Re: Re: Re: Re: What is science
ken hanly wrote: There is no such Platonic argument. Thrasymachus in the Republic argues this and gets a good trouncing for doing so at the hands of Socrates. Where do you think that PLATO argues this? Or do you think that Thrasymachus is actually Plato in the Republic. That is an interesting theory. Cheers. Ken Hanly... Thrasymachus is pushed by Socrates to admit this argument, and as a result he does get as you say, crushed. But the argument belongs to Socrates, not Thrasymachus, and it calls for a number of observations. One that I will make here is that from it we see that Plato had become much more dishonest when he wrote the _Republic_ in contrast to his younger self in the _Protagoras_, the only dialogue in which he offers a reasonably honest presentation of the opposition. The debate between Thrasymachus and that slimeball Socrates is rigged from behind the scenes by Plato. Carrol - Original Message - From: Carrol Cox [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, October 13, 2002 7:55 AM Subject: [PEN-L:31316] Re: Re: What is science Charles Jannuzi wrote: The science report is that sad sick pretense of an exercise in c/v building that pretends we can. The basis both of SCIENCE (deified -- as at Sceptical Inquiere) and of SCIENCE (demonized -- as with Carl too many others) -- is the Platonic argument that a mathematician is not a mathematician when he/she is making a mistake. Both (Carl Sceptical Inquirer) are pitching religous woo-woo and can't tell us much about the actual world. Carrol
Re: Re: What is science
Charles Jannuzi wrote: The science report is that sad sick pretense of an exercise in c/v building that pretends we can. The basis both of SCIENCE (deified -- as at Sceptical Inquiere) and of SCIENCE (demonized -- as with Carl too many others) -- is the Platonic argument that a mathematician is not a mathematician when he/she is making a mistake. Both (Carl Sceptical Inquirer) are pitching religous woo-woo and can't tell us much about the actual world. Carrol
Re: Re: Re: What is science
From: Carrol Cox [EMAIL PROTECTED] ... Both (Carl Sceptical Inquirer) are pitching religous woo-woo and can't tell us much about the actual world. Carrol Woo-woo it may be, but it is of a decidedly irreligious nature. Know then thyself, presume not God to scan, what? The proper study of mankind is man. Carl _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
Re: what is science?
In part Doyle wrote: We're talking about Neuro-networks not intuition. Whatever intuition is supposed to be in popular imagination it is pointless to go on about intuition when we have better ways to talk about what is going in someone's mind. Problem is, we still have no adequate logic for modelling what is going on in someone's mind. Still, Peirce makes an admirable attempt to get beyond 'mere intuition' that escapes the nets of deduction and induction with his term 'abduction' or 'abductive logic'. It's well worth reading. Charles Jannuzi __ Do you Yahoo!? Faith Hill - Exclusive Performances, Videos More http://faith.yahoo.com
Re: Re: Re: What is science
There is no such Platonic argument. Thrasymachus in the Republic argues this and gets a good trouncing for doing so at the hands of Socrates. Where do you think that PLATO argues this? Or do you think that Thrasymachus is actually Plato in the Republic. That is an interesting theory. Cheers. Ken Hanly... - Original Message - From: Carrol Cox [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, October 13, 2002 7:55 AM Subject: [PEN-L:31316] Re: Re: What is science Charles Jannuzi wrote: The science report is that sad sick pretense of an exercise in c/v building that pretends we can. The basis both of SCIENCE (deified -- as at Sceptical Inquiere) and of SCIENCE (demonized -- as with Carl too many others) -- is the Platonic argument that a mathematician is not a mathematician when he/she is making a mistake. Both (Carl Sceptical Inquirer) are pitching religous woo-woo and can't tell us much about the actual world. Carrol
Re: what is science? Pen-L:31265
Greetings Economists, Ravi writes, i would use the example of the mathematician ramanujan, whose mathematical results were stupendous, but who neither cared for nor was good at proofs (leaving hardy to do the dirty work to establish his impressive results). his justification for the results he proposed were often based on his intuition or the claim that the goddess 'parasakthi' told him so, in a vision. i hate rehasing this issue, but i have to point out that scientists will be quick to point out that intuition is alright in the 'context of discovery' but what makes science 'science' is that rigorous proof is required in the 'context of justification'. this claim is quite a distance from reality. pkf among others points out the political - the desires of the humans carrying out the justification - and theoretical - theory-laden'ness of facts - limitations of of this 'context of justification' claim. --ravi Doyle, We're talking about Neuro-networks not intuition. Whatever intuition is supposed to be in popular imagination it is pointless to go on about intuition when we have better ways to talk about what is going in someone's mind. Not that I will eschew saying the word intuition in this short essay, but that is we are going to be 'rigorous' we want to at least know that rigor requires using neuro-networks not poorly materially defined terms like intuition. Secondly let's consider rigorous proof as a form addressing the issue of memory recall. So if we want to know something we want to remember how to get there. That is part of the reason why a neuro-network is better than a linear sequential computing process. We assume the methods of pencil and paper mathematics (Erdos forgive us our transgressions against your mathematics!) in considering mathematics but the method of 'writing' mathematics can be quite un-like pencil and paper. Thirdly, it is necessary in my view to understand if we are going to refer to desires of human beings to understand how feelings are related to the neo-cortex. Hence why we might want to build computing networks that reflect context based files we exchange with each other. Hence why we want to remember something, and share the work of