p.s.
I also thought that your conflating a second-hand opinion concerning young
James's debilitating depression and feeling of helplessness with a mature
discourse on freewill versus determinism was ridiculous.
On Jun 27, 2011, at 12:41 PM, MarshaV wrote:
Dmb,
Since I did
Marsha said to dmb:
You left off your last statement the You freakin weasel part., which was way
out of proportion. Now your neglecting to include the last statement is even
more ironic, but not surprising.
dmb says:
Weasel is just the casual, slang version of the complaint I explained at
dmb,
If you say I am a weasel, it must be so.
Marsha
On Jun 27, 2011, at 1:50 PM, david buchanan wrote:
Marsha said to dmb:
You left off your last statement the You freakin weasel part., which was
way out of proportion. Now your neglecting to include the last statement is
even
On 6/26/11 9:55 PM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote:
snip
How can free will exist without an independent agent?
How can we be morally responsible if our values (and consequent actions) are
predetermined?
Experiential existence hinges on autonomous value-sensibility. It makes no
For anyone who's genuinely interested in a Jamesian analysis of free will...
...The pragmatic method includes directives for validating a belief, whereas
the principle of pure experience includes directives for formulating the belief
in experiential terms...He [James] calls on the principle of
Charlene wrote:
...The pragmatic method includes directives for validating a belief, whereas
the principle of pure experience includes directives for formulating the belief
in experiential terms...He [James] calls on the principle of pure experience,
for instance, to demonstrate that if
On Monday, June 26, 2011 at 9:55 PM, Joseph Maurer jh...@comcast.net
wrote:
Hi Ham and all,
Pirsig proposes a metaphysics of DQ/SQ. DQ is indefinable not
unknowable. The independent agent is DQ/SQ. There is something
in our actions that enable the indefinable. Free will enables action
On Sat, Jun 25, 2011 at 11:12 AM, John Carl ridgecoy...@gmail.com wrote:
Free will is a choice.
Have you though this idea through at all?
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On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:50 AM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
[dmb]
To ask about the meaning of life in the first sense is to ask for the
definition of the term life.
To ask about the meaning of life in the second sense is to ask about the
nature of human existence.
It's not just the word
On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 8:03 AM, Steven Peterson
peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:50 AM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
[dmb]
To ask about the meaning of life in the first sense is to ask for the
definition of the term life.
To ask about the meaning of life in the
On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 12:09 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
How about neither accepting free will, nor rejecting freewill.
Marsha
Hi Marsha,
I think that is somewhat what Pirsig does in Lila. He raises the issue
of free will but doesn't accept either horn of the dilemma as
traditionally
Hi Steve. Here's my reply at my new ponderous rate of return:
On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 8:35 AM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com
wrote:
Hi John,
What you are missing is that the above dilemma (the traditional free
will/ determinism problem) is a false choice that arrises only when we
Hi John,
I'm packing for a short trip, but quickly...
You concede that free will is redundant, but below in response to my
claim that we don't choose our values but rather we ARE our values you
said that Choice and valuing are synonomous. Is what I've been
saying. What we choose is what we
- Original Message
From: Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com
To: moq_disc...@moqtalk.org
Sent: Tue, June 21, 2011 1:43:24 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone
On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 1:08 PM, Matt Kundert
pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hey Ron,
Matt said
Hi Steve,
I'm no expert, but I've been exposed to neither/nor logic, as a non-dualistic
logic, through my reading of Buddhist philosophy. It seems to me it places
the issue of freewill into the metaphor of horns of a rabbit. The abstract
concept is dissolved and one is sent back to
Hi Marsha, Steve, [Matt quoted] --
On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 12:09 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net asked:
How about neither accepting free will, nor rejecting freewill.
[Steve replied]:
I think that is somewhat what Pirsig does in Lila. He raises the issue
of free will but doesn't accept either
Dmb,
I would accuse you of misconstruing the argument and James's position but that
would be too generous. You're just making stuff up, probably to avoid the
burden of addressing the actual argument. You freakin weasel.
