On 3/19/2012 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Mar 2012, at 00:40, meekerdb wrote:On 3/18/2012 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy, because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is trivial, nothing new).There is rock stability and no oscillation whatsoever; Indeterminacy is always withus, in the real world thanks to deterministic chaos, in physics thanks to Heisenbergand even in pure mathematics thanks to Godel and Turing, but your complications do notadd any more because no matter how convoluted you make them as long as you make clearwho "I" and "you" and "he" is your additional probabilities always boil down to 0% or100%. And if you don't make it clear then everything is meaningless.I agree with your criticism of Bruno's use of pronouns,If you can help me to understand John Clark's critics on the use of pronouns. He is theone who mocks the many distinctions I do introduce, like notably the first person andthe third person.He fails to understand that the protocol verification bears on the personal account ofthe duplicated people. The question bears on the future personla experience, so compeliminates all answers like "I will see all movies", because none of the copies will say"I have seen all movies". Almost all people will confirm that at the middle of the moviethey cannot predict the next image, except by vague description like "random pattern".Clark is inconsistent because he acknowledges the existence of the 1-I, and at the sametime, he asserts that the probability question, asked to the guy before themultiplication is done, is non sense, because "you are duplicated", and here that "you"is ambiguous.

I agree that "you" is ambiguous.

He forget that the 1-I will just be the one asked to verify the prediction.

`Are you saying there is a unique soul, "the 1-I", that will be in one duplicate or the`

`other but not both? Otherwise there is no "one" asked to verify the prediction. There`

`are two and one answers "Verified" and one answers "Falsified".`

It is obvious, in the WM duplication, with the simple definition of 1-I given, that ifthe guy said "I don't know, I would say either in W or in M", both copies will confirmit. If he predict W, one copy will confirm it, and one copy will refute it (and that'senough, given that Clark already agree they both have the same right of being "John Clark).

`But that's John's point that after the duplication the probabilities are 1 and 0 - which`

`is always the case after a probability is actualized. So you need some way of expressing`

`the probability *before* the duplication, but without the indexial "you". I think an`

`operational meaning can be given in terms of frequentist probabilities in a recursive`

`repetition of the experiment, i.e. some diaries will read MWWMWMWMMWWWM and some will read`

`WWMMMWWMWMWMWMW but statistically they will be consistent with probability 1/2.`

If he predicts that he will be in both W and M, again, that's ambiguous. But theverification gives the meaning of the "1-I", because if the guy in W says "I am both inW and M", we will tell him: "--come on, you were asked on which city you will feel to bein now, and now you are not feeling to be in the two cities, you can't even be sure thereconstitution is already completed in the other city". And the guy in Washington shouldanswer, "Ah, that's the 1-view? OK, I could not have predicted feeling the one in W".but I don't think it's essential to his argument.Hmm... You will have a problem for dismantling the quanta from the qualia. Given theindexical character of basically the whole physicalness, I am not sure it makes sense toforget the pronouns, except at the block-mindscape ontology, where indeed theaddictive-multiplicative structure of the non negative integers is already enough. Butwithout pronouns, I am not sure that there is still a "real"moon or a a "real" quark, ifcomp is true.Here's a free neutron, n. What is the probability that you will observe it to decay inthe next 10min? This is a very standard form of question about probability and theanswer is 1/2. Bruno (and Everett) want to replace it with, "Ten minutes from nowthere will be two JCs one of which has observed the decay of n and one of which has notand they have equal measure in the Hilbert space of the universe."OK. (if we abstract that I claim that once we assume comp the Hilbert space of theuniverse has to be shown equivalent withthe tiny (sigma_1) arithmetic seen from inside.You don't need any pronouns to express it.You need them to justify the working of them in your everyday subjective life, andrelate that subjective life with the life of other people. In AUDA, each hypostasis canbe seen as a mathematical definition of "pronoun" notions. G1 is the 3-I, S4Grz1 is the1-I, Z1(*) is a plural 3-I, X1* is the first person plural, etc. In all circumstances wehave a subject who try to predict his most probable subjective experiences.

`But the question is, can we suppose that every possible experience happens to the first`

`person and still make sense of that as a probability.`

Brent

With comp, or its everything-like weakening, betting in a reality is not enough, we haveto derived stability by a statistics on realities. Everett applies QM to the physicists,and I apply arithmetic to the arithmeticians, simply. Gôdel, Löb and Solovay did thehard work.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com> Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4880 - Release Date: 03/19/12 --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "EverythingList" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.