Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
I'm not sure what is relevant to this inquiry, but my web pages related to Husserl and phenomenology are: http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber7.htmlExperience and Subjectivism (Sections I.F-II.D) by Marvin Farber http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber1.htmlThe Issue of Naturalism vs. Subjectivism by Marvin Farber http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber2.htmlNaturalism and Subjectivismhttp://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber2.html: Contents by Marvin Farber http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber6.htmlEdmund Husserl and the Aims of Phenomenology by Marvin Farber Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy Within Nature by Marvin Farber http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber9/PE-0.htmlContents Foreword http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber9/PE-mp.htmlMarvin Farber on Maurice Merleau Ponty http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber3.htmlThe Search for an Alternativehttp://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber3.html I: Subjectivism, Phenomenology, Marxism, and the Role of Alternatives by Marvin Farber http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber5.htmlThe Search for an Alternativehttp://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber5.html 8: The Historical Outcome of Subjectivism by Marvin Farber http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber4.htmlThe Search for an Alternativehttp://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber4.html 9: From the Perspective of Materialism by Marvin Farber Phenomenology and Natural Existence: Essays in Honor of Marvin Farber, edited by Dale Riepe http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber8/PNE-0c.htmlContents Acknowledgements http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber8/PNE-0i.htmlIntroduction by Dale Riepe http://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marcuse5.htmlThe Concept of Essence (Excerpt: Phenomenology) by Herbert Marcuse http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/marcuse7.htmlOn Science and Phenomenology by Herbert Marcuse http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/marcuse8.htmlComment on the Paper by H. Marcuse by Aron Gurwitsch http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/adornohuss.htmlAdorno contra Husserl by Ralph Dumain http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/lifeworld1.htmlLife-World within Brackets by David H. DeGrood http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/degrood1.htmlThe Appearance of Reality and the Reality of Appearance by David H. DeGrood At 09:29 PM 4/3/2008, CeJ wrote: JF: I am interested in them because of my general interest in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: culturally, socially and politically of differing philosophies of science. Concerning the Vienna Circle, I am in agreement with George Reisch that because of the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism into the anglophone world, especially in the US, people have generally failed to understand or appreciate the broader concerns of the Vienna Circle, so that it was generally understood in the US as having been mainly about modern logic and the philosophy of science, whereas they in fact had much broader interests. I'm interested in issues in philosophy of social sciences (psycho-, logico-formal, cognitive, linguistic, social, etc.), but my limited knowledge of the VC leads me to think (perhaps quite wrongly) there wasn't much fruitful work done amongst them in such areas. I haven't had time to search down info. on all the official members listed in that manifesto. And although Popper never got listed as a VC member (and was down officially as an opponent of the logical positivists), they published at least of his books, didn't they? Of their contemporaries, I find Husserl and Vygotsky much more interesting on scientific approaches to the social and psychological realms. And in education, I would cite Freire and his use of non-positivistic approaches. (You could say variations of positivism pervade academic social sciences in the anglophone world and much of Europe. And that would include the way academia co-opts 'practitioner sciences' in order to make more high-paying work for itself and to control certification and indoctrination in education and other applied and clinical specialities. For example, academic approaches to 'qualitative research' , 'classroom resarch', and 'action research'.) Husserl, I believe, is a hugely under-estimated influence on so much of modern and post-modern philosophy. Directly and indirectly. He got somewhat dismissed because of anglo-analytic propaganda about Frege. Popper seems to have got some of his ideas about open society directly from Husserl, but Popper is a direct product of the logical positivists/empiricists and Husserl is not. He is a true opposition to it. You can dismantle Popper with Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. You can find parallels between late Popper and Piaget. But you can also demolish Popper using Husserl's analysis of why positivist programs fail in the 'sciences of man'. Interestingly enough Carnap's
