On Sat, Mar 17, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>  we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has survived in both
>> cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both cities*.
> > But he feels he is in only one city.


> He used your trick to predict that he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he
> woke in Washington.


> Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is in
> Washington AND in Moscow. But how could he *know* that?

If the Helsinki man didn't know he (pronoun use OK here) was going to be
duplicated then it can hardly be expected that the Helsinki man is going to
be able to give probabilities based on that fact.

> He can only *verifie* that. The presence, or not, or the other, the
> doppelganger, is like a scientific needing some confirmation. He can give a
> call to Moscow, to say hello to "himself", but bad luck, he just learned
> that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow. This illustrates that
> each copies can know where they are, but can only believe the other copy is
> or not in the other city.

It does not matter to the Helsinki man in Helsinki if the Helsinki man in
Moscow (the Moscow man for short) or the Helsinki man in Washington (the
Washington man for short) believe in the existence of each other or not,
because by direct observation the Helsinki man knows he is in Moscow and by
direct observation the Helsinki man knows he is in Washington. How can the
Helsinki man be at 2 places at once? BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. But
they now hold different views on where they are, what are the consequences
of that? The Helsinki man differentiates into two, the Moscow man and the
Washington man; although both are still the Helsinki man, at least in the
same way that although you Bruno Marchal have changed from what you were
yesterday, you Bruno Marchal of today are still the man you were yesterday.
And the point in space your body was in yesterday or today is not relevant
to the question at hand.

> you confuse an intellectual hybrid of your 1-you with the set {3-you in
> M, 3-you in W},

The only thing this homemade gobbledegook achieves is confusion, mostly to

> By definition of first person (content or sequence of content of the
> diary)

Then I (the original John K Clark or the copy, there is no way for me to
tell the difference) share the same "first person" (whatever the hell that
is) with the person who just materialized in front of me in the duplicating
chamber, because the diary I'm holding looks just like the one that other
fellow is holding, and I can vividly remember writing every single line of
that diary and he says he remembers doing that exact same thing too.

> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy,
> because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is
> trivial, nothing new).

There is rock stability and no oscillation whatsoever; Indeterminacy is
always with us, in the real world thanks to deterministic chaos, in physics
thanks to Heisenberg and even in pure mathematics thanks to Godel and
Turing, but your complications do not add any more because no matter how
convoluted you make them as long as you make clear who "I" and "you" and
"he" is your additional probabilities always boil down to 0% or 100%. And
if you don't make it clear then everything is meaningless.

  John K Clark

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