On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to > > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or > > without comp). > > But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
Good point. However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking them seriously. I would recommend the following piece, particularly the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface): http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf Hoffman's 'conscious realism', I have recently discovered, is a systematic effort to work out the consequences implicit in some of the intuitions I've been attempting to share recently, with such underwhelming results. When I examine the effort he's put into this, it's not hard to see how he is able to be coherent and empirical where I am merely vague and suggestive (even to myself). Nonetheless there is a kinship of basic intuition. A commentary on this which attempts to align it with Husserlian phenomenology is: http://www.urop.uci.edu/journal/journal06/03_matthews.pdf I suspect that all of the above bears much kinship with at least aspects of comp. I'd be interested in Bruno's reaction. David > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: > > >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial > >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. > > > You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any > > "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD, > > and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense). > > > And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything > > epistemological. > > > Then, what you call "primary matter" is explained by the appearances > > of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real > > question is "why is it so symmetrical", is information preserved, is > > the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc. > > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to > > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or > > without comp). > > But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head. > > Brent > > > > > Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it > > follows from comp)? > > > Bruno > > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
