On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

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> > Dear Joseph, > > How do numbers implement that necessary capacity to define each other > and themselves? What kind of relational structure is necessary? From what I > can tell, it looks like a "net of Indra" where every jewel, here a number, > reflects all others. This is a non-well founded structure. > You'll have to be more explicit than this if I am to make any sense of it. > > > > > >> >> >> >>> There are many arguments about how the brain is a classical machine and >>> those are fine but if you examine them they all seem to be narrowly focused >>> on some particular aspect of brain physiology. Max Tegmark's paper focused >>> on ion transport. >>> >> >> Wrong. Tegmark's result is *very *general because it shows that >> decoherence timescales are *many *orders of magnitude smaller than those >> of brain functioning (neuron firing, etc.). >> >> >> Dis he consider any form of mechanism that might factor up the >> degrees of freedom in brain structures? no. Did he consider structures that >> will cause attenuation of the phonon transport mechanism that he was using >> in his model? No. His paper is the modern equivalent of the papers written >> by eminent scientist back in the day that "proved" that bumblebees could >> not fly. Pfft. Does not the fact that quantum coherence mechanism have >> actually been found in biological systems that operate at room temperature >> and timescales that are useful? >> > > Yeah yeah, I never hear the end how mind-blowing it is that quantum > effects play a role in photosynthesis. > > > In the case of photosynthesis, it increases the efficiency of the > effect to useful proportions. QM effects could play a similar role in brain > processing and may also use EPR effects to synchronize sense data so that > we have the "unity of awareness" effect. A study of the brains of > schizophrenics and others that have dissociative disorders may show this. > Right. I am not entirely opposed to this idea. Preliminary work on quantum networks shows that they have intriguing differences from classical networks. (Example: entangled quantum networks can rewire themselves globally via local node operations (1 <http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.5630>), so this is somewhat tantalizing, because the "unity of consciousness" for me is a fairly big problem.) > > > > >> Please, just be a bit agnostic and not doctrinaire. >> > > I am just a realistic agnostic. (Also, I am playing the Devil's Advocate > a bit here.) > > > I do appreciate that! > > > > > > >> Resent research has proven that quantum effects are indeed used by >> organic systems to increase their efficiency in energy conversion >> processes, >> > > Indeed, for biophysical systems whose relevant timescales are comparable > to those of decoherence. > > >> and we have barely scratched the surface, so why are we so eager to go >> all in with the assumptions about classicality? >> > > I for one am not so eager. I am neutral on whether consciousness is > related to quantum phenomena, in spite of the contravening evidence. In > fact, I am probably more open to the idea than the average commentator. But > it doesn't matter in this context. > > > OK, then let's put that aside for now and address the measure >> problem directly. What is the measure supposed to do, exactly? I would like >> to see your explanation of it. >> > > Measure is what gives sense to the question "When I perform a physics > experiment, what do I expect to observe?"....assuming that is what you are > referring to. I won't pretend to have all the answers here. You seem to be > skeptical of the idea that such a measure exists. If it doesn't, then COMP > is false. > > > OK. What I am claiming is that the measure is not a global regime; it > cannot be for reasons that involve computational complexity issues. My > proposal is a local notion of measure, as per what Prof. Kitada explains in > his work <http://www.kitada.com/works.html>. Waht I have found is a > general sketch of how Pratt's Chu space idea can work with Kitada's Local > Systems, but I am not yet adept enough to create a formal model of this. It > is a bit over my paygrade... So, in summary, I claim that measures can > exist, but not a global measure > What is a global measure? Measure in this context is the measure on computational states going "through" your current state (which exists assuming COMP is true). If the measure doesn't exist, or has other "problems" (white rabbit etc.) then COMP is exploded. > that would make sense of "When I perform a physics experiment, what do I > expect to observe?"; since the "physics experiment" is local so to will be > the expected results of the observation. There is no such thing as a > "global observation" and local observations cannot be arbitrarily summed or > integrated over to create global observations. (Simplified reason: > Observables are, in general, non-commutative and thus there does not exist > a unique ordering over them. For more details I recommend some study of C* > algebras or von Neumann's Mathematical Foundations of Quantum > Mechanics<http://www.amazon.com/Mathematical-Foundations-Quantum-Mechanics-Neumann/dp/0691028931/ref=sr_1_6?