On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
> >> one case.
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.
Isn't that what I have been saying.
>The entities so
> posited are of course trivially "immaterial". You might as well say
> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
It does, so why not?
> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> deployed in a particular research programme.
I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
of a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> >> >> explanatory scheme.
> >> > Who's been doing that?
> >> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were
> >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
> >> Platonism to justify the UDA
> > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
> > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding
> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.
>On the evidence
> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
> He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.
He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
is positing Platonism at all.
And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
an abductive argument.
> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
> abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
> said as much).
I think Bruno has zero interest in AI,
he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic
CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable.
> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Other
peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. You are putting forward
a better argument on his behalf than he is.
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