On Feb 6, 10:37 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 05 Feb 2012, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > I'm not lowering subst level at all, I'm saying that subst level is an
> > indexical.
> ?

That's what you aren't getting about my position. Substitution level
is not a scalar variable.

> >>> All of the quant descriptions in the universe
> >>> do not add up to a single experienced quality.
> >> You don't know that. Is it an axiom?
> > I don't know it, but I clearly understand why it is the case.
> That's not an argument.

Then you disqualify the possibility of understanding and force a 3p
supervenience to all 1p experiences.

> >>> Quantites are only
> >>> quantities.
> >> No. All universal numbers can interpret a number as a function on
> >> quantities, or as properties on quantities, which are not quantities
> >> themselves.
> > Then what are they?
> Functions, relations, properties, modalities, qualities, etc.

Quantitative relations, quantitative properties, logical
(quantitative) modalities, quantitative qualities.

> >> I take this as another axiom. You postulate the existence of
> >> something
> >> vague. I think that something like that might make sense perhaps, but
> >> as I see it it would be a consequence of the comp meta-axiom.
> > That just gives a name to comp's lack of explanatory power. I can call
> > comp a consequence of the ecumenical meta-axiom.
> comp *is* the meta-axiom. It is an axiom bearing on your own
> consciousness property (of being invariant for some substitution at
> some level).

Then I can call the ecumenical a meta-meta axiom.

> >> On the contrary. The semantics of machines explodes in the
> >> infinities.
> > Explodes into what? What does it signify other than itself?
> Explodes into the number of possible different interpretation of
> itself, which might impact on different decisions and futures, from
> the machine's point of view.

They all only signify different permutations of the emptiness of the
machine. It doesn't signify anything, it's syntax only.

> >>> It's circular reasoning to say that physical underpinnings have no
> >>> effect on our phenomenology when you are working from a theory which
> >>> presupposes that phenomenology is detectable only by quantitative
> >>> measurement in the first place. In our actual experience, we know
> >>> that
> >>> in fact all phenomenological systems without exception exist as a
> >>> function of physical systems -
> >> We don't know that.
> > Are you talking about ghosts or NDEs? Even so, those phenomena are
> > always experienced by a person with a body.
> I was not talking on NDE, but on the fact that primitive matter does
> not exist.

Primitive or not, all phenomenological systems that we have observed
are associated with persons or animals who have bodies.

> >> Nor am I sure what it means exactly. Define "physical".
> > Phenomena whose properties include mass, density, volume and interact
> > effectively with other phenomena bearing those properties.
> Define mass, density, volume, and interaction.

I don't do definitions. The standard usage of these terms is adequate.

> >> Here, in AUDA terms, you might be confusing the "intelligible", with
> >> the "intelligible matter"
> >> (Bp with Bp & Dt). [] p with [] p & <> t.
> > I'm really not confused at all. You keep accusing me of that but I'm
> > very clear on my distinctions.
> You are not. And you are not well place to judge this.

You are saying that your opinions about me are facts. Fortunately I
have other people who are familiar with my ideas who don't share your

> >>> virtual servers do not fly off into the
> >>> data center on their own virtual power grid - they are still only a
> >>> complicated event of electrified semiconductors. Unplug the hardware
> >>> node and all of the operating systems, be they first order
> >>> software or
> >>> second order virtual hardware or still only software, 100% dependent
> >>> on the physical resources. It is generators burning diesel fuel
> >>> fifty
> >>> miles away that literally pushes the entire computation - not
> >>> arithmetic.
> >> At first sight.
> > What happens at second sight?
> You realize that this might be the other way round. It is in the comp
> theory. Cf UDA.

What does it mean to be the other way around? That power companies are
dependent on data centers?

