date:20110805

Jerry,

That can all be the case without contradicting anything that Peirce said. 
Peirce never, so far as I know, denied that there could be a unique character 
to something or denied that it could matter - but it's just not what he was 
mainly discussing when he used words like "singular" and individual." He meant 
the stubborn _this_, not the _uniquely such_, even when many an actual 
individual is unique in important or essential characters. 

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Jerry LR Chandler 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: Benjamin Udell 
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 8:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"


Ben, List: 


You write:


 "I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about 
_this_ or _that_ molecule."


I respond simply:


Your DNA is about "YOUR" DNA molecule and the encoding of YOUR life.  It is an 
Identity, it is singular.
It is also about your individuality.  This is the very heart and sole of 
molecular biology, biosemiotics, and Jesper's semethic. 


This modern conceptualization of the logic of chemistry and the unique genetic 
molecules of every individual was not inductively constructed until several 
decades after CSP died.


Cheers


Jerry 








On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


  Jerry, list,

  Peirce's diagrams are of two kinds in terms of logical quantity: (1) general 
icons (iconic legisigns), which are general diagrams or diagrammatic generals, 
instantiated by (2) individual icons (iconic sinsigns) which are individual 
diagrams, or diagrammatic individuals. Peirce would call general many of the 
things which you call singular - including molecules in general and their 
adjacent parts in general. When he calls something singular he means, for 
example, just _this_ actual individual hydrogen molecule and no other actual 
individual hydrogen molecule, a molecule kept perhaps it in a certain place 
where people could come view at least its container, a molecule singular like 
you, me, or the Parthenon - I don't mean singular or unique in quality, I mean 
singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about _this_ or 
_that_ molecule.

  For my part I've said in the past that I regard the idioscopic a.k.a. special 
sciences as taking for their subject matter actual individuals in a way that 
more abstract fields do not; the observable universe, for example, is an actual 
individual; but what we want to learn about such subject matter is not just its 
individualities but its kinds, its totalities and parameters, and its laws, 
such as could not be learned purely from more general or mathematical 
considerations, and such that we would come to have good reason for confidence 
in our opinions as to those kinds, totalities, and laws, as pertaining to 
indefinitely many actual individuals that we would not have the actual 
opportunity to single out or observe.

  The idea of a real general is simply the idea of a general that is 
independent of particular persons' or groups' opinions yet is discoverable such 
that investigators would come to agree about it if they were to push 
investigation about it far enough. So we suppose that intelligent life 
elsewhere in the galaxy might announce its presence by broadcasting the first 
score or so prime numbers, because we figure that prime numbers are _real_ or, 
as many prefer to say, _objective_. Peirce also allows of generals that are not 
real but are instead figments, e.g., the objects of false universal 
propositions.

  Best, Ben

  - Original Message -
  From: Jerry LR Chandler
  To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
  Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 7:13 PM
  Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
Semiosis Process"


  Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List:


  Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. 
  I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic as 
antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit within 
the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences.




  I believe  that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and the 
universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, particularly in the 
evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity of the individual.


  If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then this 
asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough.


  But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as nominialistic.  
CSP was a realist.  I consider "universals" to be metaphysical objects, not 
real objects. I recall from an ancient source a phrase about the meaning of an 
utterance - when I speak the word 'horse' a horse does not come out of my 
mouth.  :-) 


  The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps being 
most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed universal diagrams 
t

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

2011-08-05 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Ben, List:

You write:

 "I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about 
_this_ or _that_ molecule."

I respond simply:

Your DNA is about "YOUR" DNA molecule and the encoding of YOUR life.  It is an 
Identity, it is singular.
It is also about your individuality.  This is the very heart and sole of 
molecular biology, biosemiotics, and Jesper's semethic. 

This modern conceptualization of the logic of chemistry and the unique genetic 
molecules of every individual was not inductively constructed until several 
decades after CSP died.

Cheers

Jerry 




On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

> Jerry, list,
>  
> Peirce's diagrams are of two kinds in terms of logical quantity: (1) general 
> icons (iconic legisigns), which are general diagrams or diagrammatic 
> generals, instantiated by (2) individual icons (iconic sinsigns) which are 
> individual diagrams, or diagrammatic individuals. Peirce would call general 
> many of the things which you call singular - including molecules in general 
> and their adjacent parts in general. When he calls something singular he 
> means, for example, just _this_ actual individual hydrogen molecule and no 
> other actual individual hydrogen molecule, a molecule kept perhaps it in a 
> certain place where people could come view at least its container, a molecule 
> singular like you, me, or the Parthenon - I don't mean singular or unique in 
> quality, I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just 
> about _this_ or _that_ molecule.
>  
> For my part I've said in the past that I regard the idioscopic a.k.a. special 
> sciences as taking for their subject matter actual individuals in a way that 
> more abstract fields do not; the observable universe, for example, is an 
> actual individual; but what we want to learn about such subject matter is not 
> just its individualities but its kinds, its totalities and parameters, and 
> its laws, such as could not be learned purely from more general or 
> mathematical considerations, and such that we would come to have good reason 
> for confidence in our opinions as to those kinds, totalities, and laws, as 
> pertaining to indefinitely many actual individuals that we would not have the 
> actual opportunity to single out or observe.
>  
> The idea of a real general is simply the idea of a general that is 
> independent of particular persons' or groups' opinions yet is discoverable 
> such that investigators would come to agree about it if they were to push 
> investigation about it far enough. So we suppose that intelligent life 
> elsewhere in the galaxy might announce its presence by broadcasting the first 
> score or so prime numbers, because we figure that prime numbers are _real_ 
> or, as many prefer to say, _objective_. Peirce also allows of generals that 
> are not real but are instead figments, e.g., the objects of false universal 
> propositions.
>  
> Best, Ben
>  
> - Original Message -
> From: Jerry LR Chandler
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 7:13 PM
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
> Semiosis Process"
> 
> Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List:
> 
> Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. 
> I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic as 
> antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit within 
> the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences.
> 
> 
> I believe  that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and the 
> universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, particularly in the 
> evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity of the individual.
> 
> If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then this 
> asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough.
> 
> But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as nominialistic.  
> CSP was a realist.  I consider "universals" to be metaphysical objects, not 
> real objects. I recall from an ancient source a phrase about the meaning of 
> an utterance - when I speak the word 'horse' a horse does not come out of my 
> mouth.  :-) 
> 
> The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps being 
> most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed universal diagrams 
> that S. Mac Lane exposes so forcefully and beautifully.
> 
> Peirce's diagrammatic logic (exhibited on 'sheets of assertion') are 
> singulars. Thus, the meaning of CSP diagrams is open, at least in my mind.  
> Clearly, CSP's logical diagrams are semiotic in character.  Indeed, he uses 
> the chemical concept of valence in creating the assertions and in expressing 
> the grammar of the diagrams. (see Gary F. essay for details).  The modern 
> understanding of (co)valence is as a particular relation between two parts of 
> a molecule. A valence, as a graph edge (or line in CSPs diagram) is not a 
> unive

