Jason:
   I gave it over 2 years ago, but did not get any argumentive
questions. Can I attach the prior charts here?
                                 Ronald

On Nov 30, 11:06 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Ronald,
>
> Have you given this talk in the past to a similar audience?  What kind of
> objections did people raise?  Perhaps that would help us formulate a line of
> reasoning which would be more effective.
>
> Jason
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 8:15 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Thanks Jason. Not certain how all of that helps. I will have think
> > more before I answer Bruno.
> >                                               Ronald
>
> > On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > > On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> > > > Jason(and any others)
> > > >   Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's
> > > > reality is equally hard to convincing present.
> > > >                               Ronald
>
> > > Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in
> > > principle duplicable?  This entails subjective indeterminacy.
> > > All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to
> > > understand UDA 1-7.
>
> > > UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if
> > > you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with
> > > Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the
> > > movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to the
> > > physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I
> > > don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case. With
> > > just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum
> > > weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a
> > > qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in
> > > presence of a primitively material universe).
>
> > > AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need
> > > familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory.
>
> > > Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I
> > > am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't
> > > grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help.
> > > Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is
> > > considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational
> > > arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first
> > > person) indeterminacy. Thanks.
>
> > > Bruno
>
> > > > On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
> > > >> wrote:
> > > >>> Jason:
> > > >>>  I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do
> > > >>> not
> > > >>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter.
> > > >>>                                                  Ronald
>
> > > >> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to
> > > >> present convincingly?  Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or
> > > >> the
> > > >> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for
> > > >> exploration?
>
> > > >> Jason
>
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