memory by talking to each other. This is simple to say. We walk around in the world, not sit in front of desktop computers, and when we are in the world such as Mother and children we want to see to it that the social structure insures we get our work done. That is a context based view of things. We use how we feel to tell us how to choose. Many a woman has argued that that sort of work is 'intuition' based because rigorous proof as a mathematical method of doing work is not and I repeat this as loudly as possible a practical means of implementing a relationship with a child. That techniques invented for mathematics in the world of pencil and paper is irrelevant to the complex immediate tasks for which neuro-networks have evolved to do work in. That describes the purpose of having augmented reality displays where we are in the world. We want something that comes up (from memory) when needed, not laboriously constructed by sequential rules of logic. That writing that context based information structure requires that all points have factorial structure to it in an n-dimensional way. Hence spintronics offers ways of addressing at once some powerful computational problems that can't be done logically and consistently otherwise. thanks, Doyle Saylor
RE: Re: RE: what is science?
Title: RE: [PEN-L:31275] Re: RE: what is science? In reference to my comment on the normal role of intuition (e.g., Einstein) in science, Ian writes: What's the difference between intuition and guess? and explains: It may matter somewhat if we are to discern not only the cognitive processes of scientists as they try to report to others how they go about working through various problems, but, further, as a way to get a handle on the anti-science backlash borne of the 60's and 70's, when intuition was somewhat romanticized, to borrow a phrase. Given that there is still a lot of anti-science attitudes in US culture which completely evades the issue of how science has been totally subordinated to capitalism for the past 350 years, it would seem to behoove those of us who wish to see science serve different social agendas along with concomitant transformations of the psychology of scientists and anti-scientists alike, t oget a somewhat better handle on how scientists and philosophers and artists etc. have thought about the distinction. I broached the question because it was raised in a very serious manner by Bas Van Fraasen back in the 80's in a symposium dealing with some controversial issues in the philosophy of science, one of which was the vaunted problem of induction, the inference to best explanation and their justifications as methods of organizing scientific data. well put! he asked: What's the difference between intuition and analysis? When does the one process leave off and theother begin in the dynamics of cognition and emotion? I answered:there seems to be a dialectical interpenetration of opposites, in which emotions and cognition condition each other, determining each others'character (within the social context, of course). The same can be said about intuition and analysis. But that doesn't say that all of these are one big mush, so we can jettison logical/empirical analysis, give up trying to separate cognition and analysis from emotion and intuition, and sit back smoke some weed. We should try to be in touch with our emotions (as we say here in California), but we want our actions and views to be as rational as possible. Ian:I 'see' them as complements rather than opposites; because if we each harbor multiple intelligences then we're dealing with issues of pluralism and coherence as the notions of Self we've gotten from Luther, Descartes, Locke and Kant as well as many others lose their tennuous grip on Western Culture. In a related issue, we might still, following Wordsworth, wonder, after we've separated those processes from 'one another,' what motivates us to engage in such distinctions as well as what 'ends' they serve. this makes sense: it's true that one can't be (humanly) rational without emotions or (humanly) emotional without reason. From which of the contrasting and possibly complementary terms/processes do we make the distinction[s]? And are these differences connected in any way to our individual and group abilities to perceive/conceive randomness and patterns within our bodies, societies and space-time? I wrote:I don't understand the above very well. I'd bet that it's easier to deal with such issues if they were stated in concrete terms (with examples) rather than dwelling in abstraction. Ian:Fair enough; how does the distinction between intuition and guess help us with the mathematics of induction and the role of randomness in statistics, probability theory and information theory as well as the choices we make in applying them to understanding social phenomena? If intuition is not reducible to analysis and is not the same as guessing, 'what' is 'it'? I haven't thought much about intuition. But in the small piece of abnormal psychology that I'm familiar with, it plays a role in a specific way. People with autism or Asperger's syndrome (borderline autism) lack an intuitive sense of the seamless web of social relationships (societal norms, etc.) Instead, they figure it out intellectually or logically. This means (1) that they take a long time figuring out how to fit in (or deal) with society, even their local society, or that it takes a large amount of energy to do so; and (2) they are usually rigid in their social relationships, insisting on specific rules (rather than the ambiguity which most people are willing to put up with). So why is it that people on the autistic spectrum face the social world in this non-intuitive way? They lack the ability seen in neurotypical folks to see and understand the subtle cues of social life, such as facial expression and body language. They have a hard time feeling empathy because they can't read others' minds to figure out what emotions other people have [see Simon Baron-Cohen's book on Mindblindness]. (There's no lack of the potential to feel empathy.) Those on the spectrum also usually focus on concrete specifics rather than seeing the interconnections and rather than generalizing from the specifics. By analogy
Re: Re: Re: RE: Re: RE: what is science?
