On 23 Sep, 06:59, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <[email protected]>
>
> >>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>>> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> >>>>> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> >>>> What do you mean by this?
>
> >>> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> >>> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> >>> be a property.
>
> >> That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical"
> >> existence
> >> and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless"
> >> thing.
>
> > *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton
> > in multiple proeprtiless things
>
> Why?
By the Identity of indescernibles, there can only be
one thing that has the empty set as the set of
its properties.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles
>And what's the relevance of this?
> Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property
> which makes possible to attach qualia to it.
> Why would that piece of matter get the qualia "seeing red", and that
> other piece of matter having the qualia "seeing blue"?
Why would they get different physical properties?
Answer: starting conditions+physical laws.
Property dualism would require psychophysical laws
as per Chalmers.
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