a problem
that needs to be addressed, I'm not certain
On 17/05/2012 17:11, Ronald Bonica wrote:
Thanks for introducing this document!
I would like to bring the authors' attention to the following documents
that are working in OPSEC:
- draft-behringer-lla-only
- draft-baker-opsec-passive-ip-address
To some extent, draft-grow and
On 08/06/2012 18:08, Christopher Morrow wrote:
would be nice if more folk would chime in, however, in either the
positive or negative.
+1
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On 31/08/2012 17:02, Noel Chiappa wrote:
On the actual subject of the document, I too agree it would be good to have a
document which looks in detail at aggregation in destination-vector routing
architectures; there are indeed some interesting 'issues' when you try and
automatically start
On 04/09/2012 20:17, Danny McPherson wrote:
FYI, may be able to find a home here in grow if folks are interested.
Encourage feedback from all...
Danny,
regarding section #4, Accuracy and Integrity of Data, you've missed the
most important part of all - the tie between the resource and the end
On 15/11/2012 00:02, Christopher Morrow wrote:
one clarifying point, the RPKI doesn't actually say anything at all
about 'path' data. I merely says which origin-as(es) should be able to
announce a prefix.
i'm being slack about my usage of the term rpki here, and should have
referred to bgpsec
, cheap and
practical methods (or hammers) that would accomplish the same goal. In
fact, any entity trying to use RPKI as a hammer I would say that it is
very badly advised (to said the least).
Regards,
as
snip
On 14/11/2012 21:52, Nick Hilliard wrote:
From a non-technical point
oops, is it too late to add a hum in favour of this ID from here?
Nick
On 14/11/2012 22:35, Christopher Morrow wrote:
Grow Folks,
the authors of: draft-mcpherson-irr-routing-policy-considerations
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcpherson-irr-routing-policy-considerations-01
have
On 06/09/2013 03:45, Jon Mitchell wrote:
We would like to solicit any further comments on
draft-lapukhov-bgp-routing-large-dc-06. Originally this draft was
presented by Petr in Vancouver in both IDR and GROW and we feel this
draft is useful to the IETF community as it documents a working
should grow people consider whether to comment on this?
Nick
Original Message
Subject: [iab-ch...@iab.org: Call for Review of
draft-iab-filtering-considerations-06.txt, Technical Considerations for
Internet Service Blocking and Filtering]
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2014 14:17:27 -0500
/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf
Thomas Mangin
Sent from my iPad
On 5 Feb 2014, at 23:21, Nick Hilliard n...@inex.ie mailto:n...@inex.ie
wrote:
should grow people consider whether to comment on this?
Nick
On 20/05/2014 02:11, Jared Mauch wrote:
Is there a need for this to be explicitly documented within the IETF? I
certainly agree there is a problem, but this feels like operational
guidance or perhaps a BCP or similar document? (eg: Filter your peer
ASNs from your other peers).
On 21/05/2014 14:34, Peter Schoenmaker wrote:
I would like to call a second working group last call on
draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats-02. we issued a previous one in
december but received no comments. The document is ready to publish,
and now is your last time to support or comment.
larger issues which acted as disincentives to IRRDB routing policy management
- rpsl is poorly specified
- rpsl didn't keep up to date with technologies.
- https://lists.isc.org/pipermail/irrtoolset/2011-April/000736.html
- it may be useful to see some discussion on the state of the IRRDB
On 15/10/2014 13:29, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
There seem to be two types of organizations that do this: geographically
dispersed ones that advertise subprefixes in different locations, such
as multinationals, and organizations with very independent subunits but
with more limited geographical
On 15/10/2014 13:43, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
Although I wouldn't expect an organization to deaggregate down to hundreds or
thousands of more specifics just for traffic engineering.
probably not no, but on the basis of visibility into IXP announcements with
prefix analysis to see what's
On 16/10/2014 16:47, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
Growth in IPv6 more specifics was 57% last year...
1y is an interesting data point, but shouldn't form the basis for a new
policy. What does the aggregate:more-specifics ratio look like over the
last 5-8 years?