The errors of SCIENCE will never be corrected by the kind of critique Carl offers because what Carl is attacking doesn't exist Carrol What a relief. Would that were true for everything I attack. Carl _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
Re: What is science
Hope I got the thread title correct. It was mostly a discussion I didn't participate in because I've been AWOL for two days. A few comments though: Note how Peirce's typology of 'logic' in practice applies (though I'm discussing them here with insights from Wittgenstein as well). Deductive logic: the logic of proof that tells us nothing new about the world Inductive logic: the logic of probability that never offers us absolute proof. Experimental science is largely dependent on inductive logic and probabilistic reasoning. Abductive logic: the logic of 'intuition'. I think that when people do complexes of tasks over a lot of time extremely well they are firing on all abductive 'cylinders' and most probably couldn't explain even one percent of what they are doing in explicit terms. The science report is that sad sick pretense of an exercise in c/v building that pretends we can. C Jannuzi __ Do you Yahoo!? Faith Hill - Exclusive Performances, Videos More http://faith.yahoo.com
what is science?
i have been following the discussion about whether certain characteristics are intrinsic to science or not. i am curious about what the participants believe is this thing called science? how do you delineate it from other activities so as to provide meaning to your positions on the matter. could not the correctness of your position hinge on the very definition you adopt? (yes this is all old hat: if you are too strict in your definition, such as defining science as a 'method', then it has been demonstrated that what we accept as science often breaks this 'method' rule. if you make the definition more general, say a form of discovery or reporting, then many activities, that the high priests are unwilling to accept as science, qualify). my own suspicion (which i will try to flesh out if this thread proceeds) is that what is broadly accepted as science or scientific activity (or approach), by the high priests and their followers, is indeed inherently dehumanizing (i think that's carl remick's [sp?] position?) and dangerous. again i am reminded of martin heidegger: science does not think. i must stress my use of the word 'suspicion' (since the last time i said something on a similar matter, i upset jks terribly). i wish i had more time to tie this thread to the thread about language and formalism (where i raised the question of whether a language can be developed that is not strictly formalized but can still lead to consistent and finite proofs of truth for various propositions). --ravi
RE: what is science?
Title: RE: [PEN-L:31244] what is science? Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. -- Richard Feynman. That doesn't mean that all self-styled (or society-styled) scientists live up to Feynman's definition. No-one's perfect, while some don't understand this view. BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific (logical-empirical) thinking. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine -Original Message- From: ravi [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Friday, October 11, 2002 8:01 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L:31244] what is science? i have been following the discussion about whether certain characteristics are intrinsic to science or not. i am curious about what the participants believe is this thing called science? how do you delineate it from other activities so as to provide meaning to your positions on the matter. could not the correctness of your position hinge on the very definition you adopt? (yes this is all old hat: if you are too strict in your definition, such as defining science as a 'method', then it has been demonstrated that what we accept as science often breaks this 'method' rule. if you make the definition more general, say a form of discovery or reporting, then many activities, that the high priests are unwilling to accept as science, qualify). my own suspicion (which i will try to flesh out if this thread proceeds) is that what is broadly accepted as science or scientific activity (or approach), by the high priests and their followers, is indeed inherently dehumanizing (i think that's carl remick's [sp?] position?) and dangerous. again i am reminded of martin heidegger: science does not think. i must stress my use of the word 'suspicion' (since the last time i said something on a similar matter, i upset jks terribly). i wish i had more time to tie this thread to the thread about language and formalism (where i raised the question of whether a language can be developed that is not strictly formalized but can still lead to consistent and finite proofs of truth for various propositions). --ravi
Re: what is science?
