2008/12/1 Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > "Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation > needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how > could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order for a computation > to be physically instantiated, the physical instantiation needs to > satisfy a few properties. One of these properties is clearly some sort > of isomorphism between the computation and the physical instantiation: > the actual steps of the computation are represented in physical form. > A less obvious requirement is that the physical computation needs to > have the proper counterfactuals: if some external force were to modify > some step in the computation, the computation must progress according > to the new computational state (as translated by the isomorphism)."
So if you destroy the counterfactual behaviour by removing components that are not utilised, you end up with a recording-equivalent, which isn't conscious. But what if you destroy the counterfactual behaviour by another means? For example, if I wear a device that will instantly kill me if I deviate from a particular behaviour, randomly determined by the device from moment to moment, but survive, will my consciousness be diminished as a result? You might say, no, because if the device were not there I would have been able to handle the counterfactuals. But then it might also be argued for the first example that if the unused components had not been removed, the recording-equivalent would also have been able to handle the counterfactuals; and you can make this more concrete by having the extra machinery waiting to be dropped into place in a counterfactual universe. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---