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Jerry, list,

Peirce's diagrams are of two kinds in terms of logical quantity: (1) general 
icons (iconic legisigns), which are general diagrams or diagrammatic generals, 
instantiated by (2) individual icons (iconic sinsigns) which are individual 
diagrams, or diagrammatic individuals. Peirce would call general many of the 
things which you call singular - including molecules in general and their 
adjacent parts in general. When he calls something singular he means, for 
example, just _this_ actual individual hydrogen molecule and no other actual 
individual hydrogen molecule, a molecule kept perhaps it in a certain place 
where people could come view at least its container, a molecule singular like 
you, me, or the Parthenon - I don't mean singular or unique in quality, I mean 
singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about _this_ or 
_that_ molecule. 

For my part I've said in the past that I regard the idioscopic a.k.a. special 
sciences as taking for their subject matter actual individuals in a way that 
more abstract fields do not; the observable universe, for example, is an actual 
individual; but what we want to learn about such subject matter is not just its 
individualities but its kinds, its totalities and parameters, and its laws, 
such as could not be learned purely from more general or mathematical 
considerations, and such that we would come to have good reason for confidence 
in our opinions as to those kinds, totalities, and laws, as pertaining to 
indefinitely many actual individuals that we would not have the actual 
opportunity to single out or observe.

The idea of a real general is simply the idea of a general that is independent 
of particular persons' or groups' opinions yet is discoverable such that 
investigators would come to agree about it if they were to push investigation 
about it far enough. So we suppose that intelligent life elsewhere in the 
galaxy might announce its presence by broadcasting the first score or so prime 
numbers, because we figure that prime numbers are _real_ or, as many prefer to 
say, _objective_. Peirce also allows of generals that are not real but are 
instead figments, e.g., the objects of false universal propositions.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Jerry LR Chandler
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 7:13 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"


Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List:


Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. 
I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic as 
antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit within 
the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences.




I believe  that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and the 
universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, particularly in the 
evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity of the individual.


If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then this 
asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough.


But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as nominialistic.  
CSP was a realist.  I consider "universals" to be metaphysical objects, not 
real objects. I recall from an ancient source a phrase about the meaning of an 
utterance - when I speak the word 'horse' a horse does not come out of my 
mouth.  :-) 


The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps being 
most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed universal diagrams 
that S. Mac Lane exposes so forcefully and beautifully.


Peirce's diagrammatic logic (exhibited on 'sheets of assertion') are singulars. 
Thus, the meaning of CSP diagrams is open, at least in my mind.  Clearly, CSP's 
logical diagrams are semiotic in character.  Indeed, he uses the chemical 
concept of valence in creating the assertions and in expressing the grammar of 
the diagrams. (see Gary F. essay for details).  The modern understanding of 
(co)valence is as a particular relation between two parts of a molecule. A 
valence, as a graph edge (or line in CSPs diagram) is not a universal.


The consequence of these sentences is a deep tension between Popper's view of 
falsification of hypotheses and chemical / biosemiotic practice.


Popper's logic of falsification depends on an inductive universal; logically, 
it is possibility that a (physical?) universal is falsified.
Chemical inductive logic (wrt logical diagrams) is never a universal, it is 
always about two particular adjacent particles.  Furthermore, it is always 
about antecedent and consequence within a context of material causality. 


This local inductive argument of biosemiotics is mathematically necessary as a 
consequence of the the chemical table of elements and Dalton's hypothesis of 
ratio of small whole numbers.  It is the deepest source of biological identity 
/ individuality in that it eme

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

2011-08-05 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List:

Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. 
I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic as 
antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit within 
the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences.

I believe  that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and the 
universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, particularly in the 
evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity of the individual.

If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then this 
asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough.

But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as nominialistic.  
CSP was a realist.  I consider "universals" to be metaphysical objects, not 
real objects. I recall from an ancient source a phrase about the meaning of an 
utterance - when I speak the word 'horse' a horse does not come out of my 
mouth.  :-) 

The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps being 
most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed universal diagrams 
that S. Mac Lane exposes so forcefully and beautifully.

Peirce's diagrammatic logic (exhibited on 'sheets of assertion') are singulars. 
Thus, the meaning of CSP diagrams is open, at least in my mind.  Clearly, CSP's 
logical diagrams are semiotic in character.  Indeed, he uses the chemical 
concept of valence in creating the assertions and in expressing the grammar of 
the diagrams. (see Gary F. essay for details).  The modern understanding of 
(co)valence is as a particular relation between two parts of a molecule. A 
valence, as a graph edge (or line in CSPs diagram) is not a universal.

The consequence of these sentences is a deep tension between Popper's view of 
falsification of hypotheses and chemical / biosemiotic practice.

Popper's logic of falsification depends on an inductive universal; logically, 
it is possibility that a (physical?) universal is falsified.
Chemical inductive logic (wrt logical diagrams) is never a universal, it is 
always about two particular adjacent particles.  Furthermore, it is always 
about antecedent and consequence within a context of material causality. 

This local inductive argument of biosemiotics is mathematically necessary as a 
consequence of the the chemical table of elements and Dalton's hypothesis of 
ratio of small whole numbers.  It is the deepest source of biological identity 
/ individuality in that it emerges from the encoding of genetic symbols, the 
semiotics of DNA and molecular biology.  

There are several conundrums buried in this text - I have just sketched the 
surfaces that are easily translated into expressions that may carry some 
meaning for this group (I hope that my comments are not too technical, but fear 
the worst!). I have intentionally not addressed the problems of the community 
as the source of our symbolic expressions, such as this series of email 
exchanges. For example, a modern community uses multiple sign systems to 
communicate - alphabets, mathematics, music, dance, chemistry, etc, each with a 
particular diagrammatic logic. Does falsification in one symbol system infer 
falsification in another symbol system?  In short, what is the role of category 
theory in semiotics or in Jesper Hoffmeyer's 'semethic'? This line of thought 
moves us into the multiple roles of logics in human communication - a topic 
dear to Tori Alexander's writings.

