On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:

> On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>
>>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>>>> What do you mean by this?
>>> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
>>> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
>>> be a property.
>> That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical"  
>> existence
>> and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless"  
>> thing.
> *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton
> in multiple proeprtiless things

Why? And what's the relevance of this?

Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property  
which makes possible to attach qualia to it.
Why would that piece of matter get the qualia "seeing red", and that  
other piece of matter having the qualia "seeing blue"?
MGA shows that matter is as much a problem than consciousness when we  
assume comp. Well, consciousness can at least be explained by the  
intrinsic gap between inferable truth and provable truth that all self- 
referential mathematical entity can discover about itself. Matter then  
emerge as a special modality (Bp & Dp), needed for having a  
probability one for the proposition "true in all consistent  
extension". The Dp is needed for preventing the cul-de-sac worlds  
where probabilities get awry.



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