Ronald, Have you given this talk in the past to a similar audience? What kind of objections did people raise? Perhaps that would help us formulate a line of reasoning which would be more effective.
Jason On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 8:15 AM, ronaldheld <[email protected]> wrote: > Thanks Jason. Not certain how all of that helps. I will have think > more before I answer Bruno. > Ronald > > On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote: > > > > > Jason(and any others) > > > Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's > > > reality is equally hard to convincing present. > > > Ronald > > > > Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in > > principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy. > > All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to > > understand UDA 1-7. > > > > UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if > > you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with > > Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the > > movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to the > > physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I > > don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. With > > just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum > > weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a > > qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in > > presence of a primitively material universe). > > > > AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need > > familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory. > > > > Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I > > am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't > > grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help. > > Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is > > considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational > > arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first > > person) indeterminacy. Thanks. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <[email protected]> > > >> wrote: > > >>> Jason: > > >>> I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do > > >>> not > > >>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter. > > >>> Ronald > > > > >> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to > > >> present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or > > >> the > > >> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for > > >> exploration? > > > > >> Jason > > > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> > > > . > > > For more options, visit this group athttp:// > groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/->Hide > > quoted text - > > > > - Show quoted text - > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
