Dear Bruno, here we go again.... A very colorful discussion about that darn consciousness, indeed, as it develops. I find YOUR scholarly text a bit skewed (Goedel and Goedel) since math logic is IMO a product of human(!) consciousness. I do not comment on your "MACHINE" consciousness, since I don't feel comfortable as a machine with set inventory/design, even a universal one - IF IT IS a machine. The human intellect (another unknown! - not sarcastically said) has no borders or inventory, at least we have not experienced such so far.

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A "causally effective" Ccness? I wrote already my 'causality' deviation as considered within the 'model' of our so far acquired knowledge and the deterministic 'reasons' considered only by factors 'within', while the still unknown factors (maybe lots of such) also influence all that happens assigned to 'causality' of the partial listing. (This is the reason why our terms are not 'absolute' and "The Truth".) We may 'list' EFFECTIVE causes, but maybe not all. <I would not like to offend you with my hint to 'the world beyond arithmetical truth (logic).> ------------------------ Soroud's expression: "*consciousness is always embodied consciousness of life..."* begs the question: what is life? how different is it from Ccness, if I identify the latter as 'response to relations' (information)? what else is life? They seem to be close in such formulation. None of them "human" or even "terrestrial". Not even 'bodily ascertainable' which is a part of the figment "physical world". The JCS-online list has a long discussion about structured and unstructured dualism. I think Descartes HAD to include the soul into his 'human' unit to escape from Inquisition and that is why he anticipated the "complexity" in our time's idea - that includes the body and *mind* with its bi sided influences as a body-soul dualism. (I don't want to start a battle on this). Consciousness - as the process of responding to relations is universal, human and terrestrial concepts are includable, it is independent of our so far acquired knowledge and does not restrict the application to the physical world and so the domains developed by the human mind. I have no theory to that, am insecure about the deterministic 'happening' - a term that requires 'time' - for a system where there is no time-factor identified as we know it. The so far perceived reality I know of did not give me(!) answers to a lot of questions. That's why I say I am agnostic. John Mikes On Sat, Jul 2, 2011 at 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 01 Jul 2011, at 13:23, selva kumar wrote: > > Is consciousness causally effective ? >> >> I found this question in previous threads,but I didn't find a answer. >> > > Was it in the FOR list (on the book Fabric of reality by David Deutsch) ? I > thought I did answer this question, which is a very imprtant and fundamental > question. > > It is also a tricky question, which is very similar or related to the > question of free-will, and it can lead to vocabulary issue. I often defend > the idea that consciousness is effective. Indeed the role I usually defend > for consciousness is a relative self-speeding up ability. Yet the question > is tricky, especially due to the presence of the "causally", which is harder > to grasp or define than "consciousness" itself. > > Let me try to explain. For this I need some definition, and I hope for some > understanding of the UDA and a bit of AUDA. Ask precision if needed. > > The main ingredient for the explanation are three theorems due to Gödel: > > - the Gödel completeness theorem (available for machine talking first order > logic or a sufficiently effective higher order logic). The theorem says that > a theory or machine is consistent (syntactical notion, = ~Bf) iff the theory > has a model (a mathematical structure in which it makes sense to say that a > proposition is true). I will rephrase this by saying that a machine is > consistent if and only if the machine's beliefs make sense in some reality. > > - the Gödel second incompleteness theorem ~Bf -> ~B(~Bf): if the machine is > consistent, then this is not provable by the machine. So if the beliefs are > real in some reality, the machine cannot prove the existence of that > reality. This is used in some strict way, because we don't assume the > machine can prove its completeness (despite this has shown to be the case by > Orey). This entails that eventually, the machine can add as new axiom its > own consistency, but this leads to a new machine, for which a novel notion > of consistency appears, and the 'new' machine can still not prove the > existence of a reality "satisfying its beliefs. yet that machine can easily > prove the consistency of the machine she was. This can be reitered as many > times as their are (constructive) ordinals, and this is what I describe as a > climbing from G to G*. The modal logic of self-reference remains unchanged, > but the arithmetical interpretation of it expands. An infinity of previously > undecidable propositions become decidable, and ... another phenomenon > occurs: > > - Gödel length of proof theorem. Once a machine adds an undecidable > proposition, like its own consistency, as a new axiom/belief, not only an > infinity of (arithmetical) propositions become decidable, but an infinity of > already provable propositions get shorter proofs. Indeed, and amazingly > enough, for any number x, we can find a proposition which proofs will be x > times shorter than its shorter proof in the beliefs system without the > undecidable proposition. A similar, but not entirely equivalent theorem is > true for universal computation ability, showing in particular that there is > no bound to the rapidity of computers, and this just by change of the > software (alas, with finite numbers of exceptions in the *effective* > self-speeding up: but evolution of species needs not to be effective or > programmable in advance). > > Now I suggest to (re)define consciousness as a machine (instinctive, > preprogrammed) ability to bet on a reality. This is equivalent (stricto > sensu: the machine does not need to know this) to an ability of betting its > own consistency (excluding that very new axiom to avoid inconsistency). As a > universal system, this will speed-up the machine relatively to the probable > local universal system(s) and will in that way augment its freedom degree. > If two machines play ping-pong, the machine which is quicker has a greater > range of possible moves/strategy than its opponent. > > So the answer to the question "is consciousness effective" would be yes, if > you accept such definition. > > Is that consciousness *causally* effective? That is the tricky part related > to free will. If you accept the definition of free will that I often > suggested, then the answer is yes. Causality will have its normal "physical > definition", except that with comp such physicalness is given by an > arithmetical quantization (based on the material hypostase defined by Bp & > Dp): p physically causes q, iff something like BD(BDp -> BDq). I recall Dp = > ~B ~p. But of course, in God eyes, there is only true (and false) number > relations. The löbian phenomenon then shows that the consciousness > self-speeding up is coupled with the building of the reality that the > machine bet on. At that level, it is like if consciousness is the main > force, perhaps the only original one, in the physical universe! This needs > still more work to make precise enough. There is a complex tradeoff in > between the "causally" and the "effective" at play, I think. > > I hope this was not too technical. The work of Gödel plays a fundamental > role. This explanation is detailed in "Conscience et Mécanisme", and related > more precisely to the inference inductive frame. > > To sum up: machine consciousness, in the theory, confers self-speeding up > abilities to the machine with respect to the most probable > continuation/universal-**machine. It is obviously something useful for > self-moving creature: to make them able to anticipate and avoid obstacles, > which would explain why the self-moving creatures have developed > self-reflexive brains, and become Löbian (self-conscious). Note that here > the role is attributed to self-consciousness, and not really to > consciousness. But you need consciousness to have self-consciousness. > Consciousness per se has no role, like in pure contemplation, but once > reflected in the Löbian way, it might be the stronger causally effective > force operating in the 'arithmetical truth', the very origin of the (self) > acceleration/force. > > Note that the Gödel speed-up theorem is not hard to prove. There is a > simple proof of it in the excellent book by Torkel Franzen "Gödel's theorem > An Incomplete Guide To Its Use and Abuse" which I recommend the reading > (despite it is more on the abuses than the uses). The original paper is in > the book by Davis: the undecidable (republished in Dover), and which I > consider as a bible for "machine's theology". > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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