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332256199&sr=1-6> > > > >> >> >> >> >>> Maybe we just want a solution that we can point to and say "aha, there >>> it is, I don't need to worry any more about that..." >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure to be >>>> acted upon and an action to carry out the cutting and pasting. What defines >>>> the set or category or topos of the "data"? Did you know that surgery - >>>> which is what cutting and pasting is - violates a basic principle in >>>> topology, the invariance of genus of a continuous manifold? Sure, we can >>>> define computations in terms of functions in surgical quotient spaces, but >>>> where do we get the spaces or the functions to perform these actions? >>>> What is it mereology (whole-part relation of the manifold)? What >>>> axioms does the data obey? What are its organizational principles? You seem >>>> to just assume that such are already defined by some fiat! What will not >>>> do, for you are just avoiding Leibniz' question: "Why this and not some >>>> other?" >>>> This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that Nature >>>> is not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why Integers and >>>> not a large but finite field? Why not the P-adics? Why not the surreals? >>>> Why not some form of non-standard numbers? Each of these sets have >>>> different properties and computational features, we should never be so >>>> anthropocentric to think that "Man is the measure of all things!", which is >>>> exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains >>>> ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a >>>> restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig a bit >>>> deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1) digital >>>> substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it is possible. >>>> Surprisingly it can be easily argued that the latter is just a restatement >>>> of the former. But is this done in the discussion of COMP so far? I haven't >>>> seen it. So I ask again: Why are we putting our selves through such >>>> convoluted abstractions to talk about the simple idea of moving though >>>> space-time? >>>> COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships >>>> between numbers and the content of observer moments, but it assumes that >>>> some particular set of numbers are ontological primitives and some >>>> idealization of actions that we only know to occur when we run actual >>>> calculations on our computers of work out in long form stuff on chalkboards >>>> of by the actions of the neurons in our brains. >>>> >>>> At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to explain >>>> that there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they cannot count >>>> themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity, they are purely and >>>> perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any talk that involves any kind of >>>> activity or change is nonsense in COMP. >>>> >>> >>> Not from the perspective of conscious observers like you and I. >>> >>> >>> OK, but then we need a serious theory of time that explains how the >>> appearence of change and measures of change arise. I have only found one >>> attempt that seems to work, but it is hard to make sense of unless one is >>> well versed in scattering theory math. :-( See: >>> http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0212092 Here is an informal explanation by >>> the author that he wrote to me: >>> http://lists.metasciences.ac/pipermail/mirai/2011-June/000108.html >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Everything is assumed to occur simultaneously as if the speed of light >>>> where infinite, >>>> >>> >>> Where is this assumption made? >>> >>> >>> Consider the implied "physics" of the Platonic Realm >>> >> >> I can't fathom what you mean by this. >> >> >> OK, let's not worry about that. >> >> >> >> >>> where in the computational strings exists as "Forms". Every thing is >>> given simultaneously. All things such as factors of numbers are defined via >>> maps and so forth and nowhere is any hint of problems such as computational >>> complexity? It is as if the Platonic real is a Oracle >>> Computer<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_Turing_machine>with infinite >>> memory. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to information processing >>>> >>> >>> Where? >>> >>> >>> Computations are being considered to run merely by the fact that a >>> string of numbers, representing the algorithm, is proven to exist within >>> the Integers. So why bother which any form of physical implementation when >>> we don't have to bother considering how much physical resources are >>> required for a computer to run a given computation. In the physical world >>> we have a rule: "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch", computation >>> when taken as Platonic is the ultimate free lunch. Consider for a moment >>> that our Platonic Turing machine is running an emulation of Maxwell's >>> Demon, would this not generate at least one violation of thermodynamics? >>> >> >> You are confusing Platonia with the physical universe we observe. >> >> >> Then please enlighten me as to what exactly is Platonia. What is it? >> > > Platonia is not a place. It is the abstract truth of mathematical > statements (on this list, generally we're just concerned with arithmetical > truth). > > > Does