Nick
On 16/10/2014 17:26, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
I haven't checked, but obviously the percentage growth was large and the
absolute growth small.
not obvious: please post data.
Nick
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On 16/10/2014 17:53, Enno Rey wrote:
not sure to what extent $RIRs act accordingly (have been involved in
requesting resources from all five of them in the past and can tell you
1st hand that there's quite some encouraging $LARGE_ENTERPRISES to
become LIRs, in one way or the other). there must
On 18/10/2014 10:06, Robert Raszuk wrote:
You can't *mandate* anything in BGP until you have a way to
effectively enforce it regardless if this is v4 or v6 or v9.
it's a common misconception that bgp is a stick to beat people with, and
that the RIRs are the routing police.
Nick
On 20/10/2014 22:58, Christopher Morrow wrote:
NOTE: why don't v6 allocations in that file have 'ALLOCATED PA' in
their entries?
because there are only two types of v6 blocks: ALLOCATED PA and ASSIGNED
PA. The assignments aren't in that document and for v4, there are several
types of status:
On 20/10/2014 23:41, Randy Bush wrote:
there seems to be a lot of deagg because of the perception that it
reduces the threat of mis-origination of one's routes. asia/pac is the
poster child for this but the competition is keen, see geoff's reports.
this could be highly entertaining in the
On 21/10/2014 19:22, John G. Scudder wrote:
where where in the
the spring
cut-n-paste typo. Not present in the .txt.
I agree with all that. However I think the point at which DFZ size
becomes the upper bound is well below the point at which a practical
problem rears its ugly head.
the
On 20/03/2015 06:48, Claudio Jeker wrote:
OpenBGPD's bgpctl is able to read mrt dump files as well. Currently only
table dumps are supported though.
- openbgpd bgpctl
written in C.
http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.sbin/bgpctl/
Hi Claudio,
Are there any plans to support
On 02/11/2015 04:18, Jared Mauch wrote:
> I plan on covering this briefly in the GROW meeting today and uploaded
> the revised text that has been sitting in my output queue since August.
>
> This is basically codifying the fact that you MUST NOT default to "bgp
> unsafe-ebgp-policy” for any BGP
On 18/09/2015 15:28, Jeffrey Haas wrote:
> What seems to be needed more than a standard as to what communities everyone
> should use is a method of exchanging the mappings for a given provider.
that would be difficult, as there is no way of exchanging exact semantics.
I.e. one provider's opinion
On 05/12/2015 19:10, John G. Scudder wrote:
> Hi Nick, Randy and Stephen,
>
> If I understand you correctly, the proposition is:
>
> - The IPSec option I offered and the TLS option you offered are
> semantically identical from the perspective of their security
> properties.
> - TLS would be
On 05/12/2015 14:23, Jeffrey Haas wrote:
> So... who is willing to sign your network up for this grand experiment at
> securing your BMP?
bcp61 exists because we are no longer living in a world where it's ok to
ship sensitive data around the internet in a format which is open to
compromise.
The
The IESG wrote:
> The IESG has received a request from the Global Routing Operations WG
> (grow) to consider the following document:
> - 'BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing'
>as Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments
Job Snijders wrote:
> Follow-up question: without section 3.4 - would you still object?
I don't think that IXPs should be mentioned anywhere in this document.
For the general case of blackholing, an IXP is a clearing house so
should not get involved in the business of dropping its participants'
Job Snijders wrote:
> I feel that this is not the appropiate forum to define what IXPs can,
> can't, should and shouldn't in context of legal enforcement agencies.
I wasn't suggesting it was. What I said was two things:
1. regarding everything except section 3.4: if two organisations decide
to
Job Snijders wrote:
> Thank you for your time and reiew! I'm responding to your first in this
> thread, in context of the wealth of information provided as follow-ups
> to this email.
are these changes published anywhere, e.g. ietf datatracker or github?
Nick
Job Snijders wrote:
> Nick understands the intent of the draft very well: honoring this
> community is optional and usually (but not always) part of a commercial
> supplier-customer agreement.
