On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> > without comp).
>
> But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.

Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):

http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf

Hoffman's 'conscious realism', I have recently discovered, is a
systematic effort to work out the consequences implicit in some of the
intuitions I've been attempting to share recently, with such
underwhelming results.  When I examine the effort he's put into this,
it's not hard to see how he is able to be coherent and empirical where
I am merely vague and suggestive (even to myself).  Nonetheless there
is a kinship of basic intuition.  A commentary on this which attempts
to align it with Husserlian phenomenology is:

http://www.urop.uci.edu/journal/journal06/03_matthews.pdf

I suspect that all of the above bears much kinship with at least
aspects of comp.  I'd be interested in Bruno's reaction.

David

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> > You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any  
> > "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,  
> > and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).
>
> > And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything  
> > epistemological.
>
> > Then, what you call "primary matter" is explained by the appearances  
> > of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real  
> > question is "why is it so symmetrical", is information preserved, is  
> > the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc.
>
> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is  
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that  
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to  
> > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or  
> > without comp).
>
> But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> > Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it  
> > follows from comp)?
>
> > Bruno
>
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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