At least to me, closure on the concept of falsification remains remote - 
obscured by the different usages of signs and the different "sign" languages 
used by different disciplines. 

Cheers

Jerry

Jerry LR Chandler
Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study

On Aug 5, 2011, at 5:08 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote:

> Peter, List,
> 
> this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. 
> But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the 
> content of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in 
> that form. (Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first 
> part of W2).
> 
> 
> Best
> Stefan
> 
> 
> There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses 
> and hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the 
> subjects of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here...
> 
> Peter
> 
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
> Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
> Semiosis Process"
> 
> Ben, list,
> 
> I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least 
> two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses 
> (presently, I would tend to agree with you t

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Peter, Stefan, Gary R., list,

That's a good point, Peter, about falsification's pertaining to 
general/universal judgments. Even a perceptual judgment that there are no 
animals (besides oneself!) in this room is, in Peirce's view, general only in 
its predicate - we can utter it "All x..." etc. but one perceptually judges of 
this, that, yon, etc. conjunctively, that this, that, and yon,etc., are 
such-and-such. A fallibilism about one's perceptually compelled judgments will 
itself be theoretical in some sense. Hence maybe one could say that scientific 
falsificationism is 'prefigured' or foreshadowed in fallibilism about 
perceptual judgments, but only given that such fallibilism is already somewhat 
theoretically oriented. 

The _fallibility_ of perceptual judgments does seem bound up with scientific 
falsificationism insofar as science depends on perceptual judgments, and 
involves inferring to universal propositions from perceptual judgments. But 
could one have a theoretical falsificationism, in particular a scientific 
falsificationism, without a theoretical falsificationism about perceptual 
judgments? It seems possible at first glance but seems kind of dicy when one 
tries to imagine how it would work. I'm left uncertain. 

Regarding Peirce on singular versus individual, the distinction that he made 
(at least sometimes) was that which is in one place and time (a singular), and 
that which is in only one place at a time (an individual). In that sense, we 
are individuals but not singulars. A singular in that sense is a single point 
in space and time. Even a mathematical point, when considered as being in 
motion or stationary in a timelike dimension, does not represent such 
singularness - it makes a temporoid line. However, later he often used 
"singular" in the sense that he had given to "individual." In "Questions on 
Reality" http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm 
Winter-Spring 1868 (Three Drafts) MS 148 (Robin 931, 396): Writings 2.162-187, 
perhaps the section that Stefan was trying recall:
  With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain 
general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these are 
called individuals. They are generals that is, not singulars, because these 
latter [the singulars -B.U.] occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at 
one point and can only be at one date. The subject of individuality, in this 
sense, therefore, belongs to the theory of space rather than to the theory of 
logic. []

  [] But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the 
sense of that which has no generality [the singular -B.U.] and which here 
appears as a mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far 
wider sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will be 
convenient to call the former a singular and the latter only an individual. 
So, at that time he held that there are two kinds of individuals,

- singular individuals, called singulars, occupy neither space nor time and can 
only be at one point and can be only at one date.
- general individuals, called individuals, can be only in one place at one time 
(one place at a time).

Peirce goes on to say in that text that "In short, those things which we call 
singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute to them is 
self-contradictory."

But the singulars that Peirce in later years discusses in regard to perceptual 
judgments are usually that which he earlier called general individuals - you, 
me, a horse, etc.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Stefan Berwing 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 5:08 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

Peter, List,

this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. 
But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the content 
of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in that form. 
(Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first part of W2).

Best
Stefan

There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses and 
hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the subjects 
of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here...

Peter

From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
Gary Richmond 
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

Ben, list,

I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least 
two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses 
(presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual 
judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd s

[peirce-l] Fwd: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

2011-08-05 Thread Stefan Berwing

Gary, List,

thanks for the hint Gary.

I was referring to W2 p.181:

"With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are
certain general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one
time, and these are called individuals. They are generals that is, not
singulars, because these latter occupy neither time nor space, but can
only be at one point and can only be at one date. The subject of
individuality, in this sense, therefore belongs to the theory of space
rather than to the theory of logic"

Best
Stefan

Peirce also defined both “singular” and “individual” in Baldwin’s
Dictionary:

http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm

Gary F.

*From:*C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU]
*On Behalf Of *Stefan Berwing

*Sent:* August-05-11 5:08 PM
*To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
*Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of
the Semiosis Process"

Peter, List,

this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the content of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in that form. (Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first part of W2).

Best

Stefan

There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses and hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the subjects of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here...

Peter
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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Peirce also defined both “singular” and “individual” in Baldwin’s Dictionary:

http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm

 

Gary F.

 

From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Stefan Berwing
Sent: August-05-11 5:08 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

 

Peter, List,
 
this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. 
But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the content 
of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in that form. 
(Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first part of W2).
 
 
Best
Stefan
 
 
There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses and 
hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the subjects 
of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here...
 
Peter 

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
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message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

2011-08-05 Thread Stefan Berwing

Peter, List,

this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. 
But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the content 
of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in that form. 
(Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first part of W2).

Best
Stefan

There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses and 
hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the subjects 
of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here...

Peter

From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM
To:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

Ben, list,

I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least 
two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses 
(presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual 
judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd say, 
is--more basic than falsification).

Best,

Gary

>>>  Benjamin Udell  8/5/2011 2:53 PM>>>

List, Steven, Peter,

It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" propositions said 
that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close to saying, 
compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's perceptual judgments (at 
least in retrospect if not at the time of the compulsive judgment) already prefigures 
falsificationism.

But it should be added that the fact that B_entails_  C does not mean that B is in fact a premiss or postulate for C. 
"A is A" is an axiom, but it entails very little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we 
often say "presupposes" in the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism can be more basic than 
scientific falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice falsificationism 
entails/presupposes fallibilism.

Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. S. Peirce and 
G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism."http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html  
Peirce at times wrote of allowing of practical certainty as opposed to theoretical 
certainty.

Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to 
posts' ends, when replying to a post.

Best, Ben

- Original Message -
From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith"
To:mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU>>
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

I agree with Peter.

Steven

On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

>  Gary,
>
>  I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce and 
Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by the 
falsifiability of hypotheses.
>
>  Peter
>  
>  From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
>  Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
>  To:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; 
Skagestad, Peter
>  Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"
>
>  Peter, Gary F.
>
>  Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not 
ever conclusive.
>
>  I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist," 
and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The point I wanted to make in passing, but which 
I clearly didn't express very well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot 
more could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly that both were 
fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for example, Susan Haack and Konstantin 
Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth"http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816  , the 
two fallibilists being exactly Peirce and Popper.
>
>  Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry 
given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
>
>  Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say 
that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his other 
claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to agree with 
him).
>  
See:http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
>  "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, is 
a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as 
absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all scientific 
theories remain falsifiable entails falli

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses and 
hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the subjects 
of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here...

