# Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

`I hope Russell will indulge my comment on that first paragraph.`
```
On 05 Feb 2012, at 15:41, Craig Weinberg wrote:

```
```On Feb 5, 2:09 am, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

```
```Stephen is objecting that such abstract systems are, well, too
abstract. He'd prefer something more concrete - whatever "concrete"
might actually be.
```
```
Here is another way to look at that sentence:
"Stephen is objecting that such non-concrete systems are, well, not
concrete. He'd prefer something more actual - whatever "actual" might
concretely be.

It's hard for me to take seriously the idea of failing to grasp the
meaning of 'concrete' in the same breath that uses the word actual and
abstract.
```
```

```
They are indexicals. Those things are obvious for 1-person, but of course, less obvious when you work in some (any) 3p-theory. You are the one making them infinitely complex, by lowering the subst level in the infinite. But they are simple indeed, and can be handled from the simple diagonalization (if Dx gives xx, then DD gives DD. Also with D'x = F(xx), for any F. D'D' will gives F(D'D')).
```

```
```Talking about a mountain is not a mountain.
```
```
Right.

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```The menu does
not taste like the meal.
```
```
Rarely.
It might smell like the meal, in bad restaurant, though.

```
```All of the quant descriptions in the universe
do not add up to a single experienced quality.
```
```
You don't know that. Is it an axiom?

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```Quantites are only
quantities.
```
```
```
No. All universal numbers can interpret a number as a function on quantities, or as properties on quantities, which are not quantities themselves. Universal numbers can also transform, or interpret numbers as transformation of transformation, properties of properties, up in the constructive transfinite, etc. When the quantities can add and multiply, soon their attributes are beyond all quantities, and Löbian quantities are arguably already knowing that about themselves.
```

```
```They don't scale up into anything else without something
that is capable of experiencing the low level granular quantities as a
completely novel level of continuous qualities.
```
```
```
I take this as another axiom. You postulate the existence of something vague. I think that something like that might make sense perhaps, but as I see it it would be a consequence of the comp meta-axiom.
```

```
```Digital computing
cannot do that.
```
```

```
I think that this intuition is grounded by the fact that digital computing *can* do that, but cannot, indeed, justify that they can do that. So, this is just an *easy* insult on digital computing. You might as well say to your brother that he is stupid.
```

```
```Any kind of semantic scaling in a digital computation
can only wind up as being more or less a-signifying generic digits.
```
```
```
On the contrary. The semantics of machines explodes in the infinities. They can be aware of their ignorance, and conceive transcendent realities. Of course, it is not the machine's who think, but abstract and relatively concrete person, or more generally living ideas, in relatively concrete realities, with their sharable and non sharable parts.
```

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```It is true, I understand, that the UDA (and AUDA) does
not eliminate the possibility of a "concrete physical
```
underpinning". It is just that such a concrete physical underpinning has
```no measurable, or detectable effect on our phenomonology other than
that due to its capability of universal computation.
```
```
It's circular reasoning to say that physical underpinnings have no
effect on our phenomenology when you are working from a theory which
presupposes that phenomenology is detectable only by quantitative
measurement in the first place. In our actual experience, we know that
in fact all phenomenological systems without exception exist as a
function of physical systems -
```
```
We don't know that.
Nor am I sure what it means exactly. Define "physical".

```
Here, in AUDA terms, you might be confusing the "intelligible", with the "intelligible matter"
```(Bp with Bp & Dt). [] p with [] p & <> t.

```
```virtual servers do not fly off into the
data center on their own virtual power grid - they are still only a
complicated event of electrified semiconductors. Unplug the hardware
node and all of the operating systems, be they first order software or
second order virtual hardware or still only software, 100% dependent
on the physical resources. It is generators burning diesel fuel fifty
miles away that literally pushes the entire computation - not
arithmetic.
```
```
At first sight.

```
```Arithmetic has 0% independence of physical systems *as a
whole* even though computations can be understood *figuratively* as
being independent of any particular physical structure.
```
```
```
Why figuratively? The computable functions from N to N have been discovered in math. It happens that we are surrounded by local physical approximation of universal system, from gas in complex volume, to bacteria genome, subset of human languages, brains, higher animals and man made computers. You can postulate or assume some universal numbers, and say "that's the ultimate local universal number", but comp predict that any named ultimate local universal numbers hides the "real" one. With comp the real "one" has no name. or by "physical" you mean something more vague, and mixing the 3p and 1p, and then, I might interpret your intuition in some perplexities of the LUMs.
```

```
```
All computation can be impacted by changes to it's physical
underpinning. Devices which are damaged or have low power supply, or
brains which have physiological irregularities produce changes to
their phenomenology independent of program logic. The physical
topology, the materials and events that effect them can drive
phenomenology as well.
```
```
```
Obviously assuming comp. We have to bet on locally stable universal number to say "yes" to a doctor. The physical is not denied. On the contrary it is justified on a conceptually deeper ground.
```

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```
Which is why I'd like to remind people of Witgenstein's comment: Whereof
```one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
```
```
A great quote, but I do not think Wittgenstein intended it to be used
to silence speculation. Unfortunately I have only ever seen it used to
serve that function. What he refers to is the limitation of language
to express the sense that language makes to the listener (http://
www.teleologie.org/OT/deboard/2117.html). That meaning is reversed
when used as an admonition, so that the meaning becomes something like
"It is better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to open
your mouth and remove all doubt".
```
```
That's a good one!

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Now, when Wittgenstein said "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.", he should have remained silent. We can only ask to Wittgenstein "But what where you speaking about?".
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```
Note the similarity with Gödel's second theorem: Dt -> ~BDt (dually BDt -> Bf).
```
<> t -> ~[] <> t
[] <> t -> [] f

```
But looking closer, Wittgenstein paradox (close to Damascius's one, and to the problem met by Plotinus on the ineffability of the one), is plausibly more related to Tarski-Gödel theorem on the non definability of truth.
```
```
Damascius wrote thousand of pages to explain that even one sentence on the ineffable is one sentence too much.
```
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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