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Hi Jim Given what I have studied of BT and given his failure to participate more actively in the Vienna Circle I have been of the opinion that he was not a verificationist. The admiration, and apparent benign relationship between Popper and BT, I would have thought, might even indicate that he was closer to Popper than A.J. Ayer. Paddy Hackett - Original Message - From: Jim Farmelant [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Saturday, April 05, 2008 2:10 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. On Fri, 4 Apr 2008 11:47:50 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Hi Given that Bertrand Russell rejected verificationism as the criterion as to what is science, can you tell me what was his criterion or criteria for identifying science as against non-science was? What makes you think that Russell wasn't a verificationist? It seems to me that his logical atomism was at least by implication, verificationist. Paddy Hackett ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Hi Given that Bertrand Russell rejected verificationism as the criterion as to what is science, can you tell me what was his criterion or criteria for identifying science as against non-science was? Paddy Hackett ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
On Vygotsky: http://www.mail-archive.com/marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu/msg01947.html -- CeJ [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: JF: I am interested in them because of my general interest in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: culturally, socially and politically of differing philosophies of science. Concerning the Vienna Circle, I am in agreement with George Reisch that because of the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism into the anglophone world, especially in the US, people have generally failed to understand or appreciate the broader concerns of the Vienna Circle, so that it was generally understood in the US as having been mainly about modern logic and the philosophy of science, whereas they in fact had much broader interests. I'm interested in issues in philosophy of social sciences (psycho-, logico-formal, cognitive, linguistic, social, etc.), but my limited knowledge of the VC leads me to think (perhaps quite wrongly) there wasn't much fruitful work done amongst them in such areas. I haven't had time to search down info. on all the official members listed in that manifesto. And although Popper never got listed as a VC member (and was down officially as an opponent of the logical positivists), they published at least of his books, didn't they? Of their contemporaries, I find Husserl and Vygotsky much more interesting on scientific approaches to the social and psychological realms. And in education, I would cite Freire and his use of non-positivistic approaches. (You could say variations of positivism pervade academic social sciences in the anglophone world and much of Europe. And that would include the way academia co-opts 'practitioner sciences' in order to make more high-paying work for itself and to control certification and indoctrination in education and other applied and clinical specialities. For example, academic approaches to 'qualitative research' , 'classroom resarch', and 'action research'.) Husserl, I believe, is a hugely under-estimated influence on so much of modern and post-modern philosophy. Directly and indirectly. He got somewhat dismissed because of anglo-analytic propaganda about Frege. Popper seems to have got some of his ideas about open society directly from Husserl, but Popper is a direct product of the logical positivists/empiricists and Husserl is not. He is a true opposition to it. You can dismantle Popper with Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. You can find parallels between late Popper and Piaget. But you can also demolish Popper using Husserl's analysis of why positivist programs fail in the 'sciences of man'. Interestingly enough Carnap's itinerant education led to his being taught by a who's who of philosophy, including Husserl, Frege, and Bruno Bauch, as well as personal correspondence with Russell. Also, you could say Heidegger's philosophy starts with the teaching of Husserl. Even Goedel cited Husserl as an influence. I should like to re-read Wittgenstein on psychology in light of having read more of Brentano, Husserl and the gestaltists. Husserl is that rationalist hinge on which so much modern and post-modern philosophy swings. So why did Husserl and Vygotsky refer to a CRISIS in naturalistic and positivist approach to the 'sciences of man'? (Though it is often forgotten that to quite an extent positivism originates in attempts to shift social philosophy into a scientific framework--such as Comte's sociology.) (I think RD has reviews and essays that relate to Husserl (such as Husserl vs. positivism). Could he post some links and excerpts if he has time? ) Here are some online Husserl and Vygotsky primary sources, typical of what I have I have been reading off and on for the past two years at marxists.org. 1. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/husserl2.htm (by the way, I have the book, but am citing an online source for list participants) small excerpt �61. Psychology in the tension between the (objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry (the psychophysical and that of psychology based on inner experience). ALL SCIENTIFIC empirical inquiry has its original legitimacy and also its dignity. But considered by itself, not all such inquiry is science in that most original and indispensable sense whose first name was philosophy, and thus also in the sense of the new establishment of a philosophy or science since the Renaissance. Not all scientific empirical inquiry grew up as a partial function within such a science. Yet only when it does justice to this sense can it truly be called scientific. But we can speak of science as such only where, within the indestructible whole of universal philosophy, a branch of the universal task causes a particular science, unitary in itself, to grow up, in whose particular task, as a branch, the universal task works itself out in an originally vital grounding of the system.