Peter

From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

Ben, list,

I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least 
two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses 
(presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual 
judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd say, 
is--more basic than falsification).

Best,

Gary

>>> Benjamin Udell  8/5/2011 2:53 PM >>>
List, Steven, Peter,

It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" propositions said 
that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close 
to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's 
perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time of the 
compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism.

But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that B is 
in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom, but it entails very 
little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we often say "presupposes" in 
the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism can be more basic than scientific 
falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice 
falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism.

Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. S. Peirce 
and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism." 
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of allowing of 
practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty.

Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to 
posts' ends, when replying to a post.

Best, Ben

- Original Message -
From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith"
To: mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU>>
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

I agree with Peter.

Steven

On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

> Gary,
>
> I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
> But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
> and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by 
> the falsifiability of hypotheses.
>
> Peter
> 
> From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; 
> Skagestad, Peter
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
> Semiosis Process"
>
> Peter, Gary F.
>
> Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever 
> conclusive.
>
> I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a 
> falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The 
> point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very 
> well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more 
> could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly 
> that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for 
> example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of 
> the Truth" http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being 
> exactly Peirce and Popper.
>
> Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry 
> given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
>
> Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say 
> that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his 
> other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to 
> agree with him).
> See:  
> http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
> "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, 
> is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can 
> establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever 
> remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails 
> fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future 
> revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R.
>
 "Skagestad, Peter" 8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>>
> Gary,
>
> This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
> interpreted,

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Ben, list,

I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at
least two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others'
responses (presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism
re: our perceptual judgments prefigures falsification and that
fallibilism can be--I'd say, is--more basic than falsification).

Best,

Gary

>>> Benjamin Udell  8/5/2011 2:53 PM >>>
List, Steven, Peter,

It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary"
propositions said that perceptual judgments amount to compelling
abductions, which is very close to saying, compelling explanatory
hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's perceptual judgments (at least in
retrospect if not at the time of the compulsive judgment) already
prefigures falsificationism.

But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean
that B is in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom,
but it entails very little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we
often say "presupposes" in the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism
can be more basic than scientific falsificationism, yet the latter
arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice falsificationism
entails/presupposes fallibilism.

Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C.
S. Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism."
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of
allowing of practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty.

Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server
to posts' ends, when replying to a post.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith" 
To: 
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the
Semiosis Process"

I agree with Peter.

Steven

On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

> Gary,
> 
> I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific
knowledge. But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is
affirmed by both Peirce and Popper, appears to me to be an independent
conclusion, not entailed by the falsifiability of hypotheses.
> 
> Peter
> 
> From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; Skagestad, Peter
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the
Semiosis Process"
> 
> Peter, Gary F.
> 
> Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is
not ever conclusive.
> 
> I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a
falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made.
The point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't
express very well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list (
suggesting that a lot more could be said about it--and has been, even
recently on this list!) is exactly that both were fallibilists (and Tom
Short, apparently, as well).  See, for example, Susan Haack and
Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth"
http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being exactly
Peirce and Popper.
> 
> Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works
eeiry given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
> 
> Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct
to say that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks?
What of his other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment
I would tend to agree with him).
> See: 
http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
> "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in
our world, is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful
testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable:
it forever remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain
falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic
efforts remain open to future revision. There can be no certain
foundations to knowledge."
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R.
> 
 "Skagestad, Peter" 8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>>
> Gary,
> 
> This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has
often been interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic.
Popper's falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between
falsification and verification in that a single counterexample will
refute a universal statement, whereas no number of confirming instances
will prove it. Thus no number of observed black ravens will prove the
statement "All ravens are black," whereas a single white raven will
refute it. But it does not follow, nor did Popper ever say, that a
falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of course be mistaken both in
my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my perception that it is
white.
> 
> Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific
Disco

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

List, Steven, Peter,

It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" propositions said 
that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close 
to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's 
perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time of the 
compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism.

But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that B is 
in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom, but it entails very 
little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we often say "presupposes" in 
the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism can be more basic than scientific 
falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice 
falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism.

Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. S. Peirce 
and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism." 
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of allowing of 
practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty.

Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to 
posts' ends, when replying to a post.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith" 
To: 
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"


I agree with Peter.

Steven


On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

> Gary,
> 
> I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
> But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
> and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by 
> the falsifiability of hypotheses.
> 
> Peter
> 
> From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; Skagestad, Peter
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
> Semiosis Process"
> 
> Peter, Gary F.
> 
> Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever 
> conclusive.
> 
> I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a 
> falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The 
> point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very 
> well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more 
> could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly 
> that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for 
> example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of 
> the Truth" http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being 
> exactly Peirce and Popper.
> 
> Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry 
> given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
> 
> Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say 
> that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his 
> other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to 
> agree with him).
> See:  
> http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
> "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, 
> is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can 
> establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever 
> remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails 
> fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future 
> revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge."
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R.
> 
 "Skagestad, Peter" 8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>>
> Gary,
> 
> This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
> interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
> falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
> and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
> statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
> number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are 
> black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
> nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
> course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
> perception that it is white.
> 
> Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
> (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense 
> that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus 
> Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of 
> basic statements concludes:
> 
> The empirical bases of objective s

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

I also agree with Peter. Is it possible that we all (that is, all who 
participated in this discussion of falsifiability & fallibilism) are in 
agreement? If that is indeed so, it might represent a kind of first here! Best, 
Gary

>>> Steven Ericsson-Zenith  8/5/2011 2:22 PM >>>
I agree with Peter.

Steven

On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

> Gary,
> 
> I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
> But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
> and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by 
> the falsifiability of hypotheses.
> 
> Peter
>

-
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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"


Section 2: The sign process as autonomous[paragraphs 6-11]
 
I’ve decided to proceed with the second section of Joe’s paper in the
interest of sticking to the revised schedule as best I can. Again, the
relevant paragraphs [6-11] from Joe’s paper are pasted below my
signature. In this section Joe gets to the heart of his argument—namely,
that semiosis is autonomous—and introduces his own essay as example.
[Section 3. (to be posted sometime next week) will continue the argument
(and example) in consideration of iconicity, indexicality, and
symbolicity.]
 
