On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:19, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to
both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind
literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is
a kind of computation."
from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/
I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point.
I have no difficulty with this point.
Which point?
This point.
that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought
literally is a kind of computation."
This point being what I understand your steps one to seven to be
making.
? No it is the contrary. If I survive at some level, both mind and
matter (and some weird non nameable divine (non machine) entityies),
are not computable. The first person from the first person point of
view is not a machine. I am not sure you get the indeterminacy point
in front of the UD.
However, I am very happy to settle for "Mind is an algorithm and /
or a structure of information of some kind. An arithmetical process.".
So instead of CTM, I will use ALG
I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point, ALG,
the mind is an algorithm and / or a stucture of information. An
arithmetical process.
Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it
much easier to see what you are saying.
By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the
indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical
context / instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an
automatic concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic
structure of information) i.e. ALG.
By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer
can be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent
simultaneously at two different locations in space at the same time,
the observer is similarly existent simultaneously at two different
locations in time 'at the same time'. I would also include this as
an automatic concomitant with ALG.
Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is non-
local. The observer as mind (as structure of information /
algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments
If above you accept arithmetical, you make treachery to invoke the
physical here. It is a bit like some one defend the theory of
evolution up to the apes, and then say and God appears an creates man.
Once you accept that at some level you are Turing emulable, you
somehow disperse yourself in infinities of variants, and the physical
is some sum on all those variants. So a physical body is, despite the
appearance, a bad locus for instantiating a mind. The mind, even
individual is more associated to a continuum of possible bodies/
projection. In fine it depends on the math, the comp physical logic
still lacks (a bit laike quantum logic) a good tensor product.
My strategy is top down, I work from hypothesis toward constrains.
where it is instantiated. Again, I would include this as an
automatic concomitant with ALG.
You still miss the point that if ALG is correct then the physical has
to be derived and cannot be used to singularize a conscious experience.
Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in
my view.
The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points:
1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in
a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that
I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this
in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their
argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4.
2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person
indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step
four).
3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been
more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web
page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place),
but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short
version, recently published).
4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from
virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and
it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese
and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy
and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of
the computation.
All good so far.
Nice. Not yet sure you really get the point. You still seems to travel
from radically new to thats what I say. But if you are OK that any
first order specification of any universal system is enough for the
ontology, and that we cannot use the term "physical" before defining
in a way respecting the first person indeterminacy, then it is all
right.
Bruno
Continued in Multisolipsism
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