On 09 Dec 2011, at 00:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of
process occur for computations and would go even further in
computations from not having a physical component but would not
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.
True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism. To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?
Mechanism is usually used by materialist or dualist to put the mind-
body problem under the rug, with the idea that we are just (material)
machine, so that mind emerge from material activity. Then the whole
point of UDA is that such an idea does not work. Weak materialism (and
thus both monistic and dualist materialism) is incompatible with
computationalism (in the sense of "yes doctor"). That is not yet very
well appreciated. With one exception scientist usually see the point,
but most seems not to be interested in the mind-body issues. They see
this kind of stuff as religious and condemn it without realizing that
the mind-body problem, even with mechanism is not yet solved, which is
the main point of UDA.
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