>
> We changed the text to the following:
>
>""" BGP speakers in a bilateral peering relationship
heasley wrote:
> Sat, Aug 13, 2016 at 01:18:20PM +0100, Nick Hilliard:
>> The second adds a note to say that both the receiving and the sending
>> party should explicitly filter out more-specifics unless they're tagged
>> with BLACKHOLE. I would be in favour
Job Snijders wrote:
> Maybe I am misunderstanding the intention of your proposed change - can
> you elaborate? Are you sure that the problem case you describe isn't
> already covered by the existing text?
The intention is to document that if there is an existing policy to
filter at max prefix
joel jaeggli wrote:
> sure l3 acls can be applied to l2 ports.
>
> most ixps are going to have a set of filters that prevent certain kinda
> of activity, e.g. spanning tree PDUs, router-advertisement, proxy-arp
> and so on. these are all within the technical capabilties of most
>
Would it be possible to add a clause to mention that accepting + honouring bh
prefixes is not mandatory? At the moment the text sort-of implies that it
might be. Eg "although it is NOT REQUIRED for bgp speakers in a peering
relationship to accept and honor BGP announcements carrying the
> On 3 Aug 2016, at 19:02, Christopher Morrow
> wrote:
> doesn't look new to me, no. and 'worse', today someone COULD just (if they
> are in the right place and can do bgp packet creation,etc) just tag all of
> your announcments to your provider(s) with the local
Job Snijders wrote:
> To address the latest concerns, draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-02 has been
> posted.
>
> Executive summary:
>
> - Changed intended status from STD to INFO
> - Added section 4 "Vendor Implementation Recommendations"
> - Simplify the security section
> - Clarify
Job Snijders wrote:
> Do you have any more comments or concerns queued up?
I don't think the draft is well specified in terms of its intended
semantics. This is a problem with a standards track document,
particularly one with big scary warnings in the security considerations
section. It needs
Christopher Morrow wrote:
> first noting that it'd be helpful if you have concerns to suggestions
> that you send text that might be used to address them. Playing 'bring me
> a rock' is not fun for anyone.
"bring me a rock" was not intended.
Also, email is a terrible medium for communication
Job Snijders wrote:
> I believe this update addresses the concerns raised in this phase of the
> document.
yes, thanks, it addresses these concerns, and the document is a lot
better as a result.
The second major area of concern I have about this proposal is the
transitive nature of the bgp
Job Snijders wrote:
> Should it be somehow clarified that router vendors are not supposed to
> implement mechanisms, which are by default enabled, that discard traffic
> for BLACKHOLE'ed prefixes?
I would have said the opposite, i.e. that any traffic tagged with this
prefix is dropped via e.g.
iljit...@muada.com wrote:
> I'm all for a permanent solution, but routers just don't get updated
> with new features all that often.
Extended communities have been around for years. Peoples' lack of
inclination to properly maintain their infrastructure is not a good
reason to introduce additional
Robert Raszuk wrote:
> The problem with 16:16 and now with endorsing 32:32:32 is that it still
> requires an external oracle to manually translate encoded magic number
> into set of actions.
I'm struggling to understand how and why this is relevant to adopting
large as-is.
Operators are free
Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) wrote:
>> right, ok - I misunderstood. So you're suggesting that the control
>> plane correlates asns to interfaces and does something like
>> creating a higher cost alternative path out each candidate source
>> interface (based on ASN, as determined in the control
Christopher Morrow wrote:
> Howdy gentle folk,
> Let's take a few minutes to discuss and digest whether or not the
> subject draft with abstract:
> Examples and inspiration for operators on how to use Large BGP
>Communities.
>
> should be adopted as a WG draft in GROW. This call ends
Job Snijders wrote:
>>From an operational perspective it is really useful if you can drop a
> line in the peer's syslog which covers why you shutdown a BGP session.
