On Apr 4, 3:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 04 Apr 2012, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that
> >>> is
> >>> in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
> >>> cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
> >> This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
> >> well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself
> > I don't see that there can be any interior realism without qualia -
> > they are the same thing.
> I agree with this.
> > Mechanism assumes that because we can't
> > explain the existence of qualia mechanistically, it must be an
> > emergent property/illusion of mechanism.
> It explains the existence of qualia, including some possible geometry
> of them. It fails to explain only some aspect of qualia, but it meta-
> explains why it cannot explain those aspects. The internal realism has
> a necessary blind spot somehow.

A blind spot is what I would expect when trying to explain a parent
phenomenon from a child perspective.

> > If we instead see that
> > mechanism is a particular kind of lowest common denominator exterior
> > qualia,
> > then it would be silly to try to explain the parent
> > phenomenology in terms of the child set of reduced possibilities.
> ?

Arithmetic is a kind of qualia. It is a particular kind - a low common
denominator of qualia, just as black and white could be said to be
kinds of color (the most colorless kinds) but colors are not reducible
to black and white.

> >> which can be
> >> explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
> >> "feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks
> >> at
> >> first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
> >> from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person
> >> view.
> >> If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
> >> As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
> >> mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the
> >> meta-
> >> level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
> >> consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
> > Mechanism is always going to implicate mechanism as the cause of
> > anything, because it has no capacity to describe anything else and it
> > has not capacity to extend beyond descriptions.
> Yes it has. Once a machine is Löbian it can see its limitations, and
> overcome it. This leads to many paths.

Only when those limitations can be described arithmetically. It leads
to many paths but they are all descriptions rather than experiences.
At what point can a Löbian machine see that it can't taste or smell?

> > Consciousness is a
> > much larger phenomenon, as it includes all of mechanism as well as
> > many more flavors of experience.
> It is fuzzy. I can agree and disagree depending how you circumscribe
> the meaning of the terms you are using.
> > Only through direct experience can we
> > know that it is possible that there is a difference between
> > description and reality.
> Yes. But we cannot know reality as such, except for the conscious non
> communicable parts. So, when we talk with each other, we can only make
> hypothesis and reasoning.

Hypothesis and reasoning is all that we need since we already are
experiencing the non communicable parts ourselves directly.

> > Through the monochrome lens of mechanism, it is easy to prove that
> > audiences will think they see something other than black and white
> > pixels because we understand that they are seeing fluid patterns of
> > changing pixels rather than the pixels themselves, but this doesn't
> > explain how we see color. The idea that a machine would logically not
> > think of itself as a machine doesn't explain the existence of what it
> > feels like to be the opposite of a machine or how it could really feel
> > like anything.
> But mechanism is not proposed as an explanation. It is more a "law"
> that we exploit to clarify the problems. You can see it as a strong
> assumption/belief given that it is a belief in possible
> reincarnations. Comp is refutable. Non-comp is not refutable.

Comp's refutability is an illusion, since the possibility of something
being refutable is a computation. Refuting comp through a comp is like
saying that running things over with a steam roller is a test of
whether or not they are flat.


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