Ronald,

Have you given this talk in the past to a similar audience?  What kind of
objections did people raise?  Perhaps that would help us formulate a line of
reasoning which would be more effective.

Jason

On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 8:15 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Thanks Jason. Not certain how all of that helps. I will have think
> more before I answer Bruno.
>                                               Ronald
>
> On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote:
> >
> > > Jason(and any others)
> > >   Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's
> > > reality is equally hard to convincing present.
> > >                               Ronald
> >
> > Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in
> > principle duplicable?  This entails subjective indeterminacy.
> > All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to
> > understand UDA 1-7.
> >
> > UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if
> > you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with
> > Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the
> > movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to the
> > physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I
> > don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. With
> > just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum
> > weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a
> > qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in
> > presence of a primitively material universe).
> >
> > AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need
> > familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory.
> >
> > Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I
> > am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't
> > grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help.
> > Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is
> > considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational
> > arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first
> > person) indeterminacy. Thanks.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>> Jason:
> > >>>  I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do
> > >>> not
> > >>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter.
> > >>>                                                  Ronald
> >
> > >> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to
> > >> present convincingly?  Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or
> > >> the
> > >> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for
> > >> exploration?
> >
> > >> Jason
> >
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