Hi Bruno,
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Saturday, July 02, 2011 3:24 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is consciousness causally effective ?
Hi Stephen,
On 02 Jul 2011, at 16:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:
[SPK]
Could you elaborate a bit more on the part where you say
"...self-speeding up abilities to the machine with respect to the most probable
continuation/universal-machine"? What defines the "most probable"?
The universal dovetailing, or equivalently the true sigma_ sentences and their
proofs, and relative proof. This follows from the UD argument.
The logic of "probability one" can already be characterized by the logic of the
"arithmetical quantization" BDp with p a Sigma_1 propositions. It gives an
arithmetical non boolean sort of quantum logic.I think that if you search on
the name of "Goldblatt" in the archive you might find longer explanation that I
have already given to you on this, if I remember well.
I am just translating a problem in philosophy/theology into a problem in math
by using the comp hypothesis to justify the use of computer science and
mathematical logic.
I have taken a look at the Steve Vickers slides you pointed too. It is rather
complex and does not seem related to comp in an easy way. It it can be related
at all, it has to be related through the S4Grz1 ("universal soul, the "pure"
first person") and X1* ("universal feeler") arithmetical points of view.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
[SPK]
OK. I was just wanting to be clear in my understanding. I am studying
Vickers’ book and several other that you recommended. Thank you for your quick
reply.
One other question: could you say that X1* is like a universal attributor, in
the sense of assignation or defining all maps of 1p “feelings” to 3p ....?
Onward!
Stephen
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