On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
> > On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
> >>> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
> >>> generated
> >>> by something else that does
> >>> 2. I ontologically exist
> >>> 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
> >>> 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.
> >>> Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards
> >>> to here
> >> 5. But the UD exists only mathematically.
> >> Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence.
> >>> There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology
> >>> of mathematics.
> >> For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a
> >> general mathematical agreement.
> > No there isn't.
> What is the disagreement?
The age old debate about whether numbers exist
> >> There may be no philosophical
> >> argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non
> >> philosophical
> >> reasoning.
> > Ontology is philosophy. You can't settle ontological quesitons
> > with mathematical proofs.
> Philosophy, or theology. OK. But comp is an assumption in cognitive-
No. *CTM* is. "Comp* is your own fusion of CTM with
> It is an assumption that a form of
> reincarnation is possible.
> This is not pure mathematics. UDA belongs
> to the intersection of cognitive and physic science. UDA is not purely
It is not going anywhere without some ontological
assumptions either. since it has an ontological conclusion.
> >>> You are aware. are you not, that philosophers
> >>> and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking
> >>> and defending Platonism and other approaches?
> >> Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something
> >> far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all
> >> mathematicians agree.
> > I am not concerned with argument about how many pixies exist.
> So a doubt about the existence of a large cardinal in set theory rise
> a doubt about the existence of seven?
No. A doubt about the ontological existence of seven leads
to a doubt about the rest.
> I have use arithmetical realism, because I have never met any
> difficulty, among mathematicians, physicians and computer scientist.
> Nor even with philosophers, except some which just dodge the issues of
> showing what they miss in the argument.
Hmm. Well, you would say that, wouldn't you.
> My work has been indeed rejected in Brussels, by philsophers. But it
> has been defended a s a PhD thesis by a jury with mathematician,
> computer scientist, physician (yes, not physicist, but doctor!).
But it is a philosophical thesis, since its conclusion is the nature
> > The point remains: there *is* a debate so there is *not* a standard
> > ontology.
> >> It is believed explcitly by many physicists too,
> >> like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics.
> > I never said no-on beliieves Platonism. I said some
> > people belive other things. Therefore it is contentious,
> > therefore it is needs jsutification.
> It is more efficacious to see if the consequence of comp, believed by
> many, are verified by nature.
It's the consequences of CTM+Platonism
> >>>> By comp, the ontic
> >>>> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can
> >>>> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson
> >>>> Arithmetic
> >>>> is already enough.
> >>> I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist.
> >> This may be the root of your problem.
> >>>> comp = CTM.
> >>> It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in
> >>> your SANE paper.
> >> All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 = 4".
> > Nope, mere truth does not buy the immaterial existence of a UD
> But from "2+2 = 4" and CT, you can derive the existence of UD.
Only the mathematical existence.
> >>> Classical logic is just a formal rule.
> >> It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In
> >> computer science people admit that a running program will either
> >> halt,
> >> or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of
> >> classical logic.
> > It still does not demonstrate the immaterial existence of computers
> > no-one has built.
> No one has ever build the prime numbers.
No. They were not built. they did not spontaneously spring
into being, they do not exist at all.
> >>> Bivalence is not Platonism
> >> Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully
> >> "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and
> >> Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology).
> > Even more reason to distinguish between AR qua truth and AR qua
> > existence.
> Yes, and I use only AR qua truth.
Then you cannot come to any valid conclusion about my existence.
> I may ask you what are your evidence for a primary matter, or for your
> notion of AR qua physical existence.
You dismiss matterial existence assuming Platonic existence
I dismiss Platonic existene assuming material existence.
I may not have a proof, but neither do you.
> >>> So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the
> >>> alternatives
> >>> to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still
> >>> *probably* correct.
> >> You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material.
> > I am telling you I do not have to give equal weight to
> > every hypothesis.
> >>>> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the
> >>>> issue.
> >>> What issue?
> >> CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible.
> > Not demonstrated.
> You have pointed on invisible or implicit errors only, up to now.
> In your preceding post, you even argue somehow that you cannot show me
> the errors because they are invisible.
> At least you don't argue against the first person indeterminacy
> (unlike Chalmers who pretends that after a duplication between W and M
> you feel yourself to be simultaneously at the two places).
> I think you have difficulties with MGA, but if you are interested we
> can go back to the MGA posts, and you could explain precisely what you
> feel to be missing.
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