> >>> Arithmetic has 0% independence of physical systems *as a
> >>> whole* even though computations can be understood *figuratively* as
> >>> being independent of any particular physical structure.
> >> Why figuratively? The computable functions from N to N have been
> >> discovered in math. It happens that we are surrounded by local
> >> physical approximation of universal system, from gas in complex
> >> volume, to bacteria genome, subset of human languages, brains, higher
> >> animals and man made computers.
> >> You can postulate or assume some universal numbers, and say "that's
> >> the ultimate local universal number", but comp predict that any named
> >> ultimate local universal numbers hides the "real" one. With comp the
> >> real "one" has no name.
> > Maybe it has no name because there's nothing there?
> >> or by "physical" you mean something more vague, and mixing the 3p and
> >> 1p, and then, I might interpret your intuition in some perplexities
> >> of
> >> the LUMs.
> > Physical can only be contemplated in these poetic terms because we
> > have the luxury of being protected from physicality by an advanced
> > civilization. Survival of the body and the world of the body is
> > physical. It doesn't need to be an absolute universal of all possible
> > experiences, but it is a universal of our conscious waking experience.
> I am waiting for a theory. I have no clue what you mean by "physical",
> "body" etc.

You are overthinking it. I mean what every English speaking person on
Earth means when they say "physical" and "body". By splitting
vernacular terms into infinities of linguistic formalism, you tip the
scales to prejudice theory over practice. It's not necessary and adds

> >>> All computation can be impacted by changes to it's physical
> >>> underpinning. Devices which are damaged or have low power supply, or
> >>> brains which have physiological irregularities produce changes to
> >>> their phenomenology independent of program logic. The physical
> >>> topology, the materials and events that effect them can drive
> >>> phenomenology as well.
> >> Obviously assuming comp. We have to bet on locally stable universal
> >> number to say "yes" to a doctor.
> >> The physical is not denied. On the contrary it is justified on a
> >> conceptually deeper ground.
> > That's the problem. It is presumed that the physical needs our
> > theoretical justification while hiding the fact that it is the
> > theoretical justification itself that is more in need of tethering to
> > the physical.
> You confuse level of explanation. You could say that we cannot explain
> how a chalkboard works because we need it to write the explanation on
> the board.

I'm not confused at all. A chalkboard 'works' in a lot of ways besides
writing explanations, but no explanation has ever existed which was
not associated with some physical body's activity.

> >> You cannot invoke your own understanding. That's an argument per
> >> authority (it proves nothing and augment the plausibility that you
> >> are
> >> crackpot in the interlocutor ear).
> > It's not an argument from authority, it's an argument from sense.
> An argument cannot refer to senses.

All arguments refer only to senses.

> > Just
> > as your theory is contingent upon the acceptance of primitive
> > arithmetic truth, my hypothesis comes out of a sense primitive. In
> > order to understand the cosmos as a whole, including subjectivity, we
> > must invoke our own understanding or mechanism will mislead us into
> > disproving ourselves. Sense is the price of admission to the real
> > world.
> Define cosmos, define sense. Only a wrong understanding of mechanism
> can mislead us.

Eliciting definition-fetching is a passive aggressive tactic. The
common usage definitions of cosmos and sense will suffice.

> >>> It will
> >>> only change according to what and how it's script allows it to
> >>> change.
> >> The "allowing" is a universal machine dependent notion, and they are
> >> many.
> > But what is allowed can never exceed the range of possibilities of the
> > script. Living organisms seem to be able to do that.
> There are no evidence for that.

We are the evidence of that.

> We cannot change the physical laws,
> which are deterministic in all physical theories (except QM+collapse,
> which is not really a theory).

We don't need to change physical laws, we transcend them with
psychological non-laws.

> >>> When you talk with them, do they answer the same way to the same
> >>> question every time?
> >> The conversation is made in Platonia, and is not entangled to our
> >> history, except for period where I implement it on some machines.
> >> Even
> >> in that case, they didn't dispose on short and long term memories,
> >> except for their intrinsic basic arithmetical experiences (which
> >> bifurcate up to you and me).
> > I can't really interpret that in any way other than an evasion of the
> > question. You say there have been public dialogs at various times. I
> > asked if the answers are the same every time. You answered in a way
> > that sounds like 'talking to machines isn't anything like talking and
> > it doesn't occur in time, but then somehow they become us and then
> > talking becomes talking.'
> They become us when entangled in the long and deep computations (which
> belongs to arithmetic).