> A common use case is to provide a reference between the shutdown event
> and an emailed maintenance notification, or maybe you want
Robert Raszuk wrote:
> Just to be clear: I am also OK with free form text with the few well
> known and easy to machine parse keywords (in it).
the field should either be fully structured or free-form, and the
explicit intent of this draft is free form, utf8. Having a half-way
house is in
joel jaeggli wrote:
> The case where routine maintance creates temporary blackholes is
> basically ubiquitious were you attempting to use urp strict.
oh indeed - I've been at the receiving end of exactly this type of
blackholing. Very annoying. But I just wonder if urpf is the best tool
to
Neil J. McRae wrote:
> I just wish I thought we had the luxury of lazy operations like this!
there are more places in heaven and earth, Neil, including many places
where automation makes no sense and many other places where unstructured
text would be a useful tool in the operator's box. Just
Neil J. McRae wrote:
> I just wish I thought we had the luxury of lazy operations like this!
to clarify my previous email, it's a matter of simple economics:
automation needs scale to work properly, and in particular, bgp session
management automation only makes sense for a relatively small
Neil J. McRae wrote:
> I would be deploying automation to take care of network
> problems/issues/whatever whether I worked at BT or I was the admin of
> a network with four and a half nodes.
For sure. e.g. we've automated the hell out of INEX (which has more
than 4.5 nodes btw). The point is
Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) wrote:
> This work has been submitted to OPSEC WG.
> Posting here also since it may be of interest to GROW WG members as well.
> Comments/suggestions on this draft are welcome -- here or on the OPSEC list.
> Thank you.
Sriram,
this looks difficult to implement and easy
Marco Marzetti wrote:
> Why RPKI can't be part of that?
tl;dr: route servers and rpki are an uncomfortable fit.
rpki can be part of that, but it's problematic because the route server
is running the routing decision engine on the part of the client. RPKI
is a relatively fine-grained tool in the
Matthias Waehlisch wrote:
> the current discussion makes clear that documentation of
> origin-validation-signaling in IXP context is needed
rpki is conceptually no different to any other type of signaling
mechanism: it's simply another input into the BGP decision engine
process, just like
John G. Scudder wrote:
> Registration policies have to be changed by an RFC, so if this
> proposal sounds good to the WG I volunteer to write a short Internet
> Draft to make it so. Before going to the effort i wanted to solicit
> feedback though.
this looks sensible. The justification is sound
Christopher Morrow wrote:
> Howdy folks!
> There were 3 people, 4 if you include me, that had something to say here...
>
> it'd be nice if a few more folk had read through and agreed/disagreed :)
violent support for this.
This is something that should have been in bgp on day one, and its
heasley wrote:
> Ignoring support or opposition for the topic of the thread, why should
> the ietf concern itself with programming (and testing) incompetency of
> this magnitude? The RFCs should document the procedure to negotiate
> the capability, not endeavor to design for every possible
Susan Hares wrote:
> This email is to make you aware of the discussion on the Extended
> Messages draft (draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-21). Do you
> want the message size extended for all BGP messages or just UPDATE
> messages? This probably is more important if you want to have a
>
r from this issue as the check is currently performed on
> ALL messages as currently specified including the OPEN.
>
> So I would suggest to just change the wording to include all message type
> but OPEN, and leave it as an exercise to the reader to write another draft
> allowing
Will Hargrave wrote:
> With a 30 minute cull window, there is substantial concern that an
> operator will begin to debug the ‘problem’, discover ICMP PING works but
> TCP/179 doesn’t work, and get very annoyed at this strange behaviour. I
> think we should operate on a principle of least surprise
Tore Anderson wrote:
> By the way, as an IXP operator, you also have the possibility to simply
> shut down your members' interfaces prior to performing maintenance,
> instead of doing culling. Doing so would be completely analogous to the
> directly connected BGP speakers scenario discussed in
Tore Anderson wrote:
> In other words: in my opinion, BGP session culling should be considered
> a BCP even in situations where link state signaling and/or BFD is used.
> IP-transit providers should perform culling towards their customers
> ahead of maintenance works. Direct peers, likewise.
Susan Hares wrote:
> If Quagga, Bird, or GoBGP have been run against test devices (IXIA,
> etc), the testers used to test against these cases. Most of these took
> their initial code from open-source GateD which had this feature. The
> open-source GateD was distributed into many different
Job Snijders wrote:
> At this moment I'm inclined to consider such 'staggered gradual
> restoration' recommendations out of scope for this BCP. Mainly because I
> am not aware of a generic, currently in-use recommendations and the
> problem space might be somewhat undefined.
