On 19 Mar 2012, at 19:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/19/2012 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2012, at 00:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/18/2012 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-
indeterminacy, because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an
indeterminacy (but it is trivial, nothing new).
There is rock stability and no oscillation whatsoever;
Indeterminacy is always with us, in the real world thanks to
deterministic chaos, in physics thanks to Heisenberg and even in
pure mathematics thanks to Godel and Turing, but your
complications do not add any more because no matter how
convoluted you make them as long as you make clear who "I" and
"you" and "he" is your additional probabilities always boil down
to 0% or 100%. And if you don't make it clear then everything is
meaningless.
I agree with your criticism of Bruno's use of pronouns,
If you can help me to understand John Clark's critics on the use of
pronouns. He is the one who mocks the many distinctions I do
introduce, like notably the first person and the third person.
He fails to understand that the protocol verification bears on the
personal account of the duplicated people. The question bears on
the future personla experience, so comp eliminates all answers like
"I will see all movies", because none of the copies will say "I
have seen all movies". Almost all people will confirm that at the
middle of the movie they cannot predict the next image, except by
vague description like "random pattern".
Clark is inconsistent because he acknowledges the existence of the
1-I, and at the same time, he asserts that the probability
question, asked to the guy before the multiplication is done, is
non sense, because "you are duplicated", and here that "you" is
ambiguous.
I agree that "you" is ambiguous.
He forget that the 1-I will just be the one asked to verify the
prediction.
Are you saying there is a unique soul, "the 1-I", that will be in
one duplicate or the other but not both? Otherwise there is no
"one" asked to verify the prediction. There are two and one answers
"Verified" and one answers "Falsified".
OK, but this is not a problem. You know in advance that you will feel
like being one of them, and not both.
We might defined the soul by the 1-view, and this one remains
unique ... from its personal point of view. So the soul is unique from
the soul point of view. We can intellectually attribute a soul to
someone else, and that soul might be unique or not. This can be
decided later, because it does not change the reasoning.
So when you say there is no "one" asked to verify the prediction, I
would say there is just many "one" to which we should asked.
The situation is similar with quantum mechanics (without collapse). If
I am undecided between going to the North or to the South for my
holiday, and decide to use a quantum coin, like 1/sqrt(2)(up + down),
to take the decision, QM will predict that the wave (pertaining on me
+ the particle) evolves in two branches. In one of them I am going to
the North, and in the other I am going to the South. But from my
perspective, the experience will be the same whatever the
indeterminacy is ground on, and in all case I remain for the whole
experience one and entire. I can only believe "intellectually" in the
other branch, in case I am a believer in QM.
It is obvious, in the WM duplication, with the simple definition of
1-I given, that if the guy said "I don't know, I would say either
in W or in M", both copies will confirm it. If he predict W, one
copy will confirm it, and one copy will refute it (and that's
enough, given that Clark already agree they both have the same
right of being "John Clark).
But that's John's point that after the duplication the probabilities
are 1 and 0 - which is always the case after a probability is
actualized.
Sure. If I win the lottery, the probability that I have won the
lottery is 1.
So you need some way of expressing the probability *before* the
duplication, but without the indexial "you".
Here I am not sure why. The indexical "you" can be duplicated, both
the 3-I (the body plan), and the 1-I, the owner of memories, making
the candidate just uncertain about his future, but still certain (with
comp and all default assumptions) that he will have a future. He just
does not know which one. The use of pronouns does not need to be
changed more than in any situation with non determinate outcome (be it
classical ignorance, quantum-MW-ignorance, or comp). The reason of the
indeterminacies can be very different, but the personal outcomes are
equivalent.
I think an operational meaning can be given in terms of frequentist
probabilities in a recursive repetition of the experiment, i.e. some
diaries will read MWWMWMWMMWWWM and some will read WWMMMWWMWMWMWMW
but statistically they will be consistent with probability 1/2.
I am OK with that analysis, and that's why I use often the iterated
duplication to explain the indeterminacy.
Actually in such a case, all the copies can meet, counts themselves
and verify that after each iteration the proportion of people having
had the "W" experience is exactly given by the Newton binomial
coefficients.
They know that a good sampling on their population has to reflect
this. Thanks to the exact numerically identity of the copies just
before they differentiate, we might even argue that we can apply
Pascal's "sufficient reason". Imo, the comp-1-indeterminacy gives
the first example of "exact probabilities" in the classical setting,
at least in the case of those simple protocols.
You don't need any pronouns to express it.
You need them to justify the working of them in your everyday
subjective life, and relate that subjective life with the life of
other people. In AUDA, each hypostasis can be seen as a
mathematical definition of "pronoun" notions. G1 is the 3-I, S4Grz1
is the 1-I, Z1(*) is a plural 3-I, X1* is the first person plural,
etc. In all circumstances we have a subject who try to predict his
most probable subjective experiences.
But the question is, can we suppose that every possible experience
happens to the first person and still make sense of that as a
probability.
I don't see why we could not. Everett does not abndon the idea of
probabilty, despite the determinist evolution of the universal wave.
There are other reasons, coming from AUDA, which can make us doubt
that those uncertainty evaluations can really be probabilities per se,
and I use them only in the special and simple protocols used to
explain the reversal.
With the global indeterminacy, that is, the comp 1-indeterminacy "in
front of the whole UD* or arithmetic", it appears that the
indeterminacy behaves more like a quantum credibility than a classical
probability, by the self-reference correctness constraints.
But then the quantum probabilities are also not exactly like
"classical probabilities", and this reflect in both case the fact that
below some description level, infinities of computations have to play
some interfering roles.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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