On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >>>> That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> >>>> before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of
> >>>> CTM on
> >>>> the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno
> >>>> hasn't
> >>>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of
> >>>> mind
> >>>> on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me
> >>>> to
> >>>> the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can
> >>>> tenably
> >>>> be founded on CTM
>
> >>> coupled with Platonism.
>
> >> With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point. What Bruno has
> >> demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
> >> shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
> >> virtuality*. Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
>
> > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>
> >> Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
> >> RITSIAR=platonic.
>
> > CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> > I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> > that
> > Possible X => actually X
> > is a fallacy.
>
> So you have a problem with the indexical approach of time, and space.
i don't know what you mean by that.
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