Marsha
On Jun 24, 2011, at 12:10 PM, david buchanan wrote:
I agree Craig. Some people choose to have free will and some people don't.
Free will is a choice.
John
I guess my speculation might be right: some people have free will others
don't.
Craig
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Steve said:
I think whether the issue with regard to causation or determinism comes up as
problematic is whether one thinks of causation as an epistemological issue
(certainty/uncertainty) or as somehow ontological/metaphysical (things actually
follow laws that can be spelled out or are
How about neither accepting free will, nor rejecting freewill.
Marsha
I agree Craig. Some people choose to have free will and some people don't.
Free will is a choice.
John
I guess my speculation might be right: some people have free will others
don't.
Craig
___
Steve said to Craig:
What is interesting to me is that though we tend to feel like our conscious
self is the author of our thoughts, when we mediate--when we make our best
effort to be conscious and pay attention to our own thoughts--we notice that
that feeling of willing our thoughts is
Hey Dan,
Matt said:
I didn't mean a textual ambiguity on Pirsig's part, but an idea I've
before called the indeterminacy of Dynamic Quality thesis. I think
Pirsig is more or less clear about the difference between Dynamic
Quality and chaos. What I meant is that the distinction between DQ
Hi Matt, Steve,
Matt:
... if determinism is the
thesis that we are caught up in causal chains, then it is not
destructive of moral reasoning because moral reasoning is
something that occurs partly _because_ of causal chains. Moral
reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if that's the case,
Steve:
...I think it was relevant to MY point which was that whatever James lied awake
worrying about as a young man is not necessarily what it means to be
philosophically Jamesian. I should try to be more straight-forward. Sometimes I
forget how slow you are.
dmb says:
That's not true
Hey Matt:
Yes, Dennett is probably best described as a compatibilist. And I have been
saying that freedom and constraint are both real so I agree with you and
Dennett on that. But determinism and the causal chains that the idea rests upon
would deny any freedom. I mean, causal relations are
On 6/24/11 10:41 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
snip
I'm using the standard definition of determinism, by the way. Determinism is
not compatible with moral responsibility precisely because of our actions are
determined by causes. It is the doctrine that all events,
Hey Dave,
DMB said:
Yes, Dennett is probably best described as a compatibilist. And I have
been saying that freedom and constraint are both real so I agree with
you and Dennett on that. But determinism and the causal chains that
the idea rests upon would deny any freedom. I mean, causal
Matt, all,
Matt said:
Oh. I guess I don't think causation implies certainty. You might say
that in my set-up of how stuff works, I incorporate the uncertainty
of life at a different level. A causal relationship itself doesn't imply
certainty, because certainty only comes up for persons
Hello everyone
On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 3:50 PM, Matt Kundert
pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
I apologize to everyone, but I'll be gone for two weeks, so don't be
surprised when I'm unresponsive.
Hi Matt
Just want to say thanks for the discussion. Very stimulating
intellectually. Thank
Steve and Matt --
On Fri, June 24, 2011 at 9:52 PM, Steven Peterson
peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
Matt, all,
I think whether the issue with regard to causation or determinism
comes up as problematic is whether one thinks of causation as an
epistemological issue (certainty/uncertainty) or
Steve, Craig, Matt and All --
On Wed, June 22, 2011 7:31 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com
wrote to Matt:
Matt:
... if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up in causal
chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning because
moral reasoning is something that occurs
Hello everyone
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 4:36 PM, Matt Kundert
pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Dan,
Matt said:
I have trouble equating Dynamic Quality or freedom with the absence
of patterns for the Pirsigian reason of the concomitant distinction
between and ambiguity between DQ and
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 10:35 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
[Steve]
As your thoughts come unbidden
anyway, then ask yourself where these thoughts come from.
Craig:
From me, of course. Neuroscience can even pin down the parts of the brain
involved.
The important point is to avoid the
Steve said to Matt:
Then there is the issue of _pre_determination which I think is only a concern
if you imagine an omniscient super-being, but it still manages to keep James
and dmb awake at night.
dmb says:
James and I are imagining an omniscient super-being? Huh?
