On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
> > On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
> >>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
> >> You are in a third person way.
> > That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
> I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only
> numbers.

Is that supposed to be an argument for Platonism? Why should
what exists be limited to what is shareable among humans?

> All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers
> through mathematical relation.

The properties fo the map need not be the
properties of the territory.

> the e-rest is already instinctive bets
> and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people,
> images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants,
> and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking
> formalism so seriously .... :)

> >> If you are a program relatively to any
> >> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
> >> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person
> >> sense).
> > Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.
> But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting
> Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably
> false from an (arithmetical)  first person point of view like Bp & p).

CT only that it exists mathematically, which, if formalism
is correct, means no more than mathematicians take it
seriously. CT does not prove Platonism.

> >> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
> >> epistemological.
> > A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
> > one to take its place.
> It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is
> probably richer in the internal information.
> It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but
> only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition.

If the UD has no actual existence, material or immaterial, I am not
running on it.
Existing in the sense that formalists think Pi exists -- in people's
like Sherlock Holmes -- is not enought to support RITSIAR.

> >> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> >> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> >> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> >> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> >> without comp).
> >> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
> >> follows from comp)?
> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
> > attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
> > emodied
> > or not.
> To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or
> without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the
> comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter)  is Colin
> McGuin (the mysterianist).

> Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean
> theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves
> interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet
> on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter,
> except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still not
> clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA).

So how can engineers build computers out of matter?
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