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Ralph you say that you are not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. I am intrigued by this because although I look to a range of philosophical resources - Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Jameson, etc - they do tend for me to be politically progressive figures. I wonder if you can give any examples of how you find non-politically progressive individuals to be fruitful? Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 03 April 2008 05:08 To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. I wonder if this is unequivocally true about the Frankfurters. For sure, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse had an animus against positivism, but it is not necessarily the case that they viewed the neopositivists themselves as reactionaries. The closest approach to specific animosity I can think of is some correspondence in the '30s I read about where Horkheimer refused to participate in dialogue with Neurath, but I don't trust my memory. I would like to point out for the general purpose of such discussions, I am not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. At 08:09 PM 4/2/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Bad grammar aside, I thought my point was non-mysterious. If, after I've given a detailed argument as to why some philosophy is false and harmful, someone retorts that philosopher X actually had politically progressive views, why should I then be more favorably disposed towards said bullshit? Your question is the reverse: what individuals (thinkers, presumably) do I find fruitful though not politically progressive? I would imagine there must be thousands, but why is this even a question? The more important question in either of these scenarios is: is there an intrinsic connection between a body of thought and a politics, and what is its nature? The case of Heidegger is a particularly apt example, though there are countless others. At 01:36 AM 4/3/2008, Phil Walden wrote: Ralph you say that you are not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. I am intrigued by this because although I look to a range of philosophical resources - Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Jameson, etc - they do tend for me to be politically progressive figures. I wonder if you can give any examples of how you find non-politically progressive individuals to be fruitful? Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 03 April 2008 05:08 To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. I wonder if this is unequivocally true about the Frankfurters. For sure, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse had an animus against positivism, but it is not necessarily the case that they viewed the neopositivists themselves as reactionaries. The closest approach to specific animosity I can think of is some correspondence in the '30s I read about where Horkheimer refused to participate in dialogue with Neurath, but I don't trust my memory. I would like to point out for the general purpose of such discussions, I am not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. At 08:09 PM 4/2/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Hi Jim Interesting! You seem very familiar with the Vienna Circle. What was it that attracted your interest in it? Paddy Hackett - Original Message - From: Jim Farmelant [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Thursday, April 03, 2008 2:09 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. Why did Wittgenstein not view himself as a logical positivist? The Circle admired Wittgenstein, but he was not inclined to reciprocate. He thought that they misunderstood what he was attempting to do. He was willing to meet with individual members of the Circle, with people like Schlick, Carnap, Feigl etc. but he refused to meet with the Circle as a whole. What, if any, the principal difference(s) between their philosophies in these early days. I can see why there is a difference between Popper and Logical Positivism --the question of verfiability over falsifiablity. There were differences with in the Circle over such issues as physicalist realism versus phenonomenalism, coherence theories of truth versus correspondence theories of truth. Later on there were somewhat different understandings of what was entailed by the unity of science. Did that mean that a straight forward reductionist program was possible with everything being ultimately reduced to the laws of chemistry and physics, or did it simply mean that all meaningul propositions about the world, whether those propositions be from the natural sciences, or the behavioral and social sciences, were expressible in terms of physicalist language? Neurath tended to champion holistic conceptions of truth and knowledge and he shied away from extreme reductionism. His positions were thus akin to those that many Marxists have held over the years. Jim F. Paddy Hackett - Original Message - From: Ralph Dumain [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Wednesday, April 02, 2008 7:47 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. Interesting. I wonder if I should put this or similar items into my bibliography. This is a Marxist advocating the Popperian approach as a way of circumventing doctrinal rigidification. Can you think of other Marxists who have taken this road? ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
