On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 2:16 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote:
> >Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence > of > >number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of > >matter does not explain the existence of number relations. It is > therefore > >a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is > fundamental > >and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist > >independently of each other. > > How does the existence of number relations really explain the material > qualities of matter though? The material qualities of matter are all the results of rules (which are ultimately determined by the properties of the mathematical object an observer happens to find themselves in). With computationalism, the exact mathematical object an observer happens to exist in cannot be definitively determined or predicted. Rather it might be said the observer simultaneously exists in all of them (all mathematical structures which contain that observer's mind). This is confirmed by quantum mechanics. When you measure the state of a particle, the result is unpredictable because one cannot know in which universe they will be at the time the the result is observed. > Would that mean that in all possible > universes a proton is a proton and 79 protons is gold? Is water a > mathematical inevitability independent of our macroscopic experience > of water? > It is believed that there are many free parameters in the standard model (around 20 or so). Varying these parameters results in universes with entirely different physics and chemistry. For example, physicists have discovered no good reason why the fine structure constant has the value it does. > > On Jul 21, 2:03 pm, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > >> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces > computation > > >>> to be there. > > > > >> The computations are concrete relations. > > > > > If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them. > > > > If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, > everything > > you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the > > computation implementing your mind. > > > > Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a > > concrete existence. How would a many-worlder point to the other branches > of > > the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past? How would an AI > or > > human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is > > rendering its environment? > > > > > > > > > They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be > > >> described by some axiomatic. > > > > > And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So the > > > "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of > relations. > > > > Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a > > chair? > > > > > The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs. > > > > Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence > of > > number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of > > matter does not explain the existence of number relations. It is > therefore > > a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is > fundamental > > and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist > > independently of each other. > > > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
