On Feb 5, 11:19 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> I hope Russell will indulge my comment on that first paragraph.
> On 05 Feb 2012, at 15:41, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Feb 5, 2:09 am, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> >> Stephen is objecting that such abstract systems are, well, too
> >> abstract. He'd prefer something more concrete - whatever "concrete"
> >> might actually be.
> > Here is another way to look at that sentence:
> > "Stephen is objecting that such non-concrete systems are, well, not
> > concrete. He'd prefer something more actual - whatever "actual" might
> > concretely be.
> > It's hard for me to take seriously the idea of failing to grasp the
> > meaning of 'concrete' in the same breath that uses the word actual and
> > abstract.
> They are indexicals. Those things are obvious for 1-person, but of
> course, less obvious when you work in some (any) 3p-theory. You are
> the one making them infinitely complex, by lowering the subst level in
> the infinite.

I'm not lowering subst level at all, I'm saying that subst level is an

> But they are simple indeed, and can be handled from the simple
> diagonalization (if Dx gives xx, then DD gives DD. Also with D'x =
> F(xx), for any F. D'D' will gives F(D'D')).
> > Talking about a mountain is not a mountain.
> Right.
> > The menu does
> > not taste like the meal.
> Rarely.
> It might smell like the meal, in bad restaurant, though.


> > All of the quant descriptions in the universe
> > do not add up to a single experienced quality.
> You don't know that. Is it an axiom?

I don't know it, but I clearly understand why it is the case.

> > Quantites are only
> > quantities.
> No. All universal numbers can interpret a number as a function on
> quantities, or as properties on quantities, which are not quantities
> themselves.

Then what are they?

> Universal numbers can also transform, or interpret numbers
> as transformation of transformation, properties of properties, up in
> the constructive transfinite, etc.
> When the quantities can add and multiply, soon their attributes are
> beyond all quantities, and Löbian quantities are arguably already
> knowing that about themselves.
> > They don't scale up into anything else without something
> > that is capable of experiencing the low level granular quantities as a
> > completely novel level of continuous qualities.
> I take this as another axiom. You postulate the existence of something
> vague. I think that something like that might make sense perhaps, but
> as I see it it would be a consequence of the comp meta-axiom.

That just gives a name to comp's lack of explanatory power. I can call
comp a consequence of the ecumenical meta-axiom.

> > Digital computing
> > cannot do that.
> I think that this intuition is grounded by the fact that digital
> computing *can* do that, but cannot, indeed, justify that they can do
> that.
> So, this is just an *easy* insult on digital computing. You might as
> well say to your brother that he is stupid.
> > Any kind of semantic scaling in a digital computation
> > can only wind up as being more or less a-signifying generic digits.
> On the contrary. The semantics of machines explodes in the infinities.

Explodes into what? What does it signify other than itself?

> They can be aware of their ignorance, and conceive transcendent
> realities.
> Of course, it is not the machine's who think, but abstract and
> relatively concrete person, or more generally living ideas, in
> relatively concrete realities, with their sharable and non sharable
> parts.
> >> It is true, I understand, that the UDA (and AUDA) does
> >> not eliminate the possibility of a "concrete physical
> >> underpinning". It is just that such a concrete physical
> >> underpinning has
> >> no measurable, or detectable effect on our phenomonology other than
> >> that due to its capability of universal computation.
> > It's circular reasoning to say that physical underpinnings have no
> > effect on our phenomenology when you are working from a theory which
> > presupposes that phenomenology is detectable only by quantitative
> > measurement in the first place. In our actual experience, we know that
> > in fact all phenomenological systems without exception exist as a
> > function of physical systems -
> We don't know that.

Are you talking about ghosts or NDEs? Even so, those phenomena are
always experienced by a person with a body.

> Nor am I sure what it means exactly. Define "physical".

Phenomena whose properties include mass, density, volume and interact
effectively with other phenomena bearing those properties.

> Here, in AUDA terms, you might be confusing the "intelligible", with
> the "intelligible matter"
> (Bp with Bp & Dt). [] p with [] p & <> t.

I'm really not confused at all. You keep accusing me of that but I'm
very clear on my distinctions.

> > virtual servers do not fly off into the
> > data center on their own virtual power grid - they are still only a
> > complicated event of electrified semiconductors. Unplug the hardware
> > node and all of the operating systems, be they first order software or
> > second order virtual hardware or still only software, 100% dependent
> > on the physical resources. It is generators burning diesel fuel fifty
> > miles away that literally pushes the entire computation - not
> > arithmetic.
> At first sight.

What happens at second sight?

> > Arithmetic has 0% independence of physical systems *as a
> > whole* even though computations can be understood *figuratively* as
> > being independent of any particular physical structure.
> Why figuratively? The computable functions from N to N have been
> discovered in math. It happens that we are surrounded by local
> physical approximation of universal system, from gas in complex
> volume, to bacteria genome, subset of human languages, brains, higher
> animals and man made computers.
> You can postulate or assume some universal numbers, and say "that's
> the ultimate local universal number", but comp predict that any named
> ultimate local universal numbers hides the "real" one. With comp the
> real "one" has no name.

Maybe it has no name because there's nothing there?

> or by "physical" you mean something more vague, and mixing the 3p and
> 1p, and then, I might interpret your intuition in some perplexities of
> the LUMs.

Physical can only be contemplated in these poetic terms because we
have the luxury of being protected from physicality by an advanced
civilization. Survival of the body and the world of the body is
physical. It doesn't need to be an absolute universal of all possible
experiences, but it is a universal of our conscious waking experience.

> > All computation can be impacted by changes to it's physical
> > underpinning. Devices which are damaged or have low power supply, or
> > brains which have physiological irregularities produce changes to
> > their phenomenology independent of program logic. The physical
> > topology, the materials and events that effect them can drive
> > phenomenology as well.
> Obviously assuming comp. We have to bet on locally stable universal
> number to say "yes" to a doctor.
> The physical is not denied. On the contrary it is justified on a
> conceptually deeper ground.

That's the problem. It is presumed that the physical needs our
theoretical justification while hiding the fact that it is the
theoretical justification itself that is more in need of tethering to
the physical.

> >> Which is why I'd like to remind people of Witgenstein's comment:
> >> Whereof
> >> one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
> > A great quote, but I do not think Wittgenstein intended it to be used
> > to silence speculation. Unfortunately I have only ever seen it used to
> > serve that function. What he refers to is the limitation of language
> > to express the sense that language makes to the listener (http://
> >www.teleologie.org/OT/deboard/2117.html). That meaning is reversed
> > when used as an admonition, so that the meaning becomes something like
> > "It is better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to open
> > your mouth and remove all doubt".
> That's a good one!
> Now, when Wittgenstein said "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
> must be silent.", he should have remained silent. We can only ask to
> Wittgenstein "But what where you speaking about?".

haha, yes that too.

> Note the similarity with Gödel's second theorem: Dt -> ~BDt (dually
> BDt -> Bf).
> <> t -> ~[] <> t
> [] <> t -> [] f
> But looking closer, Wittgenstein paradox (close to Damascius's one,
> and to the problem met by Plotinus on the ineffability of the one), is
> plausibly more related to Tarski-Gödel theorem on the non definability
> of truth.
> Damascius wrote thousand of pages to explain that even one sentence on
> the ineffable is one sentence too much.

hah. I want a job like that.


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