I don't expect all that
[Steve]
when we mediate--when we
make our best effort to be conscious and pay attention to our own
thoughts--we notice that that feeling of willing our thoughts is
nowhere to be found.
It is just the opposite with me.
When I do something like drive my car get to my destination,
I wonder how
Matt said:
It was to say that if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up
in causal chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning because
moral reasoning is something that occurs partly _because_ of causal
chains. Moral reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if that's the
case,
Steve said to Craig:
What is interesting to me is that though we tend to feel like our conscious
self is the author of our thoughts, when we mediate--when we make our best
effort to be conscious and pay attention to our own thoughts--we notice that
that feeling of willing our thoughts is
How does causality work in moral reasoning? Maybe we could say that about
formal logic if we were using causal in a figurative way but to press such a
notion so far as to save moral reasoning within a deterministic view seems to
stretch things well beyond the breaking point.
Matt said:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 7:15 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
How does causality work in moral reasoning? Maybe we could say that about
formal logic if we were using causal in a figurative way but to press such
a notion so far as to save moral reasoning within a deterministic
Matt said:
It was to say that if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up
in causal chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning
because moral reasoning is something that occurs partly _because_
of causal chains. Moral reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if
that's the case,
[dmb]
To ask about the meaning of life in the first sense is to ask for the
definition of the term life.
To ask about the meaning of life in the second sense is to ask about the
nature of human existence.
It's not just the word 'meaning' that has 2 senses in the above, but also the
word
Hello everyone
On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 12:00 PM, Matt Kundert
pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hey Dan,
I'm not sure whether you meant it as such or not, but I read
everything in the first two sections of your response as in agreement
with what I was saying. The below picks up after
On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 1:11 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Steve said:
I would say that a Jamesian pragmatic evaluation of the situation goes like
this: if determinism were true, we would behave exactly as we already behave
and have no choice in the matter even though we
On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 7:18 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
The complete interview is accessible at
http://reason.com/archives/2003/05/01/pulling-our-own-strings.
http://reason.com/archives/2003/05/01/pulling-our-own-strings.
Good antidote to the view that thoughts just come to us.
Hi Dan,
Matt said:
I have trouble equating Dynamic Quality or freedom with the absence
of patterns for the Pirsigian reason of the concomitant distinction
between and ambiguity between DQ and chaos/degeneracy.
Dan said:
Yes, equating Dynamic Quality with the absence of patterns can be
Hi Matt,
Matt:
... if determinism is the
thesis that we are caught up in causal chains, then it is not
destructive of moral reasoning because moral reasoning is
something that occurs partly _because_ of causal chains. Moral
reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if that's the case, why on
[Steve]
As your thoughts come unbidden
anyway, then ask yourself where these thoughts come from.
From me, of course. Neuroscience can even pin down the parts of the brain
involved.
The important point is to avoid the following non-sequitors:
That sometimes thoughts come to us unbidden does not
On Jun 20, 2011, at 4:56 PM, Micah wrote:
In hindsight, there is no free will - but it's hard to live that way.
Micah
Greetings Micah,
Beforehand, there was never a doubt to challenge either free will or
causation; they were so embedded in my reality. It was a shock as they
began to
Marsha
Well if we consider that all ongoing events or processes of all the 4 levels
are using free will to exist and trying to make the best out of the situation
under the actual conditions then it is obvious that there are many wills going
on at the same time that are striving to provide
Jan-Anders,
All that you write may be conventionally true, but not necessary. Causal
field, effect and the relationship between them are interdependent static
patterns with their existence further dependent on the conceptual act of
slicing and dicing experience into independent entities:
Steve said:
I would say that a Jamesian pragmatic evaluation of the situation goes like
this: if determinism were true, we would behave exactly as we already behave
and have no choice in the matter even though we have the feeling of willing
some of our acts. If free will is true, then we
Hey Dan,
I'm not sure whether you meant it as such or not, but I read
everything in the first two sections of your response as in agreement
with what I was saying. The below picks up after that:
Dan said:
If all patterns are evolving toward Dynamic freedom, or the absence
of patterns, then
Hi Matt,
Essence seems to have more baggage than existence. Hence the need for a
DQ/SQ metaphysics embracing levels in existence.