this truth have any particular valuation absent the means by > which to locate it? > Think of a set and its members. If one is, for some reason, unable to > define the membership function of a set, what can be known or said of its > members? Not much... The mere attribution of truth to a sigma_n sentence > does not define what it is nor does it distinguish it from another. This is > a universals versus nominals problem. > > > > You have said before that arithmetical truth may be independent of any * > particular* physical instantiation, but that does not make it independent > of *any instantiation at all*. This is a legitimate concern that can't be > simply dismissed. However, I think the mere (obvious) fact that > arithmetical truth is independent of a particular instantiation is enough > to let us be Realists, i.e., tells us that in some sense Platonia does > exist. Otherwise, where would this substrate independence come from? Talk > about pre-ordained harmony! > > > A pre-ordained harmony is, by definition, a global regime. I am quite > happy with the fact that you point out here, that "arithmetical truth > is independent of a particular instantiation". I am arguing against > independence *of all instantiations*, > I know. But I think that the fact that arithmetical truth is independent of *particular instantiations* already implies that the truth "1+1=2", say, exists independently of *all instantiations* (here "instantiation" means "physical instantiation", as I'm sure you mean as well.) In other words, it exists "Platonically". Why? Because if AT is independent of particular instances, the obvious question is raised: what "makes" all these physical systems obey AT? If this question has an answer, it lies in Platonia. > which is what Bruno is claiming. Without independence of a particular > there cannot be computational universality, which is very important. I > think you can see the difference. > > > > > BTW, I don't know if you are subscribed to the Foundations of > Mathematics (FOM) list, but I think you would enjoy the conversations. > There was recently a thread about the issue of fictionalism vs nominalism > vs Platonism in mathematics. > > > > I will! Thank you for this reference. Done. I am awaiting the approval > of the moderator. > > > >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and there is no such thing as a space or time. >>>> >>> >>> Where? >>> >>> >>> How is the notion of >>> space<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space#Philosophy_of_space>coded in >>> numbers? People argue that we can recover a notion of time from >>> the well order of integers, but what about spaces? How do we get those? >>> >> >> I don't think you are going to derive the subjective experience of time >> from the well-ordering of integers. >> >> >> I agree, but some people do actually argue that they can! >> >> >> >> We agree that we have a many-body problem here, although not the >> ordinary one. It is the problem of how, if you and I are just tiny slivers >> of Platonia experiencing itself, we can still interact with one another in >> the stable, well-behaved physical universe we observe. It's a staggeringly >> beautiful fact that this happens. Whence Time? Whence Space? It would take >> an incredible effort to come close to an answer here. It may or may not be >> worth it. The point here is that COMP ensures that this is true. >> >> >> Maybe the answer is very simple. We are finite slivers of Platonia >> experiencing ourselves and each other, but we do so because for every >> Boolean algebra (representing a world of possible experience) there exists >> a space as its dual. >> > > You refer to Pratt's work. It seems like an interesting metaphor, but I > don't see how it solves the problem. Could you be more explicit? The > "rational mechanics" paper takes, IMO, some odd and unjustified leaps when > it comes to his definitions. (An example: he says that the categories SET > and SET^OP "represent respectively the physical and the mental." How???) > > > Did you read the entire paper? He does explain this on page 4 for > example using functions and antifunctions... The key is to not think of > bodies and minds as "things" but as processes. Pratt is considering a > "process dualism", not a "substance dualism" as he points out that the > notion of substance is the fatal flaw of Descartes' program. I was > originally looking at Leibniz' Monadology in my study of the mind body > problem and found a similar solution, but such required a rehabilitation of > Leibniz' "pre-established harmony" concept. (Basically, we would replace > his idea of a global fiat regime of synchronizations between the monads > with a "ongoing process" idea using concepts from quantum game theory. I > have found similar ideas in the work of Lee Smolin, Stuart > Kaufmann<http://www.amazon.com/At-Home-Universe-Self-Organization-Complexity/dp/0195111303/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1332256837&sr=1-1>and > David Deutsch. But that is not sufficient to make it "true". It is just > a "crazy idea" at this point.) > Yes, I understand what the constructs are, and I see how Pratt is making an interesting analogy, but I don't see the justification for his conclusions about the mind-body problem. But I haven't finished grokking the article. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.