On 20 Mar 2012, at 19:02, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/20/2012 8:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Mar 2012, at 19:59, meekerdb wrote:

OK, but this is not a problem. You know in advance that you will feel like being one of them, and not both.

I don't know that because I don't know what 'you will' refers to. That's the indeterminancy. I can as well say I will feel being each of them - on one interpretation of "I".

Yes, on the 3-view you can have on your two necessary existing 1- views. The indeterminacy bears on the 1-view themselves. Both are you, but before the experience you have to be indeterminate on which path will be the one lived from inside. The "you" is not ambiguous, when taken in the first person way, because it is the one you address when talking to *one* person, and attributing her/him/it some consciousness (or reflexive consciousness). The "I" really *is* an indexical, and "personal identity" is an illusion, but this is more advanced than needed for the reasoning.

We might defined the soul by the 1-view, and this one remains unique ... from its personal point of view. So the soul is unique from the soul point of view. We can intellectually attribute a soul to someone else, and that soul might be unique or not. This can be decided later, because it does not change the reasoning. So when you say there is no "one" asked to verify the prediction, I would say there is just many "one" to which we should asked. The situation is similar with quantum mechanics (without collapse). If I am undecided between going to the North or to the South for my holiday, and decide to use a quantum coin, like 1/sqrt(2)(up + down), to take the decision, QM will predict that the wave (pertaining on me + the particle) evolves in two branches. In one of them I am going to the North, and in the other I am going to the South. But from my perspective, the experience will be the same whatever the indeterminacy is ground on, and in all case I remain for the whole experience one and entire. I can only believe "intellectually" in the other branch, in case I am a believer in QM.

Yes, I understand it is the same as Everett's relative state interpretation. But Everett just takes over the Born rule to get probabilities. They have to be assumed, not derived from personal uncertainty.

Everett is just quick on the question, but at the time, he convinced me that the "P = A^2" (probability = square of amplitude) can be derived from Gleason's theorem. The Graham and Preskill convinced me that a frequency operator can be defined, so that the frequentist interpretation of the P (the one = to A^2) can be derived from the SWE, locally and relatively to any choice of bases.

So, I think that the last thing which remains to be done, is to derive the SWE from the UD. (and S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* provides the arithmetical quantization which gives the formal confirmation of that necessity, but that's AUDA)

It is obvious, in the WM duplication, with the simple definition of 1-I given, that if the guy said "I don't know, I would say either in W or in M", both copies will confirm it. If he predict W, one copy will confirm it, and one copy will refute it (and that's enough, given that Clark already agree they both have the same right of being "John Clark).

But that's John's point that after the duplication the probabilities are 1 and 0 - which is always the case after a probability is actualized.

Sure. If I win the lottery, the probability that I have won the lottery is 1.

So you need some way of expressing the probability *before* the duplication, but without the indexial "you".

Here I am not sure why.

Because it's an ambiguous indexial - a contradiction in terms.

Only if you confuse the 1-view and the 3-view.

Or if you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view, (really still just the 1- view), and some 3-view on 1-views, which is just empathy, like when you say things like "they were all conscious", or "someone else is conscious". Or, like John Clark when he said, "I will be in both Moscow and Washington". This is self-emptahy, in a sense. It happens when you are talking about you (the 1-I) from some exterior view of yourself, but not when talking about the subjective experience itself, which is just here, whatever is put in a possible diary.

If you decided to duplicate into W and M (and nothing else!) you can talk about that indeterminacy of "you" in the future, exactly like the indeterminacy of "you" when talking about a future where you in front of a classical indeterminacy.

You can say," tomorrow I will throw a coin and go to Amsterdam if I get a tail, and to Kinshasa if I get a face". Like you can say, if I find myself tomorrow in Moscow, I will ask questions to Putin and if I find myself in Washington I will ask questions to Obama. Just that here you know intellectually that you will 3-live both paths, but will 1-live only one of the two path. You can say, I am not sure what I will do precisely, but whatever I will do, I will ask questions to Obama or to Putin, if things goes well, and the doctor stop to drink and other default hypotheses. You can also say: "I will ask question both Obama and Putin", meaning that you talk about yourself in the 3-sense. The ambiguity is easily resolved by distinguishing the 1-view and the 3-view.

You don't need any pronouns to express it.

You need them to justify the working of them in your everyday subjective life, and relate that subjective life with the life of other people. In AUDA, each hypostasis can be seen as a mathematical definition of "pronoun" notions. G1 is the 3-I, S4Grz1 is the 1-I, Z1(*) is a plural 3-I, X1* is the first person plural, etc. In all circumstances we have a subject who try to predict his most probable subjective experiences.

But the question is, can we suppose that every possible experience happens to the first person and still make sense of that as a probability.

I don't see why we could not. Everett does not abndon the idea of probabilty, despite the determinist evolution of the universal wave.

But he doesn't derive it from uncertainty in personal identity; he just invokes the Born rule.

Again, I am not sure of that. He provides, in his long text, an informal but conceptually clear justification of the Born rule, and it is based on the many-worlds idea, that is, that the superposition are contagious to the observer, and indeed to anything interacting with a quantum superposition. Now, all this lacks precision because it is stated in an plausibly inconsistent frame (the one universal wave + comp), and the observer is simplified into a memory machine, like in UDA. To get the whole picture, mind and matter, I'm afraid that we have to take comp, or some precise non-comp, into account.

Once I got the time I will read Everett again.



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