On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno:
I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the mind is
Turing emulatable, but will move onward.

OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor proposes an artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just that it will be preserved locally through the running of the adequate computer.



Using Star Trek transporter
concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5.

Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a "program" (a natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste apply to it).


Step 6 takes only the mind

(the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program)


and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person
into a device similar to a Holodeck,

It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) Universal Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured as an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel the difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability or credibility measure).




where the person is a
Holocharacter?

A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by the mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical computer.



I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a
finite resource Universe.

You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite and enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and non- locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of course). After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar state of "your body" in the (physical) universe.

Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a little physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy, non- locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical Platonia becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want. UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short time), but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical emulation, which exists out of space and time independently of any observers (by Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler than UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that physics just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a "space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the observers, they have been selected.

Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers. After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining step 8 to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole thing straight.

AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point. AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right, not a gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal fear of the others).

Bruno



On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote:

Jason(and any others)
  Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's
reality is equally hard to convincing present.
                              Ronald

Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in
principle duplicable?  This entails subjective indeterminacy.
All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to
understand UDA 1-7.

UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if
you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with
Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the
movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to the
physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I
don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. With
just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum
weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a
qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in
presence of a primitively material universe).

AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need
familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory.

Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I
am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't
grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help.
Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is
considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational
arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first
person) indeterminacy. Thanks.

Bruno







On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Jason:
 I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do
not
know how to present that in a technically convincing matter.
                                                 Ronald

Which message in particular do you think is difficult to
present convincingly?  Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or
the
suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for
exploration?

Jason

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com .
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group 
athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to