On 3/20/2012 8:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2012, at 19:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/19/2012 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2012, at 00:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/18/2012 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy,
because
... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is trivial,
nothing new).
There is rock stability and no oscillation whatsoever; Indeterminacy is always with
us, in the real world thanks to deterministic chaos, in physics thanks to Heisenberg
and even in pure mathematics thanks to Godel and Turing, but your complications do
not add any more because no matter how convoluted you make them as long as you make
clear who "I" and "you" and "he" is your additional probabilities always boil down
to 0% or 100%. And if you don't make it clear then everything is meaningless.
I agree with your criticism of Bruno's use of pronouns,
If you can help me to understand John Clark's critics on the use of pronouns. He is
the one who mocks the many distinctions I do introduce, like notably the first person
and the third person.
He fails to understand that the protocol verification bears on the personal account of
the duplicated people. The question bears on the future personla experience, so comp
eliminates all answers like "I will see all movies", because none of the copies will
say "I have seen all movies". Almost all people will confirm that at the middle of the
movie they cannot predict the next image, except by vague description like "random
pattern".
Clark is inconsistent because he acknowledges the existence of the 1-I, and at the
same time, he asserts that the probability question, asked to the guy before the
multiplication is done, is non sense, because "you are duplicated", and here that
"you" is ambiguous.
I agree that "you" is ambiguous.
He forget that the 1-I will just be the one asked to verify the prediction.
Are you saying there is a unique soul, "the 1-I", that will be in one duplicate or the
other but not both? Otherwise there is no "one" asked to verify the prediction. There
are two and one answers "Verified" and one answers "Falsified".
OK, but this is not a problem. You know in advance that you will feel like being one of
them, and not both.
I don't know that because I don't know what 'you will' refers to. That's the
indeterminancy. I can as well say I will feel being each of them - on one interpretation
of "I".
We might defined the soul by the 1-view, and this one remains unique ... from its
personal point of view. So the soul is unique from the soul point of view. We can
intellectually attribute a soul to someone else, and that soul might be unique or not.
This can be decided later, because it does not change the reasoning.
So when you say there is no "one" asked to verify the prediction, I would say there is
just many "one" to which we should asked.
The situation is similar with quantum mechanics (without collapse). If I am undecided
between going to the North or to the South for my holiday, and decide to use a quantum
coin, like 1/sqrt(2)(up + down), to take the decision, QM will predict that the wave
(pertaining on me + the particle) evolves in two branches. In one of them I am going to
the North, and in the other I am going to the South. But from my perspective, the
experience will be the same whatever the indeterminacy is ground on, and in all case I
remain for the whole experience one and entire. I can only believe "intellectually" in
the other branch, in case I am a believer in QM.
Yes, I understand it is the same as Everett's relative state interpretation. But Everett
just takes over the Born rule to get probabilities. They have to be assumed, not derived
from personal uncertainty.
It is obvious, in the WM duplication, with the simple definition of 1-I given, that if
the guy said "I don't know, I would say either in W or in M", both copies will confirm
it. If he predict W, one copy will confirm it, and one copy will refute it (and that's
enough, given that Clark already agree they both have the same right of being "John
Clark).
But that's John's point that after the duplication the probabilities are 1 and 0 -
which is always the case after a probability is actualized.
Sure. If I win the lottery, the probability that I have won the lottery is 1.
So you need some way of expressing the probability *before* the duplication, but
without the indexial "you".
Here I am not sure why.
Because it's an ambiguous indexial - a contradiction in terms.
The indexical "you" can be duplicated, both the 3-I (the body plan), and the 1-I, the
owner of memories, making the candidate just uncertain about his future, but still
certain (with comp and all default assumptions) that he will have a future. He just does
not know which one. The use of pronouns does not need to be changed more than in any
situation with non determinate outcome (be it classical ignorance, quantum-MW-ignorance,
or comp). The reason of the indeterminacies can be very different, but the personal
outcomes are equivalent.
I think an operational meaning can be given in terms of frequentist probabilities in a
recursive repetition of the experiment, i.e. some diaries will read MWWMWMWMMWWWM and
some will read WWMMMWWMWMWMWMW but statistically they will be consistent with
probability 1/2.
I am OK with that analysis, and that's why I use often the iterated duplication to
explain the indeterminacy.
Actually in such a case, all the copies can meet, counts themselves and verify that
after each iteration the proportion of people having had the "W" experience is exactly
given by the Newton binomial coefficients.
They know that a good sampling on their population has to reflect this. Thanks to the
exact numerically identity of the copies just before they differentiate, we might even
argue that we can apply Pascal's "sufficient reason". Imo, the comp-1-indeterminacy
gives the first example of "exact probabilities" in the classical setting, at least in
the case of those simple protocols.
You don't need any pronouns to express it.
You need them to justify the working of them in your everyday subjective life, and
relate that subjective life with the life of other people. In AUDA, each hypostasis
can be seen as a mathematical definition of "pronoun" notions. G1 is the 3-I, S4Grz1
is the 1-I, Z1(*) is a plural 3-I, X1* is the first person plural, etc. In all
circumstances we have a subject who try to predict his most probable subjective
experiences.
But the question is, can we suppose that every possible experience happens to the first
person and still make sense of that as a probability.
I don't see why we could not. Everett does not abndon the idea of probabilty, despite
the determinist evolution of the universal wave.
But he doesn't derive it from uncertainty in personal identity; he just invokes
the Born rule.
Brent
There are other reasons, coming from AUDA, which can make us doubt that those
uncertainty evaluations can really be probabilities per se, and I use them only in the
special and simple protocols used to explain the reversal.
With the global indeterminacy, that is, the comp 1-indeterminacy "in front of the whole
UD* or arithmetic", it appears that the indeterminacy behaves more like a quantum
credibility than a classical probability, by the self-reference correctness constraints.
But then the quantum probabilities are also not exactly like "classical probabilities",
and this reflect in both case the fact that below some description level, infinities of
computations have to play some interfering roles.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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