Joe
On 6/20/11 4:50 PM, Matt Kundert pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
Joe said:
In trying to arrive at the primitive concept, I suggest that existence
Hi Matt, good to have you back in the mix.
Don't have full editing facilities right now, but two points
Plus c'est la meme chose - seeing things better looking back is indeed a myth.
It has looked like that since 4000BC (Horace)
And your (Nagel) point - the closer we look (analyze) the
The complete interview is accessible at
http://reason.com/archives/2003/05/01/pulling-our-own-strings.
http://reason.com/archives/2003/05/01/pulling-our-own-strings.
Good antidote to the view that thoughts just come to us.
Craig
Moq_Discuss mailing list
START program.
A: Do you feel compelled to push the right-hand button?
IF Yes, GOTO C.
B: Do you feel compelled to push the left-hand button?
IF Yes, GOTO D.
C: Do you feel compelled to Stop?
IF Yes, GOTO B.
PUSH the left-hand button.
GOTO E.
D: Do you feel compelled to Stop?
IF Yes, GOTO A.
PUSH
NOPE!
I got the MOJO!
Mark
On Jun 21, 2011, at 5:14 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
START program.
A: Do you feel compelled to push the right-hand button?
IF Yes, GOTO C.
B: Do you feel compelled to push the left-hand button?
IF Yes, GOTO D.
C: Do you feel compelled to Stop?
IF Yes, GOTO
Andre:
Sorry folks, my last post wasn't meant to be sent.
Apologies!
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On Jun 19, 2011, at 6:57 PM, Steven Peterson wrote:
On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 12:13 PM, Horse ho...@darkstar.uk.net wrote:
So we're kind of back to the idea that 'Free Will' is an illusion!
Sam Harris goes further to say that those who meditate learn that
illusion of free will is itself an
On Jun 19, 2011, at 10:45 AM, X Acto wrote:
Marsha said:
I have probably read more commentary about causation than any other
Buddhist explanation of Emptiness. It is the first topic addressed in
Nagarjuna's MMK. Nagarjuna's logic is not easy. It seems he may
have been battling
Sorry Marsha and Steve but you are definitely on the wrong way here.
Free will is not an illusion. Free will is the ultimate basic condition for
unpredictability and ever changing identities.
It may be scary to grasp the personal responsibility it takes but without free
will there would be no
J-A,
Okay, this is your understanding of the way things are. Mine is:
not this, not that.
Marsha
On Jun 20, 2011, at 5:27 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote:
Sorry Marsha and Steve but you are definitely on the wrong way here.
Free will is not an illusion. Free will is the
Hi J-A,
On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 5:27 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson
janander...@telia.com wrote:
Sorry Marsha and Steve but you are definitely on the wrong way here.
Steve:
I know you are, but what am I?
J-A:
Free will is not an illusion. Free will is the ultimate basic condition for
Hi John,
John:
You seem to me to be missing a very important point. Is this a choice on
your part or is it the end-result of a long chain of causes over which you
have no choice and no say? Hmmm...
Steve:
What you are missing is that the above dilemma (the traditional free
will/ determinism
Hi Andre,
On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 4:59 PM, Andre Broersen andrebroer...@gmail.com wrote:
Steve to Marsha:
...even MOQers who deny the existence of the fundamental reality of an
independent subject nevertheless are horrified to think that this
subject...lacks free will.
Andre:
I am not
J-A,
My post was not meant to be a smart quick-fire reply. I consider what you've
written here to represent your point-of-view, and I respect that. My
point-of-view is that free will is an intellectual static pattern of value that
can be dropped, along with an autonomous causation.