i wrote: (yes this is all old hat: if you are too strict in your definition, such as defining science as a 'method', then it has been demonstrated that what we accept as science often breaks this 'method' rule. if you make the definition more general, say a form of discovery or reporting, then many activities, that the high priests are unwilling to accept as science, qualify). my own suspicion (which i will try to flesh out if this thread proceeds) is that what is broadly accepted as science or scientific activity (or approach), by the high priests and their followers, is indeed inherently dehumanizing (i think that's carl remick's [sp?] position?) and dangerous. to throw in a bit more into this: some of this suspicion arose from observing a magician and defender of western science (and i agree with jim's use of the quoted prefix 'western'), named 'the amazing randi', carry out some tricks at bell laboratories. in a self-congratulatory tone he described his travels to third-world nations to expose superstitions and errors (among the 'experts' and the people there), and was met with much adulation and applause from the assembled ph.d's and men of science. recently a leading researcher, a rising star in the scientific community, at the very same bell labs was found to have been doctoring his data and results, for years. what was more interesting was to note that the magician's lecture was carried to various other sites using old techniques of simulcasting, but also by multicast streaming over the internet. and that latter technology, one of the fastest growing and far reaching efforts of the last few decades, had derived little contribution from the inbred community that was enjoying the magician's 'in' jokes. this caricature in many ways seemed to represent the way science exists in society. --ravi
Re: RE: what is science?
Devine, James wrote: Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. -- Richard Feynman. That doesn't mean that all self-styled (or society-styled) scientists live up to Feynman's definition. No-one's perfect, while some don't understand this view. i do not understand this view. leading scientists have consistently fooled themselves (whether it be eddington about the relativity experiment, shockley about race, etc etc), non-scientists think in ways that attempt to not fool themselves but whose thought nonetheless is often pre-scientific i.e., if its rigour and honesty that we are talking about then that is hardly unique to science. or if feynman says that science provides a unique way to avoid fooling oneself (i.e., we are back to the formalization issue and feynman is left with a very small subset of what is accepted as science today), i would like to hear more about that. i am afraid this definition, standing by itself, doesn't help me. BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific (logical-empirical) thinking. but people have been thinking logically and empirically before there was 'science', have they not? and incompleteness means that we have to act even when logical empirical evidence is non-conclusive, and (computational theory) complexity tells us that we have to apply non-optimal rules of thumb to choose such actions. worse, penrose argues that the process of proving (as carried out by humans) contains non-computational steps. i do not believe the question is one of an *alternative* to scientific thinking. the question is only what position does *scientific thinking* (once we have defined what it is) take within the umbrella of *thinking*. --ravi
Re: Re: what is science?
Random thoughts on Western science I have little trouble in respecting the achievements of what we're calling Western science; however, on an economics list I think that a note of caution might be in order. Economists often attempt to piggyback their work on the concept of science -- even though most science is inductive and what economists refer to as science is a set of deductions from dubious premises. Attempting to give a more holistic analysis, such as Marx tried to do it appears unscientific or even sociological within economic circles. Economists' attempt to verify their theories empirically is rarely convincing to me. First of all, most of the econometric tests are very brittle. Second, much of the data is highly questionable. When I was in graduate school, I paid attention to the construction of the statistics of the capital stock. I found it ironic that economists would pay great attention to their residuals without taking account of the weakness of the data that they use. Some of you may be familiar with Oskar Morgenstern's On the Accuracy of Economic Observations. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chico, CA 95929 530-898-5321 fax 530-898-5901
RE: what is science?
Title: RE: what is science? Ravi writes: to throw in a bit more into this: some of this suspicion arose from observing a magician and defender of western science (and i agree with jim's use of the quoted prefix 'western'), named 'the amazing randi', carry out some tricks at bell laboratories. in a self-congratulatory tone he described his travels to third-world nations to expose superstitions and errors (among the 'experts' and the people there), and was met with much adulation and applause from the assembled ph.d's and men of science. recently a leading researcher, a rising star in the scientific community, at the very same bell labs was found to have been doctoring his data and results, for years. what was more interesting was to note that the magician's lecture was carried to various other sites using old techniques of simulcasting, but also by multicast streaming over the internet. and that latter technology, one of the fastest growing and far reaching efforts of the last few decades, had derived little contribution from the inbred community that was enjoying the magician's 'in' jokes. this caricature in many ways seemed to represent the way science exists in society. FWIW, the little I've seen of James Randi's stuff is that he tries to debunk _all_ views, both Western and non-Western (following the tradition of Houdini). He sheds doubt on the whole phenomenon of hypnotism and altered states of consciousness (for example), which goes too far. The entire skeptic community (Martin Gardner, the