I am interested in them because of my general interest in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: culturally, socially and politically of differing philosophies of science. Concerning the Vienna Circle, I am in agreement with George Reisch that because of the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism into the anglophone world, especially in the US, people have generally failed to understand or appreciate the broader concerns of the Vienna Circle, so that it was generally understood in the US as having been mainly about modern logic and the philosophy of science, whereas they in fact had much broader interests. For example, they had a close working relationship with the Bauhaus. That was partially because the Vienna Circle member, Philipp Frank, had a brother, Josef Frank, who was an architect and a teacher at the Bauhaus, but it was also the case that various members of the Circle, including Neurath and Carnap would regularly give lectures at the Bauhaus. The Circle saw the kind of work being pursued by the Bauhaus as being consistent with their own work as philosophers and scientists. Both the Bauhaus and the Circle were part of the broader social democratic culture that prevailed in Germany and Austria prior to the rise of fascism. Of the members of the Vienna Circle, Otto Neurath was probably the one who was the most concerned with pursuing these broader implications of logical empiricism. This no doubt was due to his experiences of having been an economic planner for the Austrian government during WW I, his participation in the radical left governments of Bavaria during the 1919 revolution, and his work for the Austrian SPD and the trade union movement during the 1920s and 1930s. Jim F. -- rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Jim Interesting! You seem very familiar with the Vienna Circle. What was it that attracted your interest in it? Paddy Hackett - Original Message - From: Jim Farmelant [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Thursday, April 03, 2008 2:09 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. Why did Wittgenstein not view himself as a logical positivist? The Circle admired Wittgenstein, but he was not inclined to reciprocate. He thought that they misunderstood what he was attempting to do. He was willing to meet with individual members of the Circle, with people like Schlick, Carnap, Feigl etc. but he refused to meet with the Circle as a whole. What, if any, the principal difference(s) between their philosophies in these early days. I can see why there is a difference between Popper and Logical Positivism --the question of verfiability over falsifiablity. There were differences with in the Circle over such issues as physicalist realism versus phenonomenalism, coherence theories of truth versus correspondence theories of truth. Later on there were somewhat different understandings of what was entailed by the unity of science. Did that mean that a straight forward reductionist program was possible with everything being ultimately reduced to the laws of chemistry and physics, or did it simply mean that all meaningul propositions about the world, whether those propositions be from the natural sciences, or the behavioral and social sciences, were expressible in terms of physicalist language? Neurath tended to champion holistic conceptions of truth and knowledge and he shied away from extreme reductionism. His positions were thus akin to those that many Marxists have held over the years. Jim F. Paddy Hackett - Original Message - From: Ralph Dumain [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Wednesday, April 02, 2008 7:47 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. Interesting. I wonder if I should put this or similar items into my bibliography. This is a Marxist advocating the Popperian approach as a way of circumventing doctrinal rigidification. Can you think of other Marxists who have taken this road? ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
I would agree with you that some of Heidegger's philosophy is important and needs to be absorbed by Marxists. I imagine you would agree that Adorno's critique of Heidegger is also important as well as being more politically conducive to the Marxist project. You have clarified matters somewhat in your reply but I still wish to ask a question. Is the value of right-wing or liberal writers that they bring into focus questions which Marxist writers haven't properly considered? I don't know if you have seen a recent book by Perry Anderson called Spectrum: from right to left in the world of ideas but he seems to hold the view that Marxist writers *have* on the whole properly considered the questions but for some unspecified reason Marxism has not won out. It's an enormous question, I know. But what do you think? Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 03 April 2008 08:45 To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. Bad grammar aside, I thought my point was non-mysterious. If, after I've given a detailed argument as to why some philosophy is false and harmful, someone retorts that philosopher X actually had politically progressive views, why should I then be more favorably disposed towards said bullshit? Your question is the reverse: what individuals (thinkers, presumably) do I find fruitful though not politically progressive? I would imagine there must be thousands, but why is this even a question? The more important question in either of these scenarios is: is there an intrinsic connection between a body of thought and a politics, and what is its nature? The case of Heidegger is a particularly apt example, though there are countless others. At 01:36 AM 4/3/2008, Phil Walden wrote: Ralph you say that you are not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. I am intrigued by this because although I look to a range of philosophical resources - Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Jameson, etc - they do tend for me to be politically progressive figures. I wonder if you can give any examples of how you find non-politically progressive individuals to be fruitful? Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 03 April 2008 05:08 To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. I wonder if this is unequivocally true about the Frankfurters. For sure, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse had an animus against positivism, but it is not necessarily the case that they viewed the neopositivists themselves as reactionaries. The closest approach to specific animosity I can think of is some correspondence in the '30s I read about where Horkheimer refused to participate in dialogue with Neurath, but I don't trust my memory. I would like to point out for the general purpose of such discussions, I am not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. At 08:09 PM 4/2/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Ralph Dumain I would like to point out for the general purpose of such discussions, I am not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. ^^^ CB: This seems to me a very central question. I don't think political questions are provincial relative to philosophy. The ultimate import of philosophy is how it comes out in politics, pretty much. The fundamental project in discovering things-in-themselves is to turn them into things-for-us ( the human race). This is the necessary unity of the projects of science-philosophy and politics. I'm not interested in philosophy and science that does not have this as its essential purpose. A concrete example of this is how modern physics was used to create nuclear weapons. I used to say that this made Einstein out as a sort of Sorcerer's Apprentice, releasing forces that he had no control over. But maybe the scientist to put in this character is Madame Curie. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
What are some of the aspects of Heidegger's philosophy that you find important ? Charles Phil Walden [EMAIL PROTECTED] 04/03/2008 9:43 AM I would agree with you that some of Heidegger's philosophy is important and needs to be absorbed by Marxists. I imagine you would agree that Adorno's critique of Heidegger is also important as well as being more politically conducive to the Marxist project. You have clarified matters somewhat in your reply but I still wish to ask a question. Is the value of right-wing or liberal writers that they bring into focus questions which Marxist writers haven't properly considered? I don't know if you have seen a recent book by Perry Anderson called Spectrum: from right to left in the world of ideas but he seems to hold the view that Marxist writers *have* on the whole properly considered the questions but for some unspecified reason Marxism has not won out. It's an enormous question, I know. But what do you think? Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 03 April 2008 08:45 To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. Bad grammar aside, I thought my point was non-mysterious. If, after I've given a detailed argument as to why some philosophy is false and harmful, someone retorts that philosopher X actually had politically progressive views, why should I then be more favorably disposed towards said bullshit? Your question is the reverse: what individuals (thinkers, presumably) do I find fruitful though not politically progressive? I would imagine there must be thousands, but why is this even a question? The more important question in either of these scenarios is: is there an intrinsic connection between a body of thought and a politics, and what is its nature? The case of Heidegger is a particularly apt example, though there are countless others. At 01:36 AM 4/3/2008, Phil Walden wrote: Ralph you say that you are not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. I am intrigued by this because although I look to a range of philosophical resources - Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Jameson, etc - they do tend for me to be politically progressive figures. I wonder if you can give any examples of how you find non-politically progressive individuals to be fruitful? Phil Walden -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 03 April 2008 05:08 To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. I wonder if this is unequivocally true about the Frankfurters. For sure, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse had an animus against positivism, but it is not necessarily the case that they viewed the neopositivists themselves as reactionaries. The closest approach to specific animosity I can think of is some correspondence in the '30s I read about where Horkheimer refused to participate in dialogue with Neurath, but I don't trust my memory. I would like to point out for the general purpose of such discussions, I am not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. At 08:09 PM 4/2/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
How does A.J. Ayer fit into this matter of the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism into the anglophone world. I obtained my initial more direct experience of it throug Ayer's titles? Paddy Hackett -- - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Thursday, April 03, 2008 12:55 PM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. I am interested in them because of my general interest in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: culturally, socially and politically of differing ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
On Thu, 3 Apr 2008 17:05:10 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: How does A.J. Ayer fit into this matter of the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism into the anglophone world. I obtained my initial more direct experience of it throug Ayer's titles? Ayer was politically a social democrat. During the 1930s he flirted with joining the British CP but declined to do because of the incompatibility between diamat and his own logical empiricism. Thereafter, he was a longtime supporter of the British Labour Party, except for a few years in the early 1980s when he supported the breakaway Social Democratic Party. Paddy Hackett -- - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Thursday, April 03, 2008 12:55 PM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. I am interested in them because of my general interest in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: culturally, socially and politically of differing ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