Hey Ron,
Ron said:
Epictetus contributes much to this discussion. I think ethical
development is the assertion of control in our lives. When we assert
control we assert ourselves as reasoning human beings, when we
look close we must take care that we must concern ourselves with
that which
Hey Ron,
Matt said:
The trouble with Pirsig's metaphysical strategy, in specific relationship
to the multifarious free will debate, is that his explanatory strategy is
to treat Value as a primitive: you treat it as the only given, and explain
everything else from that first step. That
In hindsight, there is no free will - but it's hard to live that way.
Micah
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On 6/20/11 12:08 PM, Matt Kundert pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
snip
Matt said:
The trouble with Pirsig's metaphysical strategy, in specific relationship
to the multifarious free will debate, is that his explanatory strategy is
to treat Value as a primitive: you treat it as the only
John, Steve, and All --
On Mon, June 20, 2011at 9:35 AM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com
wrote
John:
You seem to me to be missing a very important point. Is this a choice
on your part or is it the end-result of a long chain of causes over which
you have no choice and no say?
Hello everyone
On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 1:08 PM, Matt Kundert
pirsigafflict...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hey Ron,
Matt said:
The trouble with Pirsig's metaphysical strategy, in specific relationship
to the multifarious free will debate, is that his explanatory strategy is
to treat Value as a
Steve,
Please note, John, that I have always granted that people make
choices, the question is that in what sense are those choices made
freely? We have will, but what is _free_ will?
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
John:
Choice is what is meant by free will, to my mind. So I suppose in a
On Jun 19, 2011, at 1:14 AM, John Carl wrote:
That's a good point, Marsha. And helps me to rethink a bit...
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 2:30 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
I can't help but wonder...
The topic seems all wrong. Isn't the notion of free will (an intellectual
static
Matt had said::
Nagel takes a pretty
pessimistic view toward what we can do to ourselves by handling
our concepts in different ways (a pessimism I don't think Pirsig
shares). Occasionally, I imagine, we'll have to revise our moral
intuitions, but for the most part I think a lot of our moral
Marsha said:
I have probably read more commentary about causation than any other
Buddhist explanation of Emptiness. It is the first topic addressed in
Nagarjuna's MMK. Nagarjuna's logic is not easy. It seems he may
have been battling a particular form of logic, called Nyaya. Regardless
So we're kind of back to the idea that 'Free Will' is an illusion!
Horse
On 19/06/2011 16:06, Steven Peterson wrote:
HI Marsha,
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 3:30 AM, MarshaVval...@att.net wrote:
I can't help but wonder...
The topic seems all wrong. Isn't the notion of free will (an
HI Marsha,
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 3:30 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
I can't help but wonder...
The topic seems all wrong. Isn't the notion of free will (an intellectual
static pattern of value) dependent the acceptance of causation? MY
CHOICE WILLED is the CAUSE of such-and-such
I guess that's one way of looking at it, Horse.
On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 11:13 AM, Horse ho...@darkstar.uk.net wrote:
So we're kind of back to the idea that 'Free Will' is an illusion!
Horse
But I ask again, one and all, what good does it do to think free will is
illusory? How does it help
Steve said:
Free will is also false (according to the MOQ - JC) since
though everything is preference (or value), it is meaningless to
assert that preference is free.
John: It's not meaningless, Steve. Only redundant. Preference implies
freedom of choice. I can't prefer what is
Hi Horse, John, Steve, and All --
Horse says:
So we're kind of back to the idea that 'Free Will' is an illusion!
John observed:
I've often said it's the basis of individuality - that individuality is a
choice and any being which has no choice, has no real independent
being. Like an
Steve to Marsha:
...even MOQers who deny the existence of the fundamental reality of an
independent subject nevertheless are horrified to think that this subject...lacks
free will.
Andre:
I am not sure what point you are trying to make Steve.
Are you distancing yourself from 'MOQers? Or are
On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 12:13 PM, Horse ho...@darkstar.uk.net wrote:
So we're kind of back to the idea that 'Free Will' is an illusion!
Sam Harris goes further to say that those who meditate learn that
illusion of free will is itself an illusion:
It is generally argued that our sense of free
Hey, I'm very interested in reading the correspondence
between a PhD student and RMP. Very cool!
