On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:
> > > > On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: >> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <[email protected]> >> >> >> >>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>>>> There is no problem attaching consc to PM. >> >>>> What do you mean by this? >> >>> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing >>> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would >>> be a property. >> >> That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical" >> existence >> and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless" >> thing. > > *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton > in multiple proeprtiless things Why? And what's the relevance of this? Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property which makes possible to attach qualia to it. Why would that piece of matter get the qualia "seeing red", and that other piece of matter having the qualia "seeing blue"? MGA shows that matter is as much a problem than consciousness when we assume comp. Well, consciousness can at least be explained by the intrinsic gap between inferable truth and provable truth that all self- referential mathematical entity can discover about itself. Matter then emerge as a special modality (Bp & Dp), needed for having a probability one for the proposition "true in all consistent extension". The Dp is needed for preventing the cul-de-sac worlds where probabilities get awry. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