JF: I am interested in them because of my general interest in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: culturally, socially and politically of differing philosophies of science. Concerning the Vienna Circle, I am in agreement with George Reisch that because of the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism into the anglophone world, especially in the US, people have generally failed to understand or appreciate the broader concerns of the Vienna Circle, so that it was generally understood in the US as having been mainly about modern logic and the philosophy of science, whereas they in fact had much broader interests. I'm interested in issues in philosophy of social sciences (psycho-, logico-formal, cognitive, linguistic, social, etc.), but my limited knowledge of the VC leads me to think (perhaps quite wrongly) there wasn't much fruitful work done amongst them in such areas. I haven't had time to search down info. on all the official members listed in that manifesto. And although Popper never got listed as a VC member (and was down officially as an opponent of the logical positivists), they published at least of his books, didn't they? Of their contemporaries, I find Husserl and Vygotsky much more interesting on scientific approaches to the social and psychological realms. And in education, I would cite Freire and his use of non-positivistic approaches. (You could say variations of positivism pervade academic social sciences in the anglophone world and much of Europe. And that would include the way academia co-opts 'practitioner sciences' in order to make more high-paying work for itself and to control certification and indoctrination in education and other applied and clinical specialities. For example, academic approaches to 'qualitative research' , 'classroom resarch', and 'action research'.) Husserl, I believe, is a hugely under-estimated influence on so much of modern and post-modern philosophy. Directly and indirectly. He got somewhat dismissed because of anglo-analytic propaganda about Frege. Popper seems to have got some of his ideas about open society directly from Husserl, but Popper is a direct product of the logical positivists/empiricists and Husserl is not. He is a true opposition to it. You can dismantle Popper with Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. You can find parallels between late Popper and Piaget. But you can also demolish Popper using Husserl's analysis of why positivist programs fail in the 'sciences of man'. Interestingly enough Carnap's itinerant education led to his being taught by a who's who of philosophy, including Husserl, Frege, and Bruno Bauch, as well as personal correspondence with Russell. Also, you could say Heidegger's philosophy starts with the teaching of Husserl. Even Goedel cited Husserl as an influence. I should like to re-read Wittgenstein on psychology in light of having read more of Brentano, Husserl and the gestaltists. Husserl is that rationalist hinge on which so much modern and post-modern philosophy swings. So why did Husserl and Vygotsky refer to a CRISIS in naturalistic and positivist approach to the 'sciences of man'? (Though it is often forgotten that to quite an extent positivism originates in attempts to shift social philosophy into a scientific framework--such as Comte's sociology.) (I think RD has reviews and essays that relate to Husserl (such as Husserl vs. positivism). Could he post some links and excerpts if he has time? ) Here are some online Husserl and Vygotsky primary sources, typical of what I have I have been reading off and on for the past two years at marxists.org. 1. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/husserl2.htm (by the way, I have the book, but am citing an online source for list participants) small excerpt §61. Psychology in the tension between the (objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry (the psychophysical and that of psychology based on inner experience). ALL SCIENTIFIC empirical inquiry has its original legitimacy and also its dignity. But considered by itself, not all such inquiry is science in that most original and indispensable sense whose first name was philosophy, and thus also in the sense of the new establishment of a philosophy or science since the Renaissance. Not all scientific empirical inquiry grew up as a partial function within such a science. Yet only when it does justice to this sense can it truly be called scientific. But we can speak of science as such only where, within the indestructible whole of universal philosophy, a branch of the universal task causes a particular science, unitary in itself, to grow up, in whose particular task, as a branch, the universal task works itself out in an originally vital grounding of the system. Not every empirical inquiry that can be pursued freely by itself is in this sense already a science, no matter how much
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
(and was down officially as an opponent of the logical positivists), they published at least of his books, didn't they? I meant to say here that the VC published at least TWO of Popper's books. CJ ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. Why did Wittgenstein not view himself as a logical positivist? What, if any, the principal difference(s) between their philosophies in these early days. I can see why there is a difference between Popper and Logical Positivism --the question of verfiability over falsifiablity. Paddy Hackett - Original Message - From: Ralph Dumain [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Wednesday, April 02, 2008 7:47 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc. Interesting. I wonder if I should put this or similar items into my bibliography. This is a Marxist advocating the Popperian approach as a way of circumventing doctrinal rigidification. Can you think of other Marxists who have taken this road? ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