I'd suggest that ixp
Stewart Bryant wrote:
> Guessing is horrible, but if that is what you do, that is what you do,
> and if the risks are the accepted norm in the BGP
> community I am fine.
there's a general understanding out there that if you're directly
connect to $asn, you can somewhat believe $asn:* or $asn:*:*
New ID submission, as below. This is to solve a real world problem.
Comments welcome.
Nick
internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
> A new version of I-D, draft-hilliard-grow-no-export-via-rs-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Nick Hilliard and posted to the
> IETF repository.
d.
>
> From the route server client perspective it may also be simpler if there
> is just one “no export function” community instead of multiple.
>
> Why is there no consensus amongst route server operators on what the
> correct behavior is? Can you provide a citation?
>
>
Job Snijders wrote:
> OK, but you are not explaining to me why the current set of RFC's can't
> be updated to encourage different NO_EXPORT behaviour on route servers
> (compared to the rest of the BGP speakers), but instead a new community
> is required.
it's because there is no consensus in the
Wolfgang Tremmel wrote:
> From my reading of RFC1997 and RFC7947 the ambiguity is not really one:
>
> RFC1997 states that any community-aware BGP speaker MUT NOT advertise
> prefixes received with NO_EXPORT
> --> a route server is a BGP speaker
> --> it is community aware
>
> RFC7947 uses
Job Snijders wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 09:29:52AM -0400, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>> Obligatory: "Are there any IPR claims outstanding by the authors?"
>
> I am not aware of any IPR.
I am also not aware of any outstanding IPR claims.
Nick
___
Dale R. Worley wrote:
> Section 3.1.1 seems to be uniquely short. I would favor adding a list
> of the "multiple ways an Operator can accomplish that." Even just
> listing the *names* of the methods that might be used is a useful guide
> -- a novice operator can use search engines to find
Wolfgang Tremmel wrote:
> just reading your draft, a few remarks, speaking as a private internet
> citizen:
>
> "If a route server client announces a prefix tagged with both the
> NO_EXPORT and NO_EXPORT_VIA_RS communities to a route server, the
> route server MUST ignore the NO_EXPORT
Job Snijders wrote:
> * A few Internet Exchange RS operators need to deploy a new routing
> policy.
Then you should speak directly to the IXPs who disagree with your
opinions and talk them into changing their opinions. As I said, this
has already been tried and it didn't work, but
Job Snijders wrote:
> Right now some IXPs are using the IETF RFCs as a justification to not
> hide their ASN in the AS_PATH - and unfortunately some of them gloss
> over the recommendations to apply ingress filters.
the two RS RFCs are split: one is a specification of what BGP must do,
and the
Job Snijders wrote:
> It is common practise for route server operators to configure their
> route server in such a way that the route server does not append its own
> ASN to the AS_PATH attribute. Many IXPs view this practise as
> justifiable because it gives them a competitive advantage over
Job Snijders wrote:
> After the gazillionth routing incident in which an IXP route server
> amplified the problem, I think it is time we explore mechanisms to
> improve accountability, auditability & make debugging easier.
you missed the term "misconfigured" or "malconfigured" when describing
the
Jeffrey Haas wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 01:04:03PM +0000, Nick Hilliard wrote:
>> It's also common practice for transit providers to use a single ASN
>> spanning the globe e.g. 174, 2914, 3356, etc. What you're describing
>> here is an aspect of the fact that that as
Jared Mauch wrote:
> I know that Job has been pushing for the above, perhaps not in your view
> but in the view of others here.
definitely. It's been incredibly productive work, and his efforts have
produced major results in terms of pushing IXPs towards filtering. This
needs to be continued.
Job Snijders wrote:
> You and Martijn appear to argue that the 'best path selection'
> component should not be fiddled with, which leaves me wondering
> whether we have any other methods to implement a track record ala
> 'this path announcement passed through RS AS XYZ' other than
> communities.
