On 19 Mar 2012, at 00:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/18/2012 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-
indeterminacy, because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an
indeterminacy (but it is trivial, nothing new).
There is rock stability and no oscillation whatsoever;
Indeterminacy is always with us, in the real world thanks to
deterministic chaos, in physics thanks to Heisenberg and even in
pure mathematics thanks to Godel and Turing, but your complications
do not add any more because no matter how convoluted you make them
as long as you make clear who "I" and "you" and "he" is your
additional probabilities always boil down to 0% or 100%. And if you
don't make it clear then everything is meaningless.
I agree with your criticism of Bruno's use of pronouns,
If you can help me to understand John Clark's critics on the use of
pronouns. He is the one who mocks the many distinctions I do
introduce, like notably the first person and the third person.
He fails to understand that the protocol verification bears on the
personal account of the duplicated people. The question bears on the
future personla experience, so comp eliminates all answers like "I
will see all movies", because none of the copies will say "I have seen
all movies". Almost all people will confirm that at the middle of the
movie they cannot predict the next image, except by vague description
like "random pattern".
Clark is inconsistent because he acknowledges the existence of the 1-
I, and at the same time, he asserts that the probability question,
asked to the guy before the multiplication is done, is non sense,
because "you are duplicated", and here that "you" is ambiguous.
He forget that the 1-I will just be the one asked to verify the
It is obvious, in the WM duplication, with the simple definition of 1-
I given, that if the guy said "I don't know, I would say either in W
or in M", both copies will confirm it. If he predict W, one copy will
confirm it, and one copy will refute it (and that's enough, given that
Clark already agree they both have the same right of being "John Clark).
If he predicts that he will be in both W and M, again, that's
ambiguous. But the verification gives the meaning of the "1-I",
because if the guy in W says "I am both in W and M", we will tell him:
"--come on, you were asked on which city you will feel to be in now,
and now you are not feeling to be in the two cities, you can't even be
sure the reconstitution is already completed in the other city". And
the guy in Washington should answer, "Ah, that's the 1-view? OK, I
could not have predicted feeling the one in W".
but I don't think it's essential to his argument.
Hmm... You will have a problem for dismantling the quanta from the
qualia. Given the indexical character of basically the whole
physicalness, I am not sure it makes sense to forget the pronouns,
except at the block-mindscape ontology, where indeed the addictive-
multiplicative structure of the non negative integers is already
enough. But without pronouns, I am not sure that there is still a
"real"moon or a a "real" quark, if comp is true.
Here's a free neutron, n. What is the probability that you will
observe it to decay in the next 10min? This is a very standard form
of question about probability and the answer is 1/2. Bruno (and
Everett) want to replace it with, "Ten minutes from now there will
be two JCs one of which has observed the decay of n and one of which
has not and they have equal measure in the Hilbert space of the
OK. (if we abstract that I claim that once we assume comp the Hilbert
space of the universe has to be shown equivalent with
the tiny (sigma_1) arithmetic seen from inside.
You don't need any pronouns to express it.
You need them to justify the working of them in your everyday
subjective life, and relate that subjective life with the life of
other people. In AUDA, each hypostasis can be seen as a mathematical
definition of "pronoun" notions. G1 is the 3-I, S4Grz1 is the 1-I,
Z1(*) is a plural 3-I, X1* is the first person plural, etc. In all
circumstances we have a subject who try to predict his most probable
subjective experiences. With comp, or its everything-like weakening,
betting in a reality is not enough, we have to derived stability by a
statistics on realities. Everett applies QM to the physicists, and I
apply arithmetic to the arithmeticians, simply. Gôdel, Löb and Solovay
did the hard work.
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