It is the same epistemic and instrumental interpretation which is explained better and at length by Asher Peres in his excellent text

which is available free online.


On 2/4/2012 7:56 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Regarding the issue of instantiation, the recent GHZM quantum experiments may be relevant as they imply a lack of a pre-existing reality.
Here is a rather long and technical argument that there is no pre-existing 
I provide below the first and last paragraphs in this argument. The last paragraph explains what he means by pre-existing reality. In it he negates MWI, all hidden variables theories and even classical physics.
Richard Ruquist
Lubos Motl:
I want to go through the GHZM experiment again and somewhat carefully (and in latex) and discuss the insanity of the assumptions about the laws of Nature that are forced upon you if you want to believe in "realism", i.e. the idea that the results of experiments (including those at the microscopic level) reflect a pre-existing reality. What I finally want to emphasize is that all this redundant and "objectively real but totally unobservable" superstructure – from many worlds to extra invisible Bohmian positions of particles (which can't help in the case of spin or particle production, anyway) or other hidden variables to GRW collapses prescribed from above – is only being invented because certain people behave as bigots who are unable to admit that the physics research in the 20th century has irreversibly falsified all intrinsically classical models of the reality. All the new "fanciful stuff" with tons of choices and processes (superluminal communication, preferred frames, collapses, the length scale to which the GRW collapses shrink the wave function, the frequency of such flashes etc.) that can never be observed and with the infinite amount of fine-tuning and obfuscation that is needed for it to fake the real, relativistic quantum world (to guarantee that none of the new predictions is really observed) is only being proposed because some people's bigotry has no limits. Their dogmas about "realism" are more important for them than /any/ amount of empirical evidence, more important for them than everything that science has actually found.

On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Stephen P. King < <>> wrote:

    On 2/4/2012 8:58 AM, David Nyman wrote:

        On 4 February 2012 12:22, Bruno Marchal<
        <>>  wrote:

            No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as 
            that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to 
isomorphisms) as

            So you have to explicitly show what is not valid in the UDA1-8. You 
            something, let us try to find out what.

                I am not missing a thing, Bruno. You are missing something that 
            obvious to the rest of us.

            If someone else can confirm this, and put some light on what 
Stephen is
            saying, I would be pleased.

        Bruno, I used to think that you were indeed missing "something that is
        obvious to the rest of us".  I don't think so any longer, because I
        understand now that you are presenting a theory and your arguments
        consequently derive strictly from the axioms and assumptions of that
        theory.  I don't pretend to understand all aspects of that theory of
        course, but through discussion and the contrast of ideas I have come a
        bit closer than when I started.

        I don't know if it will help at all for me to state here my
        understanding of what might motivate the theory in the first place,
        but I'll try.  Firstly, as you have so often said, the
        informational/computational theory of mind (CTM) is more or less the
        default assumption in science.  Indeed this conclusion seems almost
        unavoidable given that brain research seems to imply, more or less
        unambiguously, the correlation of  mental states with relations,
        rather than relata.  However, CTM in its uncritically-assumed form
        continues to be combined with the additional assumption of an
        Aristotelian primitively-physical state of affairs.  This leads
        directly either to denialism of the first-person, or alternatively to
        some ill-defined species of property dualism.  These consequences by
        themselves might well lead us to reject such primitive-physicalism as
        incoherent, even without an explicit reductio ad absurdum of the
        unambiguous association of conscious states with "physical
        computation".  Either way, in order to retain CTM, one is led to
        contemplate some form of neutral monism.

        The question of what form such a "neutral" theory should take now
        arises.  Since the theory is explicitly *computational*, the axioms
        and assumptions of such a theory should obviously be restricted to the
        absolute minimum necessary to construct a "computational universe" (in
        the traditional sense of "universe") or rather to indicate how such a
        universe would necessarily construct itself, given those axioms and
        assumptions.  The basic assumption is of a first-order combinatorial
        system, of which numbers are the most widely-understood example.
        Given the arithmetical nature of such a universe, construction and
        differentiability of composite entities must necessarily derive from
        arithmetical assumptions, which permits the natural emergence of
        higher-order structural integration via the internal logic of the
        system.  Of particular note is the emergence in this way of
        self-referential entities, which form the logical basis of

        Since the reality of first-person localisation is not denied in this
        theory (indeed the theory positively seeks to rationalise it), the
        system is not posited as having merely third-personal status, but as
        possessing a first-person self-referential point-of-view which is
        associated with consciousness.  Perhaps it is this aspect of the
        theory which is the most tricky, as it cuts across a variety of
        different intuitions about consciousness and its relation to the
        phenomena it reveals.  For rather than positing a primitively-physical
        universe which "instantiates" conscious states, the theory must
        reverse the relation and posit conscious states that "instantiate"
        physical phenomena.  In so doing, it exposes itself to empirical
        refutation, since those phenomena must be, at least, consistent with
        ordinary observation (although they also predict, in the limit,
        observations of  high improbability).

        It is this last issue of instantiation which seems to be one of main
        bones of contention between Stephen and yourself, though I'm not sure
        why this is the case.  From my own perspective, unsophisticated though
        it may be, it seems reasonable that the emergence of "truly physical"
        phenomena should indeed be the result of "personal instantiation" in
        the conjunction of consciousness and computation.  After all, when do
        questions as to what is "truly physical" emerge, other than in the
        context of what is "truly experiential"?  The rest is calculation.


    Dear David,

       Does my claim that our primitive ground must be neutral with respect to 
    properties make any sense? It like the zero of arithmetic from which we can
    extricate any set of positive and negative quantities in pairs such that 
their sum
    is equal to zero. What I see in Bruno's interpretation of COMP is that it 
    for the primitive to have a set of properties (numbers and + and *) to the 
    of its complementary opposites. Since this is a violation of neutrality, 
thus I see
    a fatal flaw in Bruno's Ideal monist interpretation.



-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
    "Everything List" group.
    To post to this group, send email to
    To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
    For more options, visit this group at

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - <>
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2112/4789 - Release Date: 02/04/12

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to