[6] Joe argues that the basis for seeing the sign process as autonomous
is that it does not fall under a rule, but rather is itself a rule (“the
disposition or power of the sign to generate an interpret is the rule”):
it is an immanent principle of the sign itself. Joe begins his argument
reflecting on one of the principle trichotomies in semeiotic:
 
The sign in itself:
Qualisign (1ns*)
|> Legisign (3ns)
Sinsign (2ns)
 
[*Long term members of the forum will be familiar with my using 1ns,
2ns, and 3ns as handy abbreviations for firstness, secondness, and
thirdness, especially in trikonic diagrams as the one above.]
 
Analyzing the sign in this way is to say that, in itself—that is, when
prescinding it from both its relations to the object and to the
interpretant (impossible to do in any ‘living’ semiosis)—that in itself,
the sign is either a qualisign, that is, a character or quality
factoring in some semiosis; or, it is a sinsign (== single-sign), that
is an actual existent thing or occurrence so factoring; or it is a
legisign, a rule, or law which is a sign. So, expanding our first
diagram a bit:
 
The sign in itself:
Qualisign (1ns), a character or quality 
|> Legisign (3ns), a law, or rule, or habit
Sinsign (2ns), a single existential occurrence
 
These are equivalent to what Ransdell refers to as a sign’s “modal
aspects.” 
 
Modal aspects of a sign:
It has a certain appearance (qualisign, 1ns) 
|> It has a power of generating interpretants (legisign, 3ns)
It is something that actually occurs or exists (sinsign, 2ns)
 
Joe’s quite reasonable assertion, at least as I see it, is that what
makes a sign a sign from the semeiotic standpoint (i.e., for logical
analysis) is its power of generating interpretants. Of course this
doesn’t mean that we cannot turn our attention to its ‘appearance
property’ (1ns), or to ‘some existential relationship in which it stands’
(2ns) for some particular semeiotical analytical purpose. But again, and
in a way which moves far beyond the mere analytical, the power of a sign
is that of generating an interpretant of itself, thereby “affecting [. .
.] the sequence of subsequent interpretation.”  While this anticipates
Joe’s discussion in the paper’s final paragraph of teleology in relation
to semiosis, for now we need only see that the generative power of the
sign makes it future oriented as, indeed, all generation is and must be.

 
[8] Peirce further analyzes another trichotomy of types of legisigns
which Joe turns to in continuing his argument. 
 
Legisigns:
Iconic legisigns
|> Symbolic legisigns
Indexical legisigns
 
Returning to the topic of the autonomy of signs, Joe comments that
these “systematically coordinated and mutually compatible ways in which
something [. . .] can be a sign,” along with there being three types of
legisigns, results in there being “three corresponding dimensions [. .
.] of the self-governance implicit in a semiosis process.” These three
ways cooperate in the unfolding of any given semiosis, their offering
“three basic principles of interpretation which work from within the
semiosis process itself.” 
 
Analytically, this results in Peirce’s diagram of ten principle
categories of signs; six of the ten categories are precisely legisigns
(3 are sinsigns; 1 is a qualisign). However, Joe’s core idea would seem
to be that this systematic coordination and cooperation of the system’s
several trichotomic dimensions show the sign to be self-organizing. ((To
my way of thinking, this power of self-organization is precisely what
distinguishes Peirce’s trichotomic (that is, 3-category) semeiotic from
all other forms of it.)) 
 
[9] In this paragraph Joe introduces his principal illustrative
example, the essay we’re slow-reading, “Teleology and the Autonomy of
the Semiosis Process” when considered as a unitary whole.  This is to
say that, for example, while Joe’s essay is composed of a very large
number (perhaps innumerable) signs and sub-signs, yet, as a single,
complex “unity of meaning” (as a unitary whole) that it has “a
corresponding unitary object” suggested exactly by the title of the
paper. 
 
Furthermore, the reach of the paper can be seen as extending well
beyond the essay itself, so that “it has a number of (possible or
actual) unitary global interpretants as a sign of that object”: for
example, me, you, or virtually anyone who has read or will read the
essay being analyzed. Joe notes that it is even po

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

2011-08-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith

I agree with Peter.

Steven


On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

> Gary,
> 
> I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
> But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
> and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by 
> the falsifiability of hypotheses.
> 
> Peter
> 
> From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; Skagestad, Peter
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
> Semiosis Process"
> 
> Peter, Gary F.
> 
> Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever 
> conclusive.
> 
> I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a 
> falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The 
> point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very 
> well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more 
> could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly 
> that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for 
> example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of 
> the Truth" http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being 
> exactly Peirce and Popper.
> 
> Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry 
> given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
> 
> Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say 
> that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his 
> other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to 
> agree with him).
> See:  
> http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
> "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, 
> is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can 
> establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever 
> remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails 
> fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future 
> revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge."
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary R.
> 
 "Skagestad, Peter"  8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>>
> Gary,
> 
> This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
> interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
> falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
> and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
> statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
> number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are 
> black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
> nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
> course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
> perception that it is white.
> 
> Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
> (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense 
> that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus 
> Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of 
> basic statements concludes:
> 
> The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about 
> it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its 
> theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on 
> piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to 
> any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is 
> not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied 
> that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time 
> being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11)
> 
> This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce:
> 
> Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is 
> still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and 
> can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay 
> till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55)
> 
> Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although 
> later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with 
> Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of 
> metaphysics being, as you note, one of them.
> 
> Best,
> Peter
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
> Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> S

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

2011-08-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith

Peirce uses the notion of fallibility/infallibility from his earliest times but 
as he formalized the notion it led him to the same place that Popper found 
himself:

CP.141  "All positive reasoning is of the nature of judging the proportion of 
something in a whole collection by the proportion found in a sample. 
Accordingly, there are three things to which we can never hope to attain by 
reasoning, namely, absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute 
universality. We cannot be absolutely certain that our conclusions are even 
approximately true; for the sample may be utterly unlike the unsampled part of 
the collection. We cannot pretend to be even probably exact; because the sample 
consists of but a finite number of instances and only admits special values of 
the proportion sought."

CP.149  "... Nor does fallibilism say that men cannot attain a sure knowledge 
of the creations of their own minds. It neither affirms nor denies that. It 
only says that people cannot attain absolute certainty concerning questions of 
fact. "

The operative phrase being "questions of fact."

So despite Peirce's extensive informal usage of the term "fallible," I will 
argue that his intuition of Falliblism became formalized as an essential part 
of his scientific epistemology and, in particular, does not relate to the fact 
that we can make informal statements that are not founded upon fact. As such 
Falliblism as formally conceived by Peirce applies to the validity of 
scientific statements of inquiry and not all statements, since the exceptions 
are not merely fallible, they lack reason. And so the test of Falliblism cannot 
be applied.

