On 20 Aug, 11:31, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 20 Aug 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:

> Indeed, you don't believe in the number seven. But sometimes you seem  
> to believe in their mathematical existence, and that is all what I  
> need.

No. I always qualify mathematical existence as a mere
truth claim that adds up to nothing ontologically.

>The UD exists in the same sense than the number seven.
> If you don't believe in the mathematical existence of the number  
> seven,

I believe in backwards-E 7. I don't believe that
is enough to generate RITSTIAR. THat would be
like a fictional character coming to life

>then indeed you cannot go farther than step zero.
> I let you know you are the first person on this planet who does not  
> believe in the mathematical existence of the number seven.

> >> I have no clue what you mean by "ontological existence",
> > It is what Platonists affirm of numbers and formalists deny
> Formalist accept arithmetical existence. They reject set theoretical  
> existence.
> They need arithmetical existence to define their formal systems.

Not at all. That is more like intuitionism or something

> > I have explained this over and over. I accept that
> > true backwards-E statements are true. I don't accept that backwards-E
> > means ontological existence.
> When science tackle fundamental question, it is better to be agnostic  
> and abandon any ontological commitment.
> Your ontological, and philosophical commitment, seems to prevent you  
> to even read the reasoning.

You have as much ontological commitment as I.

> >>> Since it [UD] does not exist, it does not contain anything.
> >> UD exists like PI exists.
> > That doesn't exist ontologically either
> The point is that the proof goes on with such form on not necessarily  
> ontological existence, or you have to show where in the reasoning  
> things get wrong.

1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated
by something else that does
2. I ontologically exist
3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.

Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards
to here

> >>> That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
> >>> You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
> >>> ontological RITISAR existence.
> >> I still don't know if by RITSIAR you mean "real in the sense my first
> >> person is real" or "real as my body is real".
> >> You told me that the difference is epistemological, and I can accept
> >> this (for a while). But that makes a huge difference in the meaning  
> >> of
> >> RITSIAR. I cannot doubt my first person, but I can doubt my body.
> >> After UDA+MGA, my first person appears to have an infinity of bodies
> >> (like in QM without collapse), and this makes the difference between
> >> those two forms of RITSIAR even bigger.
> > UDA proves nothing without an argument of the actual, if non-physical,
> > existence of numbers.
> I need the usual mathematical existence of number.

There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology
of mathematics. You are aware. are you not, that philosophers
and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking
and defending Platonism and other approaches?

There is of course a standard set of backwards-E claims....

>By comp, the  ontic  
> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can  
> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson Arithmetic  
> is already enough.

I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist.

> >>> The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses
> >>> are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence
> >>> for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no
> >>> certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest
> >>> plausibility.
> >> I have better that a scrap of evidence: a deductive argument. A  
> >> proof,
> >> that COMP => physics has to emerge from numbers.
> >> But I have also evidences for comp, in the sense that the physics
> >> which emerge from numbers is a multiversial physics, and the quantum
> >> reality makes many people to consider that we may live in a
> >> multiversial reality. And I have also more technical evidences coming
> >> from the Arithmetical UDA. That are evidence for comp.
> >>> I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence,  
> >>> any
> >>> more than I can be "in" Nanrnia
> >> ... then CTM (comp) is false, and you should help us to find the  
> >> error
> > comp is false because comp=CTM+CTT+AR
> > CTM is not falsified.
> comp = CTM.

It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in
your SANE paper.

> You may repeat the contrary as much as you want, but comp  
> is CTM. You are the one who has invented a sequence of notion like  
> seven needs to have actual or ontological existence for the reasoning  
> to go through, but you have never show where in the reasoning I am  
> using such actuality or ontologicalness.

> >> in UDA, instead of just denying existence for what almost everybody
> >> accepts to exist mathematically.
> > That is not true at all. Mathematicians tend to
> > be instinctive Platonists.
> And I am not. But I am platonist (I prefer to say "arithmetical  
> realist") in the arithmetical realm. This means that I believe that  
> classical logic can be applied to arithmetical sentences.

Classical logic is just a formal rule.

>I have met  
> mechanist who are not arithmetical realist. I have never met  
> computationalist which are not arithmetical realist, if only because  
> you cannot prove any "limitation result" in computer science without it.
> You are not criticizing comp, you are criticizing computer science.

Bivalence is not Platonism

> > One of the upshots
> > of that is that they don't feel the need to argue
> > for Platonism, which in turn means they
> > never formulate good argumetns for it.
> (I don't use platonism, even in the usual sense of the mathematician)
> If you believe that arithmetical realism could be false, CTM lost all  
> its appeal and even sense.

Once again. I don't dispute the *truth* of any claim.

> Now the UDA reasoning can be done even with an intuitionist weakening  
> of arithmetical realism,

Intuitionists do not accept the truth of the
standard results. Formalists do.

 but it makes the prose more technical. Only  
> ultrafinitism really break the UDA proof down.
> > They have the same assumptions but "where" they are alters
> > the truth of the assumptions.
> > Since the truth of the conclusions
> > depends
> > on the soundness of the assumptions , they do not both have to be
> > correct
> > even if they are employing the same reasoning.
> This shows you put the assumption in the conclusion!
> The reasoning of the material P.Jones, about the existence of matter  
> is correct because it is material, and the reasoning of the  
> mathematical P. Jones is non correct because it is immaterial.

So what? I dare say the BIV PJ is comming to wrong conclusions to...
if he exists. But there is no evidence he does

> But the reasoning was supposed to show that P. Jones is material!

So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the
to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still
*probably* correct.

> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the  
> issue.

What issue?

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