On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> >> follows on the *assumption* of CTM.  The razor is then applied on the
> >> basis of that assumption.  If you prefer a theory of mind based on
> >> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
> >> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
> > No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
> > forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
> > on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
> > likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
> > to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
> > real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
> > between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
> Well, the either the Olympia/MGA reductios entail this consequence, or
> they don't.  You imply that they don't, but you still haven't put
> forward a clear refutation in a fully explicit form that could be
> considered here on its merits.

No-one's put forward a clear statement of it either.

>  Until you can do this, it isn't a
> question of certain or good-enough knowledge, but rather about the
> logical entailment of CTM itself.

It's about both. It can have entail possibilities that
are very unlikely.

> This is an extremely non-trivial
> point: the burden of the argument is that CTM entails a reversal in
> world-view; it is fundamentally incompatible with a materialist
> metaphysics.
> > BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
> > a smaller material universe?
> That is a tenable view.  But not with the simultaneous assumption of
> CTM.


>That is the point.  I should say that my starting position
> before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> the basis of any consistent notion of physical process.  Bruno hasn't
> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> on some such basis is actually untenable.  But he has awakened me to
> the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> be founded on CTM

coupled with Platonism.

> David
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to