With respect,
Steven


On Aug 4, 2011, at 11:45 PM, Michael J. DeLaurentis wrote:

> "The idea of a fallible natural science was in Charles Peirce's time, as it
> is now, widely accepted. But Peirce is the first philosopher to ... extend
> fallibilism to all areas of knowledge because it is at the very heart of all
> human inquiry." Elizabeth F. Cooke, "Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry --
> Fallibilism and Indeterminacy " [Continuum, 2006].  I thought Knox's
> application of the principle to semeiosis was spot on. 
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Michael J. DeLaurentis [mailto:michael...@comcast.net] 
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:28 AM
> To: 'Steven Ericsson-Zenith'; 'PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU'
> Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the
> Semiosis Process"
> 
> But none of the quotes in this string, Steven, or anywhere else in Peirce
> I'm aware of limits the doctrine of fallibilism to "the validity of
> scientific statements."  You may have in mind his limitation of pragmatism
> to "intellectual concepts." But your quote below [re continuity as
> fallibilism objectified] and all of "The Scientific Attitude and
> Fallibilism" point to the opposite conclusion: that fallibilism is
> inescapable in any domain of inquiry, and really amounts to an attitude
> shunning both certitude and skepticism, each of which blocks the way to
> continuing inquiry and acknowledgment of synechism at work in the natural
> world.  Peirce was not consistent in his explanations of the scope of
> fallibilism [notably re mathematical truths]; he even went so far as to
> limit the doctrine to matters of fact (in "The Scientific Attitude and
> Fallibilism"): ""[Fallibilism] only says that people cannot attain absolute
> certainty concerning questions of fact." 
> 
> Where do you find he limits the doctrine to the validity of scientific
> statements [whatever they are]? 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 1:09 AM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the
> Semiosis Process"
> 
> Context is everything:
> 
> CP 1.171 If I were to attempt to describe to you in full all the scientific
> beauty and truth that I find in the principle of continuity, I might say in
> the simple language of Matilda the Engaged, "the tomb would close over me
> e'er the entrancing topic were exhausted" -- but not before my audience was
> exhausted. So I will just drop it here. Only, in doing so, let me call your
> attention to the natural affinity of this principle to the doctrine of
> fallibilism. The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism
> objectified.
> ...
> 
> 
> 
> On Aug 4, 2011, at 5:04 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote:
> 
>> Steven, List,
>> 
>> - "Falliblism" as such speaks about the validity of scientific statements,
> not statements in general.
>> 
>> I'm in doubt about that. 
>> 
>> [[  For fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute
> but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of
> indeterminacy. 
>>  CP 1.171]]
>> 
>> If it was like you say, should Peirce then not write "scientific
> knowledge" in place of "our knowledge"? Is t

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Gary,

I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by the 
falsifiability of hypotheses.

Peter

From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; Skagestad, Peter
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

Peter, Gary F.

Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever 
conclusive.

I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a 
falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The 
point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very well 
 in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more could 
be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly that 
both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for example, 
Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth" 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being exactly Peirce 
and Popper.

Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry given 
that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.

Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say that 
falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his other 
claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to agree 
with him).
See:  
http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
"Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, 
is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can establish 
a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains 
conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails 
fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future 
revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge."

Best,

Gary R.

>>> "Skagestad, Peter"  8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>>
Gary,

This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are 
black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
perception that it is white.

Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 
105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we 
have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a 
fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements 
concludes:

The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. 
Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 
‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we 
have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles 
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., 
pp. 11)

This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce:

Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is 
still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can 
only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it 
begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55)

Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although 
later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. 
But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of 
metaphysics being, as you note, one of them.

Best,
Peter





From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, 
and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven.

Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesi

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Agreed, but I would add that Peirce also articulated - or came close to 
articulating - falsificationism, without using the word. Take the following: 
"That which is to be done with the hypothesis is to trace out its consequences 
by deduction, to compare them with results of experiment by induction, and to 
discard the hypothesis, and try another, as soon as the first has been refuted; 
as it presumably will be. How long it will be before we light upon the 
hypothesis which shall resist all tests we cannot tell; but we hope we shall do 
so, at last." (CP, 7.220) I think there are clearer passages than this, but it 
is the best I can come up with without a fair amount of research.

Peter

From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:33 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

Thanks, Peter, for this clarification and correction, which is much more exact 
than my post about Popper.

I assume that we are in agreement that, although "Popper was a fallibilist as 
well as a falsificationist", what he called "falsification" is quite different 
from what Peirce called "fallibilism".

Gary F.

} I was sure until they asked me ... now I don't know. [Jane Siberry (after St. 
Augustine)] {

www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home



-Original Message-
From: Skagestad, Peter [mailto:peter_skages...@uml.edu]
Sent: August-05-11 12:13 PM

Gary,

This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are 
black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
perception that it is white.

Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 
105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we 
have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a 
fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements 
concludes:

The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. 
Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 
‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we 
have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles 
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., 
pp. 11)

This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce:

Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is 
still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can 
only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it 
begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55)

Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although 
later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. 
But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of 
metaphysics being, as you note, one of them.

Best,
Peter

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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Peter, Gary F.
 
Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is
not ever conclusive.
 
I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a
falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made.
The point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't
express very well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list (
suggesting that a lot more could be said about it--and has been, even
recently on this list!) is exactly that both were fallibilists (and Tom
Short, apparently, as well).  See, for example, Susan Haack and
Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth"
http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being exactly
Peirce and Popper.

Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works
eeiry given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
 
Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to
say that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What
of his other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I
would tend to agree with him). 
See: 
http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html

"Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our
world, is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing
can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it
forever remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain
falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic
efforts remain open to future revision. There can be no certain
foundations to knowledge."
 
Best,
 
Gary R.
 
>>> "Skagestad, Peter"  8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>>
Gary,

This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has
often been interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic.
Popper's falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between
falsification and verification in that a single counterexample will
refute a universal statement, whereas no number of confirming instances
will prove it. Thus no number of observed black ravens will prove the
statement "All ravens are black," whereas a single white raven will
refute it. But it does not follow, nor did Popper ever say, that a
falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of course be mistaken both in
my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my perception that it is
white.

Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only
in the sense that we have decided not to test them, at least for the
time being. Thus Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist.
His discussion of basic statements concludes: 

The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute'
about it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of
its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building
erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp,
but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the
piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply
stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the
structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11)

This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce:

Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It
is still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a
bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I
will stay till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55)

Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce,
although later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of
agreement with Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their
divergent conceptions of metaphysics being, as you note, one of them.