Christopher Morrow wrote:
(who hopes to one day have better answers for this than: "err, ask the
customer / peer which irr they use?"
congrats, you just stood on the trust model dog turd.
Right now we have the lolz model (anyone can put anything in any
non-authoritative IRR and it will be
Sandra Murphy wrote:
A university abandoning publication of its research and, at least
right now, not even sustaining the archive of its former
publications. Ugh.
Long term document storage is hard.
Has the IETF looked at how to work around this problem? If so, who is
dealing with it? If
This errata report isn't wrong, but belongs to a bigger category of
problems relating to how the IETF handles third party references in RFCs.
It's unlikely that the researchgate url will be persistent in the longer
term, at least any more than any other URL.
Nick
RFC Errata System wrote:
Job Snijders wrote on 11/06/2018 21:59:
Please take a moment to read and evaluate the document and let the
working group know whether you'd like to continue work on this document
as working group or not.
yep, sounds good, but what will this do to the vendors' two main
weapons, fear and
Randy Bush wrote on 12/06/2018 19:12:
job sugggested to add a clause recommending that operators not use
'set' at all to remove communities, but do it explicitly. the authors
would appreciate comments on that.
it strikes me as being a latter day "Go To Statement Considered Harmful"
sort of
Randy Bush wrote on 13/06/2018 16:18:
it strikes me as being a latter day "Go To Statement Considered
Harmful" sort of thing.
goto is harmful!
just like many of the best things in life.
am i supposed to replace
set 666:42
with
remove *:*
add 666:42
like that's not gonna be
Thomas King wrote:
> Hi Job,
>
> to be clear, my suggestion covers MC-LAGs and more importantly LAGs.
reading between the lines, in the case of single-device LAGs, I'm
guessing that you're talking about LAGs deployed over different line
cards on larger chassis based network devices. On devices
Job Snijders wrote on 06/08/2018 20:35:
I'm not the biggest fan of that philosophy. Especially because in the
milions of objecst that exist in the combined IRR databases, it appears
only four of them have something with ASDOT in the wrong place.
right, you didn't mention that the 4 affected
Gert Doering wrote on 06/08/2018 23:08:
It totally wrecked my nice AS3.3 into an ugly large number, but there
was strong enough pushing that I was overruled.
asdot was something that seemed like a good idea until the day that
someone tried to use it in production :-|
Nick
Job Snijders wrote on 06/08/2018 14:22> RFC 5396
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5396 described the "asdot+" and
"asdot" representation formats for AS numbers.
I'd personally prefer a single canonical way to represent ASNs
(asplain), and while RFC 5396 proposes the adoption of a decimal value
Daniel Shaw wrote on 10/08/2018 08:29:
I think that on closer examination you may find the AFRINIC whois also
changed around the same timeframe, perhaps a year later. It seems that
there may be one (or possibly some other very small number of) test
objects that did not get converted/clean-up.
This probably doesn't suck as an idea.
One of the shortcomings of as-sets in RPSL was that there was no forward
security when including as-sets. In other words, anyone could include
any other AS or as-set in their own as-set. This allowed a good degree
of flexibility, but could also create
Christopher Morrow wrote on 06/11/2018 04:34:
Please have a read/review/comment and let's see if we can close out and
move forward by the end of the month.
no comments to add. please publish.
Nick
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Jeffrey Haas wrote on 04/10/2018 20:51:
Based on the primary use case for loc-rib (avoid the need for a parallel BGP
session to your BMP rib-in session), I suspect what's intended is "send the
route that's eligible to be sent to BGP".
probably yes, although this may give an obscure view about
LGTM. No issues with waving this through with minimal bureaucracy.
Nick
Christopher Morrow wrote on 20/09/2018 21:33:
Hello Grow Folks,
This seems like a sane plan ... I or Job can either unilaterally accept
this, or ask for adoption...
If there's enough immediate call to avoid the 2wk
Qing Yang wrote on 25/09/2018 19:53:
But the 'rejected prefix due to a policy' really is a function of two
entity: the incoming *updates*, and the policy itself. Let us say, you
receive 10 prefixes from a peer, and the policy is rejecting 5, and you
show the counter as 5. Later on, you change
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