On 21 Mar 2012, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> on the 3-view you can have on your two necessary existing 1-views.
[...] if you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view, (really still just
the 1-view), and some 3-view on 1-views, which is just empathy
[...] At the end of UDA, we know it is not 3p, but 1p-plural.
This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not your
mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start which is
the foundation for everything else.
The foundation is sand. You make all sorts of distinctions between
convoluted "view" and "p plural" stuff
Those admit precise and simple definition, related to the duplication
and multiplication thought experience.
First person = content of a diary bring in the duplication devices.
Third person = content of a diary of an external observers.
First person plural = content of the diaries of a collection of person
but you can't give a scrap of evidence that such differences
Just look at the content of the diaries. It contains statements like
"I predict that I will feel to be in W or in M, I am in M, so I win",
pr "I predict that I will see Flying circus, but I see nothing
recognizable, so I fail", etc.
nor can you give even the ghost of a hint of a hint of a idea as to
how or why such a enormous change (that is nevertheless undetectable
by the scientific method) has occurred, you just ask us to believe
that it has.
Well, if you believe in comp, the difference is as big as finding
oneself in W, and finding oneself in M.
I have no real clue what you are talking about.
You don't claim that one hydrogen atom is different from another and
I'm sure you will grant that information can be duplicated, and yet
when information and generic atoms get together and form another
identical body and brain of Bruno Marchal then for reasons you never
explain you say you've got to start differentiating between
different "views" and start talking about "1p,2p,3p'". And through
all this science can find no difference to make a differentiation
between. I'm sorry Bruno but I just can't get past that.
I am sorry for you. You are the first to have a problem with the
difference of the 1-view and 3-view. Those are rather standard in
coginitive science, and already use in projective geometry, in
Everett, in AI. Of course, once duplication is introduced, it makes
the 1-view indeterminate. But as you say oddness should be expected in
For example: If the body and brain of the Helsinki man is
annihilated a instant after the information in his body and brain
was read out and used to make identical copies in Washington and
Moscow then you say the Helsinki man is dead.
I have never said that. I have said that the original is annihilated.
If I said it, it might have been a slip on my tongue, or I said it in
a context to get a reductio ad absurdo, or just to say he is
annihilated, unlike the step 5 where the one copied is not cut.
Obviously, by just the definition of comp, he does not die.
But I don't understand why you say that, there is certainly someone
(actually in this example 2 people) who would very very strongly
disagree with you about him being dead because he remembers being
the Helsinki man and remembers walking into the duplication chamber
just seconds ago, and he has no gaps or jumps or discontinuity of
any sort in his subjective experience.
Yes. As I told you in the last post, which you might reply, that is
exactly my point. If the guy annihilated die, then he would say that
P(M) = P(W) = 1/2, and there would be no 1-indeterminacy.
He remembers walking out of the chamber only to find himself in a
distant city, and now you tell him he's dead.
I have never said that.
He wouldn't believe you and neither would I. I just don't see what
more the Helsinki man needs to do to survive, he's survived from his
own point of view and after all that's the only one that matters.
So all your fuss about not understanding the difference between the 1-
view and the 3-view are illustrated by an example where you put in my
mouth the exact contrary of what I am saying.
>we are neutral on the natire of matter.
Nor that. And if you're not a big fan of matter I don't understand
why it's so significant to you that the atoms in the Helsinki man's
body have been rearranged into ashes, especially when there are 2
perfectly good identical replacement bodies available that were made
of atoms that were just as good as the atoms the have in Helsinki
and arranged in exactly the same way .
To simplfy the reasoning, but you have to study it. The paragraph
above shows that you have not yet understand what is meant by comp,
given that comp implies by definition that the guy in Helsinki does
not die. You are criticizing only your own misunderstanding of what I
call comp: it means to survive with a digital brain and with the
original brain destroyed. It means to survve classical teleportation,
and duplication. why would I ever asked you to evaluate the chance of
living the Moscow experience if I thought that the orginal died in the
You seem to me rather casual, jocose and throwaway.
I wait the reply of the preceding post, which you should have read
because I already corrected there the mistake that you are doing again
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