late Carl Sagan, Michael Shermer, et al) can be self-righteous. Methinks they don't apply enough skepticism to their own enterprise sometimes. (Shermer is a libertarian right-winger, whereas other skeptics, such as the late Stephen Jay Gould, are on the left. They disagree with each other sometimes: for example, as a psychologist, Shermer rejects Randi's rejection of hypnotism.) But these guys at least have fought mysticism, the spoon-bending of Uri Geller, etc., etc. I wish economists would be more skeptical, rejecting mystical notions such as that of the Invisible Hand (a.k.a., the Walrasian Auctioneer). (One of the reasons why we see antagonism toward science on pen-l is because most economists mix mysticism with a dollop of science and then call it science.) The Bell Labs guy got caught -- by other scientists. That's a victory -- of the bittersweet sort -- for science. Of course, it was a blot on science's escutcheon that such fraud would ever occur and that the guy would be so respected for so long. It suggests the corrupting influence of the star system on science. In a different message, I wrote: Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. -- Richard Feynman. That doesn't mean that all self-styled (or society-styled) scientists live up to Feynman's definition. No-one's perfect, while some don't understand this view. Ravi answers:i do not understand this view. leading scientists have consistently fooled themselves (whether it be eddington about the relativity experiment, shockley about race, etc etc), non-scientists think in ways that attempt to not fool themselves but whose thought nonetheless is often pre-scientific i.e., if its rigour and honesty that we are talking about then that is hardly unique to science. or if feynman says that science provides a unique way to avoid fooling oneself (i.e., we are back to the formalization issue and feynman is left with a very small subset of what is accepted as science today), i would like to hear more about that. i am afraid this definition, standing by itself, doesn't help me. Contrary to what I said, Feynman's phrase is not a definition. But the point of is that scientists should take no perspective for granted. Skepticism should be the rule, while there are no final conclusions, only hypotheses to be tested in a logical and/or empirical way. (In addition, I would point out that scientists often fall for a logical/empirical fallacy of supposing that a narrow specialization can be adequate. But this leaves important matters out.) Eddington -- and other scientists -- have been fooled, but that's because scientists are human (and in society, to boot). It should also be noted that there are some propositions in science which can't be tested in any way. This is the basis for Kuhn, _et al_'s work. (Occam's Razor, for example, is one of these.) But a scientist should be conscious of the role of such propositions, highlighting their role. BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific (logical-empirical) thinking. Ravi:but people have been thinking logically and empirically before there was 'science', have they not? Of course. Science is nothing but a distillation of an important component of human thinking. BTW, the (hopefully) old-fashioned scientific disdain for folk science is not inherent in scientific thought. It's part of the arrogance of (European-based) Enlightenment/Modernist thinking
Re: what is science?
When we talk about science, we frequently talk about two different kinds of order without adequately distinguishing between them. One kind of order has to do with laws of causality, the other has to do with conscious intent. If one lives at the edge of a cliff, it is consistent with the laws of physics to throw one's garbage over the side -- the garbage will fall. But that grave result doesn't take into account other possible or even likely consequences, such as the effect of toxic waste on an eco-system below or on people dwelling at the bottom of the cliff. Some or many of the consequences of an action may be, practically speaking, unknowable. It would take so long and so much energy to find out all the consequences that one would never be able to act. Because inaction itself may have consequences, the dilemma is unresolvable. Therefore one forms intentions on the basis of experience and judgment, not on the basis of a complete assessment of how the laws of causality apply to a given situation. When I say experience and judgment I imply memory because it is what we remember from our experience (whether consciously or subconsciously) that forms the basis of our judgment. If I forget that there may be people living at the bottom of the cliff, it doesn't really matter any more to my judgment that I once knew it. Now, memory doesn't obey the laws of physics but it does obey the laws of nature (I am speaking metaphorically when I use the terms law, physics and nature, although I am not certain *how* metaphorical). It is possibly that I may capriciously bring to mind only these or those physical laws when forming an intention. If I claim that my action was scientific because it scrupulously took into account the physical laws that I capriciously remembered, there is something missing in my account. We might refer to the missing element as humility. Science without humility -- that is without a proper regard for the vagaries of memory and intention -- is unscientific. The fact that the facts emphasized are indeed facts trivializes the relationship between memory, intention, action and causality. Of course, it is entirely possible for people to form intentions that completely disregard causal (or probabilistic) relationships. Otherwise who would buy lottery tickets? Is it somehow more scientific to throw one's garbage over the side of a cliff than to buy a lottery ticket because in the former act one has taken into account at least *some* of the laws of causality? How many laws and how much judgment and memory must come into play to distinguish between the scientific and the unscientific? Where does one draw the line between science and caprice? Consciousness is qualitative. Analysis forms an important part of consciousness, but consciousness cannot be reduced to analysis. Tom Walker 604 255 4812
Re: Re: what is science?