And a printing of Dr. Alvord's commentary has just been
printed. Something great with my morning coffee.
Hurray for us! Whoever us be.
On Jun 18, 2011, at 12:24 AM,
J-A.
All good points and well said.
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 1:02 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson janander...@telia.com
wrote:
Hi Ham and Steve
The human beings freedom and ability to see and choose between intellectual
values, being superior to social and biological values, is the door to the
That's a good point, Marsha. And helps me to rethink a bit...
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 2:30 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
I can't help but wonder...
The topic seems all wrong. Isn't the notion of free will (an intellectual
static pattern of value) dependent the acceptance of
Hi Steve,
You seem to me to be missing a very important point. Is this a choice on
your part or is it the end-result of a long chain of causes over which you
have no choice and no say? Hmmm... I guess the answer to that question
would determine how hard I work to persuade you rather than
On Jun 16, 2011, at 6:22 PM, david buchanan wrote:
Marsha said to dmb:
I'm sure you think your paraphrasing is always correct, but it is mentally
constructed from your own biases. And thergrouping together of your
paraphrased comments out of context make them sound like
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 3:16 PM, Joseph Maurer jh...@comcast.net wrote:
Metaphysics is binding. Physics is open to discussion. I like Pirsig's
take on DQ, binding and undefined. MOQ suggests an explanation that: You
have to bind yourself before you can be free.
Steve:
If metaphysics isn't
Hi Craig,
On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 6:08 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
[Steve]
You are not free to value smoking over your
health if you actually value your health more than smoking.
Craig:
Yes you can, it's called changing your mind.
Steve:
No doubt people change their minds. But are they
Steve offers his opinion:
To quote The Dude, that's just, like...your opinion, man.
I think we would be more loving compassionate people if we dropped the
dubious notion of free will.
John counters with his:
That's just about the stupidest idea I've heard from you Steve. How can
there
John counters with his:
That's just about the stupidest idea I've heard from you Steve. How can
there be love if there is no choice in the matter?
How could you help being anything but compassionate toward another
when you recognize that there but by forces beyond my control go I?
It is
I almost forgot...
John counters with his:
That's just about the stupidest idea I've heard from you Steve.
Thanks!
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Hi Steve,
If metaphysics is open for discussion, in trying to uncover the truth in
metaphysics what is the criteria for ending the discussion? I say so?
Obviously I have discordant views all the time since my will picks and
chooses, and my will follows my metaphysics. To be open for discussions
On Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 3:57 PM, Joseph Maurer jh...@comcast.net wrote:
Hi Steve,
If metaphysics is open for discussion, in trying to uncover the truth in
metaphysics what is the criteria for ending the discussion? I say so?
Obviously I have discordant views all the time since my will picks
On 6/17/11 3:52 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
There is no non-questing begging way to settle a dispute between two
metaphysical systems.
snip
Hi Steve and all,
That is my point. There can't be a dispute between two metaphysical systems
according to the MOQ where DQ
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During The P's 2005 Liverpool conference visit i personally took charge of all
defecations, and kept the solid ones in my fridge,
next to my chicken nuggets and McCain oven chips.
10 micron slices have been encased in 6cm diameter
Hi Ham and Steve
The human beings freedom and ability to see and choose between intellectual
values, being superior to social and biological values, is the door to the free
will IMO.
But if we as human intellectuals are bound then to rational reason and
Intellectual thruths and concepts we
I can't help but wonder...
The topic seems all wrong. Isn't the notion of free will (an intellectual
static pattern of value) dependent the acceptance of causation? MY
CHOICE WILLED is the CAUSE of such-and-such independent EFFECT?
Putting aside what it appears like for normal people,
On Jun 15, 2011, at 6:09 PM, david buchanan wrote:
dmb says:
... The MOQ says DQ is the quality of freedom ... Without DQ nothing could
grow or change... DQ degenerates into chaos. Without DQ, static quality
would fossilize or die of old age.
Marsha asks:
Quite a lot of chatter
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