dev-security-policy  

Messages by Thread

• • Re: [FORGED] Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Tom Delmas via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Lee via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
• GRCA: Out-of-date CPS provided in CCADB Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GRCA: Out-of-date CPS provided in CCADB irvinfly--- via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GRCA: Out-of-date CPS provided in CCADB Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GRCA: Out-of-date CPS provided in CCADB horn917--- via dev-security-policy
• Filtering on problem reporting e-mail addresses Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Filtering on problem reporting e-mail addresses Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• Request to Include certSIGN Root CA G2 certificate Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Request to Include certSIGN Root CA G2 certificate Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Request to Include certSIGN Root CA G2 certificate Gabriel Petcu via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Request to Include certSIGN Root CA G2 certificate Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Request to Include certSIGN Root CA G2 certificate Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
• Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key sandybar497--- via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key sandybar497--- via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key Robin Alden via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key Robin Alden via dev-security-policy
• CT2 log signing key compromise Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: CT2 log signing key compromise Alex Cohn via dev-security-policy
  • RE: CT2 log signing key compromise Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: CT2 log signing key compromise Alex Cohn via dev-security-policy
  • RE: CT2 log signing key compromise Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • RE: CT2 log signing key compromise Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • RE: CT2 log signing key compromise Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: CT2 log signing key compromise Ian Carroll via dev-security-policy
  • RE: CT2 log signing key compromise Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
• DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • RE: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • RE: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • RE: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Pedro Fuentes via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Pedro Fuentes via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DRAFT May 2020 CA Communication/Survey Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
• IdenTrust mis-issuance of an EV SSL Certificate IdenTrust Inc via dev-security-policy
  • Re: IdenTrust mis-issuance of an EV SSL Certificate IdenTrust Inc via dev-security-policy
  • Re: IdenTrust mis-issuance of an EV SSL Certificate Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• Change of Root ownership structure Arnold Essing via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Change of Root ownership structure Pedro Fuentes via dev-security-policy
  • AW: Change of Root ownership structure Arnold Essing via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Change of Root ownership structure Pedro Fuentes via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Change of Root ownership structure Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Change of Root ownership structure Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Change of Root ownership structure Arnold Essing via dev-security-policy
• Proposal: Make readable CPSes easier to find Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: Make readable CPSes easier to find Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: Make readable CPSes easier to find Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: Make readable CPSes easier to find Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: Make readable CPSes easier to find Wojtek Porczyk via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: Make readable CPSes easier to find Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Roland Shoemaker via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Eric Mill via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) westmail24--- via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020) Filippo Valsorda via dev-security-policy
• GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Andy Warner via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
  • RE: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: GTS - OCSP serving issue 2020-04-09 Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy
• Welcome Ben Wilson to Mozilla! Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Welcome Ben Wilson to Mozilla! Jeff Ward via dev-security-policy
  • Welcome Ben Wilson to Mozilla! Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Welcome Ben Wilson to Mozilla! Leo Grove via dev-security-policy
• Revocation from the fuuutuuuuuure Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
• Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal: prohibit issuance of new certificates with known-compromised keys, and for related purposes Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
• Musings on mass key-compromise revocations Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Musings on mass key-compromise revocations Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Musings on mass key-compromise revocations Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
• Auditing of CA facilities in lockdown David Kluge via dev-security-policy
• Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with previously-compromised key within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with previously-compromised key within 24 hours Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
• Revocation as an independent user agent decision Ian Carroll via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Revocation as an independent user agent decision Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Revocation as an independent user agent decision Ian Carroll via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Revocation as an independent user agent decision Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• Microsec: Revoked subordinate CA certificates under the „Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009” root Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Revoked subordinate CA certificates under the „Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009” root Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Revoked subordinate CA certificates under the „Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009” root Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Revoked subordinate CA certificates under the „Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009” root Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Revoked subordinate CA certificates under the „Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009” root Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
• COVID-19 and CA Operational Status Burton via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 and CA Operational Status Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 and CA Operational Status Burton via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 and CA Operational Status Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: COVID-19 and CA Operational Status Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• QuoVadis: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • RE: QuoVadis: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Stephen Davidson via dev-security-policy
  • Re: QuoVadis: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: QuoVadis: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • RE: QuoVadis: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Stephen Davidson via dev-security-policy
• Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Digicert: failure to revoke certificate with previously compromised key Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
• Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Paessler (was Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours) Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Paessler (was Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours) Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Paessler (was Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours) Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Paessler (was Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours) Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Josh Aas via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Josh Aas via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Let's Encrypt: Failure to revoke key-compromised certificates within 24 hours Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
• Fwd: Proposal for New CA Certificate Policy Module Owner Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proposal for New CA Certificate Policy Module Owner Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
• DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • AW: DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Arnold Essing via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • AW: DFN-Verein: CPS/CP link in CCADB not in English Arnold Essing via dev-security-policy
• Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Wojtek Porczyk via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Bruce via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Is issuing a certificate for a previously-reported compromised private key misissuance? Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Burton via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Nick France via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Ronald Crane via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Robin Alden via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Terms and Conditions that use technical measures to make it difficult to change CAs Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • RE: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields dr . Szőke Sándor via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Microsec: Issuance of 2 IVCP precertificates without givenName, surName, localityName fields Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
• Rules about OCSP responders availability tdelmas--- via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Rules about OCSP responders availability Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
• Proper place for the Private Key Compromise information in CPS Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proper place for the Private Key Compromise information in CPS Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
  • Re: Proper place for the Private Key Compromise information in CPS Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy

• Earlier messages
• Later messages