CTM = Computational theory of mind PM = Primary matter UD = Universal Dovetailer UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument AUDA = Arithmetical Dovetailer Argument
Quentin 2009/9/23 m.a. <[email protected]> > *Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes > being used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.)* > ** > ** > ** > ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Nyman" <[email protected]> > To: <[email protected]> > Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM > Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology > > > 2009/9/22 Flammarion <[email protected]>: > > >> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach > >> over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, > >> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then > >> the abduction is only to be expected. > > > > I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does > > not > > need premises of its own but negates the premises of its > > counterargumetns. > > Not > > that I accept it > > AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively. > It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM, > rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is > accepted. In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified, > its consequences would of course be expected to match observation. > > >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be > >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least > >> one case. > > > > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial > > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. > > "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of > the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of > persons and the appearance of matter on this basis. The entities so > posited are of course trivially "immaterial". You might as well say > that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be > "unmathematical". I thought you had denied that you were seeking some > ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining > a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be > deployed in a particular research programme. > > >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for > >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that > >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point > >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either > >> >> explanatory scheme. > >> > >> > Who's been doing that? > >> > >> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were > >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of > >> Platonism to justify the UDA > > > > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He > > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. > > Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing. Either you're demanding > that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we > seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't. On the evidence > of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you. > He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is > based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of > mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism. > > AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to > abandoning CTM. It is motivated by the desire to pursue a > computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the > face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM. > In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive > physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without > the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes > said as much). > > In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental > physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference. The > alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for > mathematics. Either approach would of course subsequently be expected > to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme. > > >> Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a > >> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp > >> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem > >> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"? > > > > No. But is has assumptions of its own. > > > >>If so, it > >> shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation > >> if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't > >> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the > >> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. > > > > Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. > > Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. > > Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion. Frankly, > most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would > probably choose the former option. However, Bruno has a point when he > observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice. The waste > bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned > out to be the opposite of the truth. I make no claim to knowing which > of these alternatives, if either, is correct. We are discussing only > which conjunctions of claims may be consistent, and which theoretical > commitments make any difference worth bothering about. > > David > > > > > > > > > On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <[email protected]>: > >> > >> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's > >> >> starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to > >> >> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is > >> >> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this. OTOH > >> >> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective > of > >> >> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the > >> >> opposite is the case, > >> > >> > That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that > >> > there is a difference between assuming something because you > >> > think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because > >> > its consequences match observation (abduction) > >> > >> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach > >> over the other, but it isn't forced. Indeed, in the case of the MGA, > >> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then > >> the abduction is only to be expected. > > > > I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does > > not > > need premises of its own but negates the premises of its > > counterargumetns. > > Not > > that I accept it > > > >> But if you agree with my > >> formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below: > >> > >> >> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why, > >> >> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as > >> >> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of > >> >> computational theory. > >> > >> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as > >> > well as CTM. > >> > >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be > >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least > >> one case. > > > > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial > > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. > > > >>If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider > >> CTM+PM has been defended. OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures > >> the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'. In > >> this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM. If the > >> latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the > >> theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics. > > > > There is no UDA without a Platonic UD. > > > >> When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are > >> agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not > >> you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a > >> theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed > >> to the material? > > > > Yes. > > > >>And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from > >> Arithmetical Realism to me. > > > > I think Bruno's use fo AR is ambiguous. Sometimes he uses > > it to mean Platonism. sometimes he uses it to mean bivalence. > > > >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for > >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that > >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point > >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either > >> >> explanatory scheme. > >> > >> > Who's been doing that? > >> > >> This seems an odd question at this stage. I thought you were > >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of > >> Platonism to justify the UDA > > > > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He > > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively. > > > > > >> >> The opinions cited in the first posting assume > >> >> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take > >> >> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes > >> >> the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it? > >> > >> > Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a subject-matter. > >> > It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of > >> > irrefutable certainty. > >> > >> Well then, surely we can agree. One finds grounds for preferring a > >> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work. Comp > >> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem > >> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"? > > > > No. But is has assumptions of its own. > > > >>If so, it > >> shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation > >> if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't > >> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the > >> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt. > > > > Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument. > > Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism. > > > >>Either conclusion might motivate a > >> preference for one research approach over another. > >> > >> David > >> > >> > > > > > > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
