2009/9/23 m.a. <[email protected]>: CTM = Computational Theory of Mind CT = Church Thesis PM = Primitive Matter (A)UDA = (Arithmetical) Universal Dovetailer Argument AR = Arithmetical Realism MR = Multiple Realisability WR = White Rabbit MGA = Movie Graph Argument Olympia = Tim Maudlin's anti-CTM reductio argument RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real
ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More? David > Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being > used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.) > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "David Nyman" <[email protected]> > To: <[email protected]> > Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM > Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology > > 2009/9/22 Flammarion <[email protected]>: > >>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach >>> over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, >>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then >>> the abduction is only to be expected. >> >> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does >> not >> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its >> counterargumetns. >> Not >> that I accept it > > AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. > It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, > rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is > accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, > its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. > >>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be >>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least >>> one case. >> >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. > > "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of > the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of > persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so > posited are of course trivially "immaterial". You might as well say > that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be > "unmathematical". I thought you had denied that you were seeking some > ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining > a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be > deployed in a particular research programme. > >>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for >>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that >>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point >>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either >>> >> explanatory scheme. >>> >>> > Who's been doing that? >>> >>> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were >>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of >>> Platonism to justify the UDA >> >> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He >> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. > > Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding > that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we > seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence > of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. > He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is > based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of > mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. > > AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to > abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a > computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the > face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. > In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive > physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without > the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes > said as much). > > In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental > physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The > alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for > mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected > to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. > >>> Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a >>> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp >>> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem >>> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"? >> >> No. But is has assumptions of its own. >> >>>If so, it >>> shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation >>> if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't >>> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the >>> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. >> >> Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. >> Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. > > Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion. Frankly, > most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would > probably choose the former option. However, Bruno has a point when he > observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice. The waste > bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned > out to be the opposite of the truth. I make no claim to knowing which > of these alternatives, if either, is correct. We are discussing only > which conjunctions of claims may be consistent, and which theoretical > commitments make any difference worth bothering about. > > David > >> >> >> >> On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >>> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <[email protected]>: >>> >>> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's >>> >> starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to >>> >> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is >>> >> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this. OTOH >>> >> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of >>> >> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the >>> >> opposite is the case, >>> >>> > That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that >>> > there is a difference between assuming something because you >>> > think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because >>> > its consequences match observation (abduction) >>> >>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach >>> over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, >>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then >>> the abduction is only to be expected. >> >> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does >> not >> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its >> counterargumetns. >> Not >> that I accept it >> >>> But if you agree with my >>> formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below: >>> >>> >> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why, >>> >> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as >>> >> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of >>> >> computational theory. >>> >>> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as >>> > well as CTM. >>> >>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be >>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least >>> one case. >> >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. >> >>>If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider >>> CTM+PM has been defended. OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures >>> the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'. In >>> this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM. If the >>> latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the >>> theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics. >> >> There is no UDA without a Platonic UD. >> >>> When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are >>> agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not >>> you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a >>> theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed >>> to the material? >> >> Yes. >> >>>And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from >>> Arithmetical Realism to me. >> >> I think Bruno's use fo AR is ambiguous. Sometimes he uses >> it to mean Platonism. sometimes he uses it to mean bivalence. >> >>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for >>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that >>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point >>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either >>> >> explanatory scheme. >>> >>> > Who's been doing that? >>> >>> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were >>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of >>> Platonism to justify the UDA >> >> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He >> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. >> >> >>> >> The opinions cited in the first posting assume >>> >> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take >>> >> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes >>> >> the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it? >>> >>> > Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a subject-matter. >>> > It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of >>> > irrefutable certainty. >>> >>> Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a >>> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp >>> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem >>> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"? >> >> No. But is has assumptions of its own. >> >>>If so, it >>> shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation >>> if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't >>> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the >>> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. >> >> Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. >> Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. >> >>>Either conclusion might motivate a >>> preference for one research approach over another. >>> >>> David >>> >>> >> > >> > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