> >>> that all such machines remain silent
> >>> on all of these questions every time tells me that they clearly
> >>> possess no awareness.
> >> You have frightening telepathic power.
> > It's not telepathy, it's first hand knowledge that awareness entails
> > natural variation in response. You cannot ask any question of any
> > person over and over and expect to get the same response every time
> > for every person.
> Because they have a good handling on short and among term memories.
> The machine I interview are virgin of any sustained experience related
> to our environment. Your question just don't apply to them.

How convenient.

> > That's because awareness is not mechanical.
> It is not entirely mechanical, but that is a theorem in the comp
> theory. Not an argument against mechanism.

Define mechanism, theorem, argument...

> > That's
> > what makes a machine a machine, a lack of capacity to transcend
> > recursive behavior or deviate from universal behavior.
> They don't lack that capacity, at their own high level.

That seems entirely theoretical at this point.

> They lack that
> capacity on their lower levels, and below. So do we, very plausibly. I
> cannot change the local laws of physics.
> >> Because I limit myself to ideally self-referentially correct machine.
> >> They already know that it is insane to let the secret of their
> >> identity slip.
> > So it's impossible for a machine to go insane? Seems like another
> > fundamental difference between minds and machines.
> On the contrary all sane machine can know that they can become insane,
> and even that they cannot know if they are sane or not.
> Of course any self-referentially correct entity, be it man or machine,
> is sane (by definition).

If it's possible for a machine to go insane but not possible to give
up their mysteries under questioning through that insanity, that puts
an arbitrary limit on insanity. Humans don't have any kind of limit
like that. They can answer any question they want, any way they want,
sane or insane. If there is any limitation at all for machines, then
they can never have fully human consciousness.

> >> Not at all. When you ask them why they remain silent on some
> >> question,
> >> they can find answer and provide (theological) theories/hypothesis.
> > For example?
> Question: <>t ?   (= ~[] f ? = Are you consistent. = "Will you prove
> bulshit?")
> Answer: <none> (= the machine remains silent)
> But later the machine asserts  <> t -> ~[] <> t   (If I am consistent
> I will never tell you so).
> Note that <> t, [] f are used here as abbreviation of purely
> arithmetical propositions, and I interview any sound (and rich enough)
> theorem prover of arithmetical proposition.

I think all that tells you is about how logic works. If there were any
awareness at all there, there would be variation in the answers
locally from machine to machine. It can't have a personality if all of
them tell you that they won't tell you if they are consistent.

> >>> What about them makes them perceptible as opposed to computational?
> >> But they are perceptible, if the theory is correct.
> > Only because deciding that they are perceptible is the only way to
> > preserve the possibility that the theory could be correct.
> Not just that. They verifies the usual property of qualia. (Having
> qualitative attributes which are  non communicable in a 3p-way,
> obeying already given axiomatic for qualia, etc).

You don't need to have qualia to have a property of 3p non

> >> I didn't say that. You confuse level. When you say that sense and
> >> matter are self-explanatory, you just make no sense at all.
> > You're overthinking it. Sense is the ability to detect and incorporate
> > what is detected into a larger coherence.
> That is a not to bad 3p-definition of sense. Note that machine have
> that ability, although they have to assume locally the larger
> coherence, and bet on some truth, and so they have to be a bit
> mystical (conscious) for this. But they are indeed. Note that this
> implicit inference allows us to connect the 1p-sense to the 3p-notion
> that you describe.

I think that the 1p-sense that the machine has is unrelated to the 3p-
mechanism. The real 1p- sense of any given machine reflects the
experience of the substrate, not the human code riding on top of that.
The 1p we imagine behind the function of the program is 100%

> >> How? Given that sense are primitive, which makes no sense.
> > If sense is primitive, then it makes sense by definition.
> So the ability to detect and incorporate what is detected into a
> larger coherence is a primitive operation?
> That seems senseless to me.

Why? Since arithmetic truth requires detection and integrative
coherence, it cannot be as primitive as sense. Nothing more primitive
than sense can make sense by definition, so it cannot be detected or
integrated. This is what I'm telling you - sense is *the* primitive of
the cosmos.