Tom Walker wrote: When we talk about science, we frequently talk about two different kinds of order without adequately distinguishing between them. One kind of order has to do with laws of causality, the other has to do with conscious intent. If one lives at the edge of a cliff, it is consistent with the laws of physics to throw one's garbage over the side -- the garbage will fall. But that grave result doesn't take into account other possible or even likely consequences, such as the effect of toxic waste on an eco-system below or on people dwelling at the bottom of the cliff. Some or many of the consequences of an action may be, practically speaking, unknowable. It would take so long and so much energy to find out all the consequences that one would never be able to act. What is specific to the structures of knowledge in the modern world-system rather is the concept of the 'two cultures'. No other historical system has instituted a fundamental divorce between science, on one hand, and philosophy and the humanities, on the other hand, or what I think would be better characterized as the separation of the quest for the true and the quest for the good and the beautiful. Indeed, it was not all that easy to enshrine this divorce within the geoculture of the modern world-system. It took three centuries before the split was institutionalized. Today, however, it is fundamental to the geoculture, and forms the basis of our university systems. This conceptual split has enabled the modern world to put forward the bizarre concept of the value-neutral specialist, whose objective assessments of reality could form the basis not merely of engineering decisions --in the broadest sense of the term--but of socio-political choices as well. Shielding the scientists from collective assessment, and in effect merging them into the technocrats, did liberate scientists from the dead hand of intellectually irrelevant authority. But simultaneously, it removed from the major underlying social decisions we have been taking for the last 500 years from substantive--as opposed to technical--scientific debate. The idea that science is over here and sociopolitical decisions are over there is the core concept that sustains Eurocentrism, since the only universalist propositions that have been acceptable are those which are Eurocentric. Any argument that reinforces this separation of the two cultures thus sustains Eurocentrism. If one denies the specificity of the modern world, one has no plausible way of arguing for the reconstruction of knowledge structures, and therefore no plausible way of arriving at intelligent and substantively rational alternatives to the existing world-system. In the last twenty years or so, the legitimacy of this divorce has been challenged for the first time in a significant way. This is the meaning of the ecology movement, for example. And this is the underlying central issue in the public attack on Eurocentrism. The challenges have resulted in so-called 'science wars' and 'culture wars' which have themselves often been obscurantist and obfuscating. If we are to emerge with a reunited. and thereby non-Eurocentric, structure of knowledge, it is absolutely essential that we not be diverted into side paths that avoid this central issue. If we are to construct an alternative world-system to the one that is today in grievous crisis, we must treat simultaneously and inextricably the issues of the true and the good. --Immanuel Wallerstein Louis Proyect www.marxmail.org
Re: RE: what is science?
From: Devine, James [EMAIL PROTECTED] BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific (logical-empirical) thinking. I'd say intuition, but that's only a hunch :) Carl _ Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger: http://messenger.msn.com
RE: Re: RE: what is science?
Title: RE: [PEN-L:31261] Re: RE: what is science? said I: BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific (logical-empirical) thinking. Carl: I'd say intuition, but that's only a hunch :) ha! of course, contrary to scientistic/positivistic propaganda, intuition is part of science. What was Einstein, if not intuitive? (I'm told that his math wasn't very good.) Scientists use their intuition all the time. But then the products of intution that can't be validated logically or empirically fall by the wayside. Jim
Re: RE: Re: RE: what is science?
Devine, James wrote: of course, contrary to scientistic/positivistic propaganda, intuition is part of science. What was Einstein, if not intuitive? (I'm told that his math wasn't very good.) Scientists use their intuition all the time. But then the products of intution that can't be validated logically or empirically fall by the wayside. i would use the example of the mathematician ramanujan, whose mathematical results were stupendous, but who neither cared for nor was good at proofs (leaving hardy to do the dirty work to establish his impressive results). his justification for the results he proposed were often based on his intuition or the claim that the goddess 'parasakthi' told him so, in a vision. i hate rehasing this issue, but i have to point out that scientists will be quick to point out that intuition is alright in the 'context of discovery' but what makes science 'science' is that rigorous proof is required in the 'context of justification'. this claim is quite a distance from reality. pkf among others points out the political - the desires of the humans carrying out the justification - and theoretical - theory-laden'ness of facts - limitations of of this 'context of justification' claim. --ravi
Re: what is science
Jim Devine wrote, of course, contrary to scientistic/positivistic propaganda, intuition is part of science. What was Einstein, if not intuitive? (I'm told that his math wasn't very good.) Scientists use their intuition all the time. But then the products of intution that can't be validated logically or empirically fall by the wayside. The first product of intuition is intuition of itself. This product cannot be validated by exogenous logical or empirical criteria. I think therefore thinking exists. The indivuated sumness of it is far less certain.
Re: what is science?