Best,
Peter





From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on
behalf of Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the
Semiosis Process"

I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred,
d_obrien, and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven.

Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that
can be refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof
that a hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never
conclusive. Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called
"fallibilism", which indeed he applied to all inquiry and not only to
special sciences. Besides, the term "science" has greater breadth for
Peirce than it does for you or Popper. For instance, Peirce speaks of
metaphysics as a science, and i don't think either you or Popper would.

By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies"
(though we don't always

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Thanks, Peter, for this clarification and correction, which is much more exact 
than my post about Popper. 

I assume that we are in agreement that, although "Popper was a fallibilist as 
well as a falsificationist", what he called "falsification" is quite different 
from what Peirce called "fallibilism".

Gary F.

} I was sure until they asked me ... now I don't know. [Jane Siberry (after St. 
Augustine)] {

www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home



-Original Message-
From: Skagestad, Peter [mailto:peter_skages...@uml.edu] 
Sent: August-05-11 12:13 PM

Gary,

This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are 
black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
perception that it is white.

Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 
105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we 
have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a 
fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements 
concludes: 

The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. 
Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 
‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we 
have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles 
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., 
pp. 11)

This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce:

Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is 
still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can 
only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it 
begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55)

Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although 
later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. 
But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of 
metaphysics being, as you note, one of them.

Best,
Peter

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Gary,

This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are 
black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
perception that it is white.

Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 
105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we 
have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a 
fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements 
concludes: 

The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. 
Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 
‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we 
have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles 
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., 
pp. 11)

This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce:

Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is 
still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can 
only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it 
begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55)

Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although 
later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. 
But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of 
metaphysics being, as you note, one of them.

Best,
Peter





From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process"

I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, 
and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven.

Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that can be 
refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof that a 
hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never conclusive. 
Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called "fallibilism", which indeed 
he applied to all inquiry and not only to special sciences. Besides, the term 
"science" has greater breadth for Peirce than it does for you or Popper. For 
instance, Peirce speaks of metaphysics as a science, and i don't think either 
you or Popper would.

By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies" (though we 
don't always make it easy for them to enter the conversation). I expect we'll 
hear more from you, judging from the quality of your post -- and it would be 
helpful if you would sign your future contributions (so we don't have to 
address you as d_obrien).

Gary F.

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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"

Gary and list,

You’ve given a very helpful account of logical determination in semiosis, Gary. 
But i’m still bothered by Joe’s distinction between causal and logical “force”, 
for the very reason that you quote from Peirce: that “the concept of a 
consequent is a logical concept” and that causality is a kind of 
consequentiality. It’s also a metaphysical concept, and if “metaphysical 
concepts are logical concepts applied somewhat differently from their logical 
application,” then it won’t do to make a strong distinction between causal and 
logical force.

However i think there’s a simple solution to the terminological issue (if 
that’s what it is). Peirce accepted and used (with some modification) all four 
of Aristotle’s “causes”: efficient, material, formal and final. Final causality 
or “teleology” is especially operative in semiosis, as Joe points out, but he 
doesn’t use the term “final cause”. My suggestion is that Peircean/Aristotelian 
“final cause” is included in what Joe means by “logical force” – but he doesn’t 
use the word “cause” for that, because he is following the usage still common 
in the physical and biological sciences, and in the vernacular too, in which 
only efficient cause is called “cause”. In this i think Joe’s usage differs 
from the usage in biosemiotics and other related sciences (such as ecology), 
where the full range of Aristotle’s four “causes” is recognized as such (again, 
with some modification).

By the way, the concept of final cause has been implicit even in mainstream 
evolutionary biology for a long time, although they don’t call it that. That’s 
why they are careful to make the same distinction that Joe makes between 
“tendential” and “intentional” teleology, only they use different terms. Ernst 
Mayr, for instance, uses “teleonomic” for Joe’s “tendential”, and 
“teleological” for Joe’s “intentional” (see Mayr’s essay on “The Multiple 
Meanings of Teleological”). However mainstream biology hasn’t caught up with 
Peirce’s semiotic yet, in my opinion – which is why biosemiotics is important.

Gary F.

} You can't carry a ladder while you climb it, or think about signs while you 
read them. [gnox] {

 

  www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home

 

From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Gary Richmond
Sent: August-03-11 3:59 PM



Gary F, List,

 

I'll be referring to Eliseo Fernández's paper several times in the course of 
this read, but, I'm afraid, only in passing. However, I hope to discuss his 
work in some detail and depth in a future thread, perhaps in the Fall (I think 
my last question anticipates that discussion). For now, let me just comment 
briefly on the critical matter of 'determination' in consideration of semiosis. 
I've CC'd Eliseo, who is a member of this forum, in the hopes that he might 
sound in on this matter as well.

 

On logical determination: I interpret Peirce's concept of 'determination--as in 
"the object determines the sign for the interpretant"--to be logical and not 
causal  (perhaps this suggests why Eliseo added in the snippet you quoted that 
it's a "peculiar" kind of causality). I can't argue this in any great detail 
now since it would tend to lead us too far away from Joe's paper. Suffice it to 
say that it is my understanding that 'determines' semiotically means something 
like 'semiotically constrains'. 

 

To my knowledge, Peirce's most extended argument concerning 'determination' in 
the context of semiosis (as 'constraint') occurs in a 1906 draft of "The Basis 
of Pragmatism" for a paper in the Monist series (see Item 27 in EP2, especially 
pp 391-4). Peirce's is a highly complex argumentation which I cannot hope to 
summarize here, but pointing  to a few key passages in the argumentation of the 
draft paper might be helpful.

 

Peirce first refers to a remark made in an earlier paper in the series to the 
effect that to say that a meaning is determinate would be to say that "it would 
leave 'no latitude for interpretation," and that, as I see it, would-be 
determination in the long run, so, in the final interpretant. Another way of 
saying this might be that the truth of reality constrains the final 
interpretant at the theoretical end of inquiry. So, determination in this sense 
is in futuro, and the meaning of a sign can never be absolutely settled on as 
long as inquiry continues. (Still, that we can make use of, for example, 
scientific discoveries in the development of various technologies suggests that 
we do sometimes come to a definitive conclusion--a kind of 'end of inquiry'--in 
the sense that we've established the validity of such principles as are 
required for the actual creation and development of such technologies.)

 

But, Peirce, says further: "Even a future event can only be determinate in so 
far as it is a consequent. Now the concept of a consequent is a logical 
concept. It is derived from the concept of the conclusio

[peirce-l] Correction

2011-08-05 Thread Neal Bruss

I apologize for sending a badly flawed version.

