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On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote: > > > > > > > On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote: > > >>> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or > >>> generated > >>> by something else that does > >>> 2. I ontologically exist > >>> 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD > >>> 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist. > > >>> Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards > >>> to here > > >> 5. But the UD exists only mathematically. > > >> Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence. > > >>> There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology > >>> of mathematics. > > >> For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a > >> general mathematical agreement. > > > No there isn't. > > What is the disagreement? The age old debate about whether numbers exist > >> There may be no philosophical > >> argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non > >> philosophical > >> reasoning. > > > Ontology is philosophy. You can't settle ontological quesitons > > with mathematical proofs. > > Philosophy, or theology. OK. But comp is an assumption in cognitive- > science/philosophy/theology. No. *CTM* is. "Comp* is your own fusion of CTM with Platonism > It is an assumption that a form of > reincarnation is possible. > This is not pure mathematics. UDA belongs > to the intersection of cognitive and physic science. UDA is not purely > mathematical. It is not going anywhere without some ontological assumptions either. since it has an ontological conclusion. > >>> You are aware. are you not, that philosophers > >>> and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking > >>> and defending Platonism and other approaches? > > >> Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something > >> far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all > >> mathematicians agree. > > > I am not concerned with argument about how many pixies exist. > > So a doubt about the existence of a large cardinal in set theory rise > a doubt about the existence of seven? No. A doubt about the ontological existence of seven leads to a doubt about the rest. > I have use arithmetical realism, because I have never met any > difficulty, among mathematicians, physicians and computer scientist. > Nor even with philosophers, except some which just dodge the issues of > showing what they miss in the argument. Hmm. Well, you would say that, wouldn't you. > My work has been indeed rejected in Brussels, by philsophers. But it > has been defended a s a PhD thesis by a jury with mathematician, > computer scientist, physician (yes, not physicist, but doctor!). But it is a philosophical thesis, since its conclusion is the nature of existence. > > The point remains: there *is* a debate so there is *not* a standard > > ontology. > > >> It is believed explcitly by many physicists too, > >> like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics. > > > I never said no-on beliieves Platonism. I said some > > people belive other things. Therefore it is contentious, > > therefore it is needs jsutification. > > It is more efficacious to see if the consequence of comp, believed by > many, are verified by nature. It's the consequences of CTM+Platonism > >>>> By comp, the ontic > >>>> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can > >>>> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson > >>>> Arithmetic > >>>> is already enough. > > >>> I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist. > > >> This may be the root of your problem. > > >>>> comp = CTM. > > >>> It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in > >>> your SANE paper. > > >> All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 = 4". > > > Nope, mere truth does not buy the immaterial existence of a UD > > But from "2+2 = 4" and CT, you can derive the existence of UD. Only the mathematical existence. > >>> Classical logic is just a formal rule. > > >> It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In > >> computer science people admit that a running program will either > >> halt, > >> or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of > >> classical logic. > > > It still does not demonstrate the immaterial existence of computers > > no-one has built. > > No one has ever build the prime numbers. No. They were not built. they did not spontaneously spring into being, they do not exist at all. > >>> Bivalence is not Platonism > > >> Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully > >> "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and > >> Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology). > > > Even more reason to distinguish between AR qua truth and AR qua > > existence. > > Yes, and I use only AR qua truth. Then you cannot come to any valid conclusion about my existence. > I may ask you what are your evidence for a primary matter, or for your > notion of AR qua physical existence. You dismiss matterial existence assuming Platonic existence I dismiss Platonic existene assuming material existence. I may not have a proof, but neither do you. > >>> So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the > >>> alternatives > >>> to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still > >>> *probably* correct. > > >> You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material. > > > I am telling you I do not have to give equal weight to > > every hypothesis. > > >>>> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the > >>>> issue. > > >>> What issue? > > >> CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible. > > > Not demonstrated. > > You have pointed on invisible or implicit errors only, up to now. > In your preceding post, you even argue somehow that you cannot show me > the errors because they are invisible. > > At least you don't argue against the first person indeterminacy > (unlike Chalmers who pretends that after a duplication between W and M > you feel yourself to be simultaneously at the two places). > > I think you have difficulties with MGA, but if you are interested we > can go back to the MGA posts, and you could explain precisely what you > feel to be missing. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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