From: ravi [EMAIL PROTECTED] my own suspicion (which i will try to flesh out if this thread proceeds) is that what is broadly accepted as science or scientific activity (or approach), by the high priests and their followers, is indeed inherently dehumanizing (i think that's carl remick's [sp?] position?) and dangerous. Yes. At heart I guess I'm just a peasant with a pitchfork eager to storm Dr. Frankenstein's castle. And indeed, I have my very own mad scientist right in the neighborhood. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory -- headed by Dr. DNA himself, wacky ol' James D. Watson -- is just a couple of miles from where I live. Carl _ Join the worlds largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com
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RE: [PEN-L:31261] Re: RE: what is science? - Original Message - From: Devine, James said I: BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific (logical-empirical) thinking. Carl: I'd say intuition, but that's only a hunch :) ha! of course, contrary to scientistic/positivistic propaganda, intuition is part of science. What was Einstein, if not intuitive? (I'm told that his math wasn't very good.) Scientists use their intuition all the time. But then the products of intution that can't be validated logically or empirically fall by the wayside. Jim = What's the difference between intuition and guess? What's the difference between intuition and analysis? When does the one process leave off and the other begin in the dynamics of cognition and emotion? From which of the contrasting and possibly complementary terms/processes do we make the distinction[s]? And are these differences connected in any way to our individual and group abilities to perceive/conceive randomness and patterns within our bodies, societies and space-time? If I recall correctly, several mathematicians thought Eisntein would have made an excellent mathematician and geometer. Rohrshach blotter...I mean blots, anyone, Ian
RE: what is science?
Title: RE: what is science? In reference to my comment on the normal role of intuition (e.g., Einstein) in science, Ian writes: What's the difference between intuition and guess? I'm not sure it matters what the difference is. What's the difference between intuition and analysis? When does the one process leave off and the other begin in the dynamics of cognition and emotion? there seems to be a dialectical interpenetration of opposites, in which emotions and cognition condition each other, determining each others' character (within the social context, of course). The same can be said about intuition and analysis. But that doesn't say that all of these are one big mush, so we can jettison logical/empirical analysis, give up trying to separate cognition and analysis from emotion and intuition, and sit back smoke some weed. We should try to be in touch with our emotions (as we say here in California), but we want our actions and views to be as rational as possible. From which of the contrasting and possibly complementary terms/processes do we make the distinction[s]? And are these differences connected in any way to our individual and group abilities to perceive/conceive randomness and patterns within our bodies, societies and space-time? I don't understand the above very well. I'd bet that it's easier to deal with such issues if they were stated in concrete terms (with examples) rather than dwelling in abstraction. Ravi writes: i hate rehasing this issue, but i have to point out that scientists will be quick to point out that intuition is alright in the 'context of discovery' but what makes science 'science' is that rigorous proof is required in the 'context of justification'. this claim is quite a distance from reality. pkf [Feyerabend?] among others points out the political - the desires of the humans carrying out the justification - and theoretical - theory-laden'ness of facts - limitations of of this 'context of justification' claim. I have no complaint with this. I just think that using idealized science-style thinking to oppose capitalism (and the Pentagon and the scientific star system, etc.) is going to be more effective than embracing mysticism or whatever the alternative is to science-style thinking. Carl: ... At heart I guess I'm just a peasant with a pitchfork eager to storm Dr. Frankenstein's castle. ... but isn't it a mistake to rely on your heart (emotions) as a guide for action? Obviously, emotions can and should play a role, but there must be a role for thinking about the consequences of action and the like (as I'm sure you do). Luckily the Committee on Experimentation with Human Subjects prevents people from doing Frankenstein-type (or Milgrom-type) experiments. The need for such a committee tells us something that we already knew: science should never be the be-all and end-all. Jim
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If what "can't be validated logically or empirically" falls by the wayside, how/why do we have economics? In confronting mainstream micro purveyors, anything empirical put before their noses is dismissed as "anecdotal." An intuition that is validated by unfolding events is "anecdotal." Meanwhile they can validate neither empirically or logically. Give me intuition or give me freedom from "economists." Gene "Devine, James" wrote: said I: > >BTW, I still want to know what the alternative is to scientific > >(logical-empirical) thinking. Carl: > I'd say intuition, but that's only a hunch :) ha! of course, contrary to scientistic/positivistic propaganda, intuition is part of science. What was Einstein, if not intuitive? (I'm told that his math wasn't very good.) Scientists use their intuition all the time. But then the products of intution that can't be validated logically or empirically fall by the wayside. Jim
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Ian Murray wrote: What's the difference between intuition and guess? What's the difference between intuition and analysis? At least according to Susanne Langer analysis is dependent on intuition. Her example: Suppose someone admits that All men are mortal and that Socrates is a Man, but cannot see that therefore Socrates is mortal. That would be a failure of intuition. And hence, I guess, the explanation of intuition (gee the 'tions' add up) would be a problem of neuroscience, not of logic or philosophy. Carrol
Re: RE: what is science?