> >> A machine can say "17 is prime".
> > Can it? Or do we have to define what prime is for it in advance? Most
> > machines don't know what 17 or prime is.
> Same for man. Of course we have to define the object we talk about if
> we want argue for or against their existence. This does not
> distinguish machine and man, unless you endow man with magical
> abilities.

Is the ability to participate in the world without having to define it
arithmetically a magical ability?

> I took it here that prime (17) is something like (~(x = 1) and ((y
> divides x) -> ((x = 1) or (x = 17))))
> (y divides x) is supposed to be an abbreviation of Ez (yz = x).
> >> It also means that machine can justify it by the +
> >> and * laws.
> >> Ideally correct machine cannot say, in general  "True('17 is
> >> prime')".
> >> They can refer to a reality as such. they are modest.
> > It makes the entire universe into a uniform meaningless exercise of
> > self reference.
> Shakespeare said so. And then what? Science is not wishful thinking.
> To be sure, what you say does not follow, given that the self-
> reference and contexts provides the 1p and 3p sense (in comp +
> classical theory of knowledge).
> > That doesn't even make sense. Any scientific truth can be expressed in
> > a poetic form. Genres aren't real.
> There is no scientific truth. There is only scientific beliefs.
> "scientific truth" is a term used by journalist in bad popular
> journal. Or by old scientists having brain problems, or by
> epistemologists working at a higher non assertive level. In science we
> never use the word truth, nor should we do in religion, except when it
> is the subject matter, but again, we will not pretend that we are
> true, or that we propose scientific truth. Science is only beliefs,
> even when true (by chance, for example).

I'm ok with that, but even more reason to say that scientific beliefs
can be expressed in a poetic form. Or are you saying there are no
truths or that arithmetic is not poetic?

> >>> That's only half of reality, but it is only through that reality
> >>> that
> >>> we can know any part of the other half.
> >> Argument?
> > The argument is that all truths beyond our senses are known to us only
> > through our senses. What is the argument against it?
> I asked an argument for the quantity 1/2.

not sure what you mean. you want me to argue with myself about this?

> >> No problem with that. I wish only you try harder.
> > Try harder to be impartial, or try harder to stack the deck in favor
> > of comp?
> Try harder to refute comp.

Ohh. Comp can only be refuted outside of comp. It's a closed loop of

> > No, a machine cannot think because the only reason that we might be
> > tempted to think it could can be explained through that example. You
> > can make the piano more sensitive to bumps, and you can make the bumps
> > more sophisticated to articulate the piano's mechanism better, but
> > neither the truck, the piano, nor the bumps can play the piano, they
> > are all parts of a recording made by humans trying to imitate their
> > own playing of the piano.
> You beg the question.

I'm showing that it's absurd. I guess if you actually believe that the
truck is a pianist, you certainly are entitled to that view - and it's
a logical view for figurative purposes, but if we apply it literally
in public, it would be considered delusional, and not for no reason.

> >> The logical sense of coherence is in the "Dt", the tangible detection
> >> is in "p", and the machine's body and relative belief is in "Bp". The
> >> Bp & Dt & p is a variant of the self-reference logic. The non first
> >> person communicable part of the logic of that variant (named X1* in
> >> AUDA) is the qualia logic, or the sensible matter hypostasis. The
> >> bootstrap law is given by p -> [] <> p, with []p defined roughly by
> >> Bp
> >> & Dt & p. Bp is Gödel probability applied on the arithmetical sigma_1
> >> sentence p. Dp is ~B~p. <> p is ~ [] ~, and t is "1=1".
> > The existence of variables like Dt and p already presupposes sense and
> > detection of visual symbols.
> It does not. But it implies them.

What are they without them?

> >>> It sounds like bones are ontologically less important than brains?
> >> I don't see why. Brains are also locally stable patterns obtained
> >> by a
> >> relative statistics on
> >> infinities of (infinite) computations.
> > So why are brains more associated with human consciousness than bones?
> Because brains seems to be needed for a person to manifest his
> consciousness relatively to another, one; where bones seem to be
> needed only to stand up and make sports.

That's begging the qwesch. I'm asking why brains over bones?

