On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:22, Flammarion wrote:

> On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>>> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>>>>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>>>>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>>> You are in a third person way.
>>> That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>> I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only
>> numbers.
> Is that supposed to be an argument for Platonism? Why should
> what exists be limited to what is shareable among humans?

In the comp hypothesis I don't limit what exists to what is sharable,  
quite contrary with the "qualia theories".

>> All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers
>> through mathematical relation.
> The properties fo the map need not be the
> properties of the territory.

Of course, but comp entails constraints and make possible some fixed  
points. Comp makes obvious some role of computer science, a branch of  
math, and the study of the consequences of the computationalist  
hypotyhesis, in what? math, physics ... To already choose would be to  
already known the answer. That's why it is preferable to use the  
vocable of 'theology'. After all it is a belief in a form of (material  
at first, but not necessarily primitively material) rencarnation.
And then G* can be described as the logic of general propositional  
theology of the (Löbian) Universal Machine.
And at the beginning of the reasoning the theology is agnostic on  
Plato or Aristotle, Primary Matter, Gods, whatever.
We assume numbers and programs, physical machine implementing the  
genuine relation between  numbers which sustained us relatively to our  
most probable history.

>> the e-rest is already instinctive bets
>> and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people,
>> images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies,  
>> plants,
>> and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking
>> formalism so seriously .... :)
>>>> If you are a program relatively to any
>>>> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material  
>>>> UD,
>>>> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person
>>>> sense).
>>> Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.
>> But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting
>> Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably
>> false from an (arithmetical)  first person point of view like Bp &  
>> p).
> CT only that it exists mathematically, which, if formalism
> is correct, means no more than mathematicians take it
> seriously. CT does not prove Platonism.

CT uses "platonism" in your sense. I mean CT uses the fact that a  
machine stop or not stop, to let the f_n disperse uncomputably into  
the phi_i.
CT uses arithmetical realism. No more than what is needed to make  
debugging procedure in computer science/use.

>>>> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
>>>> epistemological.
>>> A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
>>> one to take its place.
>> It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is
>> probably richer in the internal information.
>> It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm,  
>> but
>> only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical  
>> proposition.
> If the UD has no actual existence, material or immaterial, I am not
> running on it.

1-you or 3-you. 3-you is in the UD by "yes doctor" + math, and 1-you  
is in by MGA.

> Existing in the sense that formalists think Pi exists -- in people's
> minds,
> like Sherlock Holmes -- is not enought to support RITSIAR.

I love Pi, I have read a lot of books on it. I prefer gamma. Your  
comparison between Sherlock Holmes is non relevant.
Numbers and programs obeys laws, like particles and waves. We have  
theories and a lot of results. It is very big field usually classified  
in the exact science (and thus with no pretension about application  
but through supplementary assumptions).

>>>> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that  
>>>> it is
>>>> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and  
>>>> that
>>>> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
>>>> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible  
>>>> (with or
>>>> without comp).
>>>> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
>>>> follows from comp)?
>>> There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
>>> attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
>>> emodied
>>> or not.
>> To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or
>> without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the
>> comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter)  is  
>> Colin
>> McGuin (the mysterianist).
>> Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean
>> theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves
>> interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet
>> on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter,
>> except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still  
>> not
>> clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA).
> So how can engineers build computers out of matter?

Probably because the 'winning computations' are those who get  
multiplied by the randomness due to the first person indeterminacy  
below their level of substitution (by UDA).

It is an open problem (that's the main message of the UDA). It *is*  
the problem to which the mind body problem (the 1-I/3-I problem) is  
reduced. That's the point.

But of course an engineer has not to even to believe in primary matter  
to build a computer. He does not need to know much about quantum  
mechanics, except for quantum tunnelling if he wants the chips little!

To use the comp-physics (the physics we have to extract from comp)  
today, for predicting the mass of the photon, would be like using  
string theory to make a pizza. We just take comp seriously (including  
the math) and 'consciousness' seriously, first by "yes doctor", where  
you implicate yourself (UDA), then in AUDA by implicating the, ideally  
correct, universal machine instead.
Simple machine which we believe are correct, like Peano Arithmetic,  
can have their theology studied by more complex machine. No machine  
can prove its own theology, but machine can study the formal (if you  
desire) theology of simpler machine, and then pray or fear it applies  
on itself, which it does as far as you are enough near correctness,  
assuming comp.

Matter is an open problem, with comp. That *is* the (UDA) point. The  
other point  (AUDA) is that computer science and mathematical logic,  
and other branch of math paves a way toward a testable solution.



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