I wonder if this is unequivocally true about the Frankfurters. For sure, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse had an animus against positivism, but it is not necessarily the case that they viewed the neopositivists themselves as reactionaries. The closest approach to specific animosity I can think of is some correspondence in the '30s I read about where Horkheimer refused to participate in dialogue with Neurath, but I don't trust my memory. I would like to point out for the general purpose of such discussions, I am not terribly impressed to show a favorable attitude towards philosophies just because some of their proponents were political progressive individuals. This shows a rather provincial approach to intellectual problems and their broader ideological implications. At 08:09 PM 4/2/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:53:37 +0100 rasherrs [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Thank you for the help in relation to the Vienna Circle. It is a circle that has been much misunderstood in radical left circles. When I was in my late teens I was led to the view that it was a crassly reactionary group. The Frankfurters in particular pushed that view of the Circle, as did many Soviet or pro-Soviet writers, who emphasized Leninist opposition to Machism. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Popper at one time had wanted to join the Circle and was evidently very envious of the admiration Wittgenstein received from them (though by most accounts, Wittgenstein did not see himself as engaged in their scientific world view and did not encourage their acclaim of him). Here is a nice summing up of Popper, especially if you follow it up with a bit of Lakatos and Feyerabend. : http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ Popper's final position is that he acknowledges that it is impossible to discriminate science from non-science on the basis of the falsifiability of the scientific statements alone; he recognizes that scientific theories are predictive, and consequently prohibitive, only when taken in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses, and he also recognizes that readjustment or modification of the latter is an integral part of scientific practice. Hence his final concern is to outline conditions which indicate when such modification is genuinely scientific, and when it is merely ad hoc. This is itself clearly a major alteration in his position, and arguably represents a substantial retraction on his part: Marxism can no longer be dismissed as 'unscientific' simply because its advocates preserved the theory from falsification by modifying it (for in general terms, such a procedure, it now transpires, is perfectly respectable scientific practice). It is now condemned as unscientific by Popper because the only rationale for the modifications which were made to the original theory was to ensure that it evaded falsification, and so such modifications were ad hoc, rather than scientific. This contention-- though not at all implausible--has, to hostile eyes, a somewhat contrived air about it, and is unlikely to worry the convinced Marxist. On the other hand, the shift in Popper's own basic position is taken by some critics as an indicator that falsificationism, for all its apparent merits, fares no better in the final analysis than verificationism. CJ ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:19:46 +0900 CeJ [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Popper at one time had wanted to join the Circle and was evidently very envious of the admiration Wittgenstein received from them (though by most accounts, Wittgenstein did not see himself as engaged in their scientific world view and did not encourage their acclaim of him). Here is a nice summing up of Popper, especially if you follow it up with a bit of Lakatos and Feyerabend. : http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ ] Me on Richard W. Miller and Popper http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/marxism/2004w52/msg00209.htm Also, my discussion of Alex Callinocos's usages of Popper can be found at: http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/marxism/2005w48/msg00247.htm ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
The VC didn't include Husserl in their manifesto, but I think he represents an important alternative in this discussion, if we want to reconcile 'human' and natural sciences. See, for example, http://pos.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/27/3/328 Husserl, Weber, Freud, and the Method of the Human Sciences Donald McIntosh In the debate between the natural science and the phenomenological or herme neutical approaches in the human sciences, a third alternative described by Husserl has been widely ignored. Contrary to frequent assumptions, Husserl believed that a purely phenomenological method is not generally the appropri ate approach for the empirical human sciences. Rather, he held that although they can and should make important use of phenomenological analysis, such sciences should take their basic stance in the natural attitude, the ordinary commonsense lifeworld mode of understanding which cuts across the divergent abstractive specializations of natural science and phenomenology Human sci ence in the natural attitude, shorn of its naivete by phenomenological insight, would be the field of descriptive concrete sociocultural sciences capable of taking a truly explanatory approach to their subject matter, persons and personal formations. In practice, both Weber and Freud exemplify the method recom mended by Husserl. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Also worth of consideration are Piaget's discussions on the philosophy of science (especially its turn to 'sociology of knowledge' post-Kuhn). This article (which I managed to get online for free somewhere, but I can now only find the abstract for) has been influential in pushing forward a consideration of Piaget in philosophy of science, under the sub-topic of epistemology and more specifically 'constructivist epistemology'. Apparently Piaget had extensive correspondence with Kuhn (I certainly never learned this when Kuhn was taught to me in philosophy of science back in the 80s), and some late positions of Popper's (after the interaction with Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend) resulted in work that is remarkably parallel to Piaget's. But in the philosophy of science, later Popper is mostly ignored. One last aside here, Feyerabend would have been the most politically left of these prominent academic philosophers of science (Piaget wasn't a professional philosopher in an American sense), and his approach to philosophy of science is often seen as having gone off the deep end towards irrational skepticism. I don't think so, but inductive Big Science and academic philosophy of science are conservative establishment endeavours, and few people as individuals can escape the demands of sponsorship. http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/16/2/203 Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science Piaget vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress Jonathan Y. Tsou University of Chicago This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of 'scientific progress', which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas Kuhn's (1922–1996). Issues of scientific continuity, scientific realism and scientific rationality are discussed. It is argued that Piaget's view highlights weaknesses in Kuhn's 'discontinuous' picture of scientific change. Key Words: evolutionary epistemology • Kuhn • philosophy of science • Piaget • scientific progress • structural realism ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
Interesting. I wonder if I should put this or similar items into my bibliography. This is a Marxist advocating the Popperian approach as a way of circumventing doctrinal rigidification. Can you think of other Marxists who have taken this road? At 07:41 PM 4/1/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Wed, 2 Apr 2008 09:19:46 +0900 CeJ [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Popper at one time had wanted to join the Circle and was evidently very envious of the admiration Wittgenstein received from them (though by most accounts, Wittgenstein did not see himself as engaged in their scientific world view and did not encourage their acclaim of him). Here is a nice summing up of Popper, especially if you follow it up with a bit of Lakatos and Feyerabend. : http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ ] Me on Richard W. Miller and Popper http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/marxism/2004w52/msg00209.htm Also, my discussion of Alex Callinocos's usages of Popper can be found at: http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/marxism/2005w48/msg00247.htm ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Vienna Circle etc.
This must be the document I downloaded earlier today. It was linked from the Wikipedia article on the Vienna Circle, if I recall correctly. It is rather confusing in its structure. Someone should check the print source to see if the whole manifesto is here included. I always remember this quote, which reveals to me the fundamental bankruptcy of this school's presuppositions: In science there are no 'depths'; there is surface everywhere . . . At 07:42 PM 4/1/2008, CeJ wrote: 1. Logical positivists/logical empiricists, like scientific realists, tend to reject Marxist approaches to social sciences because they largely reject social sciences Having said that, let me back up and say that the translation of The Scientific Conception of the World that I have now just referred to doesn't say this. It is quite 'ecumenical' and cites Marx twice and Marxist theory once in a positive way (which doesn't surprise me, given what has been posted about the VC on this list and what I read at online sources like marxists.org.) According to the authors of this (naively) scientistic manifesto, Marx in sociology and political economy is in keeping with anti-metaphysics and proper scientific (i.e., empirical but not necessarily experimental) attitude (but so are Feuerbach, Smith, Ricardo, JS Mill, James and myriad others). Nor are they hostile to psychological phenomenology (indeed, Brentano and Meinong get more specific praise than Marx!). On the other hand, although the document is noteworthy for its inclusiveness, it isn't very specific about why this or that approach in the social sciences is scientific according to these philosophical and scientific sages. If a proponent of whatever declared he hated metaphysics and embraced science, if he had a post at top university or institute, it looks like he could have got listed. It reads more like a who's who of European and North American academia (not including metaphysicians and theologians) of the era. And it really sets up scientism (positivist, realist, etc.) and rationalism for a hard fall come WW II. http://gnadav.googlepages.com/TheScientificConceptionoftheWorldeng.doc I think this is the entire document, though I had a hard time seeing where the preface segued into the main text. If you are interested in the history of science and the history of philosophy, it is a fascinating document to read through. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