> >> In string theory, you can compute the mass of the photon. A long
> >> computation (from precise general axiom) leads spectacularly to a sum
> >> of two terms which when evaluated gives (1+2+3+4+ ...) + 1/12.
> >> Of course this only shows that IF string theory is correct then the
> >> mass of the photon is zero (because it is obvious that 1+2+3+4+5+ ...
> >> = minus 1/12, isn't it?).
> > I don't understand the minus 1/12 part.
> It is not simple to understand. The shorter explanation is that
> (1+2+3+...) = Riemann-Zeta(-1), which gives, on the complex plane the
> value -1/12 in its provable unique analytical extension.
> Riemann-zeta(z) is the analytical extension of Euler sum (1 + 1/2^z +
> 1/3^z + ...). By a beautiful formula of Euler, the Riemann-zeta
> functions provides crucial information on the distribution of the
> prime number.

I'll take your word for it. You know I don't speak math. At least if
you spoke French I could try to pick out some words here and there.

> >>>> Who said this? The pope? The Ayatollah? The government?
> >>> It's not an authoritative proposition, it's a voluntary
> >>> interpretation
> >>> (which, if I'm right, is what half of the universe is anyhow).
> >> You dream aloud.
> > Isn't that what you say numbers do also?
> OK. But with the number I limit myself to those simple one who are
> easily shown to be self-referentially correct.
> > We are sharply divided in the US in our opinions about that. Are
> > universal numbers less conflicted about when life or consciousness
> > begins and ends? Are they Pro-Life or Pro-Choice?
> I intuit that the correct LUMs are pro-choice, but the LUMs in general
> can harbor any idea.

Except the idea that they can reveal their deep secrets.

> >> But here all the problem is in linking the easy 1p and the less
> >> easy 3p.
> > It's not a problem when you realize they are linked in only in their
> > anomalous symmetry with each other.
> That does not help.

I don't quite understand why not.

> >> We don't have to include it. Brains are the simplifier tools.
> > No, brains are just the meaty end of a simplifier tool which is
> > semantic and experiential.
> Such brain does not exist in the comp theory. yet we can explain why
> person will correctly believe in the observation of such brain, in the
> epistemology.

I can explain why a person will correctly believe in the observation
of comp too, even though the universe of comp is not real.

> >>>> Study the work of other people. Address their problem, with or
> >>>> without
> >>>> your "theory" as training.
> >>> That would be worthwhile I'm sure, but unfortunately it would be too
> >>> much of a distraction.
> >> OK. That why I am not good in saucer. All those guy running after the
> >> ball distract me too much. But then I don't pretend marking the goal.
> > This isn't a game though, it's the truth of reality.
> If you don't study the work of others, you will not succeed in making
> your point "really" accessible to others.

It already is accessible to some others, I don't think that anyone can
succeed in making any point to all others.

> > Why not? What about numbers suggests dreaming?
> The fact that they organize themselves, by just obeying their + and *
> laws, into computations.

That can happen through our pattern recognition. It's universal

>The, the fact that comp implies a mind-comp
> supervenience thesis.

It doesn't say anything dreamy to me.

> > Incompleteness says the opposite to me that it does to you. I see
> > Gödel showing the limitation of arithmetic truth in the face of
> > organic sense, not the omnipotence of it.
> Gödel's result show on the contrary that arithmetical truth is beyond
> the grasp of any machine (and of any super-machine, super-super-
> machine, etc.).

That only means that it cannot be reconciled with our local reality,
not that reality emerges from it. Fantasy is the same way. It too is
beyond the grasp of all real systems and arithmetic too.

> >> But it has, in the relevant sense, once you admit there is a
> >> substitution level.
> > Substitution level is an indexical of perception.
> If this is true, then comp would lead to solipsism.

No because there is no self there to anchor a solipsistic orientation.
It leads to vacuous nihilism.

> But the evidences
> are that first person plural makes sense, in the comp theory, and in
> "reality" (thanks to the MWI which multiplies collection of machines).

There is no perception going on, so substitution level is fixed
programmatically. Come to the light side Bruno...

