to handle this kind of case, but it isn't clear to me how that
> might go.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> ------
> *From
characterized as a possible, an existent or a
>> necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant.
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354&
l.com>
> *Sent:* Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the
> Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this
Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited
Gary F., List:
I
Gary F., List:
I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the
Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my
current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300.
Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object. The
Edwina, List:
1. My problem with your terms is that you consistently use them in ways
that deviate significantly from what I understand to be Peirce's own
usage. In any case, we both agreed about a year ago to use "Sign" for the
internal triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
List:
As promised/warned, I have more to say about Peirce's semeiotic and
metaphysics in accordance with his 1904 employment of Aristotelian terms
for the Categories--Form (1ns), Matter (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). My
understanding--aided by my recent reading of Vincent Colapietro's
book,
Edwina, List:
1. Please read more carefully--I stated that all concepts are Symbols, not
that all Signs are Symbols. Obviously Icons and Indices are also Signs.
2. Peirce explicitly distinguished three kinds of Interpretants, only one
of which is a Sign. "I have already noted that a Sign has
Edwina, Jon S, Gary f, list,
ET: I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
I completely disagree. First, as you wrote, it is a "current focus." Other
foci are possible and, no doubt, desirable. If
Garys, List:
Two quick clarifications.
1. My point about concepts is that they *are *Signs, specifically Symbols,
while Immediate Objects are *parts *or *aspects *of Signs. Hence every
concept *has *an Immediate Object, but no Immediate Object *is *(by itself)
a concept.
2. The Interpretant
Gary f, Jon S, list,
I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so
I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked:
Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind?
I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that the
Stephen, list,
Thank you for stating your beautiful assertion of pragmatism,
for stating the esteem that renders pragmatism receptive to further
conversation.
"assertion", read "hope", and "concerning all things", read "concerning the
matter in hand", and [the logicians'] doctrine becomes
I make no claims. My aims are modest. The highest value I hold is
non-idolatry which means that I tend toward a certain iconoclasm. Toward
everything. I understand what you are saying as an effort to see if I
conform to an understanding of Peirce. Or at least to some standard of
authority like
Stephen, list,
If what you say is absolutely true and not simply something you do not
doubt,
and you know of this method Peirce left us that would help us distinguish
the two, then I am all the happier.
That is,
if your key terms are:
reality ethics and aesthetics and *not* *esthetics
Logos has lots of meanings and associations but to me, it suggests truth
that might take some time to realize fully but which exists already in an
ontological sense. I assume that history is a movement toward greater
realization. Because logos also carries a good deal of theological freight
I do
Dear Stephen,
You said:
Your final sentence eludes me..
I think Peirce is the most important of the three because of his insistence
on a pragmaticist understanding of practical outcomes.
Were he better known the world would benefit.
If the implication of your final sentence is a sort of
Your final sentence eludes me. I would assume all on this list would like
Peirce to be better known. If I parse You Tube correctly, he is not sought
out as much as Wittgenstein and Nietzsche who I see as influential. I think
Peirce is the most important of the three because of his insistence on a
Dear Stephen, list,
When you say that transformation goes on all the time and that Peirce is
right about so many things and that you regret he is not better known and
that he needs help in the interpretation department and you encourage
understanding by interpreting,
I take that to be products
The transformation goes on all the time. Sometimes many times a day.That's
why Peirce is right about so many things. Too bad he is no better known. He
needs some help in the interpretation dept. Understand by interpreting!
amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Jerry Rhee
Gary, Jon S,
I’ve inserted a few questions below …
Gary f
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15
Jon, list,
Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:
EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical, in such identity as a
Sign may
Jon, list,
Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:
EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such
identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted by
it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the
Truth*.
If
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