2009/9/23 m.a. <marty...@bellsouth.net>:

CTM = Computational Theory of Mind
CT = Church Thesis
PM = Primitive Matter
(A)UDA = (Arithmetical) Universal Dovetailer Argument
AR = Arithmetical Realism
MR = Multiple Realisability
WR = White Rabbit
MGA = Movie Graph Argument
Olympia = Tim Maudlin's anti-CTM reductio argument
RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real

ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More?

David

> Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being
> used in this thread?  (e.g.  CTM, PM, UD etc.)
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "David Nyman" <david.ny...@gmail.com>
> To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
>>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
>>> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
>>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
>>> the abduction is only to be expected.
>>
>> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
>> not
>> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
>> counterargumetns.
>> Not
>> that I accept it
>
> AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
>  It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
> rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
> accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
> its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.
>
>>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>>> one case.
>>
>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.  The entities so
> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
> "unmathematical".  I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
>>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>>> >> explanatory scheme.
>>>
>>> > Who's been doing that?
>>>
>>> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
>>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>>> Platonism to justify the UDA
>>
>> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
>> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
>
> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.  On the evidence
> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
>  He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.
>
> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
> abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
> said as much).
>
> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.  The
> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
>>> Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
>>> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
>>> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
>>> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?
>>
>> No. But is has assumptions of its own.
>>
>>>If so, it
>>> shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
>>> if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
>>> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
>>> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.
>>
>> Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument.
>> Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism.
>
> Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion.  Frankly,
> most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would
> probably choose the former option.  However, Bruno has a point when he
> observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice.  The waste
> bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned
> out to be the opposite of the truth.  I make no claim to knowing which
> of these alternatives, if either, is correct.  We are discussing only
> which conjunctions of claims may be consistent, and which theoretical
> commitments make any difference worth bothering about.
>
> David
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>>
>>> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
>>> >> starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
>>> >> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
>>> >> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this. OTOH
>>> >> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
>>> >> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
>>> >> opposite is the case,
>>>
>>> > That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
>>> > there is a difference between assuming something because you
>>> > think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
>>> > its consequences match observation (abduction)
>>>
>>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
>>> over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
>>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
>>> the abduction is only to be expected.
>>
>> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
>> not
>> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
>> counterargumetns.
>> Not
>> that I accept it
>>
>>> But if you agree with my
>>> formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below:
>>>
>>> >> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
>>> >> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
>>> >> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
>>> >> computational theory.
>>>
>>> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
>>> > well as CTM.
>>>
>>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>>> one case.
>>
>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
>>>If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider
>>> CTM+PM has been defended. OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures
>>> the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'. In
>>> this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM. If the
>>> latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the
>>> theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics.
>>
>> There is no UDA without a Platonic UD.
>>
>>> When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are
>>> agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not
>>> you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a
>>> theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed
>>> to the material?
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>>And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from
>>> Arithmetical Realism to me.
>>
>> I think Bruno's use fo AR is ambiguous. Sometimes he uses
>> it to mean Platonism. sometimes he uses it to mean bivalence.
>>
>>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>>> >> explanatory scheme.
>>>
>>> > Who's been doing that?
>>>
>>> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were
>>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>>> Platonism to justify the UDA
>>
>> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
>> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
>>
>>
>>> >> The opinions cited in the first posting assume
>>> >> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
>>> >> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes
>>> >> the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
>>>
>>> > Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a subject-matter.
>>> > It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
>>> > irrefutable certainty.
>>>
>>> Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a
>>> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp
>>> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem
>>> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?
>>
>> No. But is has assumptions of its own.
>>
>>>If so, it
>>> shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
>>> if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
>>> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
>>> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.
>>
>> Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument.
>> Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism.
>>
>>>Either conclusion might motivate a
>>> preference for one research approach over another.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>> >
>>
> >
>

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