> >> You are saying that you are superior, in some sense, to other
> >> entities. You deny a soul to a class of individuals, by invoking
> >> fuzzy
> >> rhetorical trick reifying your own experience.
> > That is precisely why I am superior to a machine, because I can do
> > that. A machine can't. It needs a reason to presume it's own
> > existence. I don't. I can assert my primordial authority because I
> > feel and know, and understand that I can. I don't need permission from
> > a program or a script or a rule book. I embody the theory. We don't
> > view the universe as impartial voyeurs, we are fully immersed within
> > it. We define it and it defines us.
> What makes you sure that some machine cannot do that? This is still an
> example of your persistent question begging.

If it could then I would not call it a machine. Since I know that I
can do this, but I naturally define machines as not being able to do
that, I would need to see or understand something that convinces me

> >> You confuse the script and the show, for the numbers. The universal
> >> numbers plays the shows of the numbers.
> > Why would they play anything? For what audience?
> For the local UMs in their neighborhood, or for themselves.

Why do they need a show? Isn't the arithmetic truth enough?

> >> By having some disease in some part of the cortex inside. The
> >> modalities can be stopped to be handled correctly, or self-
> >> referentially correctly.
> > Why wouldn't the machine just route around the disease? If color is
> > everywhere inside, I don't see why color blindness should be localized
> > to some part of anything.
> That's a problem for your theory.

It's explained in my theory as large organisms employ a division of
labor among sense organs.

> >>> That sounds to me like the song does the singing and songwriting.
> >> Yes. That's the magic of the universal numbers. They can do both.
> > Then the singers and songwriters are innocent bystanders?
> No. They are UMs too.

That seems redundant.

> >> I don't assume theory as primitive. Only numbers and +, *.
> >> The existence of theories and machines is a theorem in N,+, *.
> > But +, * is already a theory of what can be done with numbers.
> No. They are symbol used in a theory.

If they don't correspond to something they can't be symbols. A theory
is required for their interpretation.

> The theory assumes some formula,
> among which you will not find a formula assuming the existence of a
> theory. You are confusing level of explanation. You could say that the
> big-bang theory assumes the existence of an alphabet, without which we
> cannot express "big-bang".

The theory and formula are parts of the same thing. From an absolute
perspective you cannot have a formula without a theory that it is part

> >>> Which would make sense if we lived in a
> >>> world of disembodied theories settling into matter but it seems
> >>> obvious that he opposite is the case.
> >> Because we are deluded by the fact that we participate to the drama
> >> from inside.
> > Why does that prevent us from encountering disembodied theories from
> > entering our drama?
> Nothing. The question is what do you mean by matter, and please don't
> refer to physical notion, because this would beg the question.

We should see formulas written in the sky then sometimes.

> >> Arithmetic emulate all histories.
> > Only if you believe in emulation.
> Emulations existence is a theorem in arithmetic (even without comp).

That is why arithmetic separates from reality. It assumes generic
interchangeability and discards the primacy of 1p unrepeatability.

> >> Comp is not a truth. It is not an obligation either. But it is a
> >> right.
> > Sure, it's a right. So are the other alternatives.
> Sure. But this does not make your argument against comp more valid.

I'm only arguing that comp is no more or less valid than any other
belief system, it just has different strengths and weaknesses. My
argument is for a meta theory.

> you should study computer science. It could help you to understand
> that comp is hard to be refuted.

It's impossible to refute, because it defines how it can and cannot be
refuted in it's own narrow terms which disqualify subjective authority
a priori.

> UDA itself comes from an attempt to
> refute it, but computer science already explains how machines
> themselves can debunk the anti-comp arguments.
> Judson Webb has already well understood the problem. Either your
> argument if fuzzy and proves nothing, or your argument is precise and
> technical, and machines can found them for themselves leading to prove
> correctly that their first person is not a machine (which is true) or
> that their body are not Turing machine emulable (which is true), or
> that comp is false (which makes no genuine sense when proved by a
> correct machine).
> I don't think I will comment paragraph where you refer to truth,
> reality, your personal understanding, nor will I comment paragraph
> which I have already answered, nor will I comment the begging question
> trick. So you have to work a bit harder.

I'm only doing this for your benefit and anyone else who might be
interested. I'm not working to convince you of something that I
already suspect you cannot be convinced of.


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