On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno(and others)
 I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation
of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program running on
a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. Step
6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on another
physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is the
usual scan and annihilate,

Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate the original anymore. A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplication where the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at his original place wihout delay. You need that to understand that if you do an experience of physics, you have to to consider into account all computations in the UD execution to predict your future experience (including "looking at a measuring apparatus needle'. OK?




and then looks for the program in the UD
still on some physical platform?

Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy, non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything 'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability of the person which is not something physically observable (yet inferable)).



Step 8 removes the physical universe
and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?

Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmetical propositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together with their many proofs. This can be derived from a well known result asserting that the computable functions are representable in Robinson (tiny) arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work of Putnam, Juila Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes it Turing universal, and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in any model of Peano Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical truth).



If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA
from my(physicla scineces POV).


Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (that is why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is more difficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) already sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It explains that the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless you accept the idea that an inactive piece of material has an active physical activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to the doctor, like Jack Mallah apparently. To avoid this I add sometimes that the survival, when saying yes to the doctor, is done "qua computatio", and I am working to make this more precise. It is always possible to put some magic in the notion of matter to build a fake comp hypothesis saving primary matter, but then you can save any theology, and it seems to me quite an ad hoc move. But I am interested in hearing your Physical Science point of view.

Bruno




Ronald

On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno:
I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the mind is
Turing emulatable, but will move onward.

OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor proposes an
artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just
that it will be preserved locally through the running of the adequate
computer.

Using Star Trek transporter
concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5.

Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the
original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a "program" (a
natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste apply
to it).

Step 6 takes only the mind

(the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program)

and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person
into a device similar to a Holodeck,

It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) Universal
Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured as
an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel the
difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at
least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability or
credibility measure).

where the person is a
Holocharacter?

A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by the
mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical computer.

I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a
finite resource Universe.

You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even
the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite and
enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and non- locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of course).
After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the
result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar state
of "your body" in the (physical) universe.

Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a little physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy, non- locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical Platonia
becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want.
UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a
physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short time),
but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the
difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical emulation,
which exists out of space and time independently of any observers (by
Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler than
UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that physics
just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital
mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a
"space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the
observers, they have been selected.

Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if
interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers.
After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining step 8
to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole thing
straight.

AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but
physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big
gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum
computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long
time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point.
AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are
already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right, not a
gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing
when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal fear
of the others).

Bruno





On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote:

Jason(and any others)
  Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's
reality is equally hard to convincing present.
                              Ronald

Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in
principle duplicable?  This entails subjective indeterminacy.
All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to
understand UDA 1-7.

UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if
you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with
Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the
movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to
the
physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I
don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case.
With
just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum
weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a
qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in
presence of a primitively material universe).

AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need
familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory.

Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help.
Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is
considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational
arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first
person) indeterminacy. Thanks.

Bruno

On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Jason:
I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do
not
know how to present that in a technically convincing matter.
                                                 Ronald

Which message in particular do you think is difficult to
present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or
the
suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for
exploration?

Jason

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