Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it
much easier to see what you are saying.
By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the
indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context
/ instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an
automatic concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic
structure of information) i.e. ALG.
By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer
can be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent
simultaneously at two different locations in space at the same time,
the observer is similarly existent simultaneously at two different
locations in time 'at the same time'. I would also include this as an
automatic concomitant with ALG.
Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is
non-local. The observer as mind (as structure of information /
algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments
If above you accept arithmetical, you make treachery to invoke the
physical here.
All right, call it all quantum mechanical environments, meaning simply
the mathematical form of quantum mechanics, instantiated as physical or
arithmetical environments.
It is a bit like some one defend the theory of evolution up to the
apes, and then say and God appears an creates man.
Nice one! LOL! [<god thinks> this evolution rubbish isn't getting
anywhere. Let's have some real people to watch / talk to / wind up / be
god to ...]
Once you accept that at some level you are Turing emulable, you
somehow disperse yourself in infinities of variants, and the physical
is some sum on all those variants.
Yes, no problem here. Exactly what I hold as 'universe superposition'.
So a physical body is, despite the appearance, a bad locus for
instantiating a mind.
Why 'bad'? The physical body is one of many possible instantiations, *no
more no less* in my view.
The mind, even individual is more associated to a continuum of
possible bodies/projection.
I would not say 'more'. It is not only associate with a continuum of
possible bodies/projection, it is instantiated, given aritmetic and
algorithmic form, in continuum of possible bodies/projection. All exist.
All are aspects of the arithmetic totality.
It is instantiated, simultaneously, in all environments, simulated or
physical (simulated physical if you like), in which this mind is formulated.
The effective environment of this mind is the simultanetiy of all such
possible bodies/projection.
This does not mean that the whole thing is not instantiated in the physical.
It is true that it need not be instantiated in a physical reality, but,
in my opinion, we still have not made any particular progress towards
that point!
In fine it depends on the math, the comp physical logic still lacks (a
bit laike quantum logic) a good tensor product.
My strategy is top down, I work from hypothesis toward constrains.
That is all very well and good, but we know the physical explanation
works. Quantum mechanics *does* explain the observed results of
experiments. If we are going to supersede it, we need a powerful logic
which not only does the same thing, fully and completely, without
requiring an underlying physical reality. I stay tuned.
where it is instantiated. Again, I would include this as an automatic
concomitant with ALG.
You still miss the point that if ALG is correct then the physical has
to be derived and cannot be used to singularize a conscious experience.
These are two very different points, and, by your statement here, it is
clear that you conflate them. But I have as yet no rationale or evidence
for this conflation.
If ALG is correct, this simply means that the mind is an instantiated
algorithm. This directly implies that the physical "cannot be used to
singularize a conscious experience.". But this *does not* mean that the
physical has to be derived. It means that the *effective physical
environment of this observer* has to be derived from the algorithm. It
says nothing about anything else.
Aha. Now I see it. Now I see why you keep claiming that steps 1-7 show
inversion of physical and arithmetic.
The logic you use in steps 1-7 are very much the same as I use in
establishing universe superposition, I think that they are the same
thing, or very similar. (What a surprise, addressing the same specific
aspect of reality we come to the same conclusion!)
Given that the mind is defined by a structure and or a process of
information, it is necessarily instantiated in a very large number of
physical situations.
Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in
my view.
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in
a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I
published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in
the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their
argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.
2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person
indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four).
3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been
more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web
page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place),
but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short
version, recently published).
4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from
virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and
it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese
and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy
and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of
the computation.
All good so far.
Nice. Not yet sure you really get the point. You still seems to travel
from radically new to thats what I say.
Sorry!
But if you are OK that any first order specification of any universal
system is enough for the ontology, and that we cannot use the term
"physical" before defining in a way respecting the first person
indeterminacy, then it is all right.
I'm OK that "any first order specification of any universal system is
enough for the ontology", in that it provides *what we need to explain*.
So, first half of your sentence OK. Once again, I have a severe problem
with the conflation.
We cusotomarily use the term "physical" for the world 'out there' giving
rise to the ontologically obvious, the existence of ourselves and our
world for which we have immediate and direct evidence.
The accustomed ontology is that 'physical' means both what is, and what
gives rise to first person frame of reference, of whatever nature. If we
hope to overturn this, surely, we have to quote chapter and verse of why
this should be a preferable, or even tenable step.
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