You hear a new slang word:  you never ask for a definition of it; and you
never get one.  You do not get even any simple example of its use; you only
hear it in ironical, twisted, humorous, sentences whose meaning is turned
inside out and tied in a hard knot; yet you know what that word means much
better than any abstract definition could have informed you.  In riding a
horse; rider and ridden understand one another [in] a way of which the
former can no more give an account than the latter. (Collected Papers,
7.447)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/4/11 10:38 PM, "d_obrien"  wrote:
> 
>> I begin with the focus on my exchange with Steven Ericsson-Zenith, where I
>> introduce myself by explaining that I'm a total newbie to Peirce.
>> 
>> I distinguish a reference from an object referred to, and a sign from its
>> signification.
>> I distinguish common from idiosyncratic usage (of symbols) such that the
>> domain of usages is divided along some line that we draw with dictionaries,
>> texts on grammar, etc.   It seems to me that the domain of common usages has
>> a certain primacy, since if there were no common understandings of the
>> meanings of our terms (common usages) there'd be no communication
>> whatsoever.  
>> 
>> Whether an usage is common or idiosyncratic is a matter for our judgement to
>> decide -  that is, whether this or that mutually exclusive predicate holds
>> or not is something which we determine and judge from the context of the
>> usage in question.  This is so whether or not someone whose usage is
>> idiosyncratic *knows* that it is idiosyncratic.  That the same sign in the
>> same sentence can have such distinct and mutually exclusive interpretations
>> according as different people understand it, seems to show that
>> interpretation isn't determined by the sign, isn't like an "effect" with the
>> sign as "cause".
>> 
>> A great deal of philosophical energy has been devoted to making plain how it
>> is that the identical sign might mean very different things in different
>> declarative sentences.  A notion studied by the scholastics is that the
>> context of "what makes sense" of a subject term with respect to this or that
>> predication in effect determines its declension, so determines the immediate
>> object of signification.
>> 
>> According as this notion, the meaning of a sign of an universal or general
>> concept, e.g. 'boat' or 'circle', understood in abstraction, is determined
>> by general definition (if this meaning is intended to be precise), but the
>> meaning in terms of what object might be signified by it "in use" in
>> sentences (declarative and others as well) is also determined contextually
>> by the grammatical role it plays and the meaning of other terms in the
>> sentence.  
>> 
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics
>> 
>> 1. Basic Sign Structure
>> 
>>  In one of his many definitions of a sign, Peirce writes:
>> I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called
>> its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call
>> its interpretant, that the later is thereby mediately determined by the
>> former. (EP2, 478).
>> 
>> ...
>>  
>> 
>>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
>>> 
>>> No, I am referring to an act or instance of "use."
>>> 
>>> Steven
>>> 
>>> On Aug 3, 2011, at 8:56 PM, d_obrien wrote:
>>> 
 I was auto-subscribed to this list by some method unbeknownst to me.
 So I'm dropped into a land where the meaning of a lot of technical
 terminology is taken for granted.
 
 When you say "Peirce would not confuse a reference to common usage
 with the act.", do you mean "with the act of understanding"?
 Of course an act of understanding of a meaning is individuated, not a
 matter of "common usage".
 
>> 
>> 
->>
-
>> ---
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>> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of
>> the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to
>> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> 
> --
> ---
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Re: [peirce-l] new subject -- Peirce on meaning

2011-08-05 Thread Neal Bruss

Here's Peirce--

You hear a new slang word:  you never ask for a definition of it; and you
never get one.  You do not get even any simple example of its use; you only
hear it in ironical, twisted, humorous, sentences whose meaning is turned
inside out and tied in a hard not; rider and ridden understand one another
[in] a way of which the former [say, a human] can no more give an account
than the latter [a horse]. (Collected Papers, 7.447)





On 8/4/11 10:38 PM, "d_obrien"  wrote:

> I begin with the focus on my exchange with Steven Ericsson-Zenith, where I
> introduce myself by explaining that I'm a total newbie to Peirce.
> 
> I distinguish a reference from an object referred to, and a sign from its
> signification.
> I distinguish common from idiosyncratic usage (of symbols) such that the
> domain of usages is divided along some line that we draw with dictionaries,
> texts on grammar, etc.   It seems to me that the domain of common usages has
> a certain primacy, since if there were no common understandings of the
> meanings of our terms (common usages) there'd be no communication
> whatsoever.  
> 
> Whether an usage is common or idiosyncratic is a matter for our judgement to
> decide -  that is, whether this or that mutually exclusive predicate holds
> or not is something which we determine and judge from the context of the
> usage in question.  This is so whether or not someone whose usage is
> idiosyncratic *knows* that it is idiosyncratic.  That the same sign in the
> same sentence can have such distinct and mutually exclusive interpretations
> according as different people understand it, seems to show that
> interpretation isn't determined by the sign, isn't like an "effect" with the
> sign as "cause".
> 
> A great deal of philosophical energy has been devoted to making plain how it
> is that the identical sign might mean very different things in different
> declarative sentences.  A notion studied by the scholastics is that the
> context of "what makes sense" of a subject term with respect to this or that
> predication in effect determines its declension, so determines the immediate
> object of signification.
> 
> According as this notion, the meaning of a sign of an universal or general
> concept, e.g. 'boat' or 'circle', understood in abstraction, is determined
> by general definition (if this meaning is intended to be precise), but the
> meaning in terms of what object might be signified by it "in use" in
> sentences (declarative and others as well) is also determined contextually
> by the grammatical role it plays and the meaning of other terms in the
> sentence.  
> 
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics
> 
> 1. Basic Sign Structure
> 
>  In one of his many definitions of a sign, Peirce writes:
> I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called
> its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call
> its interpretant, that the later is thereby mediately determined by the
> former. (EP2, 478).
> 
> ...
>  
> 
>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
>> 
>> No, I am referring to an act or instance of "use."
>> 
>> Steven
>> 
>> On Aug 3, 2011, at 8:56 PM, d_obrien wrote:
>> 
>>> I was auto-subscribed to this list by some method unbeknownst to me.
>>> So I'm dropped into a land where the meaning of a lot of technical
>>> terminology is taken for granted.
>>> 
>>> When you say "Peirce would not confuse a reference to common usage
>>> with the act.", do you mean "with the act of understanding"?
>>> Of course an act of understanding of a meaning is individuated, not a
>>> matter of "common usage".
>>> 
> 
> --
> ---
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of
> the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to
> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"