RE: what is science? - Original Message - From: Devine, James Hey, you have a different font! In reference to my comment on the normal role of intuition (e.g., Einstein) in science, Ian writes: What's the difference between intuition and guess? I'm not sure it matters what the difference is. === It may matter somewhat if we are to discern not only the cognitive processes of scientists as they try to report to others how they go about working through various problems, but, further, as a way to get a handle on the anti-science backlash borne of the 60's and 70's, when intuition was somewhat romanticized, to borrow a phrase. Given that there is still a lot of anti-science attitudes in US culture which completely evades the issue of how science has been totally subordinated to capitalism for the past 350 years, it would seem to behoove those of us who wish to see science serve different social agendas along with concomitant transformations of the psychology of scientists and anti-scientists alike, t oget a somewhat better handle on how scientists and philosophers and artists etc. have thought about the distinction. I broached the question because it was raised in a very serious manner by Bas Van Fraasen back in the 80's in a symposium dealing with some controversial issues in the philosophy of science, one of which was the vaunted problem of induction, the inference to best explanation and their justifications as methods of organizing scientific data. What's the difference between intuition and analysis? When does the one process leave off and the other begin in the dynamics of cognition and emotion? there seems to be a dialectical interpenetration of opposites, in which emotions and cognition condition each other, determining each others' character (within the social context, of course). The same can be said about intuition and analysis. But that doesn't say that all of these are one big mush, so we can jettison logical/empirical analysis, give up trying to separate cognition and analysis from emotion and intuition, and sit back smoke some weed. We should try to be in touch with our emotions (as we say here in California), but we want our actions and views to be as rational as possible. I 'see' them as complements rather than opposites; because if we each harbor multiple intelligences then we're dealing with issues of pluralism and coherence as the notions of Self we've gotten from Luther, Descartes, Locke and Kant as well as many others lose their tennuous grip on Western Culture. In a related issue, we might still, following Wordsworth, wonder, after we've separated those processes from 'one another,' what motivates us to engage in such distinctions as well as what 'ends' they serve. From which of the contrasting and possibly complementary terms/processes do we make the distinction[s]? And are these differences connected in any way to our individual and group abilities to perceive/conceive randomness and patterns within our bodies, societies and space-time? I don't understand the above very well. I'd bet that it's easier to deal with such issues if they were stated in concrete terms (with examples) rather than dwelling in abstraction. = Fair enough; how does the distinction between intuition and guess help us with the mathematics of induction and the role of randomness in statistics, probability theory and information theory as well as the choices we make in applying them to understanding social phenomena? If intuition is not reducible to analysis and is not the same as guessing, 'what' is 'it'? Ian
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Eugene Coyle wrote: If what can't be validated logically or empirically falls by the wayside, how/why do we have economics? In confronting mainstream micro purveyors, anything empirical put before their noses is dismissed as anecdotal. An intuition that is validated by unfolding events is anecdotal. Meanwhile they can validate neither empirically or logically. Give me intuition or give me freedom from economists. I think this discussion tends to treat SCIENCE has a Platonic form with a mind of its own. And this weird beast is then expected either to be perfect or to correct itself. But science is a web of social relations, inseparably enmeshed in the social relations which constitute the entire society. So when Science does something horrible or stupid, it isn't science that does it, its a general social failure. The errors of SCIENCE will never be corrected by the kind of critique Carl offers because what Carl is attacking doesn't exist Carrol
RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: what is science?
Title: RE: [PEN-L:31272] Re: RE: Re: RE: what is science? I wrote: of course, contrary to scientistic/positivistic propaganda, intuition is part of science. What was Einstein, if not intuitive? (I'm told that his math wasn't very good.) Scientists use their intuition all the time. But then the products of intution that can't be validated logically or empirically fall by the wayside. Gene Coyle: If what can't be validated logically or empirically falls by the wayside, how/why do we have economics? In confronting mainstream micro purveyors, anything empirical put before their noses is dismissed as anecdotal. An intuition that is validated by unfolding events is anecdotal. Meanwhile they can validate neither empirically or logically. of course, the strictures of science are even harder to apply in the social sciences (though I can't see anything that can replace scientific attitudes). The problem is deeper, though: most economists purvey pseudo-science. They use all sorts of scientific lingo while practicing a version of religion. This is especially true of the Chicago school. But the only way to fight this crap is to be more scientific, not to try to present an alternative religion. Jim
